CHIEF OF STAFF:
PREWAR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL, *Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, 1 September 1939–18 November 1945.*

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The War Department

CHIEF OF STAFF: PREWAR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

by

Mark Skinner Watson

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. . . to Those Who Served

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

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Foreword

In publishing the series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, the Department of the Army has four objectives. The first is to provide the Army itself with an accurate and timely account of its varied activities in mobilizing, organizing, and employing its forces for the conduct of war—an account that will be available to the service schools and to individual members of the Armed Services who wish to extend their professional reading. The second objective is to help enlarge the thoughtful civilian's concept of national security by describing the basic problems of war and the methods of meeting these problems. The third objective is to preserve for the record a well-merited tribute to the devotion and sacrifice of those who served. The fourth objective is to stimulate further research by providing students with a guide to the mountainous accumulation of records produced by the war.

The decision to prepare a comprehensive account of military activities was made early in the war. Trained historians were assigned to the larger units of the Army and the War Department to initiate the work of research, analysis, and writing. The results of their work, supplemented by additional research in records not readily available during the war, are presented in this series. The general plan provides for subseries dealing with the War Department, the Army Air, Ground, and Service Forces, the technical services, and the theaters of operations. This division conforms to the organization of the Army during World War II and, though involving some overlapping in subject matter, has the advantage of presenting a systematic account of developments in each major field of responsibility as well as the points of view of the particular commands. The plan also includes volumes on such topics as statistics, order of battle, military training, the Women's Army Corps, and other subjects that transcend the limits of studies focused on an agency or command. The whole project is oriented toward an eventual summary and synthesis. No claim is made that it will constitute a final history. Many years will pass before the record of the war can be fully analyzed and appraised.

This, the first volume on the Office of the Chief of Staff in World War II, highlights a significant and unprecedented preparation for war. It covers a period when longheaded military leadership and direction were needed before the people had been aroused to expression of their will, a people not yet aware of the dangers that lay ahead. More specifically, it tells of the contributions to national security that were made during the prewar period by the Chief of Staff and his immediate assistants. It is a history of military famine followed by plenty. It is a history of mistakes made as well as successes accomplished and of vision, foresight, forbearance, and selflessness. It is a history of deepening confidence, shared by the President, the Congress, and the people, in the integrity and ability of a leader who, although he did not aspire to greatness, was all the greater by reason thereof. During the period here depicted the Chief of Staff built so well and so strongly that the tragedy of Pearl Harbor did not shake the confidence of the nation.

Mark Skinner Watson, the author of this volume, was an artillery officer in World War I, a war correspondent during the recent conflict, and a student of military affairs for many years. His dispatches to the Baltimore *Sun* won the Pulitzer Prize for International Correspondence in 1945.

ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief, Historical Division

Washington, D. C.
12 December 1949

Preface

The treatment employed in the first volume of this work on the Office of the Chief of Staff requires a brief explanation. The original desire was to provide a fully sequential narrative, but this method was found to lead only to confusion. During any one week of the prewar period the Chief of Staff was likely to be concerned with any number of the numerous large ultimate responsibilities of his Office—administration, training, supply, arming, selecting, planning, guiding legislation, considering public policy, pacifying opposition, pressing for interservice or international co-ordination, and the like. To deal with all these responsibilities and all their variations on a week-to-week basis in a running narrative proved unprofitable. It was clearly better, in dealing with the prewar tumble of activities, to consider one class of responsibilities at a time, to discuss that class as far as possible in a sequential manner, and then to proceed to the next. Even this method could not be pursued with unfailing consistency. The difficulties of presenting a simple narrative of so complex a task as that which faced the successive Chiefs of Staff on the approach of a war for which the nation was pitifully and almost willfully unready will be manifest in the recital.

The narrative undertakes to portray in broad terms, rather than in detail, the extent of that unreadiness, the reasons for it, and the efforts of the Office of the Chief of Staff to correct it with maximum dispatch. Few separate aspects can be fully covered. Since there was hardly any activity of the War Department or the Army which in principle did not touch that Office, however fleetingly, a full account of the Office would in reality be something like an account of the whole Department against a background of world affairs as they affected American foreign policy. Even before Pearl Harbor it was clear that the Chief of Staff himself was in peril of being overwhelmed by detail, but the Departmental wartime reorganization that freed him of much of this detail and hence released more of his time for the major responsibilities of his Office did not take place until March 1942.

Because this volume deals with the approach to war, it deals with the period when the Chief of Staff's concerns were dispersed over the whole width of

preparations and far into their depth as well. The author's treatment of those concerns is primarily functional, for the reasons stated. The powers of the Chief of Staff and their origins are recited, likewise their limitations; his role in the implementing of the nation's foreign policy and, to a degree, in modifying that policy; his role in the planning and the acquiring of materiel for an army whose realization was known to be far in the future, and his adaptation of means to necessity; the raising and training of personnel with an eye on political hazards; the division of materiel with America's prospective Allies—dictated by national policy; the effort to prevent any of these three vast programs from totally dislodging the other two; the special problems of air autonomy; the necessity of combined planning with Britain at a time when secrecy was obligatory; the vital decision to make Germany, not Japan, the first target; the ominous rise of the threat from Japan; the belated scramble to erect adequate defenses at the nation's most vulnerable spots; the tragic failure to do so with precision.

The arrival of actual war at Pearl Harbor has not been regarded as a curtain shutting off all that preceded 7 December 1941 from all that followed. Thus in the discussion of certain items, such as the Victory Program, there is mention of post-Pearl Harbor events that wound up the program and hence logically call for mention. Contrariwise, numerous pre-Pearl Harbor events affecting General Headquarters and others affecting the overseas commands are omitted because the larger developments in those realms took place after 7 December and hence can more logically be considered in the succeeding volume. The present work, in brief, is a part of a much larger whole and a preparation for that which is to follow, precisely as the Army's planning and performing in the years of peace were justified, if at all, as preparation for a war which would one day come. In what was done, and not done, are to be found inescapable lessons for future guidance.

Examination of source material has been on an immense scale, but obviously has not been all-inclusive. Search of all existing records, catalogued and uncatalogued, of possible pertinence, has been too great a task for the author and his research assistants, despite their industry. Furthermore, certain records were not available in the time at hand, some (including those at the Hyde Park Library which required more time for classification) by reason of custodians' regulation, some because they were inexplicably missing from their proper lodging place, some because in all probability they have been permanently lost. Of records in the Army's own control which could have been of significant use for

the present volume, it is believed that literally none has been purposely withheld from the author's examination. Those which, while available enough, have not been scrutinized are the records in which the researchers believed there was a minimum chance of finding important information that was not more readily attainable elsewhere. Future years of study in mountainous piles of records will inevitably uncover useful material in a great many specialized fields which the present author has missed, but none of relevance and importance which he has consciously neglected.

Besides the material supplied by the official records in the government's many vaults and storehouses, newspaper files have on occasion been used in order (1) to disclose data not found in the government records and (2) to throw light on contemporary events which afforded perspective for the episodes under review. The latter category was frequently important, particularly in the study of policy decisions that were made with a watchful eye on the public or Congressional state of mind, which was itself a major factor in determining many policies. To think that such considerations, however distasteful, could be wisely ignored by the Army is to misunderstand the place of the Army in a democracy and the behavior of the high command in the nervous days of 1940–41.

Finally, great use has been made of the memories and private diaries of officers and civilians who were principal actors in the drama. One of the privileges of writing of events soon after their completion (helping to balance the disadvantages of premature appraisal) is that many of the actors still live and think and speak. Their memories may not be precise either as to the sequence of events or as to the motives which guided actions in a somewhat dimmed past, and allowance must be made for such uncertainties. Nevertheless these living but mortal memories are of irreplaceable value in several respects. (1) They suggest names and events which, once brought to attention, point the way to a fruitful search of hitherto unexplored records. (2) They recall circumstances which, tested by others' newly quickened memories of the same things, establish links that had been missing and lucid explanations of what had been inexplicable. (3) They provide vitality to a period of time which the records unassisted could have portrayed only with a dullness all but intolerable.

There is yet another respect in which these living sources have been of indispensable value and to which special tribute must here be paid. Most of the principal actors in the momentous events recorded have been accessible: they have been able to examine the manuscript recording what they and their con-

temporaries did, and upon it to offer frank criticism. This process has been of great value to the author. It disclosed omissions or actual errors of fact which consequently could be corrected prior to publication, and it permitted arguments against such conclusions as these well-informed critics felt to be unjustified, affording the author opportunity to re-examine the records and then to make revisions when reconsideration warranted them. In advance of final editing, manuscript of the text which follows was sent to a score and more of the principals whose deeds are recorded. With few exceptions they responded generously by reading the relevant text in full and commenting on it by letter or personal interview or both, often at great length. Useful suggestions came from certain retired officers of whom the text is critical, and this opportunity is taken to remark, with high respect for such integrity, that these stout soldiers asked no modification of the criticism directed against them.

Throughout years of work on this volume the author has received most generous aid from a great number of old friends in the active and retired lists of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces, and from civilian colleagues. In many instances the debt is acknowledged in footnotes, but these are far from all-inclusive. Special mention must be made of Dr. Guy A. Lee and Dr. F. Stansbury Haydon, of the Historical Division, without whose scholarship and industry and persistence and wise counsel this volume would have been less thorough and less precise. In the early days of preparation Dr. Harold D. Cater gave much appreciated assistance in painstaking and necessary research. Miss Norma Faust has worked without halt or complaint in patience-testing labors of an all-but-endless nature. For the refinements of the final editing there is a large debt to Mr. Hugh Corbett and his associates, Mr. W. Brooks Phillips and Mr. Joseph R. Friedman; for the copy editing to Mrs. Frances Fritz; for the indexing to Mr. David Jaffé; for the scrutiny of charts and statistical data to Mr. George R. Powell; for photographic selection to Lt. Col. John C. Hatlem. Mrs. Virginia Koschel and Miss Mildred Bucan skillfully accomplished the painstaking job of final typing for the printer. Throughout three years spent in preparation of this volume unfailingly generous advice has come from the Chief Historian and his fellows within the Historical Division and continuously helpful aid from librarians and archivists in the vasty deeps of the Pentagon's record vaults. To all go the grateful thanks of the author.

Washington, D. C.
12 December 1949

MARK SKINNER WATSON

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All pictures in this volume are from U. S. Army photos.

CHIEF OF STAFF:
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CHAPTER I

Introductory

In the chronicling of America's earlier wars the record of military events was unrolled almost entirely in the theater of war, within sound of the guns. In that area was the fighting, and close to the battlefield itself was devised much of the major strategy of each campaign and of the war itself. Consequently, in the hands of the field commander was vested the full control of the troops, for all planning and all employment in battle, subject only to the supreme control of his own constitutional Commander in Chief, the President himself. In World War I the accepted duty of the War Department's military establishment in Washington was to support the field commander, 3,000 miles away, by supplying him as fully and as rapidly as possible with the men and materiel requisitioned by him, for purposes determined by him in large and in detail.[1]

In World War II the American forces' high command, in the realms of plans, supply, and the approval of operations, was exercised from beginning to end in Washington, rather than in the theater of operations. Gen. George C. Marshall, the man who had been the Army's chief planner and organizer in the days before war came, remained its principal director in all theaters from the conflict's dismal beginnings down to its triumphant conclusion. Never before did one man, through his own strong chain of command, have such a large responsibility for the Army's very pattern, its size, its equipment, its training, its organization and reorganization, for the strategy that dictated its employment in skillful coordination with all other forces American and Allied, for the very timing of its actions defensive and offensive—all of these determined by a multitude of political and logistic considerations familiar at the time to the Chief of Staff and to a small group around him but known in detail to relatively few persons even now, and still difficult of appraisal even by them. The unbroken continuity of the chieftainship for six years, its unprecedentedly broad authority, plus the generally harmonious relations with President and Congress and apparent popular approval throughout that term, had two outstanding results. It made possible

[1] See Chapter III for discussion of evolution of Office of the Chief of Staff.

the development of the great Army in a closer approach to orderliness than in any previous war, and it permitted such co-ordination with other forces on distant fronts as has been attained by no other grand alliance in history.

In World War I there had been no necessity for such concentrated authority and no mechanism for its effective use. For activities in a one-theater war, as World War I was, dominantly, for American troops, the theater command could readily stem direct from the Commander in Chief in the White House, as it did in Gen. John J. Pershing's case, while the Chief of Staff in Washington concerned himself chiefly with providing full support for the distant expeditionary force. Indeed, the strategy for the American front in 1918 was more effectively devised in France than it could have been in Washington, because of the delicate balance, political and military, of French, British, and American participation, and because of the fact that decisions could be made almost on the scene of action and carried out with a minimum of delay.

As a result of that experience the single-theater concept of command in the field dominated the between-wars thinking of American military leaders whose principal experience had been that of 1917–18. Influenced largely by General Pershing himself, who remained in Washington in touch with succeeding Chiefs of Staff until his death, the Staff for years contemplated for any future war (1) the creation at Washington of a General Headquarters (GHQ), with the Chief of Staff of the Army as commanding general, and (2) the transplanting of that GHQ and its commander to the theater of war, (3) leaving the residual duties of Chief of Staff in Washington to a newly named and really secondary authority.

That concept of the relative powers of the two wartime posts continued until 1941 and ruled War Department organization until early 1942. By that time a much more dispersed war and the problems of an informal alliance had demonstrated the need both for simultaneous direction of operations, not in one overseas theater but in a great many, each with its own commander, and for simultaneous planning of further operations upon an immense and complex scale. It was this situation that forced a revision of the earlier theory and a reconstitution of the departmental organization. It brought recognition that in the global war of 1942 the Chief of Staff's Office in Washington was the establishment that not only must train and supply and administer, but must plan in considerable detail for all theaters, must co-ordinate and control their efforts, and—so closely does supply govern planning, and planning lead to operations—must actually direct each of the theater commanders in major aspects of

command itself. Vastly improved powers of communication, thanks to modern techniques, made such organization possible.

Today this concept is a truism. Yet obvious as it is in retrospect, its reasoning was not generally accepted in 1939, when wars that one day were to involve the United States were already thundering in Poland to the east and in China to the west; nor even during the next two years, when the United States was actually shipping garrisons and supplies to Caribbean islands, to Iceland, and to distant bases in the Pacific. During those years, when the Chief of Staff's Office was still going through an organizational development based upon lessons of World War I, there were already in progress external changes, not fully interpreted until actual and violent contact with them forced a swift reorganization of the Army's mechanism at the very time when that mechanism was severely strained by a multitude of tasks whose performance could not be delayed.

The sudden need for these changes in thinking and in organization raises in the mind of the observer a series of questions. Inasmuch as the chosen leaders of the military establishment possessed (in comparison with their civilian contemporaries) a superior degree of military education, military experience, and current military information, why did they by a wide margin in certain cases fail to reach correct conclusions as to needs and capabilities? Why during the two decades between wars (more significantly during the closing years of that period when war was known to be imminent in Europe and Africa and when it was under way in Asia) did the military chiefs continue to build up a command-and-staff organization that in late 1941 they themselves finally decided was unsuitable for new requirements and in need of remodeling? If there was such a need, why did they not foresee that need earlier? Why were the forces themselves so unready for expansion, the materiel so deficient, the accepted estimates of certain situations so cloudy or so distant from reality? Such questions can be asked in a few words, but the answers call for an examination of events covering broad reaches of space and time.

The Influence of Two Decades

The Chief of Staff for World War II and the General Staff, like the Army and the War Department as a whole, were heirs to what had been done in the reorganization that immediately followed World War I and in the subsequent developments upon that basic structure, and that was a great deal. But they were

heirs also to what had been left undone in a peace-minded nation whose day-by-day thinking from 1919 onward had been on other than military affairs, partly from actual antagonism to everything suggestive of "militarism," but chiefly from ignorance and apathy about the peacetime requirements of national defense. During the prosperous decade there was a popular delusion that another war was so remote from possibility that no large defenses against it were necessary, and certainly no acquisition of offensive means; appropriations for military purposes were made grudgingly and on a falling scale. During the succeeding decade of depression, the enormous governmental deficits of each fiscal year discouraged anything beyond bare maintenance of even the small establishment which the recent years' reduced appropriations had permitted. The first resumption of a naval building program in mid-depression years was justified by the White House itself on the ground that it was a make-work enterprise to reduce public unemployment.[2]

After two decades of neglect, despite known armings in Germany and Japan, the United States Army of 1939, reviving from its low point of 1933, was still weak in numbers, ill equipped by 1939 standards, scattered over a great many posts, and never assembled for true corps maneuvers, partly because it included no complete organization for corps or army troops or their service elements. The air elements were still feeble in numbers, but encouraged by the new appropriations stemming from a 1938 revitalizing. The National Guard, counted upon to provide early support for the Regular Army, was far below nominal peace strength, unbalanced, insufficiently equipped, and insufficiently trained. The supply services of the Regular force were low in number of personnel and in reserve stocks. Even so limited, their surviving personnel, notably that in ordnance arsenals, was efficient in operation and watchful in development work, and from that fortunate circumstance sprang memorable results. Industry as a whole, upon which the 1918 experience had clearly shown the armed services would have to rely for the vast output of wartime, was not set up for wartime production, nor even acquainted with the requirements for grand-scale munitions production. The "antimilitarism" groups throughout America, most of them temperamentally opposed to war of any sort, a few inspired from abroad to block American rearming, were still active, but were less of a handicap to national defense than was the apathy of the nation as a whole. Recalling today how magnificent was to be the effort of the nation and all its parts once war actually came, one is struck

[2] See "Plant Surveys and Educational Orders in World War II," U. S. Army Industrial College, Department of Research, Jan 47.

the more by the inertness of 1939, when war was almost at hand but when a large part of the American public was still suspicious of "militarists" and still sure that war could not come to America.

The public's hostility to both the principle and the cost of rearming inevitably affected White House thinking during the two decades between wars; Presidential messages to Congress sought much less in military appropriations than the services urged, and on one occasion (during the Coolidge administration) even the Congressional appropriations were reduced by a horizontal percentage cut. Public hostility to military outlay also influenced the attitude of Congress and was in turn encouraged by Congressional arguments in opposition to new outlays of money. Because Congress determined the appropriations, it was Congress which the War Department, aware of the rapidly changing world situation, had to inform of the full significance of the distant drumbeats in Berlin and Rome and Tokyo. Information had to be cautiously imparted at such a time. Yet until Congress should understand the dark prospect and the critical needs of America, there was small chance that the public would understand, or that the President would feel warranted in pressing the rearmament program with determination. National awareness of the situation appeared to come only with the burst of Blitzkrieg in mid-1940. Even this awakening was incomplete; some of the incredulity that war would really touch America, which had been shaken away in June 1940, was to return, and the public state of mind remained serene on the very eve of Pearl Harbor.

The Large Influence of President Roosevelt

Public as well as Congress had much to do with the state of defense, but an immediate influence could always be exerted by the White House, and was so exerted on the eve of World War II. It must be borne in mind that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the real and not merely a nominal Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Every President has possessed the Constitutional authority which that title indicates, but few Presidents have shared Mr. Roosevelt's readiness to exercise it in fact and in detail and with such determination. In any examination of Army responsibilities prior to and during World War II this circumstance must be remembered, even with regard to episodes of which the surviving written record is itself barren of pertinent evidence of White House intervention. If the absence of written evidence hampers the historian, it can be surmised that, at the time, it hampered the Staff. General Marshall and

Admiral Harold R. Stark, his naval colleague, were on close terms with the President. Mr. Roosevelt discussed orally with them a flood of matters which they thereafter handled through their Staff subordinates as needed, and also on occasion he gave them guidance so profoundly secret, involving policies still in the making, that it was not to be transmitted to anyone else for a period. On such occasions, as a result, junior Staff officers undoubtedly continued their work on enterprises already foredoomed, which was unfortunate and unprofitable, but in the vast majority of cases great advantage accrued from this highly confidential relationship. It enabled the Chiefs to do their planning upon safe assumptions of what a policy would be, before the policy was announced or even had fully matured. At need they could press the President for guidance upon a critical issue, and to no small degree they could help in the determination of a policy by merely indicating their own powers and limitations in implementing such a policy. This unrecorded personal influence by the Chiefs of Staff is difficult to trace and impossible to measure, but its existence is a certainty.

Yet nobody, reading the record, can doubt that the determining influence in the making of military policy in these prewar days was that of the President as Commander in Chief, as is the Constitutional design. During his long stay in office Mr. Roosevelt made countless decisions which guided the behavior of his civilian subordinates and upset their professional calculations. As the Chief of State he had unquestioned authority to do so. It sometimes is forgotten that alongside this full control of his civilian cabinet was the Commander in Chief's proper control of the military force when he chose to exercise it. Certainly it was not forgotten by Mr. Roosevelt, and he chose to exercise his military authority more frequently and far more significantly than had any of his recent predecessors.

How fully he regarded the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as his immediate advisers (which they of course were), rather than advisers only to his appointed Secretaries of War and Navy, was evidenced on 5 July 1939, well before the outbreak of the war in Europe, when by executive order he directed that on certain matters the Joint Board and other service elements report to him directly rather than through their departmental heads. This immediate influence on the services had already been evidenced in numerous respects: in his employment of the relief program long before for betterment of Navy and Army materiel; in his personal imposition of the air expansion program in late 1938 (followed abruptly and somewhat surprisingly by his reduction of the expected allotment of funds for that purpose) and his personal

pressure for later air programs larger than his advisers sought; in his refusal to support the draft bill until the prospect of its success was greatly brightened; in his ardent advocacy of arms for Britain, and later of arms for Russia, when this outward flow of supplies was at the immediate cost of rearming the United States; in his decision of September 1941 to reduce the size of the Army when its considerable increase had only just been assured by the hard-won victory for draft extension; in his determination with Mr. Churchill (and against his own advisers) in favor of a 1942 operation that would necessarily postpone the major 1943 operation already solemnly agreed upon. The present purpose is not to question the merits of these and comparable military decisions made at the Presidential level rather than by the professional military command. The purpose is simply to note that, right or wrong, with professional approval or without it, the decisions *were* made at the Presidential level and that in these and other instances the dutiful behavior of the Chief of Staff was determined by his civilian superior as precisely as orders from the Chief of Staff in their turn determined the dutiful behavior of his subordinates. The Army was an implement of the state, and must be studied in sound perspective.

The Chief of Staff and Congress

The planning within the Army itself throughout these varied years was primarily the responsibility of the Chief of Staff. By regulation his was the chief responsibility for the training program, for the changing organization, for the design and improvement of equipment, for the guidance of supply authorities, for military liaison with the Navy and the State Department, for relations with military missions from those foreign nations which were destined in all probability to be our allies, for study of the swift developments in the war theaters then aflame and in the still larger theaters where war was bound to extend, and for professional estimates of the situation. These are military activities and it is the ranking military officer of the Army who must see that they are performed as efficiently as possible. But in this critical period of 1939–41, far more than in comparable periods of the past, the Chief of Staff was repeatedly called on by the committees of Congress to furnish information and actual guidance reaching into the realm of national policy. He was found to be an effective witness profoundly informed on military matters and at the same time better acquainted than are most professional soldiers with the political difficulties which beset a legislator, and appreciative of the anxieties of civilian America at such a time.

Committee decisions that were of incalculable value, because they were made at just the right time and sometimes by the slimmest of margins, can be traced to the pleas and warnings and patient arguments presented to the Congressional committeemen by General Marshall, then Chief of Staff. The period of 1939–41 is not fully understandable unless one is aware of the part which a military witness played at that time in the decisions of a friendly and trusting Congress. The pattern of that fruitful collaboration will be discerned in the chronicle which is to follow; it compares in importance with the purely military work conducted in the Office of the Chief of Staff, and is inseparable from it.

The co-operation of Congress, interrupted as it was by delays, was both active and passive. In the former category were constructive acts; in the latter an avoidance of legislation that would have been confusing rather than helpful. Particularly to be noted is Congress' cautious attitude toward repeated suggestions for granting to the Air Forces a larger degree of autonomy, or actual separation from the Army. The bills were for the most part held in committee in order to avoid raising for legislative decision questions that were better settled within the services if settlement should be possible. In this matter General Marshall's restraint was influential. His desire to move only gradually toward Air Force autonomy, to prevent its separation from the Army at a critical time, and, rather, to gain within a reorganized Army the largest possible amount of air-ground co-operation, was a factor in bringing about all three desiderata. The co-operation of the Air Force chiefs greatly eased the tasks of reorganization within the Army itself. One of the first needs in 1940–42 was the maximum development of the Army Air Forces. For the important form of that development the Chief of Staff was largely responsible, and for an appreciable part of the substance.

There is another aspect of the good relationship between War Department and Congress which prevailed in late 1941 and early 1942 in particular and which to some extent was traceable to Congressional confidence that had developed from the 1939–41 discussions. That is the steadfastness with which the War Department was supported in Congress when the sudden disaster at Pearl Harbor and the ensuing tragedies in the Philippines shook the country. It would have been natural to seek a scapegoat in the Department, but so thoroughly was Congress informed upon the work which the Army chiefs had lately done in spite of grave handicaps that there was no immediate distraction of a desperately busy Department with complaints about past disaster; Congress' protracted inquiry into the causes of Pearl Harbor was delayed until the end of hostilities.

The Department that had been preparing for war was free, for the present, to handle the war. Both in what it did and in what it refused to do, the wartime Congress co-operated consistently and almost unquestioningly with the suggestions and requests from the Chief of Staff. On the experience of 1939–41 was founded the confidence which inspired that relationship.

In the early confusion of war unexpectedly at hand, in confusion confounded by conflicting desires and requirements, there was need for the Army's highest authority to make certain decisions which would be absolute in order to create a basis, temporarily firm, for future planning. This called for his summary rejection of the nonessentials. It called for his denying pleas that could not be satisfied without sacrifice or diversion of materials or manpower vitally needed elsewhere. It called for decision to give in small lots rather than large, and not to give at all. The judgments made and the actions that followed, for the most part made or approved by the Chief of Staff in person, were accepted by Congress and public with surprisingly little resentment.

Controlling Decisions on War Policy

Two basic principles emerged at an early date, never to be lost sight of. One was the decision that, regardless of the natural desire to avenge Pearl Harbor, the first aim had to be the defeat of Germany, and with its accomplishment as early as possible nothing whatever should be allowed to interfere; this meant, of necessity, delays in the Pacific war. The other was the decision that, in view of logistic problems that threatened to make the most attractive plans unattainable on schedule, there would be maximum emphasis on mastering the logistic difficulties in order to make these plans feasible, rather than on adapting the plans to current logistic conceptions. They were two momentous decisions, soundly made and firmly executed.

The influence of the two basic policies—to defeat Germany first, and to do the maximum with all possible speed—is seen in the making of later decisions of the war. Making some of those decisions was particularly difficult in that the grave reasons which compelled them could not be stated publicly lest the enemy be given information thereby. As a result, from civilian America came troubled and sometimes angry demands for the dispatch of reinforcements first of all to the Pacific, long before schedule and long before they could have been effective in any large sense, so dependent were troop operations upon transport and supplies and air cover and events in remote theaters. From other sections of

civilian America in those difficult days came puzzled and earnest inquiries about the reason for recruitment of troops in advance of full weapons supply, and about equipment of troops whose ships did not come, about air crews in training without new planes to fly, about "old model" planes in production when better planes were designed, about shortages of personnel here and excesses there with resultant abandonment of training programs that proved costly and at length unworkable. On few of these matters could public curiosity be fully satisfied at the time, sometimes because the situation could not be clarified for the advantage of an observant enemy, sometimes because the reasons for error were not immediately clear.

In retrospect the mysteries are less baffling and many of the seeming errors less offensive. Some were inevitable at such a season; others are recognized in time's perspective as not highly important; others, examined in the light of facts not publishable at the time, prove to have been not errors but sound decisions. There are decisions, whether by Chief of Staff or by Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff or by Chiefs of State, that remain in dispute and will remain topics of professional debate indefinitely. Such are the decisions on the use of manpower and on the training of personnel.[3] Such also are the decisions that determined from time to time the division of authority in the Pacific and the time and place of invading Europe. Long after the war two of the Allies' most distinguished field commanders continued to maintain that in September 1944 every Allied resource should have been placed back of a single attempt to force an immediate crossing of the Rhine, rather than spread over the broad front for the slower, irresistible drive with which General Eisenhower gained his victory months later; significantly, those two dissenting views disagreed not only with General Eisenhower's, but with each other. The aim in this work is not to defend the decisions, but to record them, to present the reasons for making them, and to recite the developments apparently traceable to them.

In particular it is desirable to observe the number and complexity of details that of necessity crowded in upon the Chief of Staff's Office just before the war began and during much of its course. The final decisions in many instances were those of higher authority, but the arguments that largely guided them were those of the Chief of Staff. The Army had to be built up and used at the same time,

[3] The confusions and grave sacrifices resulting from faulty experiments in the replacement policy are presented at length elsewhere in this series. See Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops,* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 165–239.

even though the building process made it impossible to use any large part of it, and even though using any part whatever greatly impeded the building up of the rest—much as if a trucking crew was engaged in repairing a vehicle while employing it to move goods at high speed through traffic. There could be employment of a small well-trained force this year, or employment of a large well-trained force next year—either, but not both. There were similar decisions on the use of limited materiel just becoming available from the arsenals—would one send it overseas for the arming of Allied troops who undoubtedly needed it immediately, or to American camps to make possible the training of battalions which would not fight immediately but which, once trained with that materiel, would be able a little later to turn the tide of battle? This was the supply issue that was repeatedly posed both before and after passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941, each time requiring immediate answer, and each time involving disappointment on one side or another. Men waited for arms, and arms for men. Potential Army recruits were diverted to industry when industrial output was desperately needed; at another time potential and actual munitions workers were drafted for the Army because infantry replacements were then essential. Ground forces were long denied their proper ratio of prime recruits because air and sea forces (which were being prepared for immediate duty) had been granted larger ratios of such men.[4] Reinforcements were denied to harassed theater commanders not only because there was a prior call elsewhere, but also because certain critical items that would make reinforcements useful were not immediately available, or because shipping was committed to another area. Invasion was delayed because transports were lacking or, when transports were at hand, because assault boats were lacking. Air defense here was denied because air offense there was urgent, or vice versa. A renewed submarine campaign by the enemy could force abandonment of a fixed plan, or the subsidence of such a peril could as quickly cause a move in the opposite direction, with consequent new strains.

In the making of decisions military wisdom was not always enough, for there were nonmilitary considerations which at times outweighed the military. The reason was partly that a democracy is not ruled by warriors, even in wartime, but by civilian authority, with the result that the wishes of Army or Navy had always to meet with approval of the President. Partly it was that, as in some of the cases cited, there was an occasional superior demand for manpower in

[4] For full discussion of the changing troop basis see the volumes on Army Ground Forces in this series, specifically K. R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, 1947).

the industrial economy. Partly it was that the requirements of the military are not always understood.

One of the largest difficulties in adjusting a peace-minded people to the temporary pursuit of war is that the facts of war are often in total opposition to the facts of peace. An industrialist trained in economy will employ for a given job just enough means to perform the job. He will avoid all excessive use of manpower and material alike. Nothing could be more rational than this instinctive economy of force. But war is irrational and war is waste, fundamentally; likewise its processes are appallingly wasteful of the less important—and sometimes wisely so, the peacetime economist is astonished to learn. Unlike the industrialist just mentioned, the efficient commander does not seek to use just enough means, but an excess of means. A military force that is just strong enough to take a position will suffer heavy casualties in doing so; a force vastly superior to the enemy's will do the job without serious loss of men and (often more important still) with no loss of the all-important commodity, time; it can thereafter plunge straight ahead to the next task, catching the enemy unaware and thus gaining victory after victory and driving a bewildered enemy into panic. What is the "force vastly superior"?

It may be superior in the number of men in concentration. Or superiority may lie in new weapons and techniques, as in the cases of the 1940 Blitzkrieg and the Allies' 1944 drive through Normandy. Or it may be in transport that quickly moves men and supplies from one place to another and thus, in effect, multiplies them, as was the case both in Normandy and in the Pacific campaigns. It may be in goods which, if plentiful, can be scattered among many advance bases and used at will when local need suddenly arises. To the untrained observer all of this is clear enough after the fact, but rarely is it acceptable in advance, when the mere suggestion of getting more men, more goods, more speed than are demonstrably needed is interpreted as a statement of bald intention to "waste." The military planner in peacetime must make the civilian mind accept the principle of "wastefulness" in this sense as an ideal to be sought. If he does not do so, he himself must yield to necessity and make the best of that foreordained peacetime economy which, when war arrives, proves to have been very bad economy indeed. The nation that winds up a war with a surplus of equipment is likely to be the nation that wins the conflict. The lessons of war are painfully learned, yet with war over are quickly forgotten until it is time to begin learning them again by the same painful process as before. They can at least be chronicled by the historian, to facilitate the relearning.

Training of the Individual and the Team

To the controlling decisions already mentioned as among those for which the Chief of Staff pressed vigorously from time to time during World War II may be added two more. One of them called for a more prolonged and systematic training than ever before in American history had been given to a whole wartime army, whereby each soldier would be soundly trained as an individual, then as member of a small unit, and then as member of a full division in field maneuver. This was the aim and for a time (and to a greater degree than in previous wars) the accomplishment. The exigencies of 1943 forced a relaxing of the rule, and those of 1944 brought swift abandonment of previous policies which, seeking better training, had not justified themselves. Unhappily, it now was necessary to utilize individuals and units alike imperfectly trained.[5] Performance did not match design, and the planning was proved not only faulty but tragically insufficient. Nevertheless the basic program produced results better than those of previous wars.

The other decision was for such intensive co-ordination of many-sided effort as the United States had not seen before. It included development of infantry-artillery-tank-engineer teamwork that had long been a precept of training but certainly not an achievement. It included co-ordination of ground forces with air forces, which in its thoroughness would one day excel the German example. It called for co-ordination of ground and air with sea forces, which alone made the amphibious operations possible, and with equal thoroughness gained a co-ordination of American and Allied endeavor in theaters on opposite sides of the globe. At home it supported the methodical timing of military planning with industrial capabilities. A vast number of men and agencies, military and civilian, shared in this widespread and deep-reaching co-ordination, a few as co-leaders, a legion as supporters, but it is difficult to name one other who in its planning and encouragement and direction was so largely responsible for its success as was the Chief of Staff of the Army.

For a detailed account of events in the theaters of operations the student must examine the record of each theater. Likewise, for intimate knowledge of the complex tasks of raising the troops, of supplying them, of training them, of transporting them, one must explore the appropriate and particular record. The roles of the civilian bodies similarly are fully portrayed in detailed records

[5] For this and for serious errors in calculations of manpower needs, see Palmer et al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops.*

of their own activities. Yet the most intensive study of each of these activities, whether before or during or after the war, is insufficient unless one re-examines those very activities in their relationship to the Army's principal agency for planning, co-ordinating, and performing. That agency was the Office of the Chief of Staff. From that control point one beholds in balance and perspective the entire panorama of America's part in World War II in all the confusion and frustration of early days, the tumult of the battle period, the majesty of the victory. To present that panorama is the purpose of the pages which follow.

CHAPTER II

Prewar Sentiment and Its Effect on the Army

The armed forces of the United States underwent an almost continuous weakening from 1918 onward for a decade and a half. The fluctuation in numbers from 1922 to 1936 was small (see Table 1), but the deterioration in equipment was continuous in that the 1918 surplus, used up rather than replaced, was not only increasingly obsolescent but increasingly ineffective owing to wear and age. In the mid-thirties the Navy was permitted, by a cautious increase in appropriations, to make a start on a new shipbuilding program which by that time was acutely needed. The Army was less favored, presumably because there was a continuing public confidence, shared by the White House and Congress, in oceans as a bulwark and a belief that the Navy could safely be thought of not merely as the traditional "first line of defense" but as the only really necessary line of defense for the time being. Even the growing reach of the airplane, unmistakably clear on the day of the first trans-Atlantic flight, was not exploited in military form to any such degree as it was in Europe and Japan. The abiding need for trained and equipped ground forces, recognized and continuously recalculated by the Army's General Staff, was generally ignored by the ultimate authority in government.

The majority of Congress is assumed under normal conditions to hold approximately the views of the public which elects it, but it is impossible to say with certainty how accurately the cautious expressions and the reduced appropriations of the prewar Congress with respect to defense measures actually represented the wishes of the public. On the one hand, the newspaper files of prewar years are almost barren of any recorded protest against excessive thrift in money appropriations. On the other hand, a contemporary public opinion analyst maintained both then and thereafter that the public was far ahead of Congress in its ultimate votes to support defense measures. His postwar estimate of the public's attitude during the previous twelve years noted that "one of the first polls we took in this business was on the question of appropriating more money for the Army and the Navy . . . back in . . . 1935. We found in that very early poll that

TABLE 1.—STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY: 1919–1941 [a]

Year	Total	Officers			Enlisted Men
		Commissioned Officers	Warrant Officers [b]	Army Nurse Corps [c]	
1919	846,498	77,966	37	[d] 9,616	758,879
1920	201,918	15,451	68	[d] 1,551	184,848
1921	228,650	13,299	1,159	851	213,341
1922	147,335	13,248	1,153	828	132,106
1923	131,959	11,820	1,086	705	118,348
1924	141,618	11,655	1,065	675	128,223
1925	135,979	12,462	1,030	725	121,762
1926	134,116	12,143	1,327	673	119,973
1927	133,949	12,076	1,263	681	119,929
1928	135,204	12,112	1,208	699	121,185
1929	138,263	12,175	1,138	734	124,216
1930	138,452	12,255	1,089	807	124,301
1931	139,626	12,322	1,028	809	125,467
1932	134,024	12,314	973	824	119,913
1933	135,684	12,301	926	669	121,788
1934	137,584	12,283	869	609	123,823
1935	138,569	12,043	825	603	125,098
1936	166,724	12,125	784	603	153,212
1937	178,733	12,321	794	625	164,993
1938	184,126	12,522	782	671	170,151
1939	188,565	13,039	775	672	174,079
1940	267,767	16,624	763	939	249,441
1941	1,460,998	93,172	931	5,433	1,361,462

[a] Represents actual strength of the active Army as of 30 June of each year. Includes Philippine Scouts. Does not include cadets at the U. S. Military Academy, field clerks, or contract surgeons.

[b] Effective 29 April 1926, 367 Army and QM field clerks were brought into the Army as Warrant Officers.

[c] Included as officer personnel in this table for comparability with later years. On 4 June 1920, Army nurses were given simulated or relative commissions applicable only to the Army Nurse Corps. On 22 June 1944 they were given temporary commissions, and on 16 April 1947 were commissioned in the Regular Army.

[d] Data are from WDGS, Statistics Branch, "Strength of Military Establishment, June 30, 1914 to June 30, 1926," Special Report No. 196, revised, 22 Jan 27.

Source: Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1922–1941; Annual Reports of The Adjutant General of the Army, 1919–1921; also Department of the Army, Strength of the Army (STM-30), 1 Jul 48.

the people were strongly in favor of increasing appropriations . . . at a time when Congress was going exactly in the other direction. . . . During the war years there was no step this country took which the public hadn't approved weeks and months before Congress. . . . In every study we made . . . we found a substantial majority of the people of the country willing and ready to support civilian mobilization or war manpower conscription."[1] It would be difficult to prove, however, that the prewar public, even when willing to express sympathy for defense expenditures, was vigorous in asserting its will unless and until provided with an energizing leadership. Congressmen—and Presidents too—normally responsive to any vigorously expressed wishes of constitutents, did not by their speeches or by their votes in those years demonstrate any pronounced change of heart toward a strong defense policy, nor do the records show that they were unseated at ensuing elections because of their lethargy on the rearmament question. It is fair to conclude that the views of officeholders who continued unruffled in office were not in active conflict with the views of the public majority that put them in office. By that test, prewar America was not war-minded, nor even defense-minded to an assertive degree. Even in early 1940 an urgent Army plea to Congress for 166 airplanes was beaten down to 57, and no 4-motor bombers were permitted, an opponent making the explanation that these were not defensive but "aggressive" weapons,[2] the very type against which the American delegates' efforts had been directed at Geneva in 1934.

Appreciation of America's addiction to the defense-only policy is necessary if one is to understand public lethargy in the early days of World War II and the handicaps under which the War Department labored as a consequence. The fact is not appreciated from a mere statement of it so well as from a study of its results. That America was peace-minded for two decades is hardly worth the saying; what matters is that because of this state of mind the nation's military strength was allowed to decrease and decay to the point where it became tragically insufficient and, even more important, incapable of restoration save after the loss of many lives and the expenditure of other resources beyond man's comprehension.

[1] Dr. George H. Gallup, American Institute of Public Opinion, before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, 17 June 1947. Industrial College Library, L 47–150.

[2] This remark, recalled by Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) Wilton B. Persons, then attending the hearings, does not appear in the transcript of the Congressional committee hearings and presumably was off the record. It was a policy so well established that on 9 May 1938 Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, Deputy Chief of Staff, in a memorandum to G–4 said: "Our national policy contemplates preparation for defense, not aggression." This is filed in OCofS 17840–115 and is quoted later in this chapter. The 166-plane request by the Army, here referred to, itself represented a severe cut from the air establishment's request.

The responsibility for the Army's deterioration between wars was so far from being exclusively that of Congress—although often visited upon Congress because that body was finally responsible for all appropriations—that the Mead committee of Congress in 1946 undertook to lessen public criticism by shifting the onus. The report noted that after 1919 "many persons in the military agencies evidenced an attitude of complacency" and that "largely as a result of this attitude Congressional appropriations for the support of our national defense were reduced to a dangerous minimum." [3] In prompt rebuttal the Under Secretary's office initiated a gathering of typical War Department expressions of a most uncomplacent nature that had been made to or in the hearing of Congress. From the annual reports of Secretary of War John W. Weeks in 1921, 1922, and 1923 were extracted warnings that "our present combat strength will be insufficient to fulfill the functions required by our national defense policy," that "additional cuts would endanger our safety," that "factors which introduce causes for war are now in the making; it is the height of folly to continue the present policy of cutting our financial support of the War Department. . . . We are already cut below our vital needs." Similar complaints of unpreparedness were extracted from the annual reports of Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis in 1925–28, his successors Patrick J. Hurley, George H. Dern, and Harry H. Woodring, and Assistant Secretaries of that period, likewise from reports and speeches of General Pershing and every succeeding Chief of Staff.

General Pershing's pungent remarks on 4 July 1925 noted that "Under our very eyes there have already been serious reductions made by Congress" and that "the politician, himself oftentimes uninformed as to his country's history, frequently appeals to the ignorant and unthinking on the score of economy; . . . such demagogues are dangerous." Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1934 summarized the personnel shortage dramatically, declaring: "In many cases there is but one officer on duty with an entire battalion; this lack of officers [has] brought Regular Army training in the continental United States to a virtual standstill . . . correction is mandatory." Stocks of materiel, he continued, were "inadequate even for limited forces . . . and, such as they are, manifestly obsolescent. The secrets of our weakness are secrets only to our own people." The 1935 report from Mr. Dern predicted that in the event of war "we should find

[3] For this and resultant correspondence and quotations cited in text see (1) Memo, Office of USW for Budget Office, 24 Sep 46, sub: Specific Refutation for Mead Report. (2) Memo, Maj Gen Geo. J. Richards for Charles Parker, Sp Asst to USW, 23 Oct 46, both filed in WDSBU 032.3 Mead Com (23 Oct 46). (3) Binder containing accompanying papers. Copies of all in Hist Div, SSUSA, Cater Files, 1941 folder, "Quotations of War Dept Spokesmen Relative to Inadequacy of National Defense during Period 1919–41."



CIVILIAN AUTHORITY LATE IN THE PREWAR PERIOD

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War 1911–13
and 1940–45

Harry H. Woodring
Assistant Secretary of War 1933–36
Secretary of War 1936–40

Robert P. Patterson
Assistant (and Under) Secretary 1940–45
Secretary of War 1945–47

Louis Johnson
Assistant Secretary of War 1937–40
Secretary of Defense 1949 ——

CHIEFS OF STAFF, 1918–30

General of the Armies John J. Pershing
1 July 1921–13 September 1924

Gen. Peyton C. March
19 May 1918–30 June 1921

Gen. John L. Hines
14 September 1924–20 November 1926

Gen. Charles P. Summerall
21 November 1926–20 November 1930

that our so-called economies have in reality been a hideously extravagant waste of money and lives." With less rhetoric Secretary Henry L. Stimson in his 1941 report made the following statement:

> Not until our country saw its former democratic allies and friends struck down in quick succession did our Congress, representing accurately the view of our public, authorize the fiscal appropriations necessary to make any adequate defense. Until such Congressional action, no increased American armies would be raised and paid for and no contracts for munitions could be entered into.

The most spirited defender of the thrifty attitude of a succession of Presidents and Congresses after World War I could hardly deny that the Army's principal spokesmen, military and civilian, had sounded ample warnings. The trouble was that listeners apparently were few, even among those who because of their positions of responsibility might have been expected to listen. Thus when Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, then Deputy Chief of Staff under Pershing, appeared before the House Appropriations Committee on 19 December 1923 and said bluntly that the 118,000 men asked for were not enough, but that 150,000 were needed, as estimated by Secretary Weeks and General Pershing, a member of the committee demanded of him when those estimates had been made. General Hines said they were in the formal reports. "I had not seen any of those reports," confessed the committeeman.

The routine, disciplined obedience of the Army to the President as Commander in Chief and to such of his agents as the Budget Director was itself a handicap to Army programs, barring any save a refractory officer from demanding more funds than were approved by the White House. This fact was illustrated every year, and often in every year, and the reason for it made clear on 25 November 1924 when Brig. Gen. K. W. Walker, then Army Chief of Finance, was interrogated by a committeeman on this issue of full acceptance of Presidential directions:

> Q. In general, which do you regard as the more important—the President's policy of economy or the actual needs and requirements of the War Department?
>
> Gen. WALKER. That is a pretty hard question for me to answer. . . . The President's policy is the controlling factor and must be our guide; but that does not prevent the War Department from stating to the President through the Budget Bureau its needs as it sees them.
>
> Q. Would it prevent the War Department from presenting its needs before this committee?
>
> Gen. WALKER. I think it would. I think when the Budget has once been approved by the President and transmitted to Congress, it is his budget estimate and no officer or official

of the War Department would have any right to come up here and attempt to get a single dollar more than is contained in that estimate. . . .

Q. So the final analysis of it is, General, that up to the present the $336,000,000 must suffice, even though that does not meet your requirements at all?

Gen. WALKER. Insofar as the War Department is concerned, yes, sir. If this committee should develop that more money should be had for any specific purpose, it would be of course its prerogative to give it, just as it is its prerogative to reduce any amount. This prerogative has been exercised time and time again.[4]

A year later, on 8 December 1925, when again the Secretary's plea for an army of 150,000 had been ignored and the Department's reduced estimates were laid before Congress, Maj. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, then Deputy Chief of Staff, answered similar questioning from appropriations committeemen in a somewhat tarter manner.

Q. If you do not get all you need that is because you do not ask for it?

Gen. NOLAN. Oh yes, we ask for it.

Q. Well, you ask the Budget and they do not give you the money, nor does Congress?

Gen. NOLAN. But we are prohibited by law from asking Congress for anything except the amount that is allowed here in the Budget.

Q. . . . Now, why should you not come up here and frankly tell us that the amount is not sufficient to maintain those activities . . .?

Gen. NOLAN. Because Congress passed a Budget law, in which there is a proviso prohibiting any official of the Government coming before a Committee of Congress and arguing for more money than is permitted under the Budget sent up by the President. That is a matter of law.

Still more directly pointing at the Congressional responsibility, General MacArthur, before the same committee, on 28 November 1932, in his pleas for the Army's miniature armored forces of that day said explosively that "they suffer tremendously from one thing and one thing only—that Congress will not give them enough money to equip them properly with modern tanks." If the Mead committee's postwar judgments found "complacency" about small Army appropriations, it was not in the major public utterances of the several Chiefs of Staff.

[4] On the eve of World War II a formal example of this practice was presented by General Marshall, then Deputy Chief of Staff, acting for Gen. Malin Craig. A TAG letter of 9 Feb 39, sub: War Department Attitude Regarding Additional Personnel (filed in WPD 3674–13 and in AG 320.2 (2–7–9) Misc F–M, and referred to in Chs. IV and VI in other connections), warned chiefs of arms and other potential witnesses before Congressional committees that, in accord with Presidential views, there had been no recommendations of increases for the mobile ground force. Accordingly "the Chief of Staff desires that this attitude be clearly maintained by all representatives of the War Department who may be called on to testify." However, the attached statement would guide them in their replies to possible questioning on what "eventually should be the first increases" in case any increase should later be permitted. The guidance was explicit: the first need was for 1,800 officers and 23,000 men with whom to complete the needed five full divisions.

Deterioration of the Army Between Wars

In the thirties, when war clouds were mounting both in Europe and Asia, the U. S. Army had ample time to rebuild itself, but no money. When war broke out in Europe late in that decade, the Army was given more and more money, but time, far more precious than money, now was lacking. That eventually the rebuilding took place, and that from the excellence of this performance grew the majestic military successes of 1944–45 is so unforgettable that the radiant last act of the drama (so suggestive of November 1918) threatens to drive from national memory the gloom and dismay of the first act (so suggestive of 1917).

In their preliminaries, developments, and immediate sequels World War I and World War II followed a cycle whose phases are well marked: (1) prior to the war, insufficient military expenditures, based on the public's prewar conviction that war could not come to America; (2) discovery that war *could* come after all; (3) a belated rush for arms, men, ships, and planes to overcome the nation's demonstrated military weakness; (4) advance of the producing and training program, attended by misunderstandings, delays, and costly outlay, but gradual creation of a large and powerful army; (5) mounting successes in the field, and eventual victory; (6) immediately thereafter, rapid demobilization and dissolution of the Army as a powerful fighting force; (7) sharp reduction of appropriations sought by the military establishment, dictated by concern over its high cost and for a time by the revived hope that, again, war would not come to America. The early phases of the cycle as encountered prior to the arrival of World War II, particularly as they relate to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, can be examined in some detail.

In 1929 President Herbert Hoover instructed the Secretary of War to order an investigation into War Department needs and methods which should "reconsider our whole army program." In accordance with direction from Secretary James W. Good on 29 July this survey was undertaken by the War Department General Staff, resulting in a 165-page report signed by the Deputy and five Assistant Chiefs of Staff.[5] Unfortunately, before the report was completed the stock market collapse of that autumn, heralding the great depression, had doomed any possible program for increasing Army expenditures. The Staff report, however, did not discuss economies. It related a nation's state of preparedness to the respect in which the nation is held and hence to the success with which the nation

[5] Report of the Survey of the Military Establishment by the War Department General Staff, 1 Nov 29, G–1/11229–39.

can make peaceful application of its foreign policies. It reviewed the world situation, noting differences between nations and the existence in America of "certain clearly defined national policies conflicting with those of other countries." It then examined the condition of the Army with regard to personnel and materiel, the reasons for its state and the proposals for remedying it, making two major proposals for that purpose. The 1920 target of 280,000 enlisted strength in the Regular Army, clearly and impressively stated in the National Defense Act of that year, was not dreamed of any more, apparently, for either of the 1929 proposals would have constituted a mean between the strength authorized in the National Defense Act and the strength possible of attainment under the successive appropriation bills. Plan I would have provided 179,000 officers and men in the Regular Army, 250,000 in the National Guard, 116,000 in the Officers' Reserve Corps, 6,000 annually from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (in colleges), and annual training of 37,500 in the Citizens' Military Training Camps. The Regular Army enlisted strength (excluding Philippine Scouts) was still fixed at 118,750 by the practical limitation of the current annual appropriation. The survey recognized existing shortages in guns and ammunition, in aircraft and antiaircraft equipment, even in tentage and certain clothing items. It reported a surplus of rifles and certain other items useful in case of large mobilization. In plain terms it reproached the Budget Director for making crippling cuts in the Army fund requests without prior consultation with the Army about the relative importance of these requests, with the result that "in effect he and not the responsible head of the Department determines to some degree what . . . shall not be included in the budget." Plan II outlined an organization smaller than that of Plan I. It was opposed as insufficient to Army needs, but what the Army received in succeeding years was much nearer to Plan II than Plan I, and was below both. Personnel was not increased at all.

In 1933 the Army was accordingly at the lowest effectiveness that it had touched since World War I, standing seventeenth among the world's armies by the estimate of the current Chief of Staff.[6] There had been no appreciable drop in personnel but there had been a steady falling off in freshness of equipment and even in the field organization, as a result of continuingly low defense expenditures which themselves were traceable to a conviction on the part of the American public as well as the Congress (comforting in a period of depression) that war was a remote possibility. On 30 June of that year the Army strength stood

[6] Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1933*. In the 1934 report is mention of only 12 modern tanks.

at approximately 14,000 officers and 122,000 enlisted men,[7] even though the 1920 National Defense Act had authorized a peacetime strength of 280,000 enlisted men.[8] The accompanying concept in the 1920 act had been that a force so small (by 1918 standards) as 280,000 should be capable of rapid and efficient expansion. To that end it would be composed of a maximum number of units in the form of cadres of men highly trained for expansion in emergency. This necessarily meant a minimum number of men per unit in peacetime. The arrangement presupposed a proper balance of units that in emergency, quickly expanded by recruitments, would compose divisions, corps, and field armies complete with headquarters, combat elements, and service organizations. But when the total number in the Army dropped from 280,000 to 125,000 or less it became impossible to maintain even in skeleton form the whole number of units that had been planned originally, and many of them ceased to exist. Hence corps and field army units had to be re-created altogether when the rebuilding of the Army was under way. Instead of a lean, hard organization capable of scientific expansion on short notice, there was from 1920 onward an emaciated organization incapable of expanding directly and automatically into a rounded field force; the skeleton units which had been eliminated would now have to be re-created from the beginning. This problem of re-creating whole units, rising in acute form when the Army expansion of 1940 was under way, was referred to at the time by the Chief of Staff (then General Marshall) in an explanation of current personnel needs:

> . . . During the lean years, dating back to 1921, the Army's fight for personnel was a fight for its very life. You will recall that within a year of the passage of the amendments to the National Defense Act of 1920 appropriations for the Regular Army had reduced its strength from the authorized figure of 280,000 to 150,000. . . . By successive stages the strength of the Army was cut and cut until in 1935 it had declined to 118,750.
>
> Let me give you a specific example of the effect of these reductions upon the efficiency of the Army. During this period I commanded a post which had for its garrison a battalion of infantry, the basic fighting unit of every army. It was a battalion only in name, for it could muster barely 200 men in ranks when every available man, including cooks, clerks and kitchen police, [was] present for the little field training that could be accomplished with available funds. The normal strength of a battalion in most armies of the world varies from 800 to 1,000 men. . . .

[7] Strength of the Army varies moderately from month to month as enlistments begin and end irregularly. In 1933 enlisted strength varied from 120,065 to 124,955. The House of Representatives in 1932 passed a bill to retire 2,000 more officers. The Senate killed the bill.

[8] This included Philippine Scouts. Authorization also was for 17,726 officers, a figure which was not attained until 1940.

Part of the reason for this deplorable condition was that, while the new air arm had developed in the latter stages of the World War, no provision for its essential expansion in our Army was made except by emasculation of the basic ground forces. The Air Corps was obtaining the necessary personnel to man and maintain its growing number of planes by stripping the Infantry, Artillery, Engineers and Signal troops. Important headquarters units, essential for battlefield control, were being dropped from the rolls. The Army as a team was gradually being starved into a condition almost comparable to its pre-Spanish-American War condition.

. . . We will be seriously handicapped in our problem of developing skill in handling large units, and keeping them properly supplied in the field, until we are able to organize again at least a limited number of the essential control, supply, and communications units of corps and army troops. Furthermore, and of equal or greater importance, is the pressing necessity for a certain minimum of seasoned, trained units immediately available for service. . . .[9]

A More Realistic Planning Basis

The state of the Army in that period of the thirties which General Marshall's letter describes, and the gloomy attitude of its War Plans Division (WPD) at the time, are alike indicated by a notation in one of the contemporary WPD reports that recommendations for increases in Army strength would be presented to President, Congress, and the Budget officer "not with any hope or idea of obtaining immediate action, but so that those responsible would understand the condition and that it should be remedied when possible." [10]

Accordingly consideration was given by the Chief of Staff in 1933, General MacArthur, to means of mobilizing a defense force from each of three stages, (I) with the current strength of 118,000 enlisted men, (II) with a hoped-for 165,000 men, and (III) with the 280,000 men authorized by the Defense Act.[11] Mobilization from stage I, it was pointed out, would be impossible in less than four to six months, there being in existence in continental United States only four incomplete divisions with no supporting force and no cadres for expansion to new divisions. There was no way, at that low stage, to maintain except on paper the four-army establishment which General MacArthur had designed as the target.

Mobilization from stage II, with a force of 165,000, would still provide no immediately available force, but would permit the creation of a more rounded

[9] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Rep Ross A. Collins, 21 Jun 40, OCS 21097–7, copy in G–1/15588–193 (6–21–40). The figure of 1935 enlisted strength (in the first paragraph quoted) does not exactly correspond with the recorded midyear strength of 125,098. The 118,750 is a budget figure omitting Philippine Scouts.

[10] WPD Memo for CofS, 19 Apr 33, WPD 3674.

[11] Annual Report of CofS, 30 Jun 33. The 118,000 figure is not exact but a budget approximation.

GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, *Chief of Staff 21 November 1930–1 October 1935.*

GEN. MALIN CRAIG, *Chief of Staff 2 October 1935–13 August 1939*

establishment which would permit efficient expansion. In particular, it would furnish one division for each of the four theoretical armies, and also five skeleton brigades. These nine infantry units would thus provide a discernible Regular Army force in each of the country's nine corps areas. The increase to 165,000 would also add slightly to the 14,600-man air force, would create five new antiaircraft regiments, would add men to the Army's incipient tank force, and would permit strengthening the weak garrisons in Hawaii and Panama. The layman is interested in seeing, thus early, the professional judgment on first needs which were to be repeatedly cited, and which long remained unsatisfied.

It was this Mobilization II which General MacArthur urged. The 280,000-man army of Mobilization III, specified though it had been as the peace-strength force as long ago as 1920, now existed only as a planning concept; of the three mobilization plans, Mobilization III alone would provide a balanced army corps for immediate use and, in addition, a framework for later expansion. But, as shown by the WPD notation just mentioned, it was thought of as unattainable, and hence not worth pressing for. General MacArthur and his successor, Gen. Malin Craig, pressed for only what they thought could be obtained, and the 170,000 enlisted strength of 1938 was the result of their pressure. A further 40,000 increase above that point is what General Craig was to seek in February 1939 when Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall as his deputy went to Congress to argue for it.

The program under Mobilization II was basic thereafter until the much larger program of 1940 replaced it, and General Staff planning for the Army was pursued with the expectation that a war involving the United States would be, in its first phase, defensive. It looked forward accordingly to the availability of an Initial Protective Force (IPF) made up of only the Regular Army and National Guard in current existence. The 1933–40 concept was of 165,000 enlisted men in the Regular Army and 235,000 in the National Guard, and these made up the 400,000-man total for the IPF, for which the supply branches of the Staff made their computations. (That modest total for the Regular Army was not in fact reached until mid-1937. The figure listed for the National Guard was not reached, even in authorization, until September of that year. Actually the National Guard entered federal service in 1940 and early 1941 with about 200,000 men who had received training of some sort).[12]

[12] The June 1940 total strength, officers and enlisted, was 241,612. Between 23 July 1940 and induction 96,043 were discharged for various reasons. Vacancies were filled by recruits so that the strength on 30 June 1941 was recorded as 263,406. Annual Report. Chief of National Guard Bureau, 1941.

The Initial Protective Force, as its name indicates, was to be the emergency defensive force only. It would be enlarged (as a plan, not a reality) under the 1937 revision to the size specified in General Pershing's 1920 program. This Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) contemplated a Regular Army of 280,000 enlisted men and a National Guard of 450,000, a total of 730,000. It was assumed that upon declaration of an emergency new recruitments would immediately add some 270,000 men who would be trained as replacements and who would bring up the total PMP force to 1,000,000 men.

The General Staff planning of 1933–39 aimed at a provision of weapons and other equipment sufficient for such a force, and it was Congress' failure to supply funds for anything like the PMP total that disturbed the General Staff throughout the period. In 1932 the supply chief of the Staff (G–4) had recognized realistically "the probability of greatly reduced War Department appropriations for Fiscal Year 1934 and succeeding years," and initiated steps toward producing a well planned and balanced and equipped force at some future time when money should be available.[13] The cumulative value of this 1934 planning of a six-year program was to prove incalculable as World War II drew nearer. The plan itself evidences the realism of General Staff thinking in this realm even in depression days when there was little that is measurable in the way of Staff doing. General MacArthur manifested concern over equipment shortages as early as 1933 in his annual report as Chief of Staff, without result. General Craig, his successor, in his own last annual report summarized his anxiety thus:

> The problem encountered on my entry into office was the lack of realism in military war plans. . . . [They] comprehended many paper units, conjectural supply, and a disregard of the time element which forms the main pillar of any planning structure. . . . What transpires on prospective battlefields is influenced vitally years before in the councils of the staff and in the legislative halls of Congress. Time is the only thing that may be irrevocably lost, and it is the thing first lost sight of in the seductive false security of peaceful times. . . . The sums appropriated this year will not be fully transformed into military power for two years. Persons who state that they see no threat to the peace of the United States would hesitate to make that forecast through a two-year period.[14]

The warning, buried deep in a long official report, passed almost unnoticed in the newspapers of that day and hence by the public and most of the Congress.

[13] Memo, ACofS G–4 (Maj Gen R. E. Callan) for TAG, 16 Sep 32, reciting the Secretary's instructions to notify all Chiefs of Supply Arms and Branches of a six-year program to cope with nonavailability of funds. General Callan on 7 Sep 34 wrote another Memo for DCofS, sub: Rearmament and Reequipment Progress, recording the course of events thereafter. Both are recorded in G–4/29552, a separate binder labeled "Research and Development, Rearmament and Reequipment, Progress 16 Sep 32–17 Dec 34," P&E file, sec 1.

[14] Annual Report of CofS, 30 Jun 39.

Not until the alarms of 1940 (when the period of Craig's warning was not yet half over) was there any common grasp of the fact that appropriations could not in fact "be fully transformed into military power for two years."

Scant Funds Allowed for New Weapons

How little Congress, the appropriating authority, understood the need for new weapons, even in 1939, is suggested by a contemporary, unofficial analysis of military expenditures of the War Department, as measured by appropriations for the fiscal year 1939, distributed among the several functions.[15] The appropriations totaled $646,000,000 but, of these, $192,000,000, or nearly 30 percent, were for nonmilitary purposes, such as Panama Canal costs and rivers and harbors work. The military items were thus divided, roughly in millions of dollars and relative percentages:

	Millions	*Percent*
1. Pay, clothing, subsistence	$267.	58.8
2. Training (direct)	12.	2.7
3. New equipment	84.	18.5
4. Research, development	5.	1.1
5. Maintenance of arms	25.	5.5
6. New construction	10.	2.2
7. Maintenance of plant	25.	5.5
8. Seacoast defense	5.	1.1
9. Procurement planning	[0.3	0.07]*
10. Miscellaneous	21.	4.6
Total military exp	$454.	[16] 100.0

*These figures, amounting to less than $1 or 0.1 percent, are absorbed in reaching the rounded totals.

[15] Analysis of War Department appropriations in the Baltimore *Sun*, 21 May 1940. The analysis was made from figures made available at that time by the War Department, where the resultant articles were scrutinized and approved before publication. Postwar effort to prove the computations by Budget reports has been unsuccessful, the Budget's complexity making it impossible to determine how the appropriate functional items (scattered among a great many classifications) had been assembled in the unofficial computation of 1940. Unfortunately the Budget office itself makes no such computation of prewar outlay as would be applicable to the points here discussed.

[16] *Ibid.* Further analysis of appropriations during the preceding decade, computed on the same basis, showed the following percentages of money devoted to new equipment: 1930—8.5%, 1931—9.2%, 1932—9.6%, 1933—6.2%, 1934—3.2%, 1935—7.6%, 1936—15.3%, 1937—16.3%, 1938—14.1%, 1939—

It will be noted that the first item (determined by statutory rates of pay and subsistence for a stated number of men) was almost inflexible; it totaled 58 percent of the whole. Mere repair of weapons plus construction and repair of plant (items 5, 6, 7) consumed 13 percent more, and the seacoast defenses plus miscellaneous (items 8, 10), another 6 percent. In the residue represented chiefly by items 2, 3, and 4 of the table, amounting to much less than a quarter of the total, had to be found the dollars for whatever revitalizing the field forces were to receive. The funds for new equipment (at a time when Germany was putting the final polish upon an immense army wholly supplied with new equipment, the war and the Versailles treaty having eliminated all the old equipment) were 18.5 percent of the pinched total, but this was a high-water mark in expenditures over a period of years. That somewhat more was being expended for producing entirely new weapons and for remodeling old ones during the years 1936–39 is only partly attributable to a national appreciation of the trends in Europe and Asia or even to the industry and judgment of the ordnance experts. Largely it is due to the fact that the Army's old equipment, most of it made during World War I, some of it earlier, was seriously out of repair, and had to be replaced with something.

There still was reluctance to spend money on the scientific research and development that alone could produce a weapon new in design and effectiveness, as distinguished from a new issue of an old design. Note item 4 in the table. Only $5,000,000, 1.2 percent of the whole military fund and less than four-fifths of a cent in the whole War Department dollar for the year 1939, was allotted to research and development. If this calls for further examination in perspective, one may observe that $5,000,000 was one-twentieth of the cost of a new battleship which was being laid down by the Navy in that same year. It was one-four-hundredth part of the moneys later to be spent for the research, development, and production of the atomic bomb alone—at a time when the 1939 viewpoint on military expenditure had gone through a revolutionary change.

18.5%. A War Department computation, employing different minor items, appearing as an unsigned memorandum in CofS files, Emergency, bndr 1, shows new equipment and ammunition as follows: 1937—17%, 1938—16%, 1939—19%, 1940—33%. Still another computation accompanies a statement by Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, 28 May 40, copy of which is in a compilation by H. W. Cater, "Annotations of War Department Spokesmen Relative to the Inadequacy of the National Defense during the Period 1919 to 1941," in Cater files, 1941 folder, Hist Div files. It concludes that of $6,169,300,000 military appropriations for the Army over 16 years (1925–40) 86.1% was for "recurring changes and improvement of plant," 8.3% for Air Corps equipment, and only 5.6% for arms and equipment of the ground forces.

The peactime failure to develop new weapons was in some degree due to the fact that World War I had left on hand a massive surplus of weapons and other equipment, in working condition but in large part obsolescent. The Congressional view was that this surplus should be thriftily used up before anything else of the sort was bought, and newspapers of the period disclose no noticeable expression of disagreement. Hence the slow and ineffective tanks of types little modified from 1918 standards lingered at U. S. Army posts while Germany was building the swift and powerfully armed vehicles that were to make possible Hitler's dazzling successes of 1940. Alongside the 1918 tanks at U. S. Army posts until 1938 lay the 1918-type antitank weapons. Not until 1940 did the American 81- and 60-mm. mortars replace the World War I type throughout the Army. The M–1 semiautomatic rifle (Garand), which greatly increased infantry fire power and which was developed by Army Ordnance persistence as a replacement for the pre-1917 Springfield, came from the factories so slowly in 1941 that training plans had to be adjusted to its delivery. The invaluable "bazooka," which for the first time made an enemy tank really vulnerable to assault by a lone infantryman, was issued to troop units while they were deployed in the Tunisian campaign, and to others aboard ship on their way overseas; few of them had ever seen the weapon previously, or heard of it.

Item 9 in the 1939 appropriation list, so small that it seems negligible, is worth more attention than the 0.07 percentage figure would seem to justify. This outlay for procurement planning actually covered only the cost of establishing district offices. However, small as it was, the entry invites attention to the larger aspects of procurement planning and "educational orders," the cost of which is lost sight of in the new equipment item. The War Department at this time was already encouraging new studies of how effectively a locomotive shop, for example, could be used to produce a self-propelled gun, or a typewriter plant could turn out a machine gun in mass production, or a watch manufacturer could use the precision of his craft for the making of intricate bomb fuses. Educational orders for such weapons justified the companies' purchase of appropriate tools and dies and development of labor skills, looking toward an ultimate production of the desired weapons by mass methods. However, any such enterprise was so patently attributable to "war preparation" that in a peace-minded era advocacy of educational orders made converts in Congress only slowly. An educational-orders bill prepared by the Army in 1927 and favorably reported was delayed until 1929 and finally beaten on the floor of the

House. Similar efforts failed in 1931 and 1933. Each of these bills proposed spending only $2,000,000 a year. They failed primarily because pacifist expressions common in publications of that period denounced munitions manufacturers as war instigators, and industries became reluctant to take munitions orders, while munitions plants surviving from 1918 were for the most part allowed to deteriorate. Not until 1938 was a bill finally passed to authorize an educational-orders program [17] and implemented by another bill [18] which provided the money for it—not by providing new money, it is worth observing, but by transferring $2,000,000 from other military funds to a special fund for educational orders: that is why the item does not appear clearly labeled in the analysis of 1939 expenditures, above.

Additional indication of the national state of mind in the early thirties is afforded by the experience with the President's July 1933 allocation (under National Recovery Administration authority) of $2,500,000 to government arsenals for supplemental munitions manufacture. It corresponded in a way with the cautious resumption of naval construction at the same time, not primarily as a defense measure but as a means of creating "made work" for the unemployed. Indeed this $2,500,000 allocation to the arsenals was publicly deplored by pacifist spokesmen who declared that it debauched the unfortunates who were dependent on government relief.[19] The pacifists made their influence felt in Congress, and when the second National Recovery Administration appropriation bill was passed, it forbade the expending of relief funds for munitions manufacture.[20] That prohibition remained in effect until 1937.

The reference to the struggle for educational orders (a detailed account of which must be found in the records of the office of the Under Secretary of War who was responsible for purchase and procurement, but not for planning or design) is enough to throw additional light upon the arms-procurement difficulties that harassed the Chief of Staff and the War Department in general during the thirties. Efforts to get merely enough weapons or ammunition or training to prevent troop deterioration encountered a professional pacifist opposition that was surprisingly potent in Congress. The money finally obtained for educational orders (which were designed by the Ordnance Department of the Army not to supply weapons currently but to pave the way to eventual mass

[17] Pub 639, 75th Cong, 3d sess.

[18] Pub 723, 75th Cong, 3d sess.

[19] See Plant Surveys and Educational Orders in World War II, U. S. Army Industrial College, Dept of Research, Jan 1947.

[20] 49 U. S. Stat 116.

production) is seen to have been grotesquely small on almost any basis of comparison. And it came disappointingly late, for of the ten initial educational orders of 1939 one was so exclusively educational that it was not executed for over two years; by that time real orders, for production rather than education, were going to industry. The principle of giving educational orders was unquestionably good but, for the reasons given, the practice was weak in that the War Department was enabled to place orders only late and only in small quantities.

The same handicaps affected the purchases of stock piles of "critical and strategic materials," the term that the Army and Navy Munitions Board used to describe the commodities essential to American industry but not produced sufficiently, if at all, within the United States or contiguous territory—such as rubber, tungsten, tin, copra, quinine, and a score of others. The danger of being cut off by wartime blockade from the sources of these supplies was so apparent that the items were listed and recommended for acquisition in quantity.[21] In 1940 came an initial appropriation of $10,000,000, later enlarged to $70,000,000; both items were too small, and both came so late that the nation actually accumulated by 1941 little in the way of strategic materials, in proportion to war needs. As a result there were unnecessarily large problems with synthetics and substitutions throughout the war.

The Accepted Policy of Arming Solely for Defense

This between-wars idea that American armed forces should be designed for defense only, not offense, illuminated as it was by the Washington Treaties for arms limitation (1922) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929), was so completely a national policy imposed upon the Army that it became a guide to Army planning and upon occasion had a particularly crippling effect upon the Air Corps. Thus, in May 1938 a program for acquiring long-range bombers was sent back to the planners by the Deputy Chief of Staff with a sharp restatement of Air Corps limitations. He directed restudy of the program, with the following reminder:

[21] The 1940 listing of the Army and Navy Munitions Board included 14 "strategic" materials (necessary to national defense but not domestically produced in sufficient quantity or quality) and 15 "critical" materials (equally essential to defense but not facing such acute difficulties in procurement from abroad). The first group comprised antimony, chromium, coconut shell char, manganese, manila fiber, mercury, mica, nickel, quartz crystal, quinine, rubber, silk, tin, tungsten. In the second group were aluminum, asbestos, cork, graphite, hides, iodine, kapok, opium, optical glass, phenol, platinum, tanning materials, toluol, vanadium, wool. The lists were variable, and the board kept its eye on other essentials which might some day be required for import, notably petroleum, beryllium, cobalt, and uranium.

(1) Our national policy contemplates preparation for defense, not aggression, (2) Defense of sea areas, other than within the coastal zone, is a function of the Navy, (3) The Military superiority of . . . a B–17 over the two or three smaller planes that could be procured with the same funds remains to be established, in view of the vulnerability, air-base limitation and complexity in operation of the former type. . . . If the equipment to be provided for the Air Corps be that best adapted to carry out the specific functions appropriately assigned it under Joint Action . . . there would appear to be no need for a plane larger than the B–17.[22]

The Air Corps was still suffering acutely from the two blights thus coupled: the nation's defense-only attitude, plus the still persistent theory that the Navy should be responsible for operations not only upon the ocean but in the air above the ocean. A month after the memorandum just recited the Assistant Secretary of War informed the Chief of Air Corps bluntly that "the unobligated funds set up for two B–15s [a long-range type] will not be used for that purpose, nor for a YB–20 [another long-range type] but will be applied to a portion of the 91 bombers, procurement of which was directed." [23] A further warning against experiment looking toward the long-range bombing fleets which soon were to mature, in spite of 1938 policy, was sent to the Chief of Air Corps by the Secretary of War announcing that "estimates for bombers in Fiscal Year 1940 [must] be restricted to light, medium and attack types." [24] It was not until the next year that the Air Board, appointed 23 March 1939 by the Chief of Air Corps, reported defiantly that the striking forces "will be required to extend the destructive effects of air operations over both land and sea, to great distances beyond their operating bases." [25]

The Psychological Effect of Repression

Rebuffs repeated for nearly two decades had resulted in holding Regular Army personnel at levels far below the 1920 National Defense Act requirement of 280,000 men. They had prevented the acquisition of materiel urgently recommended by the General Staff with the result that in the autumn of 1939 there was an accumulated deficit that General Marshall calculated at $700,000,000, much of it needing eighteen months to transform from dollars to materiel.[26] It is unlikely that the effect of these continued rebuffs was limited to such tangible

[22] Memo, DCofS, Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Stanley D. Embick for ACofS G–4, 9 May 38, CofS files 17840–115.

[23] Memo, SW for CofAC, 9 Jun 38, CofS files 17840–121.

[24] Memo, SW for CofAC, 29 Jul 38, CofS files 17840–115.

[25] Tab B of Air Board Report found in AGO 320.2 (6–26–39).

[26] Ltr, CofS to SW, 7 Sep 39, AG 302.2 (9–7–39).

results as the holding down of personnel and of purchases, but there is no way of measuring their effect upon the recipient's state of mind. The impression is that Army chiefs, discouraged by rejections of their recommendations year after year, were reduced to asking not for what was needed but for what they thought they could get.

A sharp colloquy between General Marshall and a member of the House Committee on Appropriations in April 1941 is illustrative. On this occasion General Marshall, explaining the additional costs of troop housing, mentioned the haste with which the construction had been planned and executed and the costliness of last-minute reconnaissance and surveys. A committeeman took him to task with "the only real, legitimate criticism that can be directed toward the War Department"—that it had failed to foresee an emergency and failed to have the survey made. The Chief of Staff disagreed, and pointed to the "political processes of the government" that controlled War Department procedures. The committeeman insisted that no request for funds for such a survey had been made, and wondered why. "I would say very much for the same reason that we did not come to your committee with formal recommendations for adequate ammunition," replied General Marshall. "I wanted to have about $150,000,000 worth of ammunition appropriated for in the spring of 1939 . . . but I did not present the request to this committee. I also wanted about $300,000,000 for ordnance at that particular time; $110,000,000, including about $37,000,000 for ammunition, was provided." [27] There was a suggestion of the same attitude, in retrospect, at a Senate committee hearing in 1940 when the Chief of Staff remarked that "The problem has been one of timing but that, I must admit, has often been more a question of what we might be permitted to do rather than purely a question of what should be done on the basis of national defense." [28]

The Army's hesitancy to push its case vigorously found further illustration in October 1938 when for the first time in years the incentive to rearming was supplied from the White House, and it is surprising to discover that on one occasion it was only in answer to prodding that the Air Corps itself regained confidence and sought funds on a liberal scale.[29] This raises the question of whether the Army and more particularly the General Staff made the most of opportunity either in the era of continued discouragement (the quotation from General

[27] Testimony of 28 April 1941 before House Appropriations Committee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1942. Hearings*, p. 3.

[28] Testimony of 5 August 1940 before Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Second Supplementary National Defense Appropriation for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10263*, p. 2.

[29] The reference is to a succession of events following Munich, dealt with at length in Chapter V.

Craig's farewell report suggesting otherwise) or in the period between Munich (when the White House provided initiative) and Blitzkrieg in France (when Congress and public belatedly awoke to the need of rearming). The question cannot well be answered without an understanding of the Staff's powers and limitations, discussed in Chapter III below, but certain of its performances during the mid-thirties can be examined with profit.

The Quest for New Types of Weapons

In 1932 the General Staff, conscious that the business depression (then in its third year) would continue to slow the provision of money for Army materiel, applied itself to a study of how to cope with this dangerous situation. Little money had been provided since World War I for new weapons or rehabilitation of existing weapons. Meantime technology had made large advances and, in the absence of appropriations, the Army, still using up World War I surplus equipment, was clearly behind the nonmilitary public in certain items, such as trucks. It was pioneering in almost no improved equipment.

On 16 September 1932 a memorandum for circulation among Chiefs of the Supply Arms and Branches reminded them of the War Department's past issuance of annual programs for essential work in research and development. These programs had "often been amended or canceled entirely due to non-availability of funds or change in the situation," but thirty-four development projects were then pending. "In view of the probability of greatly reduced War Department appropriations for Fiscal Year 1934 and succeeding years," the memorandum found it desirable to determine the priority of the various projects not for one year, this time, but for the period 1934–40.[30] The six-year plan, as it came to be called, was originally designed for equipping the first million men under General MacArthur's 1933 mobilization plan. Because the need was for supplying that number of men not alone with standardized weapons but with improved weapons (mechanized equipment in particular) the working out of the program on 21 September 1932 split the six-year effort in two, the first objective to be served by a "Rearmament and Reequipment," the second by a "Research and Development" program.[31] Also, when the government's public

[30] Memo, ACofS G–4 for TAG, 16 Sep 32, G–4/29552, in bndr labeled "Research and Development, Rearmament and Reequipment, Progress, 16 Sep 32–17 Dec 34," P&E file, sec 1. In same binder is General Callan's Memo for DCofS, sub: Rearmament and Reequipment Progress, 7 Sep 34, summarizing related events of the two years preceding.

[31] See General Callan's Memo of 7 Sep 34 cited above.

works planning of 1933 unexpectedly produced enterprises from which the Army might benefit, vigilant Army planners became simultaneously alert to long-standing need and newborn opportunity to acquire a modicum of modern equipment. More important, their plans for the distant future now could contemplate the possibility of personnel far in excess of the current peace strength and appropriations overreaching current budgetary limitations. Distant needs could at least be determined, even though they could not be satisfied immediately. Thus the 1934 statement of requirements could contemplate the first million men in the "Initial Mobilization" of the 1933 plan [32] as something more than a theory. It could be drawn up with confidence in the forward-looking "Policy for Mechanization and Motorization" of 22 November 1933.[33] This in turn was supported by a G–4 declaration that the War Department "could not be content" with partially equipping the first million, but that equipment for certain units "to make up a balanced force in the Subsequent Mobilization" should be provided for.[34]

In setting procurement sights much higher than they had been the Staff established objectives whose attainment was far distant. One may note among the listed development projects of 1934, for example, equipment for a mobile antiaircraft artillery force of thirty-four regiments: in 1939 that force was still projected rather than attained, and personnel for only fifteen regiments was included in the program which General Marshall in that year was still advocating before a Congressional committee.[35] Another 1934 project was the 105-mm. howitzer as the principal artillery weapon of the infantry division, to replace the 75-mm. gun. Yet for a considerable time to come the expressed aim of the Field Artillery, owing to the paucity of funds, was not the replacing of the 75's but merely the modernizing of those on hand so as to provide greater traverse and elevation and flexibility of use.[36] In February 1940 General Marshall was still so anxious to use funds for equipment of greater urgency that he was unwilling to convert immediately to the 105, because this would mean abandonment of a large amount of 75-mm. ammunition on hand, and immediate purchase of

[32] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 26 Jun 34, sub: Recommendation of Projects for Inclusion in the War Department Rearmament and Reequipment Programs FY 1936, G–4/29552.

[33] Memo, TAG for Chiefs of Arms, Branches, and Services, 22 Nov 33, sub: Policy for Mechanization and Motorization, AG 537.3 (11–9–33 Misc D).

[34] Summarized in Memo, ACofS G–4 for DCofS, 7 Sep 34, in G–4/29552, in "Research and Development, Rearmament and Reequipment Progress, 16 Sep 32–17 Dec 34," P&E file, sec 1.

[35] Testimony of 21 Feb 39 before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *National Defense Hearings . . . on HR 3791*, pp. 285–93.

[36] Memo, CofFA for TAG, 1 May 34, sub: Six-Year Programs FY 1936–41, G–4/29552.

105-mm. ammunition at a cost of $192,200,000.[37] The Ordnance Department's program of research would appear to have been stimulated by the pressures of this period, for in June a new order went into effect detailing the new work allotted to all Ordnance laboratories.[38]

A particular encouragement to Department hopes for Army rebuilding was provided by the July 1934 report of a special committee headed by former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and having among its members Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, Deputy Chief of Staff (the Baker Board). The board's principal concern was with the Air Corps, but in recommending that "more definite and continuing appropriations should be available for research and development programs," it included reference to the War Department's plans for modernizing the whole Army, and noted that in the past the Budget Bureau and Congress had "not considered it advisable . . . to sanction the financial programs" necessary for that work.[39] Later that month General Drum, while examining the accumulating estimates of research requirements, felt the need for co-ordinating the several programs in order to avert duplication, and asked G–4 to consider whether co-ordination should be the work of a new technical committee from the Department, or of G–4 itself, or of one of the services, such as Ordnance.[40] G–4 replied with an outline of existing procedure that conformed to Army Regulation 850–25 as revised on 15 July 1931. That regulation, it happened, actually terminated the War Department technical committee that had existed previously, and allotted co-ordination of the work to G–4. Accordingly no change in current practice was recommended, save for the appointment of an Air Corps technical committee that should hold its meetings in Washington—probably in order to facilitate G–4's task.[41]

Later in the month, presumably encouraged by the language of the Baker Board report, Maj. Gen. R. E. Callan proposed a considerable increase in applications for research funds. He recommended that the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch prepare a bill for a "continuing" research and development

[37] Gen Marshall's testimony of 23 Feb 40 before subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941, Hearings*, p. 5.

[38] Ordnance Department Order 48, 15 Jun 34, sub: Ordnance Laboratories.

[39] *Final Report of War Department Special Committee On Army Air Corps, 18 July 1934* (Washington, 1934). The quotations are from pages 73 and 48.

[40] Memo, DCofS for ACofS G–4, 31 Jul 34, sub: Co-ordination of Research and Development Programs of Various Arms and Services, G–4/29552–1.

[41] Memo, ACofS G–4 for DCofS, 6 Aug 34, sub: Co-ordination of Research . . ., G–4/29552–1 or AG 111 (7–31–34). The methods for development of equipment were specified in AR 850–25 as originally framed in 1924, revised in 1927, 1931, and 1936.

program involving a minimum allotment of $5,000,000 to the Air Corps and $4,000,000 to be divided among other branches, for a total of $9,000,000 annually.[42] Although General Drum expressed doubt of the Congressional attitude toward such a proposal, the $9,000,000 suggestion was approved in effect. The services' prorated recommendations were to total $7,000,000, with supplemental and conditional requests for $2,000,000 more. Of the stated minimum, $5,000,000 would be allotted to Air Corps and $2,000,000 to the others combined. The supplemental requests would be granted priority on their comparative merits.[43] Later discussion altered that ratio somewhat, for when the various branches were instructed to provide their individual estimates the Air Corps was allotted $4,500,000 of the $7,000,000 minimum, and up to $5,350,000 in the event that $9,000,000 should be granted by Congress.[44] The requests that came from the services far exceeded the stated maximums, but G–4 was so much impressed by their arguments for heavier research funds—or else by optimism based on the Baker Board's report—as to pass on to the Deputy Chief the total recommendation for $14,000,000, rather than keeping it down to $7,000,000 or even to $9,000,000. The Deputy Chief promptly eliminated excessive requests from the Air Corps and a few from the Signal Corps and reduced the total to $9,064,500.[45] He relented somewhat on G–4 argument in behalf of radar items [46] but to no avail, for the Budget Advisory Committee summarily cut the total all the way back to $7,160,400.[47] Negotiations for the 1938 fiscal year were almost a counterpart. G–4 proposed the $7–9,000,000 limits, received total estimates of $13,000,000, and recommended a minimum of $8,231,000 which met with the Deputy Chief's approval,[48] only to be battered down once more to $7,011,360 by the Budget Advisory Committee, to meet with the known views of the White House.[49] During these years the expenditures for research and development, amounting to an average of $4,600,000 a year during the 1924–33 decade, had been markedly increased, it is seen, but even in the fiscal years 1936–38 the President's Budget

[42] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 27 Aug 34, G–4/29552–2.

[43] Memo, DCofS (General Drum) for ACofS G–4, 28 Sep 34, G–4/29552–2.

[44] Memo, ACofS G–4 for TAG, 24 Oct 34, G–4/29552–2.

[45] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, with DCofS approval, 30 Jan 35, sub: Research and Development Program, FY 1937, AG 111 (12–1–34) (1).

[46] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 4 May 35, sub: Research and Development Program for FY 1937, G–4/29552.

[47] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 10 Oct 35, sub: Research and Development Program, FY 1938, G–4/29552. For expenditure program see separate note entitled Development FY 1938, in same file.

[48] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 8 Feb 36, sub: Research and Development Program, FY 1938, G–4/29552.

[49] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 30 Oct 36, sub: Research . . . for FY 1939, G–4/29552.

officer had continued to hold them considerably below the services' recommendations.

The 1936 Paradox—a Halt in Research Expenditures

In late 1936, when the plans for the distant fiscal year 1939 were being first considered, came a noteworthy change of General Staff attitude toward expenditures for research and development. It was marked by pressure from the new G–4 and the new Deputy Chief of Staff not for further increases but, rather surprisingly, for a reduction of research personnel and of research funds. The proposal was to limit research outlay to the $5–7,000,000 bracket rather than the $7–9,000,000 bracket and the announced purpose was to put an end to research and development of "unessential" equipment when "the Army needs large quantities of excellent equipment that has already been developed. The amount of funds allocated to Research and Development in former years is in excess of the proper proportion for the item in consideration of the rearmament program." [50] This apparent discouragement to research by the current G–4 chief, Brig. Gen. George R. Spalding, supported by the new Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Stanley D. Embick, and necessarily by the Chief of Staff, certainly was not occasioned by hostility to research as such. On the contrary, the written rebuke to branch chiefs for past development of "unessential" equipment was followed by assurance that they should press their development of new critical items. The dominant purpose, it is clear, was to get the existing Army re-equipped without further delay with the best equipment currently available. Appropriations by Congress for new weapons were still small, and the Staff was desirous of using a maximum of dollars for immediate acquisition of equipment rather than spending further time exclusively in development work. Prolonged research undoubtedly would produce better weapons five years hence. It would not provide any immediate betterment of a force currently handicapped by obsolete weapons and, in some cases, possessing none at all. Of the latter sort an outstanding example in 1936 was afforded by the lack of antitank weapons adapted to use against post-World War I armor. The Ordnance Department desired to work on an effective weapon of its own design, but the field forces were in imperative need of some weapon right away. The Staff supported the field forces and prevailed on the Army to put in immediate orders for a

[50] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 30 Oct 36, sub: Research and Development . . . for FY 1939, G–4/29552.

37-mm. gun of German design, that could be promptly supplied by Army arsenals. Time would show that a much more powerful weapon was needed against 1940 armor, and a 3 June 1940 memorandum from General Marshall to his G–4 called for betterment of a weapon that "reports from abroad" indicated "has been found comparatively ineffective against the heavier type tank armor." [51] American-designed guns of successively larger calibers did in fact replace this original antitank weapon as the war advanced. But this event does not disprove the cold necessity of 1936 rearming that evoked the Staff decision for immediate deliveries of available weapons. On this same reasoning the Staff called also for acquisition of a Swedish antiaircraft rapid-fire gun, the Bofors 40, and Staff judgment was fully justified by that weapon's excellent service thereafter.

The rebuke of 30 October had a temporary effect. The ensuing requests from the services apparently aimed at elimination of the less essential objectives of research, for the requests totaled only $8,590,000. This was considerably more than the target maximum, to be sure, but it was far less than the initial requests of previous years. Expressing a desire for more careful control, G–4 firmly reduced the total to $6,586,000 and was supported by the Deputy.[52] In the memorandum that listed the items of highest research priority at that time is evidence of the Staff's effort to prepare the Army for warfare in those respects where there had thus far been woefully small rearming progress and where science and technology had indicated progress was called for. The ranking items of development were listed as follows:

1. Detection of the approach of hostile aircraft.
2. Development of fire-control equipment for antiaircraft artillery and aircraft cannon.
3. Rapid methods of aerial mapping and map reproduction.
4. Development of antimechanized weapons.
5. Development of aircraft and their propulsion.
6. Improvement of air navigation equipment.[53]

The economizing by G–4 was quickly upset by new demands from the branches. Within a month the Chief of Ordnance had sought and obtained

[51] Memo signed "G. C. M." for ACofS G–4, 3 Jun 40, no sub, OCS 20945–11 and G–4/29485–93. It suggested a 47-mm. gun on a self-propelled mount. The Chief of Ordnance in a Memo for G–4 on 7 June 1940 discouraged thought of a 47, and advocated a 75 or, better, an adaptation of the 3-inch antiaircraft gun. G–4/29485–93. Maj. Gen. Lesley J. McNair discouraged a self-propelled type, save in armored divisions. Undated Memo on a slip of paper bearing a "G. C. M." request for advice, attached to a 2 Jul 40 disposition slip in G–4/29485–93. The next month brought a policy decision to use antiaircraft artillery against mechanized targets. Memo, G–4 for TAG, 12 Aug 40, G–4/29485–93.

[52] Memo (with incls), ACofS G–4 for CofS, 10 Mar 37, sub: War Department Research and Development Program, FY 1939, G–4/29552.

[53] *Ibid.*

approval of an additional $100,000 for the development of mobile artillery, G–4 supporting its own change of attitude with citations of needs demonstrated by the field operations in Spain.[54] In June the Chief of Coast Artillery asked additional funds for development of antiaircraft fire-control devices, and in August the Chief Signal Officer asked a large increase in allotment for aircraft detection. Both gained G–4 support.[55] In September the Chief of Staff informed the Chief of Ordnance that highest priority should be given to development of antitank, antiaircraft, and aircraft weapons of intermediate calibers; of the medium tank; of the 105-mm. howitzer; of fire-control equipment and ammunition. In order to comply, the Chief of Ordnance asked for an additional $500,000 and G–4 volunteered to meet part of it by diversion of other funds, so that only $350,000 increase would be required. General Embick withheld approval, apparently in continued reluctance to risk action which might endanger the new-weapons purchases, and in the belief, further, that Ordnance would not be able to use the funds during the 1939 fiscal year; he suggested that if there was later proof of necessity the funds could be diverted from procurement.[56] This solution did in fact meet the needs, and the development of the priority items in question does not seem to have been delayed thereby.

The Air Corps Breaks through Earlier Restrictions

It was in 1938 that a far more troublesome and long-lived controversy developed over the Air Corps' desire to develop the long-range, high-altitude, heavy bomber, upon which Army Air Corps eyes had long been set. The request was for $500,000 for expenditure in development that would lead toward the stated objective, a 35-ton craft capable of attaining 30,000 feet altitude and carrying a 4,000-pound bomb load for 4,000 miles. The request involved more than dollars, as nobody knew better than the Air Corps. It involved an upset of two recognized policies against which the Air Corps had long protested: (1) that the Navy should retain its historic responsibility for sea protection and hence,

[54] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 6 Apr 37, sub: Additional Funds for Research and Development for the Ordnance Department, G–4/29552.

[55] (1) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 14 Jun 37, sub: Research and Development . . . FY 1939, G–4/29552. (2) Memo, same, 10 Aug 37, sub: Signal Corps Research . . . FY 1939 (Project 113), G–4/29552.

[56] (1) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 1 Nov 37, sub: Increase in Research and Development . . . for the Ordnance Department, G–4/29552. (2) Memo, DCofS for ACofS G–4, 3 Nov 37, sub: Increase in Research . . ., G–4/29552.

constructively, that there would be no need for long-range Army Air equipment;[57] (2) that under the last arms reduction treaty "aggressive" warfare had been repudiated, and that, again constructively, a long-range heavy bomber was an "aggressive" rather than "defensive" weapon.[58] Once more the Air Corps argument failed. Its specific request for funds for development of a pressure-cabin airplane adapted to high altitude was rejected. Under instructions from the Chief of Staff, G–4 forwarded the following direction: "Experimentation and research will be confined to types of aircraft for the close support of ground troops. . . . No funds to be set up for the development of the large, heavy bomber types."[59] Cancellation of $648,000 requests for development work on the pressure cabin and diesel motor was not a complete disaster to aviation hopes, for it freed these funds for development work in the approved realms of the pursuit plane and the aerial torpedo. During the course of the 1939 fiscal year the Air Corps also persuaded G–4 to allocate $810,000 more from other funds; as a result the full amount available to the Air Corps for research and development reached the high point to date of $7,524,000 which, if below Air Corps hopes, was still well above the original Staff intentions.[60]

Much the same pressure was exerted with regard to 1940 funds, design for which G–4 began contemplating in late 1937. More warnings against the non-essential were issued[61] but by March of 1938, after whittling down the estimates, G–4 admitted that the world's unsettled state justified increases, particularly for air and ordnance development.[62] A year later it had approved a total of $9,065,950 that the Bureau of the Budget soon reduced to $7,927,810.[63] Still later, influenced by the air expansion program of 1938–39, for which the President himself was chiefly responsible, a single additional grant of $5,000,000 was allotted to the Air Corps;[64] the whole 1940 research fund rose to a total of $12,942,810, of which $10,000,000 went to Air Corps, with only slight increases to be divided among other branches.[65]

[57] See n. 22, above.

[58] See n. 2, above.

[59] (1) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 27 Jul 38, Sub: Research . . . FY 1939, G–4/29552. (2) Memo, ACofS G–4 (Brig Gen George P. Tyner) for TAG, 29 Oct 38, sub: Expenditure Program . . . Cabin Bomber, G–4/29552 or AG 112.04.

[60] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 8 Feb 39, sub: Army Research and Development. G–4/29552.

[61] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 18 Nov 37, sub: Estimates for Research . . . FY 1940, G–4/29552.

[62] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 2 Mar 38, sub: War Department Research . . . 1940, G–4/29552.

[63] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 8 Feb 39, sub: Army Research and Development, G–4/29552.

[64] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 8 Jul 39, sub: Revised Research and Development Program (Air Corps) for FY 1940, G–4/29552.

[65] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 15 Nov 39, sub: War Department Research . . . FY 1942, G–4/29552.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF IN WORLD WAR II AND HIS SUCCESSORS. *General Marshall at Verdun in 1944 with Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, then commanding the 12th Army Group. Eisenhower became Chief of Staff in 1945, Bradley in 1948.*

The threat of war naturally had increased research expenditures considerably. The reality did much more. On 7 September 1939 the Chief of Staff directed the beginning of a program for study of a most intensely applied nature—on the prospective battlefield—sending to G–2 the following message for transmission to the chiefs of all arms and to the heads of both the Command and General Staff School and the War College:

> It appears that we should start at once to examine into the details of the tactics and techniques of the arms as employed by the belligerents. To do this we should send to our military attachés, or with missions which we may send, a list of specific questions regarding which we desire detailed information. Please submit a list covering matters you consider of first importance.[66]

The information that came from the military attachés in response to these inquiries, or independently of them, normally went first to their immediate chiefs, particularly to G–2, by whom it was relayed to appropriate offices; officers returning from missions abroad made supplemental reports to the Chief of Staff on matters of known interest to him, and from time to time General Marshall passed on to various subordinates suggestive information from this source, orally or in writing.[67]

With the fall of France in June 1940 there was a redoubling of impulse to research. In the fiscal year from 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 more than $25,000,000 was spent upon research and development by branches other than the Air Corps; the Air Corps spent $102,000,000 in these fields, and of that total $42,540,012 was for service tests of the heavy bomber [68] upon which in 1938 the Air Corps had been firmly told to do no development work whatever.

Protests Against Methods of Fiscal Control

The record of those years indicates the irregular and halting progress of research and development work as well as of procurement of new weapons, and

[66] Memo, OCS for G–2 (in collaboration with G–3), 7 Sep 39, no sub, signed by SGS (Lt Col (later Maj Gen) Orlando Ward) at CofS's direction, OCS 21090–2. Attached is a 15 Feb 40 memo, similarly addressed and signed, stating that the CofS was "interested in seeing these questions." Same file.

[67] Examples are: (1) Memo, OCS for G–2, G–3, G–4, WPD, Chiefs of Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Corps, 17 Mar 41, no subject formally stated; it deals with the intensive use of German observation aviation, both airplanes and balloons, for getting information to aid artillery fire and dive bombers, and is filed in OCS 21090–18. (2) Memo, CofS for WPD, 22 Mar 41, signed by General Marshall, reporting useful information on General Sir Archibald Wavell's organization of bases and administration, which had been gathered by Col. (later Maj. Gen.) William J. Donovan, and instructing WPD to get in touch with Colonel Donovan. OCS 21090–19. See also Memo, OCS for ASW, 24 Sep 41, sub: Radio Land Mines, OCS 21179–3.

[68] Chart drawn up by G–4 dated 12–5–41 in G–4/29552. See also Memo, B&LP Br for CofS, 25 Jul 41, sub: Research and Development FY 1943. Approved by CofS, 26 Jul 41. OCS 17304–54.

the wounds that both programs received from the necessities imposed by the Budget office. The onus of responsibility for the Army lag in development, however, both press and Congress were disposed to lay on the Army itself, and in February 1939 a resentful G–4 presented to the Chief of Staff a five-page résumé of the situation, particularly a defense of G–4 performance in the areas where public criticism was concentrated.[69] It set forth the fact that for several years G–4 estimates had been reduced by the Bureau of the Budget consistently and quite unsystematically, with the result that the Department's orderly labors in development covering a year or more had been wrecked without warning. G–4 drafted a letter of protest for the Chief of Staff's signature, and proposed the creation of an annual Department reserve fund from which in such a situation moneys could be diverted for essential work. The paper was commended by the Chief of Staff's office as "sound and constructive" and its advice followed save in one respect—the letter to the Budget officer was not sent.[70] There was a painful sequel to the suggestion of the special reserve fund. The idea so favorably impressed General Marshall, the new and trusting Deputy Chief of Staff, that in compiling for the next budget the consolidated estimates for Army research and development he deliberately reduced each item by 5 percent beyond the already considerable reductions by G–4, in order to set up a $700,000 fund for such a reserve without seeking special appropriation. His thoughtful handling of the situation was ill rewarded. The Budget office, bent as usual upon reductions, gave eager welcome to this unprecedented (and unintended) aid to its labors. Observing the unallotted reserve fund of $700,000 that General Marshall had so thriftily arranged, the Budget office promptly struck it out as a start in its economies and then proceeded with the more laborious and discerning jobs of still further excision. Numerous items thus deleted were subsequently appropriated for, in view of the European war's arrival in September 1939, but the $700,000 fund, so carefully designed for systematic development work, was never restored, and the mistake of setting it up in so vulnerable a position for Budget marksmen to hit never was repeated. For misplaced faith in fiscal experts General Marshall admitted his personal responsibility, and late that year wrote a reproachful but profitless letter of explanation to the Budget office.[71]

Early in 1940 there was a further effort to cope with the slowness of the Budget mechanism, as well as with its reducing tendencies. Maj. Gen. J. O.

[69] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 8 Feb 39, sub: Army Research and Development, G–4/29552.
[70] Memo, SGS for ACofS G–4, 18 Feb 39, G–4/29552.
[71] Ltr, CofS to Dir BofB, 26 Dec 39, G–4/29552.

Mauborgne, then Chief Signal Officer, discussed in General Marshall's office the crippling effect of budgetary delays and the next day presented his argument in written form.[72] He asserted that if he complied strictly with Army Regulations procedure and War Department policy he would encounter a delay of 1½ to 2½ years in getting development work started on a new project. To prove his case he presented in calendar form the theoretical history of a new device needed by a combat arm. By his computation the whole progress from suggestion to factory production would take 6 years, of which 27 months was lost in the mere form of two Budget-office steps. It may be significant that seven months after General Mauborgne's written complaint the matter was still unsolved. It was then revived by the circumstance that observers at recent maneuvers told General Marshall that the Army's signal equipment was far behind that of commercial dealers, and the Chief of Staff asked the Signal Corps for prompt betterment.[73] (The Signal Corps' chief enterprise at this time was the installation of its first large field radar; erected in Panama, on 7 October 1940, it detected an airplane 118 miles away.) [74]

News from the war in Europe was now quickening the interest of General Staff and Technical services alike in getting more research than Army appropriations alone made possible. To that end the Chemical Warfare Service appears to have taken the lead in initiating co-operation with commercial industry in early 1939.[75] The example was followed quickly. During April of that year Col. S. C. Godfrey, of the Chief of Engineers Office, related to Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) George V. Strong of WPD his talks on the subject of basic research with Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, and others. He pointed out the work of the National Research Council,[76] and encouraged use of that civilian association, but with no observable results. In the autumn the suggestion of using the council's parent body, the Academy of Science, "created by law for just this purpose," was offered by the Acting Chief of Engineers,[77] whose

[72] Memo, CSO for CofS, 20 Feb 40, G-4/29552-17.

[73] Memo, CofS for CSO, 7 Sep 40, OCS 16281-6. It should be noted that delay in standardizing a piece of equipment did not necessarily mean that none of this equipment was procured. Its acquisition in small lots was sometimes informally provided for by a shift of funds, and thus a new device could be acquired for trial without being adopted as standard.

[74] Signal Corps Development of United States Army Radar Equipment, Pt. III, Hist Div 4-11 RA.

[75] Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 3 Jan 39, sub: Research and Development Policy of the Chemical Warfare Service, G-4/29552 or AG 441.2 (12-5-38).

[76] Memo (with incl), Ex Off Military Div of OCofEngrs for ACofS WPD, 6 Apr 39, sub: Basic Research for National Defense, WPD 4127-3.

[77] Memo, Actg CofEngrs for ACofS WPD, 31 Oct 39, sub: Basic Research, WPD 4127-2.

memorandum was circulated through the Staff and reconsidered for months. Before the Staff could come to agreement upon this approach to the problem, Vannevar Bush had himself proposed a National Defense Research Committee, gained General Marshall's approval, won the President's support, and started functioning, with War Department co-operation.[78] The Chief of Staff had previously shown more than a routine interest in the development of new weapons by directing that action determining the military characteristics of all important weapons and planes be submitted to him for final approval. He blocked manufacture of a new gun carriage, already approved by G–4, on the ground that its 8-foot height provided a too-vulnerable silhouette and its speed in going into action was insufficient for operation in view of the enemy.[79] His order called for revision in both respects.

The Chief of Staff and the Research Effort

The extent to which the Chief of Staff in person initiated study of new weapons is not determinable by the written record which reveals rather what came from the office that he headed.[80] This was a large flow. An impressive exhibit is a memorandum of February 1941, directing study and early report upon recommendations recently received from an unidentified observer in England. Beyond asking for study, it included certain mandates for immediate action, namely: the acquiring of night interception equipment for air defense; the adoption of the British system for communication with pursuit aircraft, also of that for combining oxygen mask with communication transmitter and receiver; the procurement of British types of machine gun ammunition for aircraft; better armament in general including power-operated turrets in nose and tail of all bombers (lack of which was to prove costly); more efficient antiaircraft cannon

[78] The committee was designated by the Council of National Defense, President Roosevelt approving on 27 June 1940. See OCS 16253. See also James P. Baxter, *Scientists Against Time* (Boston: Little Brown, 1946), and WPD 4127. For detail of basic research discussion in early 1940, see AG 381 Natl Defense (12–10–38).

[79] (1) Memo, OCS for G–4, 28 Feb 40, sub: Approval of Military Characteristics (signed by SGS), OCS 18235–50. (2) Memo, OCS for G–4, 18 Feb 41, sub: 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage (signed by SGS), OCS 16787–20.

[80] In 1949 Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons recalled that just before World War II, when he was a liaison officer at the Capitol, he was instructed by the Secretary of War (Woodring) and the Chief of Staff (Craig) to see that interested Congressmen had an opportunity to observe the highly secret work in radar then under way at the Signal Corps laboratories in Fort Monmouth. The result was an unexplained but unopposed addition of $150,000 to the Budget, actually used for more work in radar. He also recalled that General Marshall in turn held frequent private conferences to stimulate more intensive work in development of new weapons.

for home defense; better incendiary bombs and better means of combatting them—in brief, the memorandum directed that "full advantage be taken of British war experience" as to the necessity of maximum fire power. The instructions called for applied research aimed at developing a knowledge of the temperature range of machine gun operation and of heating devices to cope with low temperatures.[81] In answer to a later inquiry from the Under Secretary, General Marshall explained that intensive study was being directed to antitank defense, that currently the Army employed a pooling of antiaircraft weapons for general defense, in the German manner, but there was continuing study of needs.[82] An earlier memorandum, following attendance at an Army-Navy joint exercise (one of many in this period designed to test the services' readiness for combined action), made inquiry about possible means of improving Navy equipment and technique for gun support of shore forces.[83] An inquiry to the Air Corps sought information on how soon a tank-carrying airplane could be developed.[84] In the summer of 1941 the Chief of Staff received recommendations from G–4 and G–3 for improving the light tank to give it more weight, more armor, and better speed and at the same time make it a less conspicuous target; after a month's study his deputy gave approval.[85] A message from the observer in Egypt, noting defects in the light tank then going to the British forces near the Nile, was passed on by the Deputy, but the copy of the message itself bears the initials "G. C. M." [86] In late 1941 when, it would appear, there was a difference of opinion about the extent and value of General Staff influence upon Air Corps policies, the office directed a study of that influence over a period of years as affecting design and production, particularly indicative of conflicts between Staff and Air Corps.[87]

As the war progressed, the need for systematic development was increased. Time was a prime consideration in developing and producing new weapons, in teaching troops how to use them, in encouraging field commanders to exploit them to tactical advantage. As an example, General Marshall gave secret

[81] Memo, OCS for G–4, 18 Feb 41, no sub, OCS 21230–1, signed by SGS by direction of DCofS.

[82] Memo, CofS for USW, 25 Apr 41, sub: Adequacy of Antitank and Antiaircraft Weapons, OCS 20945–16.

[83] Memo, CofS for WPD, 25 Jan 40, no sub, OCS 14440–273.

[84] Memo, OCS for CofAC, 16 May 41, sub: Development of an Air-borne Tank, signed by SGS at direction of DCofS, OCS 17868–130.

[85] Memo, G–4 for CofS, 13 Aug 41, sub: Modification . . . in Light Tank, appd by DCofS (Moore), 12 Sep 41, G–4/29365–34, copy in OCS 17868–152.

[86] Rad, Col Fellers, Cairo, to China Mil Miss, 2 Dec 41, copies to SGS and others. That in OCS 17868–165 bears inked marking "G.C.M." Memo, DCofS for Liaison Officer, Armored Force, no sub, OCS 17868–178.

[87] Memo, OSC for ACofS WPD, 6 Oct 41, sub: Effect of General Staff Action on Types of Mil Aircraft, signed by SGS, OCS 17840–293.

instructions to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) William A. Borden to expedite the development and use of special weapons for jungle warfare. Colonel Borden and a group of technicians flew to the South Pacific with samples of new weapons for field demonstration and for study of further needs, making weekly reports to General Marshall. On his return it was possible to push selected weapons through the production line for rapid delivery to personnel already indoctrinated in their use. Thereafter demonstration teams went to every theater with new weapons and new techniques, speeding effective employment of many new ideas in the realms of radar, recoilless weapons, mine detectors, portable flame throwers, rockets, sniperscopes, and signal equipment among others. Colonel Borden became director of the Development Division, Special Staff.[88]

The quickening influence of Blitzkrieg in mid-1940 was particularly apparent in the field of applied research, rather than basic research. On 17 August Maj. Gen. Lesley L. McNair, Chief of Staff at GHQ, was asked for suggestions of studies on developments in Europe, and three days later directives were issued to G–3 and G–4 calling for separate studies of matters in their respective fields.[89] The subjects of special attention were enumerated as follows:

1. Modification of antiaircraft guns and fire control for use against ground targets.
2. Development of tanks or armored vehicles for use as observation posts.
3. Further development of reconnaissance vehicles.
4. Development of personnel carriers.
5. Equipment for landing operations, including boats for installation on Army transports.
6. Antitank shoulder rifle.
7. Communication system for co-ordination of air support for ground units.

A preliminary report came from G–4[90] but before studied judgments were possible another note called for a more thorough study of current fighting, looking toward an improved method of co-ordinating and developing ideas employed by European belligerents.[91] The G–4 recommendation for designating the Deputy Chief of Staff as the single co-ordinating agency was approved.[92]

[88] Personal Ltr, Gen Borden to Lt Col E. M. Harris, Hist Div, 20 May 49, in Hist Div files pertaining to this volume.

[89] (1) Memo, SGS for Gen McNair, 17 Aug 40, OCS 21157–3. (2) Memo, SGS for ACofS G–3, 20 Aug 40, OCS 21157–1; see also AG 320.2 (9–10–40). (3) Memo, SGS for ACofS G–4, 20 Aug 40, OCS 21157–2 or G–4/31955.

[90] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 23 Aug 40, sub: Development of Arms, G–4/31955.

[91] Memo, CofS for ACofS G–4, 29 Aug 40, AG 320.2 (9–10–40) or CofS 21157–4.

[92] Memo, SGS for TAG, 10 Sep 40, sub: Co-ordination of Research . . ., OCS 21157–4. See also AG 320.2 (9–10–40) and G–4/32048.

In pursuit of his new responsibilities the Deputy Chief soon made inquiry of the Chief of Ordnance upon the status of development work on land mines, shoulder antitank rifles, armor-piercing and incendiary bombs and ammunition, and mechanisms for using antiaircraft guns against ground targets, as well as on items unrelated to the 1940 preoccupation with antitank devices.[93] In early December corresponding inquiries went to the Chief of Engineers with regard to troop ferries, equipment and organization for river-crossing, steel pillboxes, and methods of exploding enemy land mines; to the Chief of Coast Artillery with regard to antiaircraft firing by infrared ray, air barrages for defense, and cold weather tests for antiaircraft artillery; to the Chief of the Air Corps with regard to dive bombers, close air support of ground troops, obstructions for airfields, observation planes, night combat detectors; to the Chief of Field Artillery with regard to cold weather tests and use of self-propelled antitank guns; to the Chief of Ordnance for the matters inquired about during September, also about mounting 20-mm. guns in aircraft; to the Chief of Infantry with regard to airborne infantry, antitank defense, armored carriers for the 81-mm. mortars, cold weather tests for the 37-mm. antitank guns, and self-propelled antitank guns.[94] As the war advanced, inquiries and instructions continued, sometimes by way

[93] Memo, SGS for CofOrd, 24 Sep 40, OCS 21157-5 or AG 320.2 (9-10-40).

[94] These several Memos from SGS to the various branch chiefs, all dated 2 Dec 40, are found in OCS 21157, items 6 to 11. Without attempting to explore the whole field of the Chief of Staff's interest in all details of the development of new weapons and techniques, as shown in prewar days, one may cite also the following inquiries and directives: on the organization of the rifle company, Memo, OCS for G-3, 2 Feb 40, OCS 20117-107; on speeding development and production of better signal equipment, Memo, CofS for CSO, 7 Sep 40, no sub, OCS 16281-61; on reconsidering methods of providing antitank and antiaircraft protection for artillery elements, Memo, DCofS for G-3, 17 Aug 40, sub: Tables of Organization, OCS 20065-39; on improving reconnaissance, Memo, OCS for TAG, 24 Apr 40, no sub, OCS 20150-140; on experimental changes in divisional organizations, Memo, OCS for CofS GHQ, 14 Apr 41, no sub, OCS 20117-117; on triangularizing square divisions, Memo, CofS for G-3, 8 Oct 41, no sub, OCS 20117-122; on proper spacing of convoys exposed to attack, Memo, OCS for G-2, 9 Sep 40, no sub, OCS 21164-1; on new scrutiny of Bofors as substitute for 37-mm. gun, Memo, CofS for Gen Charles M. Wesson, CofOrd, 13 Jan 41, no sub, OCS 16367-73; on redesign of 90-mm. gun to permit fire below horizontal, Memo, DCofS for CofOrd, 8 Jul 41, sub: 90-mm . . ., OCS 16367-89; on speeding development of self-propelled Bofors, same for same, 21 Aug 41, no sub, OCS 16367-89; on simplifying procedures to hasten production, Memo, OCS for G-4, 26 May 41, sub: AR 850-25, Devt . . . of Equipt, OCS 19666-11; on bringing via Washington Keymen Returning from Overseas Duties in order to Utilize their Knowledge, Memo, OCS for WPD, 20 Sep 40, no sub, OCS 20055-86. Personal letters were written now and then when the Chief of Staff apparently thought the principle more important than the item itself appeared to be. Thus, a letter to Private Alber, Fort Devens, Mass., 23 Apr 41, in OCS 19693-68, commending him for writing to a news magazine a letter correcting an inaccurate statement critical of the Army. There is also a three-page letter, Marshall to Hogg, 12 Dec 40, in OCS 19696-64, setting him aright on the Army's reason for selecting a certain weapon. At the end in ink is this: "Incidentally, Mr. Hogg, the preparation of replies such as this takes so much of my time and that of my staff that it very seriously interferes with the discharge of pressing duties."

of the Deputy, sometimes via the Secretary of the General Staff or by one of the Staff Divisions. Selected at random from 1941 files are memoranda calling for experiment with searchlights for use in aircraft detection; for development of plane-to-plane and ground-to-plane rocket projectiles in extension of joint experiment with the Navy, the British, and the National Defense Research Committee; for sending a parachute officer to Russia to study Russian training and organization; for experimenting with antiaircraft cannon in airplane mounts for use against enemy tanks; for assurance that development was in progress with rocket propulsion as well as take-off. At the Staff Conferences were oral inquiries on progress made in meeting a variety of equipment needs.[95] After the Roberts committee report on Pearl Harbor a scrutiny of its findings was directed in order to disclose Army errors that could be guarded against thereafter; a month later, with the scrutiny completed, the Chief of Staff pursued it with instructions for immediate action for improving defenses at airfields and for development of new air attack techniques: grimly he gave instructions also to "initiate legislation required to improve U. S. espionage and counter-espionage." [96]

Whatever the procedure used, however, progress in translating ideas into weapons was clearly slower than the Chief of Staff thought necessary. G–4's suggestions failed to satisfy him, and in mid-1941 General Marshall demanded a revision of "cumbersome peacetime procedure." G–4's proposal this time was a phrasing of the views of the Ordnance Department, suggesting a bypassing of formality and holding that ". . . rapid progress . . . can be obtained only by the most direct and informal contacts between interested individuals. Such contacts between representatives of the supply arms and services, the using arms, and the War Department General Staff will constitute the normal procedure." [97] This procedure was thereafter encouraged in the Staff, stimulated to a livelier sense of responsibility in these matters by a G–4 reminder in the previous month

[95] See series of discussions in CofS files, Miscellaneous Notes on Conf Emergency Period.

[96] (1) Memo, OCS for G–3, no sub, 4 Apr 41, OCS 15310–24. (2) Memo, OCS for Gen Barnes, 15 Aug 41, sub: Rockets, OCS 21308–4; also Memo, ACofS G–4 for SGS, 17 Sep 41, sub: Development of Rockets, G–4/33455, copy in OCS 21308–4; also Memo, DCofS for H. H. Bundy, Spec Asst for SW, 19 Sep 41, same sub and files. (3) G–3 disposition form to G–2 through OCS, 10 Sep 41, sub: Final Report . . . as Military Observer, G–3 40911, filed with OCS 21316–4. (4) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 28 Jul 41, sub: Development of Anti-tank Airplane, G–4/27277–106, copy in OCS 21304–1. (5) Memo, DCofS for Air (Maj Gen Henry H. Arnold) for ASW (John J. McCloy), 1 Dec 41, sub: Rocket airplanes, OCS 21308–7. (6) Memo, OCS for G–3, 3 Feb 42, no sub, OCS 21347–70; also Memo, OCS for Chief of Army Air Forces, 4 Mar 42, sub: Study of Proceedings of Roberts Commission . . ., same file; same for G–3, same date, sub, and file; same for WPD same date, sub, and file; and same for G–2, same date, sub, and file.

[97] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 20 Aug 41, sub: Revision of Procedure for the Development of Materiel, G–4/28541.

that "the Chief of Staff, through the War Department General Staff . . . now exercises coordination and supervision over the research and development activities of all Arms and Services." The apparent purpose was to have a General Staff officer named on each civilian research and development agency exploring military needs, partly for security reasons, partly to assure an exchange of information, for the research groups of the Army's branches now were deep in studies of such varying developments as tank and antitank materiel, aircraft and antiaircraft, incendiaries, submarine mines, radio-controlled mines, jet propulsion, rocket devices, and proximity fuses.[98] More and more the co-ordination of these studies was assumed by G–4, especially after November 1941 when Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell became its chief and promptly informed the arms and branches of G–4's supervision. Not until then was the co-ordinating power in research activities fully asserted within the Staff and fully exercised. And almost immediately thereafter the Army reorganization transferred this function to Army Service Forces, headed by the same General Somervell.

The delays recited in the design and acceptance of new materiel have an intimate relationship to other rearming aspects, particularly to the budgetary restrictions, persistent through two decades, that put research and development work not into a natural harmony with procurement but into competition with it. The Staff's deliberate effort in 1936 to limit research expenditures is a striking example.[99] In later chapters dealing with the materiel program the time factor to which General Craig referred will be found to have covered far more than the two-year period of his warning. It is apparent that in Army rebuilding there was more than the *personnel* time factor needed for the training of men. The extent of this factor could be calculated fairly well. But the men's training was dependent upon the available supply of weapons and other equipment, production of which in some cases took much more than two years. This was the *materiel* time factor, less accurately calculable and too little understood by many Army chiefs both of staff and line, who knew tactics and strategy far better than they knew supply. Besides the materiel and personnel time factors was yet another, a *political* time factor, that antedated the others and whose extent was, and is, wholly incalculable in advance. For the political, governmental authority—President and Congress—had to be convinced of necessity before one dollar

[98] Detailed information on the intensive research of this period must be sought in histories of the arms and branches concerned. Sources readily available includs G–4 records, notably G–4/29552, and the AG 580 series.

[99] Page 42 of this volume.

could be made available to the armed services for any phase of their upbuilding. In computing, after the fact, how long it took America to prepare for war, then, one must add to the personnel and the materiel time factors this large political item in the sequence of rearming events. Owing to national apathy toward defense needs during the twenties and thirties, the political time factor, the necessary predecessor to the other two, was very long indeed.

CHAPTER III

The General Staff: Its Origins and Powers

The powers and responsibilities of the World War II Chief of Staff and of the office that both counseled him in his planning and assisted him in the execution of his wishes sprang in part from authorization by Congress,[1] in part from direction by the President as Commander in Chief, and, in some cases, from an unopposed assumption of duty. They had been accumulated over a period of years, beginning with a stormy period immediately after the Spanish-American War when the blunders and confusion of the War Department direction during that conflict made clear the need of wholesale reforms.[2] The changes brought about under the far-seeing leadership of Secretary of War Elihu Root constituted a total reorganization. Previously the War Department, under the Secretary but sometimes in practical defiance of him (as when General Sherman moved his office away from Washington altogether),[3] had been ruled in part by the Commanding General of the Army, and in part by the several chiefs of bureaus long entrenched in office and able through friendly Congressmen to influence or even dominate the Commanding General. Aided by the advice of a very few officers and by an industrious study of the military systems of Europe, Secretary Root practically drove through Congress the legislation that in 1903 produced the General Staff of the Army having forty-five members. The Chief of that Staff was recognized as the principal officer of the Army deriving his powers from the President as Commander in Chief by way of the Secretary of War, but his functions, it was clearly stated, would be

[1] Initially from the Dick Act, 1903.

[2] See *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain* (in 8 Vols. Senate Document 221, 56th Cong, 1st sess, Washington: GPO, 1899) and, among the compact and highly readable unofficial accounts, Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931).

[3] Sherman's removal of his headquarters to St. Louis was announced in GO 108, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, 3 September 1874. In his *Memoirs* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1931 ed.), II, 440ff., Sherman gives a detailed account of conditions in the War Department that impelled him to move away, with President Grant's sympathy. See also Liddell Hart, *Sherman, Soldier, Realist, American* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1929), p. 417.

advisory rather than operative. This limitation of authority was a concession to an opposition so powerful and so varied that Secretary Root and his supporters saw that compromise was necessary. The veteran Commanding General of that day, Nelson A. Miles, was so fully opposed to the creation of a General Staff that the original bill had to be put over for one term of Congress; in that interval General Miles was retired from active duty. The principal chiefs of bureaus were equally opposed and longer-lived. They and their successors for many years after the Staff's creation effectively opposed reforms by exploiting in Congress the theory that a powerful General Staff would clamp militarism upon the nation.[4] So powerful were the bureau chiefs and so confident of Congressional favor that the Adjutant General of 1912, a man of great capacity and will power, offered open defiance to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary as well, and was promptly relieved from duty.[5] His voluntary retirement from the Army followed immediately. Even so, his continuing influence in Congress provided fuel for a Congressional vendetta against the current Chief of Staff and against the "militaristic" activities of the General Staff itself; accordingly the Staff's membership was reduced from the original forty-five to thirty-six. Four years later, the National Defense Act of 1916 (which otherwise was a considerable step toward coping with a war already raging in Europe) contained a clause that almost hopelessly crippled the Staff: it granted a small increase in the number of its officers but added a mischievous condition—that not more than half the total should be stationed "in or near the District of Columbia."[6] It left the United States with a General Staff of 19 officers, against Germany's 650.[7] The restriction had tragic consequences for the nation in 1917, but it supplied the next generation of Army officers with a memorable lesson upon the desir-

[4] Among accounts of the early period are the *Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899–1903;* statement of Col John McAuley Palmer, 9 Oct 19, in *Hearings . . . Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 66th Cong, 1st and 2d sess . . .* on S 2691, S 2693, S 2715 (Washington: GPO, 1919), Vol. II (also published, together with historical documents relating to the reorganization plans of the War Department, in *Hearings . . . Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 69th Cong, 2d sess,* Washington: GPO, 1927); Maj Gen Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), Chs. I–IV. This last work, while typographically confusing, is itself admirably documented; it is particularly useful for reference guidance and unexcelled as a compendium.

[5] The dispute between the Chief of Staff, Gen Leonard Wood, and The Adjutant General of that day, Maj Gen Fred C. Ainsworth, is recorded at length in Report 508, 62d Cong, 2d sess and more briefly in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service* (New York: Harper, 1948). H. L. Stimson, then in his first period as Secretary of War, initiated the disciplinary measures.

[6] Annual Report of Chief of Staff 1916, p. 168.

[7] *Army and Navy Journal,* 13 Sep 19, p. 51, quoted by Nelson, *op. cit.,* pp. 225–26.

ability of keeping on good terms with Congress; the Chief of Staff in office on the eve of World War II was to display more tact and understanding than had his predecessor of a quarter century earlier, and this was destined to redound to his and to the nation's great advantage.

The General Staff's Changing Pattern

The Staff had started out in 1903 with a membership ranging from general officers to captains. It contained a grouping that provided members with separate geographical responsibilities. By another grouping it was organized in three functional divisions, dealing respectively with administration, with information, and with planning, military education, and technical considerations. In 1908 the functional "divisions" became "sections" (these terms were exchanged back and forth for years to come) and the second and third were consolidated into one. Two years later Gen. Leonard Wood as Chief of Staff re-established three divisions, but on a wholly different scheme. This time the first division was responsible for the mobile army, the second for the coast artillery and other nonmobile installations, and the third for planning and military education, including the functioning of the War College. The elaborate fiction of 1903 (apparently necessary to get the General Staff started) that the Chief of Staff could be the Secretary's principal adviser and yet have no command authority over the rest of the Army and War Department now came to test in the case of Adjutant General Ainsworth, just referred to. As noted, the Chief of Staff won his fight, but he almost lost his war, for the legislative sequels of that conflict left the infant General Staff weaker in numbers than it had been before and with a set of war plans almost wholly unrelated to such realities as the availability of personnel and materiel alike. From its weakened state, made the worse on the eve of World War I by widespread isolationism and extreme pacifism in Congress and nation, with resultant hostility to Army preparedness, the War Department was revived by the appointment of a Secretary of War of exceptional capacity, Newton D. Baker, and by the actual arrival of war's compulsions. A mechanism so badly handled for years did not quickly start moving again. Of the incompetence and confusion of both Department and Staff there is ample evidence in the contemporary criticisms by Generals John J. Pershing, James G. Harbord, and Robert L. Bullard [8] and the later estimates of Gen. Peyton C. March.[9] So acutely did

[8] Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 225–26.

[9] See Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1932).

General Pershing, who had gone to France with the first elements of the American Expeditionary Forces in June 1917, need to have in Washington a Chief of Staff acquainted with modern war and with A. E. F. problems in particular that General March was brought back from France to fill that office and effect a reorganization. He did so with great speed and skill and effectiveness, but unhappily with such resultant enmities in Congress and with General Pershing himself as to forfeit much of the popular esteem which his brilliant and forceful labors deserved.[10] These two outstanding figures of the 1918 Army had two opposed concepts of responsibility. General Pershing had gone abroad with authority which left no doubt that he was immediately responsible to the President as Commander in Chief, through the Secretary of War. It was equally clear that he was not subordinate to the Chief of Staff. More than a year later, under General Order 80, the new Chief of Staff became the "immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the military establishment . . . charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the Army program," and took "rank and precedence over all officers of the Army." [11] It was a high authority that General March proceeded to exercise with respect to the entire Army organization in the United States and even with respect to the Assistant Secretaries of War; when their France-bound cables displeased him he "either tore them up or directed they be not sent." [12] Three thousand miles away, however, General Pershing continued to exercise the authority bestowed on him originally, and in a letter to Secretary Baker successfully resisted an attempt by General March to reduce that authority, to the end that the supply difficulties in the United States might be lightened.[13] There was merit in both contentions, as there was in both contenders. General Pershing's needs were not only the normal needs of the field commander but those of a commander in a critical situation. He felt (as is the theme of his memoirs during this period) that influences among the French and English alike were seeking to have him relieved of the command in France, and that any lessening of his authority would do irreparable damage not only to him but to the A. E. F.; in particular he felt, and probably rightly, as

[10] General March was denied his proper retirement rank as general until several years after General Pershing received his own well-merited and unique tribute as General of the Armies. General Pershing's *My Experiences in the World War* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931) and General March's *The Nation at War* present their respective views on the matters in dispute.

[11] General Order 80 was issued 26 August 1918. It construed the act of 12 May 1917 as bestowing these powers on the Chief of Staff.

[12] March, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

[13] The correspondence with accompanying discussion is found in Pershing, *op cit.*, pp. 185–92.

he wrote Mr. Baker, that "our organization here is so bound up with operations and training and supply and transportation of troops that it would be impossible to make it function if the control of our service of the rear were placed in Washington." Instead, General Pershing developed his own Services of Supply, A. E. F., under the highly competent Maj. Gen. J. G. Harbord who had been the Chief of Staff, A. E. F., before being given command of the Marine Brigade and later, the 2d Division. This efficient supply establishment provided a working liaison with Washington and also an experience that was to contribute mightily to the postwar planning of Staff and Army organization. General March's arguments, however, were so sound in principle, if not in immediate application to the 1918 emergency, that General Pershing himself in his invaluable constructive work in postwar Washington saw to it that the Chief of Staff should thereafter have the very powers that General March had asserted. It would appear that General Pershing was correct in his view as of that critical time and place, and that General March was correct in his view of the powers the Chief of Staff should have had long before, and thereafter did have.

As to the General Staff itself during World War I, there were similar convulsions in its composition, dictated by new necessity springing from new situations and from experience itself, and also dictated by views of changing Chiefs of Staff as to the proper mechanism for attaining results. The peacetime three-divisional Staff mechanism that General Wood had set up in 1910 went through the changes demanded by war, and in early 1918, just prior to General March's accession, it was reorganized with five divisions.[14] These were named Executive, War Plans, Purchase and Supply, Storage and Traffic, and Operations. Experience showed that the third and fourth of these divisions could be combined to advantage, and they were so combined under the new Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, in an organization suggestive of the Army Service Forces in a later war. Later, General Order 86 (18 September 1918) set up a Personnel Branch in the Operations Division. General Order 80 likewise created as a separate division what had been a Military Intelligence Branch, hitherto a part of War Plans and later included in the Operations Division. Intelligence had already been accepted as a major element in General Pershing's Staff at GHQ, A. E. F., which General Pershing modeled closely and conveniently upon the French General Staff. This A. E. F. organization (in contrast with that in Washington) had five divi-

[14] This was by General Order 14, dated 5 February 1918.

sions, G–1, Personnel and Administration; G–2, Intelligence; G–3, Operations; G–4, Supplies; and G–5, Training. It served as a model for the postwar General Staff in Washington, with changes suitable for peacetime whereby G–3 and G–5 were combined, and a fifth division, War Plans, took on the new duties of planning against future wars.

Changes After World War I

The task of reorganizing after World War I the Office of the Chief of Staff and the General Staff and the War Department itself was a sobering experience for the professional Army. It could not be undertaken without recognition that the organization existing up to 1917 had failed to meet requirements,[15] and that in fact it was not the Army and the Staff in Washington, so much as it was the civilian Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, and his civilian advisers, who had driven through the reorganization of February 1918.[16] That the Staff had been fearfully handicapped by restrictive legislation in peacetime has already been pointed out, but it does not appear that the Staff fully utilized such opportunities as came its way. Attention must be given to the post-factum testimony of Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood, one of the Department's severest critics although himself a member of the Staff in the years marked by his complaints. He recalls that on one occasion he presented General Wood with a sheaf of Staff memoranda. "I suggested that he select at random 100 of these . . . and predicted that none of them would bear upon any question relating to war and that no more than three of them would bear upon a question of any consequence in relation to peace or war. He did so and found my prediction true." [17] Granting that the facts lost no color in General Hagood's accomplished recital of them, his eminence in the Army and Staff and his record of achievement warrant attention to his severe postwar judgment that

> . . . the fourteen years, 1903–17, during which the General Staff had been in existence had not been spent in making plans for war, the purpose for which it was created, but in squabbling over the control of the routine peacetime administration and supply of the

[15] See Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 235, for "Causes of War Department breakdown in World War I."

[16] The abiding respect that General Marshall had for Mr. Baker's services, nineteen years after his Secretaryship was closed, was recorded in 1940. Memo, CofS for Gen E. M. Watson, military aide to the President, 14 Jun 40, sub: Letter from Maj S. P. Simpson, ORC, Harvard University, to Justice Felix Frankfurter, OCS 21097–6. Disagreeing with one of the letter writer's views, General Marshall wrote: "Mr. Baker in my opinion was the most effective Secretary of War we ever have had and probably ever will have."

[17] Johnson Hagood, *The Services of Supply* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), p. 21.

Regular Army and in attempts to place the blame for unpreparedness upon Congress. . . . Our unpreparedness did not come from lack of money, lack of soldiers, or lack of supplies. It came from lack of brains, or perhaps it would be fairer to say, lack of genius. . . .

The whole General Staff and War Department Organization generally fell like a house of cards and a new organization had to be created during the process of the war. . . . Why, seeing these things, did I not do something to correct them? The answer is that I did not see them, or seeing them did not understand. Hindsight is better than foresight.[18]

It was the completeness of the 1917 debacle, as clear to the civilian as to the military, that influenced the completeness of the 1920 change. In impressive contrast was the success attained by the A. E. F., and this contrast encouraged the adoption of the A. E. F. set-up, wartime creation though it was, as the model for a peacetime Staff in Washington. At the head would be General Pershing himself, followed by a succession of men who had been his trusted lieutenants in France. It was the experience of 1918 that dictated the very composition of the new General Staff. The whole Staff concept, for years to come, was that a new war would be a simulacrum of 1918.

The National Defense Act of 1920 was by no means what the Army wished, as expressed in General March's recommendations, transmitted by Mr. Baker with modifications of his own. The request had been for a General Staff of 226 officers; the grant was of 93 at Washington, but with no limit imposed on the number of Staff officers with troops. The function of the General Staff in Washington was to remain deliberative rather than administrative, evidence of Congress' continuing suspicion of "militarism"; there was an abiding recollection of 1903 pledges that the General Staff was to concern itself with planning and co-ordination, and with "supervision" as distinguished from "command." The operating activities for the whole Staff (for a time designated as Operations, Military Intelligence, War Plans, Supply) were set forth.[19] A significant and lasting reform gave to the civilian Assistant Secretary of War supervision of the procurement of supplies and equipment (not their design or calculation). It recognized the extremely useful work of Mr. Baker's Assistant Secretary, Benedict Crowell, in bringing order from 1917 chaos, and in the permanent organization of 1921 made the Assistant Secretary's office legally responsible for procurement. Upon the energy and capacity of that official, guided by the planning of the General Staff and eventually supported by President and Congress, thereafter depended the progress the Army should make toward

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 22ff.

[19] In General Order 48, War Department, 12 August 1920.

preparedness. In these important respects the Harbord Board's recommendations, warmly supported by General Pershing and accepted by the Secretary, provided a basis for General Staff thinking for years to come. The Staff's set-up, therefore, during almost the whole interval between World War I and World War II, can profitably be examined in order to understand how the Army did its planning.

The Chief of Staff's Powers

Army Regulations 10–15, affecting the General Staff, as of 1921 went through only minor revisions until early 1942. They included the following specifications:

> The Chief of Staff is the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the military program. He shall cause the War Department General Staff to prepare the necessary plans for recruiting, mobilizing, organizing, supplying, equipping and training the Army ["of the United States" was later inserted] for use in the national defense and for demobilization. As the agent, and in the name of the Secretary of War, he issues such orders as will insure that the plans of the War Department are harmoniously executed by all branches and agencies of the Military Establishment, and that the Army program is carried out speedily and efficiently.[20]

To this was added in the revision of 18 August 1936 the following significant paragraph:

> [He] is in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field organization and the general training of the several armies, of the overseas forces, and of the G. H. Q. units. He continues to exercise command of the field forces after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a commanding general thereof.[21]

The authority conveyed in the 1921 version's first sentence, for the "planning, development and execution of the military program," appears to be all-inclusive, and almost certainly was so designed by its framers, under the eyes of General Pershing. Under later Chiefs of Staff doubts appear to have arisen about the completeness of their control of the Army itself; whatever the doubts, they were resolved in 1936 by insertion in Army Regulations of the additional paragraph just cited, which puts into written form what presumably had been the intention of the 1921 planners. The precise legal authority for this assumption is not

[20] AR 10–15, 25 Nov 21, sec I, 1.
[21] AR 10–15, 18 Aug 36, sec I, 1b.

Chart 4.—Exercise of the Chief of Staff's Command of Overseas Establishments, Including Departments, Defense Commands, and Bases: 1 December 1941 (a)



(a) A simplified chart showing only major relationships, and omitting detail.

(b) In the case of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments, the Chief of Staff exercised command directly through the Department Commander, via his General Staff. WPD was the General Staff division primarily concerned with overseas departments. Command of the other establishments indicated was exercised through GHQ as of 1 December 1941. In a number of activities, such as supply, construction, etc., GHQ dealt through the General Staff divisions in the exercise of its control over overseas establishments. The departments, defense commands, and bases indicated included supply, administrative and tactical elements, including field force units for protective garrisons, both ground and air.

(c) At this time the Philippine Department was part of a larger command, United States Army Forces in the Far East, Gen. Douglas MacArthur being Commanding General of both.

(d) Activated in February 1941, to place the Panama Canal and Puerto Rican Departments and all bases protecting the approaches to the Panama Canal under a unified command. The command was placed under GHQ on 1 December 1941. The Caribbean Defense Command and its component organizations were co-ordinated with the naval sea frontiers for co-operative action and joint defense operations.

(e) Organized as Puerto Rican Sector and Panama Sector for unified tactical defense within the Caribbean Defense Command—administered as departments for supply. Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews was Commanding General of both the Caribbean Defense Command and Panama Canal Department.

(f) These bases included the United States Army establishments in the Bahamas, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Antigua, British Guiana, Surinam, Curaçao, and Aruba.

quotable, but the large powers of the Chief of Staff over the entire Army were not openly questioned thereafter.

The Chief of Staff was the military chief of the War Department, but not its highest authority. Over him was the civilian Secretary of War who, in the wording of Army Regulations of that time, "directly represents the President . . .; his acts are the President's acts, and his directions and orders are the President's directions and orders." [22] The Secretary's approval was required on all matters of Army policy and in his name departmental decisions were made and actions taken. To both the President and the Secretary of War the Chief of Staff was adviser (President Roosevelt's executive order of 5 July 1939 provided immediate contact between White House and the military chiefs of Army and Navy in the realms of "strategy, tactics and operations"). By long established custom, he was adviser also to the Congressional committees which naturally called upon the Army's principal figures for advice on legislative matters affecting the Army, and while General Marshall was Chief of Staff this relationship was particularly close. Similarly he was a principal Army spokesman in conferences with the State Department and other branches of government at need.

The Chief of Staff's occupation, of course, was in the control of all the Army's activities as summarized in the Regulations. This control was not questioned, although General Marshall was never designated formally as "commander of Field Forces" and never asked to be. Control was exercised largely through the five sections of the General Staff which, with Deputies and Secretary of the General Staff, composed the "Office of the Chief of Staff." Under this office, which must be regarded as a unity functioning in the name as well as the interest of the Chief of Staff himself, the Army was directed through specified chains of command indicated broadly in Chart 1, portraying the set-up as of 1 December 1941. In one category immediately below the Office of the Chief of Staff were all the branches that provided the supplies of the Army (Quartermaster Corps, Ordnance Department, etc.) and all the bureaus that performed its administrative functions (such as Adjutant General, Judge Advocate General, and Finance Division), these making up the Special Staff as distinguished from the General Staff. In another category were the chiefs of the several combat arms (Infantry, Field Artillery, and so on). In another were the nine corps areas into which continental United States was divided (the corps areas by this time being concerned with supply and administration rather than with tactical command). In another cate-

[22] AR 1–15, sec 1 (2), as revised 12 Dec. 27.

FOUR DEPUTY CHIEFS IN THE LATE PREWAR PERIOD

Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick
29 May 1936–30 September 1938

Maj. Gen. William Bryden
1 June 1940–16 March 1942

Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore
22 July 1940–9 March 1942

Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold
(Additional Deputy for Air)
31 October 1940–December 1941

SECRETARIES OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE LATE PREWAR PERIOD

Lt. Col. Robert L. Eichelberger
3 July 1935–9 November 1938

Lt. Col. Harold R. Bull
10 November 1938–2 July 1939

Col. Orlando Ward
3 July 1939–30 August 1941

Brig. Gen. Walter B. Smith
31 August 1941–3 February 1942

gory were the field forces, of which the Chief of Staff of the Army had been the designated commander since 1936. In another were the overseas establishments. In another the Air Forces. The last three categories were themselves divided in so complex a manner as to call for portrayal in separate charts, 2, 3, and 4. It was the confusing character of the command arrangement in these echelons, difficult even to chart in a wholly logical arrangement, which, not unnaturally, aroused discontent with the General Staff organization and in late 1941 led to the declaration that reorganization would be necessary. Whether or not there was compelling need for so complete a rearrangement of controls as came about was disputed, but this new set-up was decreed in March 1942.[23]

The graphic charts (1–4) suggest rather than portray the manner in which the Chief of Staff's large responsibilities were delegated throughout these various categories and areas of command. The immense labors that he performed in person are not as readily portrayed by charts as by a record of the major events in which he was a principal actor. The mechanisms whereby the Office of the Chief of Staff functioned, however, are discernible in its composition and in the recital of responsibilities allotted to its several elements.

The Deputies' Powers

These elements in the years just before World War II included the Deputy Chief of Staff (to the one deputy listed in 1936 Army Regulations two more were added later), the Secretary of the General Staff, and the five Staff Divisions. The duties of the original single Deputy were recited in the regulations, thus: "The Deputy Chief will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him . . . will report directly to the Secretary of War in all matters not involving the establishment of military policies." [24]

The Deputy Chief was particularly charged with legislative and budgetary matters, and also with general supervision of all the General Staff Divisions. Oddly, from 1921 until 1939 this important office had no statutory basis for existence, even a 3 June 1938 amendment to the National Defense Act of 1920 having failed to correct the omission. The office was established administratively in 1921 to meet an obvious need, but only in March 1939 did G–1 make recommendations effecting the change—and then apparently because of the necessity of assigning

[23] The first phases of reorganization planning are discussed fleetingly in Chapter IX. Fuller treatment will be found in a later volume.

[24] AR 10–15, 18 Aug 36, sec I, 2.

to the Deputy's post one of the "88 other officers" to which the General Staff was limited. General Craig, then Chief of Staff, supported the recommendation, likewise stressing his reluctance "to assign an officer to the position from among the limited number authorized for the performance of the detailed work of the Staff," and in July 1939 Congress provided legal authority for the Deputy's appointment.

The same bill effected another long-delayed correction to which the G–1 memorandum also had invited attention. The 1920 act had created a General Staff of four divisions (G–1, G–2, G–3, and G–4), each under a general officer of the line. When the Staff was reorganized on 1 September 1921 the War Plans Division was added, but there being no legal authority for the assignment of a fifth general officer one of the five divisions, of necessity, had to be headed by a colonel. Except during short periods thereafter this was the lot of the Intelligence Division (G–2) whose chief was thus inferior in rank to the other four Assistant Chiefs of Staff, to his opposite number in the Navy, and to a number of foreign military attachés with whom he had frequent dealings, an embarrassment which it was possible to end only in 1939.[25]

The administrative work of 1940 became so overpowering as to exceed the capacity of the existing Deputy Chief of Staff, and not only was a second deputy created but, in an attempt to meet the special needs of the growing air establishment, an additional acting deputy was added in the person of the Chief of the Air Corps. General Marshall defined the fields of activity for these three so as to grant to one deputy concern over studies and papers on all personnel matters (except in air and armored components); training, organization, and operations of ground components (except armor); all other Staff matters not allotted the other deputies. The other deputy was jointly responsible in personnel matters for the Armored Force; he was solely responsible for studies and papers on training, organization, and operations of armor and for those on construction, maintenance and supply (except air), transportation, land acquisition, and hospitalization; for a time he handled Air Corps co-ordination too.

[25] (1) Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 3 Mar 39, sub: Additional Officers for WDGS, G–1/15466–12. (2) Gen Craig's Statement Made in Hearings on HR 5971, 76th Cong, in G–1/15466–12B. (3) Pub 172, 76th Cong, 14 Jul 39. Lesser rank did not hamper work within the division, it would seem, for in the years just before the war Col. (later Brig. Gen.) E. R. W. McCabe as Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, initiated far-reaching improvements in organization, planning, and procedure. Inadequate training regulations were replaced by a new series of Field Manuals, Special and Army Regulations systematizing combat and counter-intelligence, mapping, technical intelligence, and psychological warfare. (See basic Field Manual: Military Intelligence, FM 30 series, 1940 issue; MID–SR 30–30; AR 380–5.) These had a deep influence on Army schools and training and became the guide for field intelligence activities in World War II.

The acting deputy collaborated with the first-named deputy on air personnel papers, and was solely responsible for papers on all other matters touching the air component. For several months the three deputies or their representatives met in daily conference for a joint examination of Staff papers, partly to keep each informed on the other's work, partly to expedite necessary concurrence.[26]

The Secretary of the General Staff

The Secretary of the General Staff was concerned with records and paper work and with the collection of statistical information of military importance.[27] In point of fact he usually did for his chief a great deal of analysis, liaison, and administration, repeatedly functioning much as a deputy chief of staff, serving as a link between Staff and Line and War College and Schools, preferably with a self-effacement that averted resentments. He had to have a stupendous memory in order to keep abreast of all these streams of Army plans and operations. It was inevitable that for such a confidential position secretaries would be selected on the basis of high military qualifications, and that some of them would be transferred to important duties in the combat theaters.[28]

The War Department General Staff as a whole was "charged with preparation in time of peace of the plans outlined" as the Chief of Staff's responsibility, and in a national emergency

> with the creation and maintenance of the necessary and proper forces for use in the field. To this end it will, under the Chief of Staff, coordinate the development in peace and war of the separate arms and services so as to insure the existence of a well balanced and efficient military team. . . . The divisions and subdivisions of the War Department General Staff will not engage in administrative duties for the performance of which an agency exists, but will confine themselves to the preparation of plans and policies (particularly those concerning mobilization) and to the supervision of the execution of such plans and policies as may be approved by the Secretary of War.[29]

[26] Office Memo, OCS (signed by SGS at direction of CofS), 1 Nov 40, no sub, OCS 15758–53. This should be read in connection with matters discussed at length in Chapter IX, which deals with the progress of the air establishment.

[27] AR 10–15, 18 Aug 36, sec I, 3.

[28] Among those serving as Secretary of the General Staff or associated in that office just prior to American entry in World War II were the following (with rank later attained): Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Gen. J. L. Collins, Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull, Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Maj. Gen. John T. Lewis, Brig. Gen. Paul McD. Robinett, Brig. Gen. William T. Sexton, Brig. Gen. Robert N. Young, Brig. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen.

[29] AR 10–15, 18 Aug 36, sec I, 4.

One may note in the last quoted sentence the traditional limitation of the General Staff to plans and policies and supervision in just those words, with one significant exception: administration was specifically barred in those duties "for the performance of which an agency exists." By implication it was permitted elsewhere. Here was a crevice in the ancient wall of Staff limitations. During World War II it was to be widened by WPD, and eventually all the Staff sections were to be headed by "directors," and the Staff functions were to become largely directive, rather than solely planning and supervisory. Further in this same section of the regulations, after a formal naming of the Personnel (G–1), Military Intelligence (G–2), Operations and Training (G–3), Supply (G–4), and War Plans Divisions, it was specified that WPD "will, in the event of mobilization of G. H. Q., be increased by one or more officers from each of the other General Staff divisions, so as to enable it to furnish the nucleus of the General Staff of G. H. Q." [30] This specification was in line with the concept previously noted, of a GHQ which in the event of war would move off to war under command of the officer who was currently Chief of Staff, unless otherwise directed by the President. (This concept was not altered officially, although many officers felt it was sure to collapse on war's arrival, reasoning that the field command would be given to someone younger than the Chief of Staff was likely to be.)

Duties of the Five Assistant Chiefs of Staff

The normal duties of each of the five divisions were set forth in detail, and to make clear their normal functioning as planning and supervising bodies only, not as operating commands, each division was allotted the "preparation of plans and policies and supervision of all activities." Personnel (G–1) was concerned specifically with

> Procurement, classification, assignment, promotion, transfer, retirement, and discharge of all personnel of the Army of the United States (which includes Regular Army, National Guard, Organized Reserves, Officers' Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps).
>
> Measures for conserving manpower.
>
> Replacements of personnel (conforming to G–3 priorities).
>
> Army Regulations, uniforms, etc.; decorations.
>
> Religion, recreation, morale work (by agreement with G–3), Red Cross, and similar agencies.
>
> Enemy aliens, prisoners of war, conscientious objectors.[31]

[30] *Ibid.*, sec I, 7.

[31] Condensed from AR 10–15, 18 Aug 36, sec I, 8.

The allotments to Military Intelligence (G–2) were:

Military drawings and maps.
Military attachés and observers.
Intelligence personnel of units.
Liaison with other intelligence agencies.
Codes and ciphers.
Translations.
Public relations and censorship[32] (both of which were to be elsewhere allotted before or during World War II).

The allotments to Operations and Training (G–3) were:

Organization of all branches of the Army of the United States.
Assignment of units to higher organizations.
Tables of allowance and equipment so far as related to major items.
Distribution and training of all units.
Training publications.
Military schools and military training in civilian institutions.
Consultation with G–4 and WPD on types of equipment.
Priorities in assigning replacements and equipment.
Troop movements.
Military police.
Military publications.[33]

The allotments to Supply Division (G–4) were:

Basic supply plans to enable the supply arms and services to prepare their own detailed plans.
Distribution, storage, and issue of supplies.
Transportation.
Traffic control.
Tables of allowance and equipment (in concert with G–3 and WPD).
Inventories.
Procurement of real estate. Construction and maintenance of buildings.
Hospitalization.
Distribution of noncombat troops (in concert with G–3).
Property responsibility.[34]

[32] *Ibid.*, sec I, 9.
[33] *Ibid.*, sec I, 10.
[34] *Ibid.*, sec I, 11. The procurement of supplies, it must be remembered, was by statute a function of the Assistant Secretary (later the Under Secretary). For discussion of the origins of the division of supply responsibilities between Staff and Assistant Secretary see, in this series of histories, John D. Millett: The Role of the Army Service Forces, Pt. I, Ch. I, "The War Department Organization at the Beginning of World War II," awaiting publication.

The allotments to WPD were as follows:

Plans for use in the theater of war of military forces, separately or in connection with the naval forces, in the national defense.

Location and armament of land and coast fortifications.

Estimate of forces required and the times needed.

Initial strategic deployment.

Actual operations.

Consultation with Operations, Training and Supply Divisions on major items of equipment.

Peacetime maneuvers.[35]

The theory was that all five of these sections or divisions were on even level, and this theory was restated from time to time to smooth the feelings of the various G's when WPD assumed superiority. Yet that superiority, which had formal recognition only late in 1941, was implicit from the beginning. It was suggested in the statement of ultimate duties that on the approach of war WPD would supply the new General Headquarters with a nucleus of its personnel. This could mean only that this personnel would be the principal advisers of the Chief of Staff in the event of his becoming the field commander whom GHQ would serve; it was natural that in peacetime this same personnel would be looked to by him for advice. If its potential responsibility was to be high, its current preparation for responsibility would be high, and on that assumption its personnel would presumably be selected for exceptional merit.[36] As a planning body it had to be informed of the Chief of Staff's complete wishes, and also of the supply and mobilization possibilities in fullest detail. The first relationship stimulated the second, and the second relationship was designed to give WPD the exact information needed for its labors in planning. Thus WPD in the end had to have all the data that had been or could be assembled separately by the several G's. It had, for effective planning, to do a good deal of co-ordinating among the G's, and also between line units and supply branches, and also between one departmental command and another. In 1936 Brig. Gen. Walter Krueger noted that in war there would be need for "a group in the General Staff capable of advising the Chief of Staff on broad strategical aspects." [37] When General Strong

[35] AR 10–15, 18 Aug 36, sec I, 12. The several sections' purposes are set forth in a summary of "definitions" in Memo, Col Ward, SGS, for the ASW, 8 Nov 40, OCS 15313/19.

[36] For a full discussion not only of this point, but of how WPD worked, and how this whole Staff set-up was devised and altered to meet new needs, the reader is referred to Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, by Ray S. Cline, a volume now under preparation in this series.

[37] WPD Memo, 24 Oct 36, sub: Duties of WPD of the War Department General Staff in War, WPD 1199-211.

was Chief of WPD in 1939 he remarked: "There is not an activity of the War Department . . . that does not tie in with the work of the Division." [38] It is not surprising therefore to find a maximum of the larger problems of the Army, even before Pearl Harbor, being referred by the Chief of Staff to WPD for study, or being invited to the Chief of Staff's attention by the current head of WPD.

The routine co-ordination of the several divisions was one of the functions of the Deputy Chief of Staff, who for this and other purposes made use of a General Council made up of himself, the Assistant Chiefs, and the executive officer for the Assistant Secretary. When the discussion was to include matters of interest to The Adjutant General and the chiefs of arms and services, temporary membership in the General Council was extended to include them.

All-inclusiveness of the Chief of Staff's Responsibility

It is apparent both from the all-inclusive language defining the Chief of Staff's powers, and from the language reciting the detailed functions of his advisers and assistants, that by this written authority as well as by growing tradition the Chief of Staff was accountable in some degree for almost everything that was done or not done by the Army. His enormous responsibilities, however, were not balanced by the power to fulfill them, and could not be. His policy recommendations had to meet the approval of his superiors, the Secretary and the President. His plans had to be implemented by Congressional authorization and appropriation, and it will be seen that even on the brink of war these requisites were not always fulfilled.

Precisely where the Chief of Staff's immediate responsibility began, as far as the Staff duties were concerned, is difficult to define for the reason that the Staff officers functioned not as individuals but as agents for the Chief of Staff. Their relationship to him is discussed in a great many texts including, notably, those of Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., and Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer,[39] but seldom more understandingly than by the latter in his discussion of the General Staff as properly "the General's Staff"; by that concept the Staff officers are the aides of the General, doing for him what he would do for himself if he had time and facilities. The aid that the Chief of Staff habitually received from his assistant chiefs and from the latter's subordinates is indeterminable

[38] Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G–1, 24 Feb 39, sub: Increase in Allotment of Commissioned Personnel for WPD, WPD 3354–25 or G–1/15466–12–B.

[39] See n. 4.

from the record, just as comparable aid is indeterminable in the management of any large industrial enterprise. A general superintendent who is in theory responsible for all operations gives oral orders to his juniors and receives from them supplemental or corrective advice, likewise oral, which time may show to have been the factor determining success or failure. Yet the record of these communications, too, is nonexistent.

How Staff Divisions Functioned

This constant interchange of instruction and advice within the General Staff and among the arms and branches is not fully evident in the written records of Staff activities. Examination may disclose, for instance, without related papers, a momentous recommendation signed by a chief of section that was forwarded intact to the Navy prior to Joint Board consideration, or to the Secretary of War and thence to the President leading to its eventual enunciation as a military policy. That single document can be misleading as to responsibility, and will remain so until there is access to related papers that would disclose a succession of previous events. To illustrate, the matter at issue can have originated with an unnamed officer in a subsection and risen by stages to the section chief's attention. Or it can have originated with the Chief of Staff himself or with higher authority, by whom it was passed down to the section chief for study and recommendation, and by him passed further down to the appropriate subsection. Whatever the document's appearance, it certainly did not burst suddenly from the brain of the signer of record. Rather, it normally was the result of days or weeks of thought by a number of officers in a number of offices. In a fairly typical case, a subject of military concern makes its first appearance in Staff papers as a memorandum or a note of an oral communication, sometimes direct from the Chief of Staff, more often from the Deputy Chief or from The Adjutant General, or from the Secretary of the General Staff, one of whose duties was the informal "farming out" to appropriate Staff sections of such ideas as the Chief of Staff wished explored by those specialists. Frequently the suggestion was given orally at a routine conference or at an impromptu meeting with no precise instructions and apparently with no clear purpose beyond a desire to have a broad subject explored for its military possibilities.

In preliminary stages of planning the Staff sections were equally informal. Thus, G–4 made many oral inquiries direct to the separate supply services before

bringing a subject to the general attention of the Staff; some of these inquiries appear to have risen previously in the mind of the Chief of Staff or to have been brought to his attention from outside his establishment. Where the record of a study is complete, it becomes obvious that, once the original suggestion was fully explored within one of the Staff or service sections, it was immediately exposed to criticism and correction by others. It moved up the ladder for approval and down for revision. It was referred to conferences for concurrence and in cases of nonconcurrence (which were frequent) it was sent back for further study. The typical routine of such a study was prolonged, but it was thorough, and it was designed to delay the making of a final, formal recommendation until all available objections to it had been heard and overcome. If the subject was important enough to justify the close attention of the Chief of Staff, the papers usually moved with celerity.

It is for this reason that the activities of the Chief of Staff as an individual are not clearly delineated in the record, but invisibly overflow the notations, infinitely influenced from above and below. The actual origin of a fully considered proposal is usually beyond determination even by those who participated in making it. The thing in question was done (or left undone) not by an individual but by a multiminded unity known as the Office of the Chief of Staff, and often one can focus responsibility no more closely than that. For the final decision the Chief of Staff in person as signing authority must reasonably be held accountable, but with the observer's awareness that the Chief of Staff's actual responsibility often was shared with a great many others.

Numberless suggestive illustrations might be mentioned. Thus, in noting General Marshall's recurring prewar efforts to reconcile the views of the Ground Forces and Air Forces,[40] and to provide the latter with what can be called controlled autonomy, which was among his most significant achievements, one must observe that in this period his Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G–3) was Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Frank M. Andrews, not only a distinguished aviator but the first aviator to hold that high post in the Army's General Staff. General Andrews, whose death in an airplane accident early in the war ended a career of large accomplishment and larger promise, was a proved believer in co-operation; the influence of such an adviser on such an issue can hardly have been negligible, however fragmentary are the written records.

[40] See Chapter IX.

General Marshall's frequent contacts with General Embick (whose capacities had qualified him as interim consultant for Mr. Roosevelt on a notable occasion dealt with in Chapter XII) may be presumed to have had an influence transcending that which appears in the record. The same can be surmised of General Strong with whom as chief of WPD and later of Intelligence there were numberless discussions; of General McNair of the 1940–42 GHQ; of Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold of the Air Forces; of numerous other frequently seen authorities of Staff or Line. But the responsibility for a judgment reached, a policy fixed, an action ordered, a critical step taken (or not taken) on time and in the right direction often can be attributed only to the widely inclusive Office of the Chief of Staff, where official responsibility lodges for the bold decision and the large achievement or, equally, for the dubious one, the delay and the undisguisable mistake.

With the increasing complexity of warfare, the things that the high command of a large army has to know, or know about, have taken on great number and great variety. They involve not only basic military matters of organization and equipment and tactics and strategy, but technical, mechanical, political, economic, scientific, and psychological factors, in the United States and abroad, in degrees that call for specialized knowledge beyond the powers of one man. They involve also administrative machinery in numerous echelons, and there is a resultant problem of how the essential information can be so strained and channeled as to reach the high command in the desired form and amount, and also how the essential controls are to be exercised so as to attain maximum speed and efficiency. A considerable administrative betterment in the original organization had been effected in 1926 when the Assistant Secretary's office initiated a study of long-range equipment needs that would permit standardizing (by the General Staff), co-operation with the Navy in corresponding effort, and resultant planning of procurement (by the Assistant Secretary's office) on a much more efficient basis than by the earlier system of divided responsibility.[41] It was a prolonged struggle but it was rewarded in 1937 by the completion of the Protective Mobilization Plan which—although not sufficiently projected into the future—at least set forth the nation's initial defense requirements as then seen, in terms of manpower and equipment and organization. The PMP force was a long time coming, but the objective now was defined and, even though it was not quickly attained, the General Staff's planning thus early was of incalculable value in assuring its ultimate attainment.

[41] Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 302–03.

The "Joint Board" of Army and Navy

Those phases of planning which called for co-ordination with the Navy were carried on through mechanisms that were set up as continuing bodies but that, not unnaturally, functioned chiefly when there was something specific to do. The Joint Army and Navy Board, usually referred to as the Joint Board, was the high instrument of this co-ordination and so remained until in 1942 it was superseded, in practical effect, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was originally created in 1903 by agreement of the Secretaries of War and Navy [42] but it had suspended meetings, oddly, in 1913 and 1914 when World War I was about to start; it renewed its meetings in October 1915, and was formally reconstituted by new orders at the end of that war.[43] In its new creation the Chief of Staff, Chief of G–3, and Chief of WPD made up the Army component; their colleagues were the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief, and the Director of Navy's WPD. Later the Army's G–3 was replaced on the board by the Deputy Chief of Staff. Both Army and Navy eventually added their chief air officers as representatives from their own air arms.[44] Matters of munitions supply requiring co-ordination to prevent wasteful duplication and competition were handled by the Army and Navy Munitions Board operating with a civilian chairman. Matters of co-ordinated policy and planning were the functions of the Joint Board. It was consultative, and advisory to the Commander in Chief, not executive, and positive action came only when it was required. Under these circumstances it can be seen that there was not always unanimity—indeed that for such purposes unanimity was not necessarily a virtue; the power of decision was the President's.

There was no requirement for monthly meetings of the Joint Board if need for them did not exist, and even in the winter of 1939–40, with Europe's armies deployed for war, there were no meetings between 11 October and 21 February; there were none in March 1940, nor in August. None were necessary because there existed an active and useful adjunct called the Joint Planning Committee, made up of the two services' War Plans chiefs and their first assistants. This committee met much more frequently and, with full understanding of the views of

[42] GO 107, Hq of the Army, 30 Jul 03, Washington, and its Navy counterpart.

[43] WD GO 94, 25 Jul 19, and its Navy counterpart. See Appendix B, Suspension of the Joint Board, in Jesse Douglas draft manuscript, Original Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pt. I, JCS Hist Sec.

[44] History of this is available in WPD Memo for ASW, 27 Aug 37, sub: Relations Between Army and Navy, WPD 3740–1. The air appointment is noted in JB 301, ser 702, as having taken place on 9 July 1941 with approval by the President on 10 July.

superiors, threshed out difficulties and came to tentative agreements which then, if necessary, could be laid before the Joint Board for formal approval. In practice, the "serial" (or subject under consideration) on which agreement had been reached was then "canceled" by the board as finished business with no discussion beyond that which had already taken place in the committee. Points on which the committee could not agree were laid before the Joint Board, sometimes settled there, sometimes returned to the committee for further study under new instructions, sometimes laid before the President for decision. In May 1941 the planning chiefs' assistants were assigned to a "Joint Strategical Committee" to thresh out details of joint war and operating plans for their chiefs, and in much the same manner come to agreement on a program for submission to the Planning Committee and ultimately to the board. Other planning matters normally were referred to *ad hoc* subcommittees of the Planning Committee and similarly expedited.

In late 1940 the senior body's meetings became much more frequent, being called at need to consider matters which would not await delay. Weekly meetings were formally established on 2 July 1941. The meetings developed discussions of questions which thereupon were turned over to committee for tentative agreement, or they were disposed of on the spot as far as joint policy was concerned, so that each service could proceed with its own planning in the field under discussion. Thus at the February 1940 meeting there were discussions, without vote, upon the respective services' duties and responsibilities in connection with harbor mines, with underwater listening devices, with interservice communications, and other matters with regard to the proposed joint exercises.[45] After general views were indicated, particular agreement was left to the Planning Committee. There also was on this same occasion a discussion of "increasing Army Air and Navy Aviation in the Philippines . . . as an additional deterrent to Japanese expansion" and mention that "Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies would involve 90% of the United States' rubber and tin supply." Also, two months before the burst of Blitzkrieg, there was new consideration of a memorandum that on 10 November 1939 (there had been no Joint Board meeting between October and February) General Strong, the Army's WPD chief, had written to the Chief of Staff to point out the potential usefulness of Trinidad for hemisphere defense.[46] The Navy pointed out that further development of Alaskan bases at Sitka and Kodiak called for further

[45] JB Min for 1940, 21 Feb 40 entry.
[46] *Ibid.*

defense installations by the Army.[47] This is a fairly typical recital of the board agenda at the meetings of the period. The discussions produced agreement on a great many issues. They did not result in action on all issues, nor did the discussions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its created committees, which in the 1942 reorganization took over the work of the Joint Board and its elements and continued to function throughout the war by unanimity or not at all.

Was the Prewar Staff Effective?

That the Army's Staff and Command organization of 1921, as revised piecemeal in the next twenty years, was still unsuited to great emergency is pointed out bluntly by General Nelson.[48] He lists sixty-one separate officials of the Army and War Department who in 1941 had theoretical access to the Chief of Staff; in addition there were necessary and desirable contacts of frequent occurrence with the Navy (through the Joint Board), with the State and Treasury Departments, with the White House, with Congressional committees and individual Congressmen, with scientists and other nonpolitical visitors, and with certain foreign military attachés. Such numerous contacts by one man were impossible of maintenance, and the Staff of prewar days took over many of the Chief's obligations. Nevertheless the unwieldiness of the arrangement was one of the reasons cited for the complete Army and Staff reorganization, studied long before Pearl Harbor and finally effected in March 1942.

The rising emergency proved the old Staff organization unsound, not merely in its division of duties but in its stated restriction to "planning, policy and supervision." The Army mechanism was too vast to move without actual direction and command by the Chief of Staff himself. His Staff, or a part of it, would have to operate as well as plan. The planners' devising of a GHQ mechanism years before provided its own evidence of planners' preknowledge of the fact; but either the mechanism they devised or the personnel manning it was not adequate for the emergency. The Staff divisions had statutory power to supervise and advise activities but not to order them except by direction of the Chief of Staff, and this was generally sought by one of the section chiefs only after polite request

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 328–29. On the other hand the student who examines the committee reports laid before the Army War College as late as 1939 will encounter extended studies leading to the conclusion that "the present War Department organization for supply, hospitalization, and transportation is sound and adaptable to wartime operation." Course at the Army War College 1939–1940, G–4, Report of Committee No. 1 on Organization of the War Department for Supply . . ., 30 Nov 39, p. 4.

for concurrence by other sections affected. Exceptions to this routine were made only in emergency, and as late as June 1941 WPD complained that there was no normal machinery for "prompt decision and expeditious action" upon an issue.[49] A General Staff which had passed 600 members in 1941 and which in the interest of the rapidly expanding field units had to make swift and binding decisions of a command nature, could not limit itself to "planning, policy and supervision" without serious sacrifice of efficiency in a time of national crisis. Accordingly, the decisions were made, with or without clearly stated authority. In General Nelson's words: "The War Department General Staff had to operate in 1941—indeed every section of it operated." [50] Had the authority been publicly questioned, which it was not, the defense of this untraditional action would probably have been found in the language of Army Regulations, I, 4, previously quoted, barring the Staff only from "administrative duties for which an agency exists"; patently there was no such agency visible.

The larger question of General Staff efficiency in prewar days is not merely a matter of mechanisms and technique, however. The Staff function was to plan and prepare for war on a sound basis of accurate information appropriately applied and to cope with the new problems of strategy and techniques which arise in a changing world. Later chapters will disclose varying degrees of accomplishment of their functions by all sections of the Staff, ranging from examples of exceptional foresight to examples of extraordinary dullness of perception, from contagious energy to inexplicable lethargy. Neither information nor its application was impeccable. Estimates of foreign powers' capabilities and intentions were often far from right. There were inaccurate estimates of America's own capabilities, a notable example being in the plans for mobilization of the Ground Forces treated at length in other volumes of this series; [51] the plans met with repeated corrections and delays because of embarrassing conflicts with manpower needs for Air Forces, for Navy, and for industry. The Army's ambitious plans for the early raising of large troop units had to be altered radically because of belated discovery that weapons and other equipment that these units would require could not be supplied by industry until many months after the date proposed for recruitment of the troops.[52] Indeed a large part of the difficulties that beset the War Department in its 1939–41 effort to build up the Army into a bal-

[49] Memo, Gen Gerow for CofS, 19 Jun 41, sub: Enlargement of Functions of GHQ, WPD 3209–10.

[50] Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

[51] Greenfield *et al.*, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops;* also Palmer *et al.*, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops.*

[52] See Chapters V and VI, this volume.

anced force in being, however small or large, was the shortage of equipment, thoroughly known to informed persons in Staff and services but surprisingly unfamiliar to others who most certainly should have been informed through proper Staff co-ordination among the materiel-minded, the personnel-minded, and the tactics-minded elements of that very Staff. There were impressive estimates of needs but the estimates were not converted into goods, and one of the purposes of ensuing discussion is to explore, rather than determine, the extent to which Staff, War Department, Commander in Chief, and Congress were responsible respectively for the delay in bringing about that conversion, and for that contemning of the time factor to which General Craig referred feelingly in his farewell message as Chief of Staff.[53]

All aspects of military planning are mutually dependent, supply upon troop raising and troop raising upon supply, and both upon the nation's civilian economy in the several aspects of its manpower, industry, raw materials, transportation, power, and finance. Planning is useful only as it is informed and realistic and thorough and continuous. This is the basis of every planning system, and supposedly of performance too. The extent of the General Staff's responsibilities was clear enough. The pattern of the divisions' functions was explicit, and so was the plan for co-ordination and for direction. The method of educating industry, the design for industrial mobilization (responsibility for which the Assistant Secretary of War assumed under the 1920 Defense Act), the means of raising manpower, and the recruitment of skills had been considered long before the war, approved, and methodically set down in type.

Yet the halting and confused progress of rearming in 1939–41 showed that not enough progress had been made in translating plans into reality. The mutual relationships of all these tasks were not sufficiently understood by all members of the General Staff, much less by high civilian authority in government. As World War II approached, therefore, there was a lack of exact co-ordination in planning which, atop the paucity of appropriations discussed in Chapter II, gravely delayed performance. The task of the Chief of Staff and his greatly expanded office, when the United States was at length drawn into a war long in the making, was to do what should have been done earlier as well as what had to be done upon the opening of hostilities, and to do both with the greatest dispatch, now that time, too long squandered, was no longer available. The relentless pressure of necessity would accomplish in months what pleas and

[53] Annual Report of CofS, 30 Jun 39, cited in Chapter II, p. 30.

arguments had failed to accomplish in years. It would do so at heavy cost in dollars and with errors in judgment which possibly, but not certainly, might have been avoided had there still been time for careful consideration of alternatives. The record shows the errors; it does not provide sure evidence that the alternatives would have been more profitable.

CHAPTER IV

Foreign Policy and the Armed Forces

Military power, which comes into being through advance planning and prolonged preparation, asserts influence in either of two ways. It can be employed actually, in war. Or its assertion as a potential can be effective: the nation's mere possession of military power ready for exertion provides visible support for the nation's expression of views on foreign affairs, and that often is enough to make the expression persuasive. Thus a foreign policy which has a respectable basis in justice and morality is strengthened if it has also a respectable basis in physical force. To go one step further, a nation's diplomatic officials can assert a bold foreign policy with confidence only when the nation possesses military power sufficient to enforce that policy if need be: "Who wills the end must will the means." It follows that if a nation does not have at hand the military power sufficient to support its declarations of a foreign policy, however defensible on grounds of justice and morality, it cannot be bold in asserting such a policy, or even confident in determining it.

This was the situation in which the United States found itself in the late thirties, when there was a frequent desire to make a strong assertion of foreign policy but small ability, as measured by a military force-in-being, to do any such thing. Belated appropriations for strengthening of the sea, ground, and air establishment, although larger than they had been in 1932, were still small as absolute sums and even smaller as related to the mounting expenditures by other powers. The equipment for which the appropriations were made would not, in General Craig's words, "be fully transformed into military power for 2 years." [1]

The fact that the nation's military potential could not be asserted for several years could have been little more apparent to American foreign-policy makers than to their observant counterparts in other lands. It was weak in the very years when Germany and Japan were growing stronger and becoming more defiant of world opinion and international rights. The increase of these twin perils, attended by the noisy but less alarming Italian war spirit, was rapid. The threat of

[1] Annual Report of CofS, 30 Jun 39; see above, Ch. II, p. 30.

their ultimate breach of world peace, as well as of their ultimate impingement on American interests, was such as to stimulate in official Washington expressions of American opposition to military demonstrations by all three totalitarian powers. As early as Japan's 1931 Manchurian venture the State Department expressed disapproval of Japanese action,[2] but in that case the effect of a note unaccompanied by a show of arms or even a possibility of an effective show of arms was negligible, as Japan's subsequent aggression in China demonstrated. As the decade advanced and the threats of a fully militarized Japan and Germany became more frequent and more far-reaching, President Roosevelt repeatedly expressed the nation's hostility to dictatorship and militarism, most dramatically in his "quarantine speech" in Chicago on 5 October 1937.[3] From time to time Secretary of State Cordell Hull gave evidence of his own concern not only over the foreign threats but over the doubtful ability of the United States to counter them effectively. As early as 22 January 1935 he had sent to the President a copy of a current State Department memorandum on the Far East: "We should speed our efforts toward possessing a navy so strong that no other nation will think seriously of attacking us." He later heard that the President "expressed surprise that I should be 'plugging' for a bigger navy." [4]

Mr. Hull's general concern was for the maintenance of the dignity and authority of the United States in the international concert. His particular and pressing concern late in the decade was for the position of the United States with regard to the Latin American nations, protection of which from European aggression had been regarded as an American responsibility from the days of President Monroe. Those southern nations had come to feel, with varying degrees of contentment, that they could count upon support of the United States against any European aggression; they would have to count upon that support because their own individual powers of resistance were incapable of coping with large-scale attack.

Their hospitality to mass immigration had placed in some of these lands large colonies of Germans and Italians, among whom of late years there was a pronounced degree of Nazi and Fascist sentiment. Mussolini's and Hitler's successes brought from some of these emigrants expressions of approval and

[2] U. S. Dept, *Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington: GPO, 1943) pp. 4–8, 155–86.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 383.

[4] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), I, 456–57.

kinship, and these in turn were echoed appreciatively in Rome and Berlin. In the State Department and elsewhere there were assertions that, given the opportunity and the support of arms and leadership, one or more of these transplanted colonies would in time start an Axis-inspired protest against an existing government of Latin America (the pattern designed and executed in the Sudetenland in 1938); that it soon would find an occasion for local rebellion; and that it thus would provide in the American hemisphere a ready-made bridgehead for intervention and later full-scale invasion from Europe. This, it was reasoned, could lead to a military occupation which, once established, would be far more difficult to dislodge than to have prevented in the first place. Of the local Nazis' hopes and intentions there were rumors sufficient to make American diplomatic agents uneasy and thereafter to arouse in the State Department anxiety over a military coup that might be close at hand, and against which there was in 1938 no implemented plan of protection.[5]

Army Planners' Advance from Principles of Passive Defense

The War Plans Division of the General Staff, like the corresponding division of the Navy, had reckoned with this possibility as with military possibilities in other sections of the globe, primarily with relation to the security of the United States and its interests direct and indirect. Such procedure was routine. There were "Blue," "Orange," and other "color plans" (so designated) to cope with possible enemies ("Orange," for example, signifying Japan). But in the case of the undermanned and underequipped Army, these plans were far from realistic, and hence were little more than Staff studies. This theoretical approach was inescapable, in view of the weakness of forces which would be available on war's sudden arrival. Most of the plans defined ultimate offensives, but with awareness that they would require forces that would be available only long after war should start. This meant that comprehensive planning, which is the only planning of importance, had made far less headway in the Army than in the Navy. The latter had an impressive force-in-being—the U. S. Fleet, which was continuously at sea in some phase of operational training. That the Army in contrast had at this period no means of employing expeditionary forces with promptness is apparent in the study (Chapter II) of Army strength

[5] For evidence of early State Department concern, see Minutes of Standing Liaison Committee, particularly items 1, 12, and 19 of binder 1. See n. 9.

present or quickly available. The slow efforts to build up that strength, by 1938, were not firmly pointed in the direction of any particular antagonist or any particular theater, save for defensive operations in the Pacific and at the Panama Canal approaches. As a result of its current weakness in men and materiel the Army itself was committed to a narrow conception of its potential, and as late as 1937 and 1938 there were strong expressions of Staff adherence to a policy of "passive defense" in the first phase of any conflict, dictated by the inadequacy of men and materiel for a vigorous counteroffensive. It was enunciated in annual reports and in cautious instructions upon the mission of the air arm.[6] In retrospect, Col. J. W. Anderson of WPD summarized the matter thus:

> Until the enunciation of a policy of hemisphere defense, peace, pacificism and economy over a period of twenty years had forced the War Department to accept a military mission which contemplated a passive defense of the Continental United States and our overseas possessions. Such a mission is only consonant with the stone-wall defense of complete isolation.[7]

It was the boldness and aggressiveness of Germany and Japan that eventually sufficed to reveal to Washington eyes a threat to such fundamental American policies as the Monroe Doctrine, free trade, the rights of small nations, and, at last, to self-preservation. Professional planners of Army and Navy were concerned over Pacific threats, but it was, rather, a belief that continental security itself was threatened which stirred an interest in the preparation of a more dynamic defense, that is, a defense which would start far from United States frontiers and would afford protection to the entire hemisphere. Hemisphere defense by its nature called for a considerable increase in strength and also in spirit. As later described within the General Staff, the change which this brought about was a radical one:

> Under the policy of hemisphere defense we have formulated for the Army a new mission that recognizes the importance of the initiative in war and visualizes an early need for more than passive defense. Under this policy we have set our mission as the defense, not of our territory alone, but cooperation in the defense of the entire western hemisphere. This mission requires the provision of means with which we can deny the enemy bases

[6] (1) Memo, DCofS for ACofS WPD, 1 Sep 37, sub: Degree of Readiness in Which Army Air Corps Should be Maintained in Time of Peace, WPD 3748–12 or OCS 16125–353. (2) *Annual Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1937*, pp. 1, 29, and *passim*. (3) *Annual Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1938*, pp. 2, 29–30, and *passim*.

[7] This quotation is from an unsigned and undated paper, but accompanying notes clearly indicate that it was prepared by Colonel Anderson and that it was carried by the chief of WPD to the Chief of Staff. It is filed with papers relating to Rainbow Plans in WPD 4175–2. It bears a file stamp date of 1 November 1939. Many of the phrases used here were used by Colonel Anderson when he commented on the need for a survey of air power policy in March 1939. See n. 34.

from which he might launch military operations against us or any of the democratic nations of this hemisphere. This policy is designed to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of accepting war upon our own territory.[8]

Secretary Hull Provides the Initiative

But this change, however much it may have been desired by the General Staff planners, recognized by them as sound military policy, and anticipated in their long-range planning activities, was not established as a national policy through the direct assertion of the General Staff or the Army. If it was even advanced by the Army in argument to the point of persuading the President, the available record is barren of evidence to prove it. An impulse of considerable potency was provided, rather, by the State Department. The occasion was the recent disclosure by American observers that Axis nations were offering the services of military training officers to certain South American nations, the implications of which led the Department to arrange a conference with operating (rather than policy-making) representatives of War and Navy Departments for 10 January 1938.[9] Interdepartmental conferences at this level had long been conducted as a matter of routine. At this meeting there was agreement that there should be a re-examination of American policies with regard to aiding the military establishments of Latin American nations, and in succeeding months, on 12 February and 12 March, the State Department presented its views on this subject at greater length while making its own study of what the Fascist and Nazi agents were currently engaged in doing in Latin America. But these exchanges among the departmental representatives produced no clear definition of a possible policy. In order to obtain a directive that would produce such a policy Secretary of State Hull in April addressed a formal letter to President Roosevelt proposing the creation of a standing committee made up of the second-ranking officers of State, War, and Navy Departments for continuous liaison. "The Committee would be charged with the study of coordination and liaison both at home and abroad of the three departments concerned, and of the Foreign Service and

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Ltr (with incls), Secy State to SW, 12 Feb 38, sub: Assistance from U. S. in Military and Naval Matters to other American Republics, AG 336 (2–12–38). For other documents relating to the origin and early work of the Standing Liaison Committee, which evidently sprang from this meeting, see this file and G–2/2450–336. The principal War Department file for the work of the committee is a set of four binders consisting of minutes, memoranda, letters, and related papers in the custody of the Secretary of the General Staff. These will be referred to as SLC Min. See n. 5.

the two combatant services. Matters of national policy affecting the three departments would also be taken up and discussed by the Committee." [10]

Mr. Hull's suggestion was "heartily" approved by the President [11] and was put into effect with one alteration, whereby the War and Navy Department members were not the civilian Assistant Secretaries but the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations.[12] This arrangement brought into liaison with the State Department men whose professional qualifications could provide maximum value. Thus early in 1938 was created the only formal mechanism then extant for current co-ordination of the military, naval, and diplomatic arms of government. Although the record leaves small doubt that it came to pass through the initiative of Mr. Hull rather than the military and that the subject matter of the discussions was chosen by Mr. Sumner Welles rather than his military colleagues and was largely concerned with "good-neighbor" promotion, there is interest in a post-factum memorandum upon those interdepartmental relationships which the Standing Liaison Committee was expected to improve. It states that at some time prior to his becoming Chief of Staff General Marshall urged upon Admiral William D. Leahy the importance of

> . . . having the State Department in on joint plans so that our foreign policy and military plans would be in step. He [General Marshall] mentioned this to Admiral Leahy in connection with the Rainbow Plan. Admiral Leahy seemed to think it unnecessary. [Chief of Staff Craig voluntarily provided the State Department with a copy of that plan on 6 May 1939, the day of its approval.] . . . At a subsequent meeting he [General Marshall] again brought up the subject and very definitely stated that he could not go along with the past practice of not informing the State Department as to Army and Navy joint plans. . . . Since Admiral Stark and General Marshall have been respectively Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff a point has been made of acquainting Mr. Welles, Under Secretary of State, with war plans, and the three have taken plans and other matters of vital import to national defense to the President for his approval.[13]

[10] Memo on The Proposed Standing Liaison Committee of the State, War and Navy Departments, item 4, bndr 1, SLC Min. This memorandum was prepared in the State Department and copies were enclosed in the letter of proposal sent to the President and in the letter of the Secretary of State informing the Secretary of War of Presidential approval for the committee, 8 April 1938.

[11] Memo, President for Secy State, 4 Apr 38, item 4, bndr 1, SLC Min.

[12] Memo, Asst SGS for AG, 11 Apr 38, item 4, bndr 1, SLC Min.

[13] Memo, SGS for the record, 11 Sep 40, CofS files, Miscellaneous Conferences . . ., bndr 3. Some doubt is thrown on the accuracy of this statement about "past practice" by evidence showing that Chief of Staff Craig voluntarily provided the State Department with a copy of the joint Army-Navy Exploratory Study that gave rise to the Rainbow Plans on 6 May 1939. Notes on a copy of the study filed with WD files in JB 325, ser 634.

The memorandum suggests that at the outset the liaison was neither completely trustful nor completely effective. It did not gain appreciably in effectiveness. The record of meetings of the committee indicates that the initiative came generally from the State Department, whose representative assumed the chairmanship. The meetings were irregular, about once a month. The principal anxiety at the outset was for the security of the Panama Canal, an abiding concern of Army and Navy which now were doubtless gratified to find the anxiety shared by the State Department, but the steps proposed for increasing the Canal's security were not impressive. In general Under Secretary Welles' other suggestions were of procedures that should build up swifter and surer interdepartmental liaison and lead to acceptable programs for the advancement of Pan-American relations. In the former category were suggestions for admission of foreign service personnel to the war colleges; for a more effective interchange of information at home and abroad; for a more studied selection of attachés and mission chiefs in "unimportant" areas. In the other category of external relations were suggestions to the Army and Navy chiefs for closer relations with all Latin American nations including those in which the military was dominant; for the tender of military missions at low cost to counter similar tenders from Germany and Italy and acceptance of Latin American missions to the United States; for admission of Latin American officers to the U. S. Military and Naval Academies and air schools; for more frequent visits to South and Central American nations by the naval and air fleets.[14] These were obviously not major considerations of foreign policy.

As the war quickened in Europe in mid-1940 the Liaison Committee broadened its discussions. Actually, however, it became less important, for two reasons. With the coming of Henry L. Stimson to the War Department more and more leadership in foreign policy discussion was asserted at the Secretarial level. Even before that the increased activity of the Joint Board, which in July 1939 had been instructed to report direct to the President as Commander in Chief rather than to the Secretaries of War and Navy, had reduced the necessity for the Joint Board's chief members to conduct any discussion of military policy in the Liaison Committee. The Joint Board was now engaged in planning of its own, far surpassing in importance its previous "color" planning, and obediently reporting to the President.

[14] SLC Min, *passim*.

A Start at Combined Planning with Britain

Early in 1937 both Army and Navy chiefs had recognized the frailty of certain of their existing Basic War Plans, particularly those dealing with possible developments in the Pacific where the increasingly aggressive policies of Japan compelled appraisal. On 17 March 1937 the Joint Board restudied the current draft of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange of 1928, particularly its requirements for the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific, in the light of recent events, and also its requirement of an Army expeditionary force which in 1937 was nonexistent. On 16 November 1937 it approved the recommendation of General Craig, then Chief of Staff, to rescind that obsolete plan and prepare a substitute.[15] An early draft of a substitute by the Joint Planning Committee was set aside and on 19 January 1938 two distinguished authorities on Pacific matters, Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick and Rear Adm. (later Admiral) J. O. Richardson, were directed to make a further Pacific study. This led to a new Orange Plan accepted by the Joint Board on 21 February and approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy a week later.[16] It was to implement this plan that the Navy proposed a 20 percent increase, which the President recommended to Congress and which in May 1938 was adopted. The identical facts that at this time impelled Army and Navy to reexamine their joint planning also induced the Navy to look into its relations with the British Navy, whose responsibilities in parts of the Pacific Ocean were no less than those of the U. S. Navy and whose co-operation in a Pacific War was consistently envisaged in U. S. Navy planning. A community of interests in certain realms had been recognized for years by the two naval services. There were aspects of rivalry, which at the 1921–22 Washington Arms Conference had made each Navy particularly alert to guard its own strength ratio against the other as well as against the Japanese and lesser fleets: to an extent this rivalry had been present as well at the Geneva and London Conferences that followed. But there were also co-operative aspects whose mutual benefits in 1917–18 remained unforgotten; among responsible individuals, rather than in official compacts, there was a continuing assumption that new troubles would bring new co-operation. Nothing better illustrates this than the dispatching of Capt. (later Admiral) Royal E.

[15] For a full and well-annotated account of U. S.-British naval relations in the years preceding World War II and of the Navy's large role in combined planning, see Historical Monograph on U. S.-British Naval Co-operation 1940–45, Secret, first draft manuscript (hereafter cited as Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation) prepared by Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, Hist Sec, JCS. The 1937 events here mentioned are chronicled in his Vol. I, Sec. I, Pt. D, Ch. IV, and specifically in n. 9.

[16] See JB sers 589, 597, 617, 618, with JB file 325 for 1937–38.

Ingersoll to London in December 1937 for private and "purely exploratory" conversations at the Admiralty upon those prospects of co-operation which the new Orange Plan was definitely to take into consideration. Captain Ingersoll was the current chief of the Navy WPD and his orders were given him by the Chief of Naval Operations, then Admiral (later Fleet Admiral) William D. Leahy, but he received instructions from Mr. Roosevelt in person.[17] The fruit of his journey was an "agreed record" of 12 January 1938 which provided mutual assurance that waters of the British Commonwealth would be available for U. S. vessels and U. S. waters would be available for British vessels "in the event of the two fleets being required to work together in a war against Japan. . . . The serious problem which would arise if Germany was hostile was referred to." It was a nonbinding exploration of "what we could do if the United States and Great Britain were to find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific," [18] and, although an exclusively naval venture, it was an important step in the renewal of Anglo-American planning relations affecting sea, ground, and air forces alike which would come to a formal and much more effective stage three years later with the "American-British Conversations" of early 1941. That only the two Navies were immediately involved is due to two facts: (1) navies were still commonly regarded in both nations as the first lines of defense and (2) in both nations the forces-in-being were dominantly naval. But it is of interest to note that the substance of this first conversation of early 1938 and immediately ensuing discussions within the Joint Board was of the Pacific and, as will be seen, of the larger strategy of the Atlantic—not primarily of the Western Hemisphere itself.

It must therefore be recognized that neither in terms of the objectives set forth in Secretary Hull's letter to the President nor in terms of specific achievements immediately attributable to it did any striking success attend the labors of the Liaison Committee. Its consultations, rather, provided information upon which the three department chiefs were able to act. Its written records as kept in the Office of the Chief of Staff faded to an end in 1943 when a new secretary failed to make any more entries.[19] It had not been at all the National Defense

[17] Testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, 12 Feb 46, before Joint Committee of Congress on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong, 1st sess, in *Pearl Harbor Attack* (Washington: GPO, 1946), pp. 4273–77.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 4273. See also n. 25, Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation, Vol. I, Sec. I, Pt. C, Ch. III, and n. 28 in Vol. I, Sec. 1, Pt. D, Ch. IV.

[19] A "State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee" to serve the same purpose was informally created in December 1944 by the department heads, each of whom named an assistant to handle political military matters. It was formalized on 26 October 1945 by joint statement of the Secretaries. Dept of State Bull XIII 333, 1945, pp. 745–47.

Council that its friends may have hoped it would become, but, rather, a liaison aid for higher authority. It had met infrequently or not at all during many periods of crisis. It had no permanent secretariat to press its suggestions to accomplishment. It discussed little except Latin American relations, whereas in late 1939 and 1940 the Joint Board was discussing the need for a fully developed national defense and the pressing need for greater co-ordination of foreign policy and military policy in other and more worrying areas.

Hemisphere Defense a Factor in Rearming

On the other hand it is not true that the Liaison Committee was a failure. One cannot justly point out that a disproportionate amount of the committee's discussions in 1938 and 1939 dealt with Pan-American considerations without adding that often in that period both the Army and Navy planners were most uneasy over the prime need for hemisphere defense, and admission of their anxiety was made to Congress. In early 1939 the Army War College (ideal for the purpose because it was already set up with qualified personnel for conducting an intensive study of any project) was called on for a secret study of the force needed to protect Brazil from Axis machinations. General Marshall, then Deputy to General Craig, the Chief of Staff, explained to the War College commandant the "urgent need of two such studies" (the other being on Venezuela) and impressed on him the secrecy as well as the urgency of the inquiry. Special quarters were accordingly set aside for the War College committee's labors, almost unknown to the War College outside the small committee's own membership and little known even within the General Staff itself. In ten weeks a report that won the thanks of General Craig was provided. It called for creation of a Hemisphere Defense Force of 112,000 men as soon as possible, its concentration for training as a unit, the provision of special equipment for its projected Latin American operations, and the simultaneous acquisition of shipping sufficient to transport it as a unit.[20] Anxiety about the security of Latin

[20] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall, DCofS, to Maj Gen John A. DeWitt, Comdt AWC, 6 Feb 39, OCS 14281–22. This original, plus General Craig's acknowledgment of 1 April 1939 as personal letter to General DeWitt, plus the secret directive as drafted by WPD, plus the committee report with attendant charts and maps, are assembled in binder, Course at the Army War College 1938–1939, Report of Special Committee, sub: Special Study–Brazil, date of preparation 17 Feb–29 Mar 39, Record Sec AWC. For Navy's and Joint Board's concerns on this subject see Capt Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, United States Defense Policies and Global Strategy, Secret, first draft manuscript (hereafter cited as Kittredge, U. S. Defense Policies), Vol. I, Chs. VI, VII, and VIII, Hist Sec, JCS. See also in present chapter mention of Stark-Marshall joint estimate of 27 Jun 40.

America, far from subsiding quickly, was increased the next year when the fall of France and the threat to Britain aroused fears that the fleets of those nations might be used by Germany for trans-Atlantic operations. The pressure to lend United States aid to South American nations was reduced eventually by realization that new military equipment was needed by them less urgently than by Britain and by the forces of the United States.

It must be remembered that in 1939, and for some time afterward, there was at hand no reliable prophet who could say that our first defensive blows of the war would be struck, not in the vicinity of Panama but in the shipping routes of the North Atlantic, and that our commitment to war would be brought about not near the Canal nor in the Atlantic, nor even by Hitler and Mussolini, but in the mid-Pacific by the hand of Japan. The committee discussions did indeed stress what proved to be the wrong peril and for that reason may seem to have diverted the attention of War and Navy Departments to some extent from the areas where time proved the threats to be more substantial, and from long-range planning activities that would have been more fruitful. But those surmises are upset by the Joint Board records, shortly to be referred to, which show that Army and Navy were not in fact diverted from the larger planning job. Even the attention paid to hemisphere defense was by no means wasted. It helped materially to provide an escape from the old idea of "national" defense and a basic change in concept from passive defense to a dynamic defense designed to go into action before the enemy could launch his attack, and this was a vital change. In this respect, although not in all others, the first Rainbow Plan, which came into being in 1939, constituted an epochal advance over the old "color" plans.

The danger in Latin America was in fact a possibility in 1939, and it must have seemed a probability in the dark days of mid-1940 when France had fallen and Britain was in jeopardy. It is arguable that, had the peril of Latin America been ignored, one of the critical areas might have been there. As late as 24 May 1940 there was a warning from London that 6,000 Nazis loaded aboard merchant ships were possibly headed for Brazil, there to be joined by the crews of other German merchantmen in harbor and employed by Nazi elements in Brazil as a means of seizing the government.[21] It was to cope with such a coup

[21] See Kittredge, U. S. Defense Policies, Ch. IX, Evolution of National Defense Policy . . . Hemisphere Defense May–August 1940, pp. 27ff. of first draft MS. See also reports of subversive movements cited by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason in MS of The United States in The Second World War, awaiting publication, Ch. 28.

and its possible sequels that the President on 25 May directed the Chief of Naval Operations to devise plans for the moving of 10,000 troops to Brazil by air, to be followed by 100,000 to be transported by sea. In two more days the Navy drafted the "Pot of Gold" plan for that purpose, involving ultimate use of 4 battleships, 2 carriers, 9 cruisers, and 3 squadrons of destroyers. A Joint Planning Committee memorandum of 8 July 1940 contemplated seizure of French islands in the Caribbean in the event of certain developments, and the Havana Conference of Foreign Ministers in July 1940 nervously set about a strengthening of the Americas by diplomatic means.[22] These events of mid-1940 suggest how substantial was the threat to hemisphere security in the mind of the American high command. Even so, it is clear that the General Staff did not concentrate wholly on that peril. Rather, it did all its planning with a consciousness that, whatever the threats in Latin America, the sources of the threats were in Europe. Thus much of what passed for hemisphere defense planning was in reality a planning for defense against the Axis. It was manifest in the Liaison Committee discussions and, more fruitfully, in the preparation of programs for increasing land, sea, and air forces. It was manifest, too, in Rainbow Plans 1, 4, and 5, all of which assumed that certain Latin American nations would be associated with the United States in such a war as those plans contemplated.

One other point is significant. Politically in that day it was wiser to ask Congress for support in defending the South American approaches to the Canal than in providing resistance to Hitler elsewhere: it was more visibly a "defensive" measure. Political values were not limited to those affecting American domestic affairs either: there were political considerations that affected relations with South American nations as well, and of them the State Department was naturally aware. At the end of 1938 the twenty-one members of the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima, Peru, adopted a "Declaration of American Principles" and reaffirmed their "decision to maintain and defend them against all foreign intervention. . . ." [23] As late as the spring of 1941, the fusion of political and military concerns in that area was shown in a communication from General Marshall to the Secretary of War, proposing financial assistance to faraway Paraguay. He wrote: "The State Department considers it politically desirable to assist Paraguay by financing improvements to its principal airfields. . . .

[22] (1) See reference in Memo, CofS for JB, 2 Nov 40, sub: Revision of Joint Plan for Occupation of Martinique, JB 325, ser 666. (2) See *Report of Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics* (Washington, 1941), Dept of State Pub 1525.

[23] *Report of the Delegation of the USA*, Dept of State Pub 1624 (Conference Series 50).

Strategic considerations also make this desirable," some of the Chief of Staff's advisers having told him that the best air route, all considered, to reach southern Brazil and Uruguay would be via the upper west coast route, crossing the middle Andes and Paraguay.[24]

It would be difficult to find in Secretary Hull's original suggestion and its sequels more stimulation to Army and Navy activity than has been mentioned. Munich itself provided its own stimulants to action, leading to continuous study in the planning sections of both services, spurred by their respective chiefs, by the President himself in his pressure for increased munitions, and by simple observation of Europe's rapid drift toward war. The work of the individual armed services led to and in turn was quickened by the discussions of their common problems in the Joint Army-Navy Board.[25] For the first time in years this mechanism for interservice co-ordination began functioning vigorously.

The Role of the Joint Army and Navy Board

The Joint Board, which until creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942 was the co-ordinating element for Army and Navy, and hence of great potential influence in the making of foreign policy itself, had long suffered from the same causes that weakened the Army during the twenties and thirties. It was at best an imperfect instrument for decisive action because it was designed for consultation, not command. Its decisions were made unanimously or not at all, which meant that many were made not at all. But the 1937 decision to rescind the old Orange Plan against Japan illustrates that, as a Pacific war became more threatening and Army's problem involved Navy's and vice versa, the anxieties of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations necessarily affected them in their joint relations as well as in their individual capacities, and the discussions that each held with his own staff assistants were carried over into their discussions in the Joint Board. Munich's consequences increased the anxieties over possible involvement with the Axis. In November 1938 the board instructed its Joint Planning Committee (the two services' planning chiefs and their first assistants) "to make exploratory studies and estimates as to the various practicable courses of action open to the military and naval forces of the United States in the event of (a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the Fascist

[24] (1) Memo, CofS for SW, 18 Apr 41, sub: Airfields in Paraguay, OCofS 21220–4. See also earlier Memos, CofS for Under Secy State, 1 Feb 41 and 14 May 41, same file.

[25] See Chapter III.

powers, and (b) a simultaneous attempt to expand Japanese influence in the Philippines." [26] The studies were to assume that Germany, Italy, and Japan would be joined by alliance, and that non-Fascist European nations would remain neutral so long as their own colonies in the Western Hemisphere were unmolested.

The explorations by Army and Navy planners began promptly. By January 1939 Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Frank S. Clark and others had completed a draft which, as stipulated by the instructions, recognized the alignment of America's eventual enemies, and likewise expressed doubt of active British support until British trade or territory should be affected. This early draft by Army members also denied, rather surprisingly, that loss of Guam or the Philippines involved anything which America now recognized officially as vital American interests:

> If the American government and people had so considered, they would never have consented in the Washington Conference to put the security of those possessions in pawn to the mere good faith of Japan, which even in 1922 was not on an irreproachable plane. If they had so considered, the Japanese denunciation of the Washington treaties would have instantly been followed by the impregnable fortification and garrisoning of the Philippines and Guam. If they had so considered, the Philippine Independence Act would never have been passed. . . . Whether right or wrong, they have successively undermined the possibility of successful defense by the Army and Navy of these possessions.[27]

But the draft recognized also that even though defense of the western Pacific would prove impossible, there might be a public demand that it be attempted. The inability to defend both oceans simultaneously was stated, and—impressively enough when one considers the traditional emphasis on Pacific defenses—the Army's first draft recognized that the nation's greater interest was in the Atlantic and Caribbean.[28] It is of interest to note in the approved study several bold harbingers of what would be firmly stated as a national policy a great deal later:

> In the event of such a concerted aggression there can be no doubt that the vital interests of the United States would require offensive measures in the Atlantic against Germany and Italy to preserve the vital security of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal. If this is done it will be necessary to assume a defensive attitude in the Eastern Pacific. . . .
>
> Active aggression by Germany and Italy would appear to be possible only if the United States naval forces are inextricably committed to operations in the Western Pacific. . . .

[26] Memo, Secy JB for Joint Planning Committee, 12 Nov 38, sub: Study of Joint Action in Event of Violation of Monroe Doctrine by Fascist Powers, JB 325, ser 634.

[27] Exploratory Studies in Accordance with JB 325, ser 634, initialed by Col. Clark, Sec. IV, pp. 3–4. The exact authorship of this study, one of several bearing the identical title, but with varying contents (this one is distinguished by the FSC initials), has not been determined, but markings indicate its origin in WPD prior to 25 January 1939.

[28] *Ibid.*, Sec. VI, pp. 9–10, and Sec. VII, pp. 9 and 22.

If following an initial Japanese aggression, the United States should remain in a strategic state of readiness, refraining from an advance into the Western Pacific, the fascist powers could not and would not undertake active aggression against South America. . . .

If the United States on the other hand should decide to undertake offensive operations by a Western Pacific advance, she must take due cognizance at all times of the situation and its potentialities in the Western Atlantic in regard to German and Italian activities. . . .[29]

The planners' analysis in early 1939 of Japanese capabilities and possible intentions is of special interest by reason of certain prophetic remarks. The committee believed that concerted action by Germany, Italy, and Japan would force the United States to defend the Western Hemisphere and thus make impossible an American offensive in the Pacific for a period; that Japan would seek domination of the western Pacific, and the capture of the Philippines and Guam; that, to facilitate that program, Japan would attempt first to neutralize the United States Fleet, and probably would attempt to "damage major fleet units without warning, or probably attempt to block the fleet in Pearl Harbor." [30]

The draft shows the extent of Army agreement at that time with State Department fears for Latin America. An accompanying report from Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) George V. Strong of WPD reveals that on the issue of Pacific commitment the Army and Navy members of the Planning Committee parted company:

Army members . . . consider that an advance to the Western Pacific does not properly come within the scope of hemisphere defense; that it would be an extremely costly undertaking [requiring Army participation far beyond that envisaged by the Navy] and that the benefits to be derived therefrom are in no wise commensurate with the time, effort and cost involved.[31]

General Strong urged that there be a policy decision by the President, particularly one which would determine the support that might be expected from other democracies. No Presidential decision was immediately forthcoming but the need for mutual support between the United States and Great Britain would soon be urged by other voices. In May 1939 the British Admiralty sent a Planning Staff officer to Washington to discuss with U. S. Navy officers the disposition of the two fleets in the event of war and, according to British recollection, elicited from Admiral Leahy, then Chief of Naval Operations, "personal" views upon co-operation should the two nations be involved in war with Germany, Italy, and Japan. In sum, the Navy's professional chief was understood in that

[29] Joint Planning Committee Exploratory Studies, 21 Apr 39, Sec. V, pp. 1 and 2, JB 325, ser 634.

[30] *Ibid.*, Sec. III, par. 8.

[31] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 2 May 39, dealing with JB 325, ser 634, in WPD 4175.

event to be contemplating U. S. naval control of the Pacific and a sharing of Allied control of the Atlantic and Mediterranean.[32]

The Growing Strategic Importance of the Airplane

While the Joint Board's studies continued, there was in progress a related study of air force matters that necessarily impinged on the two-ocean defense issue. This air study had been preceded by a memorandum which the Assistant Secretary of War wrote on 14 October 1938 to the Chief of Staff, suggesting a reconsideration of airplane requirements.[33] The issue shortly became engulfed in the air expansion program demanded by the President (see Chapter V) but by the end of winter the role of air power was so much in controversy within the Army that on 23 March 1939 General Craig, then Chief of Staff, named a board to study the ever-recurring problem. For present purposes references to the board will be only those touching on the major war policies then being considered by the Joint Planning Committee, but some remarks by Col. J. W. Anderson of WPD are of profound interest in their prophetic character:

> We should be prepared for prompt and limited operations requiring Army troops in the mid-Pacific, in the Caribbean, and in Central and South America. Some of these operations, unless they are to be undertaken at tremendous ultimate cost, must be planned in advance and executed with the utmost dispatch. Thev cannot await the perfection of our stonewall.
>
> . . . there should be recognized the possibility of a requirement for the prompt dispatch of a small but representative force to Europe, notwithstanding the military undesirability of such action.[34]

If early needs were met, he continued, the need for large armies might be averted, and this possibility raised the question of using aviation "in an active and aggressive defense involving operations beyond our own territory," which in turn raised the question of bases and this, in turn, "the question of our policy of national defense." He found that all considerations called for "an active and aggressive defense" by both ground and air troops seeking to "(1) deepen our defensive zone around vital areas; (2) preclude enemy seizure of important strategic areas; (3) establish advanced operating bases for our Army and Navy." [35] These considerations apparently impressed General Marshall, who

[32] See Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation, Vol. I, Sec. 1, Pt. D, Ch. IV, n. 28.

[33] Memo, ASW for CofS, 14 Oct 38, SW 622.

[34] Memo, Col J. W. Anderson for ACofS WPD, 15 Mar 39, sub: Employment of Aviation, WPD 3748–17.

[35] *Ibid.*

now had succeeded General Craig as Chief of Staff, for his suggested changes in the Air Board report (all of them accepted by Secretary Woodring) include an emphasis on the "wise strategic location of our Air Bases" as an accompaniment to "adequate radius of action of our airplanes" for the protection of America's vital installations. His 1 September 1939 memorandum to the Secretary of War notes that "the report establishes for the first time a specific mission to the Air Corps, and provides for its organization upon functional lines. . . ." A few days later, on 15 September, the Air Board's approved report was circulated through the Army by The Adjutant General. Like the Joint Board's Planning Committee report of 6 May 1939, and in pursuit of the air requirements which had been stated only a few weeks earlier in Rainbow 1 (August 1939), the Air Board report pointed the way to formulation and statement of a new military policy in a rapidly changing world.[36]

Revised Interest in Ground Force Development

In approximate synchronization with these policy studies by Joint Board and temporary Air Board and the continuing pressure for Navy expansion such as the bolder policy would call for, there was under way a new study of the Ground Forces' need for augmentation, a need which such a foreign policy unmistakably would emphasize. Instructions for the study had been given by General Craig as Chief of Staff to WPD in early November 1938, and on the last day of that month a report, several times revised, was ready to be given to the Assistant Secretary of War as an aid to him in arguing for heavier purchases of materiel. It noted the new programs for naval and air expansion and observed that these alone would not meet the nation's defense needs; in particular, that ground force augmentations were necessary in Panama, "keystone in the defense of the Western Hemisphere"; that there was danger of American involvement "in a major war that will require the dispatch of large expeditionary forces to South America or other areas" in order to seize and hold critical outposts.[37] On 10 December 1938, after a discussion at the White House that failed to supply a firm directive,

[36] For General Marshall's ideas on the report see Memo, CofS for SW, 1 Sep 39, sub: Air Board Report, AG 320.2 (3–22–39) Re Aviation in National Defense Air Board Report. There are related and supporting papers in the above file, in WPD 3748–17, and in OCS 16125–365.

[37] Study prepared in WPD and submitted by Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 30 Nov 38, sub: Augmentation of the Ground Forces, Regular Army and National Guard, WPD 3674–10. This sequence of events (as related to the materiel program, rather than to the strategic policy development) is treated in Chapter V at length.

Assistant Secretary Louis Johnson reminded the Chief of Staff that during coming months the Army would probably have to defend an augmentation program "made necessary by the unsettled and critical conditions of world affairs [which] will, in all likelihood, cover a period of several years." [38] With that prolonged need in mind, General Craig directed a new study of the Army's mission and its size requirements, entrusting it to a board made up from the Staff Divisions. Its report on 28 December inevitably called for increases in personnel that should make possible the early creation of infantry divisions existing then only on paper.[39] Shortly afterward General Marshall (then Deputy Chief of Staff) and WPD worked out a program for five trained, equipped divisions, and a start toward four others. Undiscouraged by the President's refusal to recommend personnel increases to the required extent, the Staff continued to regard this as the eventual first step in augmentation.[40] In a statement for guidance of the Army planners who would have to develop the augmentation program, and defend the inevitable request for more funds, General Marshall said:

> Dictator governments are arming heavily and penetrating economically and politically in Central and South America. Japan is establishing a "new order" in China and has been informed that we will have something to say about this "new order." These activities emphasize the possibility of this nation becoming involved in war in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, or in both these areas.[41]

A Staff report went further with the suggestion of peril to hemisphere defense:

> Violation of the Monroe Doctrine by European powers is not beyond the realm of possibility. Such violation will probably not occur as a sudden, overt act but will take the form of a step-by-step development. Before military force replaces diplomatic negotiations, hostile nations may be firmly established in the Western hemisphere in areas that threaten not only our national interest, but such vital areas as the Panama Canal as well.[42]

[38] Memo, ASW for CofS, 10 Dec 38, WPD 3674–10.

[39] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 28 Dec 38, sub: Determination of Peacetime Personnel Requirements, Regular Army, WPD 3674–12.

[40] Ltr, TAG to ACofS WPD and others, 9 Feb 39, sub: War Dept Attitude Regarding Additional Personnel, and enclosure entitled "Reinforcements for Overseas Possessions and Need for Expeditionary Forces." Copies of these papers and related papers showing their origin and General Marshall's personal interest in the matter are in (1) AG 320.2 (2–7–39) War Department Attitude Re Additional Personnel for Mobile Army . . . and (2) WPD 3674–13. This letter is cited in other connections in Chapter II, page 22, and Chapter VI, page 153.

[41] CofS's revision of WPD Memo found with AG Ltr, 9 Feb 39, cited in previous notes.

[42] Study entitled "The Most Serious Weakness in Our National Defense System," included as Tab B in Memo, ACofS WPD for DCofS, 2 Feb 39, sub: Need for Five Divisions, WPD 3674–13. See also Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 11 Apr 39, sub: Augmentation of Ground Troops, WPD 3674–14.

The Joint Board Initiates the Rainbow Plans

To return to the affairs of the Joint Board, whose members as individuals were of course prime movers in these other gropings toward a new policy and in preparations to support it: the preliminary study by Colonel Clark, lately mentioned, and summaries of certain long-considered views of the Navy's WPD with regard to war in both oceans, led in May 1939 to a rapid exchange of letters and memoranda among WPD, the Chief of Staff, the Navy's Planning Division, and the Chief of Naval Operations.[43] These exchanges led, in turn, to the Joint Board's conclusion that the common Army-Navy policy that had been consistently recognized as a necessity now had to be actively implemented. The board therefore authorized its Joint Planning Committee to produce five basic war plans in line with certain military and political stipulations, which themselves assumed the existence of a policy not greatly differing from that suggested in the remarks of Colonels Clark and Anderson. Joint Army-Navy War Plan 1 (better known as Rainbow 1) reached a fair stage of development on 27 July 1939 and on that day was submitted to the Joint Board. There it was studied and somewhat revised, and thereafter—in line both with propriety and with the President's specific order of 5 July [44] that the Joint Board make its reports direct to him as Commander in Chief—laid before Mr. Roosevelt, who gave it oral approval on 14 October 1939.

Unlike the earlier Joint War Plans, Blue, Orange, and others, each contemplating war with one nation, the five new plans contemplated the probability of war against more than one foe and in more than one theater. It was for this reason that the board abandoned the single-color nomenclature of Red, Blue, and so forth, and gave the new plans the appropriate code names of Rainbow 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. In brief, the five plans may be summarized as follows:

1. To prevent violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and to protect the United States, its possessions, and its sea trade.

2. To carry out No. 1, and also to sustain the authority of democratic powers in the Pacific zones.

3. To secure control of the western Pacific.

4. To afford hemisphere defense, through sending U. S. task forces if needed to South America, and to the eastern Atlantic.

5. To achieve the purposes of 1 and 4, also to provide ultimately for sending forces to

[43] The discussions and the resultant plans, well annotated, are dealt with at length in the opening chapter of a volume under preparation in this subseries entitled Strategy of Deployment, 1941–1943, by M. Matloff and E. M. Snell. The basic papers are filed in JB 325, ser 642.

[44] Federal Register (hereafter cited as FR), Doc. 30–2343.

Africa or Europe in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany or Italy or both. This plan assumed U. S. co-operation with Great Britain and France.[45]

The first four plans were eventually set aside. Numbers 2 and 3 (never fully developed in detailed planning) were formally canceled by the Joint Board on 6 August 1941, by which time the recognition of Germany as the principal foe made this cancellation obligatory. Although formal cancellation of Numbers 1 and 4 did not take place until 4 May 1942, much that they contemplated, such as the taking over of British bases (by the old-destroyer transfer of 3 September 1940) and the progressive use of Atlantic sea patrols, was in effect long before Pearl Harbor. Rainbow 1 and 4 were rendered obsolete by the fact that their major premise was not fulfilled—that is, Britain's naval power was not neutralized, and hence American's problem of hemisphere defense was not thus magnified. Contemporaneously with the American-British Staff Conversations (ABC) of early 1941, Rainbow 5 was expanded into War Department Operation Plan, Rainbow 5, and War Department Concentration Plan, Rainbow 5, (and corresponding programs of naval responsibility). This grand composite was the basic plan in readiness when war actually came in December 1941, the program having been continuously restudied and amplified in the light of co-ordination with British plans. By that time it specified the exact activities contemplated for protecting coasts and bases and for offensive operations overseas, but it had been modified little in fundamental concept since its drafting.[46]

The "Phony War" Gives Way to "Blitzkrieg"

The outbreak of the war in Poland on 1 September 1939, startling to the public, confirmed in many respects the expectations of military observers. The quiet that fell upon Europe immediately after the conquest and partition of Poland, and that was prolonged through the winter of the "phony war," lulled the fears only of the uninformed, but the uninformed were numerous.[47] It was on 23

[45] For a résumé of Rainbow Plans see Memo prepared by WPD, 31 Jul 41, sub: Rainbow Plans, WPD 3493–12.

[46] See Chapter XII.

[47] Memo, Gen Marshall for SW (Woodring), 4 Sep 39, sub: British-French Strategy, based upon Memo of same date from Gen Strong, ACofS WPD (both in WPD 4199 and in OCS 21090). This memorandum records War Department confidence on the outbreak of the war, fully supported by autumn and winter developments, that "serious action" by British and French Armies was unlikely in the near future. The number of neutral states on the German borders was taken to confine possible land action by Britain and France for some time to come largely to artillery and air action in an area where a frontal attack would be costly. A sea blockade was predicted and offensive air activity was expected to be keyed to German behavior.

February 1940 that General Marshall, arguing before skeptical members of the House Appropriations Committee, reminded them: "If Europe blazes in the late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere." [48]

In April it did blaze, and in May it blazed so high that again there were expressions of rising concern over Western Hemisphere security. On 21 May the Chief of Staff was given an unsigned memorandum, presumably from the Secretary of the General Staff, reading: "In view of the present world conditions it is believed that this country should take immediate steps to acquire British and French possessions in the Atlantic." This early suggestion of a measure ultimately achieved in effect by the destroyers-for-bases transaction brought no recorded action, but the memorandum bears a notation "Chief of Staff has seen." [49] On 22 May, the day after the victorious Germans reached the English Channel, Maj. (later Lt. Gen.) Matthew B. Ridgway with other WPD members submitted to the Chief of Staff a memorandum on National Strategic Decisions, occasioned chiefly by the German triumph in France.[50] It noted the old and new menaces to the United States, including Japanese attack and Nazi-bred revolts in South America with actual Nazi invasion of South America now rendered more likely by the Allies' disaster. It pointed out that dispersal of American forces to all the points endangered—the Far East, the Western Hemisphere, and the European theater—was out of the question, and that there must be a decision on which area was of first importance. Decision was needed on what the Army must be prepared to do and what it would be able to do within one year. The maximum effort that America could exert, Major Ridgway felt, would comprise "conduct of offensive-defensive operations in South America in defense of the Western Hemisphere and of our own vital interests; such limited offensive operations in Mexico as the situation may require; possible protective occupation of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere; and the defense of Continental United States and its overseas possessions east of the 180th meridian." [51] This, it will be noted, accepted as tolerable the loss of Wake as well as Guam and the Philippines. On the following day General Marshall reported having shown the memorandum to the President, Admiral Stark, and Under Secretary Welles, the first two "in

[48] House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Hearings on HR 9209* (Washington, 1940), p. 3.

[49] Unsigned Memo, 21 May 40, CofS files, Emergency file, bndr 2. See also Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 27 May 40, sub: Preventive Occupation of British Possessions in Western Hemisphere, WPD 4175–9.

[50] Memo prepared in WPD, 22 May 40, sub: National Strategic Decisions, WPD 4175–7.

[51] *Ibid.* For other considerations of this east-of-180° defense, see Chapters XIII–XIV.

general agreement . . . and specifically Mr. Welles. They all felt that we must not become involved with Japan, that we must not concern ourselves beyond the 180th meridian, and that we must concentrate on the South American situation." [52]

On the following day, 24 May 1940, accordingly, the Joint Planning Committee received instructions from the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to prepare plans "for occupying Allied and Dutch West Indies and American possessions, to prevent such from falling into the hands of Germany by surrender or cession." On the next day the President asked the naval and military chiefs to have plans prepared for support of the Brazilian Government and for prevention of revolts in Brazil inspired by the Axis. Two days later the draft of Joint Army and Navy Plan, Pot of Gold, prepared for this purpose, was submitted to them. On 28 May the Navy WPD gave to the Chief of Naval Operations the larger plan (of which Pot of Gold was an implementation) for occupation of Allied areas in the hemisphere. In this the War Department WPD was in general concurrence,[53] and, upon adoption, this became known as Joint Army-Navy War Plan 4 (Rainbow 4). After two more days the Joint Board considered this draft of the plan of action to cope with the situation in the Western Hemisphere which would follow defeat of Great Britain and France, agreeing that "the date of the loss of the British or French fleets automatically sets the date of our mobilization" of the National Guard. So urgent was this project, with France nearing its military collapse and the British preparing to move back across the Channel with all celerity, that deliberations were completed in ten days and on 7 June the Joint Board adopted the plan. It was approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy on 13 June. The rapidity and gravity of military events on the English Channel—watchfully observed in Italy and Japan as well as in Washington—were a constant spur to new and quick decisions. Several such decisions were made by the Navy Department for, as previously noted, it was the Navy that was much more nearly prepared for action and hence capable of taking it. Late in May Capt. (later Admiral) Alan G. Kirk, then the U. S. Naval Attaché in London, with advance approval from the Admiralty, recommended to his superiors the assignment of officers as observers with British fleet units, and the action was agreed to.[54] While not

[52] Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD, 23 May 40, WPD 4175–10. See also, same file, note for record prepared by Maj (later Lt Gen) Matthew Ridgway, 23 May 40.

[53] Report JPC to JB, 31 May 40, JB 325, ser 642–4, including Plan Pot of Gold, 27 May 40.

[54] See Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation, Pt. A, Ch. V, notes and appendices, p. 70, item 21, Jun 40.

immediately related to much more important agreements that followed, the step is suggestive of increasing receptivity to co-operative suggestions: for this the disturbing state of British affairs and its effect on American prospects must have had some responsibility. On 14 June, when in fact Rainbow 4 was already approved, Captain Kirk advised his superior: "In my view safety of United States would be definitely in jeopardy should British Empire fall, and would expect Italo-German combination to move swiftly in South American and Caribbean areas . . . safety of Canal seems paramount." Mr. Churchill, writing as a "former naval person," had already resumed his correspondence with President Roosevelt, making his initial request on 15 May 1940 for "the loan of 40 or 50 of your old destroyers" among other things, and on 20 May accepting a temporary repulse of his suggestion (via Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador) but restating the hope that would in fact be gratified later in the year.[55] As the scope of disaster in France increased, the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff Committee increased their discussions of American relations and on 15 June the Admiralty named a special committee, headed by Sir Sidney Bailey, to review the form of American aid to be sought, the possible areas of British and American operations and the two fleets' responsibilities in those areas, the preferred policy of co-operation, and the techniques of imparting information to United States authorities.[56] It was five days later that the British authorities informed the U. S. Naval Attaché of their intention to propose informal conversations either in London or Washington between the American and British staffs.

Japan's Imperial Aims Encouraged

The completeness of France's defeat meantime was arousing anxieties not only about the immediate future of Europe and, in America, that of the Western Hemisphere, but about that in the Far East as well. On 17 June 1940, when the despairing Marshal Pétain asked his German conqueror for armistice terms, observers in Tokyo who had for months been aware that Japan was engaged in troop-training exercises in Formosa and near Hainan expressed their suspicion of what these units were being trained for. From the U. S. Embassy in Tokyo

[55] (1) U. S. London Embassy Dispatch 1216, Ambassador for Secy State, 15 May 40. (2) U. S. Embassy Dispatch 1271, 20 May 40, "for the President from a former naval person."

[56] For extended and annotated discussion of the Bailey committee's activities (a series of its reports was drafted for Rear Adm. (later Vice Adm.) Robert L. Ghormley's examination on 7 September) see Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation, particularly Sec. II, U. S. British Relations 1939–40, Pt. D, Ch. VIII, pp. 179ff. Also Kittredge, U. S. Defense Policies, Ch. X, Sec. C.

came a warning that "Soviet and British attachés here are speculating with regard to possible Japanese invasion of Indo-China in event of capitulation of France." [57] Within WPD there was a further suspicion that such an invasion might be preceded by a Japanese assault upon the Panama Canal or upon the naval base at Pearl Harbor. This surmise, not far in principle from the ultimate reality of December 1941, was laid before the Chief of Staff by General Strong, acting chief of WPD, and led to General Marshall's sudden order, transmitted to Army commands both in Hawaii and in Panama, for an immediate alert of the defensive organizations "to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity." [58] The alert in Hawaii (to be discussed in Chapter XIV) continued for months without an official explanation of its immediate cause.

It was apparent however that the rushing events in Europe might stimulate much more than Japanese ambitions. General Marshall discussed several possibilities that day, 17 June 1940, at a staff conference attended by the chiefs of his WPD, G–3, and G–4 divisions:

> . . . We may suddenly find Japan and Russia appear as a team operating to hold our ships in the Pacific. If the French navy goes to Germany and Italy, we will have a very serious situation in the South Atlantic. Germany may rush the South American situation to a head in a few weeks.
>
> Are we not forced into a question of reframing our naval policy, that is [into] purely defensive action in the Pacific with a main effort on the Atlantic side? There is the possibility of raids. . . . The main effort may be south of Trinidad with action north thereof purely on the basis of a diversion to prevent our sending materiel to South America. This seems to indicate that we should mobilize the National Guard.
>
> . . . Should not Hawaii have some big bombers? . . . It is possible that our opponents in the Pacific would be four-fifths of the way to Hawaii before we knew that they had moved. . . .[59]

The closing conjecture, it developed on 7 December 1941, was a one-fifth understatement, and several of the other conjectures never were fulfilled. But the remarks of 17 June 1940 are impressive as marking the Chief of Staff's acceptance of his advisers' reasoning on the priority in importance of an Atlantic war which might come, even though the President did not enunciate it until much later. It would appear that the Navy's emphasis up to now on

[57] Japan entered Indo-China on 22 September 1940, with Vichy's consent. See contemporary news accounts.

[58] Memo, ACofS WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 40, sub: Defense Precautions, WPD 4322.

[59] Notes on conference of 17 Jun 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

operations in the Pacific was due to the long-standing assumption that the British-French Navies would provide reasonable security in the Atlantic. Without that assumption, first emphasis had to be on Atlantic needs. In neither the Army nor the Navy command was there doubt that war involvement was close. The uncertainty was, rather, over the quarter in which the United States would first become involved and over the means and methods of response. Hence the necessity not of one but of all five Rainbow plans to meet varying contingencies, and the further necessity of knowing much more of British plans. To the Joint Board's direction (7 June 1940) to its Joint Planning Committee to develop both Rainbow 3 (for war against Japan) and Rainbow 5 (for war against the European Axis)[60] were soon added more immediate instructions, from the President himself, for the guidance of both Army and Navy in their planning. On 13 June Mr. Roosevelt asked that the intelligence chiefs of Army and Navy examine certain assumptions which he submitted and consider the conclusions to be drawn from them, as to the probable course of the war. The intelligence chiefs sought advice from the planning sections of the two Departments and on 26 June there evolved a considered reply which Colonel Clark, of the Army WPD, and Capt. C. J. Moore, of the Navy (senior members of the JPC), tendered to General Marshall and Admiral Stark.[61] By that time, however, it had been effectively superseded by a joint effort on the part of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to get from Mr. Roosevelt clear instructions for their own guidance, necessitated by the disasters then being inflicted upon the western Allies by Germany.

The extreme gravity with which WPD was then viewing Britain's plight is shown by a 17 June memorandum from General Strong, recommending that three radical revisions of current policy be considered with Admiral Stark, prior to discussing them at the White House. These proposals were for (1) a purely defensive position in the Pacific involving "non-interference with Japanese activity in the Orient"; (2) no further commitments for furnishing materiel to the Allies, in "recognition of the early defeat of the Allies" and of the "probability that we are next on the list of victims of the Axis powers and must devote every means to prepare to meet that threat"; (3) immediate mobilization of the national effort for hemisphere defense, including increase of the

[60] See JB 325, sers 642, 642.2, 642.3, 642.4, and 642.5.

[61] See Memo, senior Army and Navy members JPC for CofS and CNO, 26 Jun 40, sub: Views on Questions Propounded by the President on the War Situation, WPD 4199 (British-French strategy). It recites the 13 June assumptions dictated by Mr. Roosevelt.

Regular Army, early mobilization of the National Guard, marked increase of munitions production, preparation for "protective seizure" of British and French colonies in the New World, and military aid to Latin America.[62] General Strong's bold recommendations were not accepted. What actually went to Admiral Stark for consideration on that same day, 17 June, was a much longer and more exploratory discussion of three more moderately stated alternatives that the President would be asked to consider. These were (1) to maintain a strong position in the Pacific and, in order to do so, "to avoid any commitment elsewhere"; (2) to make every effort "including belligerent participation" to sustain Great Britain and France in the European war; (3) to initiate operations "to prevent or overthrow German or Italian domination or lodgment in the western hemisphere." [63]

The Joint Estimate of 22 June 1940

Although the gloom apparent in General Strong's expressions lessened as day after day passed without new threats of an invasion of Britain, both Army and Navy chiefs had responsibilities that needed guidance more substantial than mere hope for the future. Using the milder of the two 17 June memoranda as a basis for discussion, they devoted ensuing days to a study of the military prospect. By 22 June they came to agreement on the draft of a "Basis for Immediate Decisions Concerning the National Defense," which they felt necessary for the conduct of national defense, but which necessarily would have to be made by the President as Commander in Chief.[64] This proposal General Marshall and Admiral Stark together presented to the President, whose oral comments were hastily jotted down by General Marshall and later furnished to the chief of WPD. Suggestions can be summarized as follows:

First, the location of the U. S. Fleet, then based at Pearl Harbor. General Marshall and Admiral Stark agreed that if the French Fleet should pass to

[62] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 17 Jun 40, sub: National Defense Policy, WPD 4250–3.

[63] Unsigned and undated copy of a proposal, accompanied by informal Memo signed "GCM" to Col Ward (SGS), 17 Jun 40, sub: Decisions as to National Action. GCM stated that "the original of this paper was handed to Admiral Stark after being read to the Liaison Committee this morning." In WPD 4250–3.

[64] A copy of this document, 22 June 40, unsigned, is found in WPD 4250–3. It apparently is the copy that General Marshall carried with him to the White House conference, for it bears General Marshall's penciled interlineations and marginal notes. These are retyped in a 24 June 40 memorandum from General Marshall for General Strong, along with the President's remarks which are referred to. This typed memorandum, signed "GCM," is also in WPD 4250–3.

German control, the major portion of the U. S. Fleet should be transferred to the Atlantic.

(In General Marshall's notes the President was quoted as saying, "Yes—but decision as to return of the fleet from Hawaii is to be taken later.")

Second, the continuing question of arms to Britain. The Chiefs believed that "to release to Great Britain additional war material now in the hands of the armed forces [large lots of reserve small arms and artillery had been released after Dunkerque] will seriously weaken our present state of defense and will not materially assist the British forces." They recommended that the United States make no further commitments of this sort. They also recommended against commercial producers' acceptance of any munitions orders which would retard the American forces' procurement.

(Mr. Roosevelt said, "In general, yes," but in extending his remarks made material qualifications. The Army and Navy "would continue to search over our material to see if there was something" to release; "decision . . . would have to depend on the situation"; if "a little help" seemed likely to carry Britain through the year "we might find it desirable from the point of view of our defense to turn over other materiel. . . ." Commercial orders would be accepted as long as materiel could be employed to block Germany and "without seriously retarding" Army and Navy procurement.)

Third, the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The Chiefs believed it might involve occupation of British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions in the Western Hemisphere (including islands of Atlantic and Pacific) excepting always Canada and Newfoundland. This would be done in time to prevent cession of these possessions to Germany through a treaty.

(Mr. Roosevelt excepted the Falklands, possibly because of Argentina's claim to those islands, and specified that the occupation should be only "after consultation with, and if possible in agreement with the other American Republics." He thought the international date line might mark the westward limit of occupation.)

Fourth, and also with regard to hemisphere defense, the occupation of other strategic positions in the Caribbean and in Latin America "in accordance with the agreements now being completed with the American Republics."

(The President phrased it "when the agreements . . . provide therefor.")

Fifth, American support of existing governments. The Chiefs recommended that this be undertaken only on a widely publicized request from the country

concerned and only when U. S. forces could be spared for that purpose. Nothing could be undertaken south of Venezuela before December 1940 save through immediate mobilization and an effective draft act.

(The President approved with only one wary addition—that this policy would stand "on a day-to-day basis.")

Sixth, arms for Latin America. The Chiefs recognized the impossibility of any excess for this purpose, save for rifles and machine guns for which there could be no ammunition before March 1941, and recommended only credits for such purchases should the possibility improve.

(The President, with a breezy comment, approved such aid as would not hamper the American rearming program.)

Seventh, economic adjustments with Latin America which would recognize that losses were a proper charge to national defense.

(The President approved without change.)

Eighth, a speed-up of arms production at home. On this the Chiefs recommended a longer working week and establishment of two-shift and three-shift operations until more workers should be trained. They recommended mechanical education for many of the unemployed.

(Here they ran into a stone wall. The President stated that until the unemployed were more largely at work he would not alter the existing five-day week. He wished the arsenals and manufacturers to be pressed into this training work. If that failed, other means would be tried.)

Ninth, a speed-up also of manpower. The Chiefs proposed immediate enactment of a selective service act "along the lines of existing plans, to be followed at once by complete military and naval mobilization."

(The President changed "complete" to "progressive," and he indicated his dislike for the draft plan itself, outlining "at considerable length" his own views. At that time he wished a year of some sort of service for the government by each youth at 18, or on graduation from high school. Some would be in Army and Navy, or in production work in arsenals and factories, or in mechanical training, others in the Civilian Conservation Corps or an equivalent. All should be "in camp" for such a period. Of this Presidential project no more was heard. The Burke-Wadsworth bill for selective service, already prepared and introduced on 24 June without initial support from either White House or Army, was employed only to produce military manpower.)

The 22 June proposals plus the 24 June memorandum to General Strong were thereupon worked over by Colonel Clark and Captain Moore, the Joint Planning

Committee, who had previously considered the President's 13 June inquiry. On 27 June General Marshall and Admiral Stark laid before Mr. Roosevelt a second "Basis for Immediate Decisions Concerning the National Defense," now carefully rephrased.[65] It recommended for the immediate future: (1) a defensive position by the United States; (2) nonbelligerent support of the British Commonwealth and China; (3) hemisphere defense, including possible occupation of strategic bases on the soil of Allied Nations' western colonies in case of those nations' defeat; (4) close co-operation with South America; (5) speeding of production and training of manpower, including a draft act and "progressive" mobilization; and (6) preparation of plans for the "almost inevitable conflict" with the totalitarian powers, to assure concerted action with other nations opposing Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Resultant Policy Conferences with Great Britain

British readiness at this season for concerted planning in advance of involvement in the war has already been mentioned, as indicated by the naming of the Bailey committee on 15 June and the prompt proposal to initiate Staff conversations. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, with a recollection of the fruitful services of Admiral William S. Sims, USN, as a Special Naval Observer in London in 1917, suggested to President Roosevelt in 1940 the sending of another senior American admiral, and the idea so impressed the President that he discussed it with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Admiral Stark. On 12 July they proposed Rear Adm. (later Vice Adm.) Robert L. Ghormley, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, who was already fully informed on naval planning. The selection was approved and, with the Navy engaged in preparing detailed instructions for Admiral Ghormley's guidance, the President determined to send in addition, but for a briefer period of duty, a representative of the Army.[66] The selection fell upon General Strong, who was similarly qualified through his detailed knowledge of Army planning, and shortly thereafter Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commanding general

[65] An unsigned copy under that title, 27 June 1940, accompanied by Appendix A listing "Pacific Islands of Great Britain and France" and allotting responsibility for several island groups to Australia and New Zealand, is found in WPD 4250. On that same day, in a letter drafted by WPD, the Acting Secretary opposed a Congressional proposal to formulate a military policy, holding that this is determined, rather, by the nation's foreign policy, which is changeable. Ltr, Johnson to Sen Sheppard, 27 Jun 40, WPD 4250–2.

[66] The sequence of these events is recorded in contemporary notes as employed in Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation, Sec. III, Pt. A, n. 8.

of the GHQ Air Force, was added, a fact which showed recognition of the large part that aviation would play in the proposed discussions in London. The three received oral instructions from the President on the subjects about which they would confer, and sailed for England on 6 August aboard the S. S. *Britannic* on what was supposed to be a secret mission; two days later the ship's radio picked up a news broadcast announcing the mission.[67]

Although it was well understood on both sides that the ensuing London discussions would deal with many matters of joint Anglo-American planning and possible co-operation, particularly on the part of the two fleets, the meetings were referred to officially as those of "The Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee." The American visitors, now joined by the U. S. Naval Attaché, Captain Kirk, and the U. S. Military Attaché, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Raymond E. Lee, made clear that they were present as individuals, not an organized mission, and that their powers were limited to discussion and recommendations.[68] Even so, the importance that the British attached to their visit is suggested both by the composition of the British group, which included Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril L. N. Newall, Chief of the Air Staff, and by the candor with which Sir Cyril discussed the relationship of arms production to strategy:

> . . . In our plans for the future we were certainly relying on the continued economic and industrial co-operation of the United States in ever-increasing volume. . . . [They] were fundamental to our whole strategy.[69]

The British Chiefs of Staff had already presented at length their conception of future strategy in the war in great detail [70] and, now replying to insistent questioning about various theaters and particularly about British commitment in the Far East, admitted that, important as was Malaya, they were not ready to support Singapore at the cost of security in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean.[71] It was an admission which was bound to influence American thinking of strategy in the Orient. General Strong at this same meeting referred to the bases for these informational exchanges and then made a suggestion of which more would shortly be heard, to the effect that

[67] *Ibid.*, (1) Entry for 25 Jul 40 and (2) Entry for 8 Aug 40.

[68] See British Minutes of the Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee meetings for 20, 29, and 31 Aug 40, filed at end of Staff Conference U. S. and Great Britain, sec 1, WPD 4402–20 inclusive.

[69] *Ibid.*, minutes for 31 Aug 40.

[70] *Ibid.*, minutes for 29 Aug 40.

[71] *Ibid.*, minutes for 31 Aug 40.

. . . it had been agreed in principle between the British and the United States Governments that a periodical exchange of information would be desirable. He thought that the time had now come when this exchange of information should be placed upon a regular basis. He outlined several methods by which the sources of information at the disposal of the United States might be placed at the disposal of the British Government.[72]

The Co-ordination of Arms Production and Supply

The exact extent to which these London discussions of "standardization of arms" contributed to Staff knowledge of munitions is not determinable from the records consulted, but General Strong returned to Washington with well-formed ideas on the relationship of arms and strategy. On 23 September the Chief of Staff gave oral directions to WPD for a report on this rapidly mounting problem. Study to that end had been under way for weeks, and consequently on 25 September WPD presented its ten-page memorandum, which discussed munitions problems against a background of strategic considerations including those lately considered in London. Actually it was the fruit of work by a group made up not only of the WPD staff, but also of Col. James H. Burns of the Assistant Secretary's Office, the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, and the Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee.[73] It estimated the current munitions situation, and came to grips with the main purpose, which was to point out, in the words of Section III: "Necessary additions to the national policy covering release of munitions and production capacity to Great Britain and other nations." With the Draft Act newly passed and the first elements of the National Guard moving off to camp in that month, the staff was conscious of the large problems of future matériel, as well as those of the new personnel. The WPD staff members' long memorandum accepted without demur that the war's first threat and chief demands would be in the Atlantic, recognized also (with powers of discernment which would be proved two days later) that trouble in the Pacific was near, and set forth the policy of keeping the Pacific operations secondary to those in and near the Atlantic.

It recognized, as a first consideration, that all three Axis powers (Japan had long before signed with Germany an anti-Comintern agreement and on 27 September was to announce her formal acceptance of affiliation with Germany

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 25 Sep 40, sub: The Problem of Production of Munitions in Relation to the Ability of the United States to Cope with Its Defense Problems in the Present World Situation, WPD 4321–9.

and Italy) might open hostilities with the United States in order to counter the continuing United States opposition to them. Germany and Italy could not do so immediately, but it was pointed out that Japan's expanding self-confidence and aggressiveness might soon lead that nation into action which would require the United States to choose between armed opposition and modification of its Far East policy. Should Gibraltar ultimately be lost and Dakar thus opened to the Axis, the resultant exposure of South America might require diversion of a part of the United States Fleet to the Atlantic, weakening the existing defense against Japan. It was "well recognized that it would be imperative . . . to anticipate . . . action [if clearly necessary to block a German move against South America] by the preventive occupation of . . . air fields and ports. . . ." It was recognized that in the event of the Iberian Peninsula's being drawn into the Axis orbit, the Azores, Canary, and Cape Verde Islands—if not immediately occupied by British or United States forces—would be taken by Axis forces as operating bases.[74] That these events were not immediately likely did not bar General Strong (the group's spokesman) from feeling that "a part of the responsibility of the United States should be to be prepared to meet the worst possible situation." Likelier than the contingencies named, General Strong felt, were (1) an intensification of existing German infiltration into South America, aimed at upsetting governments "which we have undertaken to support," and (2) a resultant acquisition of bases for German naval raiders in the western Atlantic.

As to the Pacific prospect, it was pointed out that there could be no assurance that Japan would not shortly move against the Dutch East Indies or the Philippines or Guam, especially in view of the American embargoes on exports to Japan, and in the event that the American protests should be regarded as bluff. Within the near future, then, the United States might be confronted with a demand in the Far East for a major effort for which, WPD gave warning, "we are not now prepared and will not be prepared for several years to come." Along with this realistic discussion of Far East realities were further advices on the Atlantic. Thus, if it developed that the British Fleet might be lost, "from that very day the United States must within 3 months securely occupy all Atlantic outpost positions from Bahia . . . to . . . Greenland." And "at any time . . . the United States may be required to fulfill its commitments for the employment of . . . forces to prevent German-inspired upsets of Latin-American Govern-

[74] See Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, II, 940–41.

ments." And "in order to safeguard our own security the United States may at any time, even before collapse of the British fleet, need to occupy preventively Dakar and the Azores." [75] For all or any of these measures the military was not ready, because of insufficient numbers of trained men and insufficient munitions for their equipment. The supporting evidence, in terms of men and percentages of supplies on hand, was incorporated in the memorandum.

Priority of Interest in Europe or the Far East?

It is not clear whether Mr. Roosevelt actually read in full this long and careful discussion, but its recommendations implicit or explicit evidently were communicated to him in one way or another. The influence of the reasoning is discernible long afterward in 1941 plans, some of which were carried out (as in the case of cautious restraints in diplomatic negotiations with Japan, and the garrisoning of the Atlantic outpost bases), some of them abortive (as in the case of the possible dispatch of an expeditionary force to South America, and the occupation of the Azores that was at one time scheduled). The influence of Army insistence upon priority of interest in the Atlantic, voiced on so many occasions in 1940, was now affecting the Navy as well. It was manifest on 5 October, at a meeting of the Standing Liaison Committee (at which General Strong was present) when Mr. Welles read a message from Prime Minister Churchill to the President requesting that an American naval squadron be sent to Singapore. In the ensuing discussion of the Far East situation there was agreement that no squadron should be sent, lest it precipitate Japanese action against the United States, Admiral Stark observing that "every day that we are able to maintain peace and still support the British is valuable time gained," and General Marshall that this was "as unfavorable a moment as you could choose" for provoking trouble. The Chief of Staff went further than his naval colleague in favoring withdrawal of the Marine garrison from Shanghai, on the ground that it was "inconceivable" that an attack on them could be avoided. He confessed that his views were probably at variance also with those of his civilian chief, Secretary of War Stimson, and on returning to the War Department informed the Secretary of what he had said.[76] But if, on this occasion, General Marshall was not able to convince his naval colleague in all matters,

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] SLC Min, 5 Oct 40, item 58, bndr 1.

Admiral Stark was in agreement on the basic policy of recognizing Germany as the principal foe and Japan as one to be fully disposed of at a later time. Opposing the dispatch of a squadron to Singapore, Admiral Stark on this occasion was reported as saying that "the vital theater was the eastern Atlantic, and the western Pacific a secondary one." [77] This was the conclusion to which it was felt the Strong memorandum of 25 September should have impelled the President—if the President had examined that carefully prepared document. The minutes of the Liaison Committee meeting of 5 October continue:

> General Strong inquired about the estimate of the situation which had been drafted as a basis for formulating policy. He doubted if the President had ever read it, and asked that Mr. Hull make him read it. It was of the greatest importance to get coordinated on an estimate of what the situation is and use it as a basis for action to be taken. Mr. Welles promised to take it up and see if he can get action by the President.[78]

Apparently he got none, for one month later, on 4 November, Admiral Stark drafted for presentation to the Secretary of the Navy a new estimate "of the world situation primarily from a naval viewpoint, presented for the purpose of arriving at a decision as to the National Objective in order to facilitate naval preparation. . . ." [79] This communication, a copy of which was sent to General Marshall to permit a full agreement by Army and Navy upon suggestions destined to reach the President, is of interest on more than one count. In it, one concludes from the related documents, was the suggestion from which sprang the idea of high-level Staff conversations with the British, coming about a few weeks later, the exact inception of which, oddly, does not appear in currently available records. It will be remembered that during the London meeting on arms stabilization the previous August General Strong had felt that the forces' "exchange of information should be placed upon a regular basis." In mid-October, too, Lord Lothian revived the proposal for Staff conversations, this

[77] Memo, CofS for SW, 7 Oct 40, sub: Meeting of Liaison Committee Saturday Oct 6, 1940. (*Sic.* This is an error. It clearly refers to the 5 October meeting.) General Marshall's memo is also included in item 58 of SLC Minutes previously cited.

[78] SLC Min, 5 Oct 40, item 58, bndr 1.

[79] Admiral Stark's estimate is referred to in Memo, SGS (Col Ward) for ACofS WPD, 13 Nov 40, and Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 13 Nov 40, sub: National Policy of the United States, both in WPD 4175-15. The file contains not the draft but its revision in the form of Admiral Stark's "Plan Dog" memorandum of 12 November 1940. This is referred to, later in the text, as the suggestion which led to the American-British Staff Conversations. The impulse for "Plan Dog" probably came from Naval War College discussions of April 1940, for when Captain Turner came from that institution to Washington to head the Navy WPD, on 25 October, he brought with him the April studies and the conclusions to which they led—notably that in a two-ocean war priority should be given to the defeat of Germany which would end the threats to Western Hemisphere security; that aid to the democracies would hasten that defeat; and that action against a belligerent Japan should be initially defensive.

time on a "comprehensive" basis,[80] and two days later in London Admiral Pound spoke to the same purpose in a conversation with Admiral Ghormley who, unlike his Army shipmates in the August voyage, had remained in London as a Special Naval Observer. There was no immediate result; possibly because this was at the height of the 1940 election campaign (in which both Presidential candidates had asserted no Americans would go abroad to fight).

A Firm Proposal for Anglo-American Military Co-ordination

On 12 November, shortly after Election Day, however, Admiral Stark's draft of November was prepared as a formal memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy. It recited Navy judgments on the approaching war, so basic and so detailed that Admiral Stark sent copies not only to General Marshall but to Admiral Ghormley in London and to Admiral Richardson, then commanding the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific.[81] The memorandum outlined the world situation and America's relationships to it, and then considered four possible plans: (A) limiting American activity to hemisphere defense; (B) directing primary attention to Japan, and secondary attention to the Atlantic; (C) directing equivalent pressure in both theaters; (D) conducting a strong offensive in the Atlantic, and a defensive in the Pacific. Of necessity, for immediate needs, neutrality (Plan A) was advocated, but for the future it was Plan D—or "Plan Dog" in the service lingo—for which Admiral Stark argued. As "a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into the conflict" he recommended that "the United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters" with the British in London, the Canadians in Washington (creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense Canada-United States was announced on 18 August 1940),[82] and the British and Dutch in Singapore and Batavia, "to reach agreement and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it necessary to enter the war." [83]

[80] British Ambassador's telegram to the Foreign Office, 14 Oct 40, included in memorandum referred to in Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation, Vol. I, Sec. I, Ch. III, n. 25. Lord Lothian presented the Prime Minister's proposal for Staff conversations to Mr. Roosevelt on 14 October. First favoring the proposal, Mr. Roosevelt reconsidered the matter, perhaps in the light of the 1940 election campaign, and on 27 October returned the memorandum to Lord Lothian without action.

[81] See Memo, Admiral Stark for SN, 12 Nov 40, familiarly known as the "Plan Dog Memorandum," filed in Navy Dept, as OP 12 CTB (so identified in Memo, SGS for ACofS WPD, 13 Nov 40, WPD 4175–15) and as Appendix A to notes for Sec. III, Pt. D, Ch. XIII of Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation.

[82] The Canada-U. S. defense plan was followed by a series of bilateral agreements with all South American states except Argentina and a number of special plans for Latin America.

[83] Last paragraph of the "Plan Dog Memorandum," cited in n. 81 above.

In the meantime Lord Lothian had made another trip to London where Admiral Pound repeated his view that there should be conversations in Washington with the War and Navy Department Staffs. As later recounted:

> The British representatives would consist of a small party which would easily pass unnoticed in the stream of missions, observers, and other officials.
>
> Lord Lothian returned to Washington and at the end of November, the President agreed to staff talks in Washington at the earliest possible date. The sudden death of Lord Lothian caused some delay but the British representatives to go to Washington were officially appointed.[84]

From the two countries' naval chiefs, then, rather than from the Army chiefs came the pressure that produced the full-dress American-British Conversations (ABC) of the following winter. Years afterward, during the Pearl Harbor inquiry by Congressional committee, General Marshall testified that "Admiral Stark brought up the proposition and I acquiesced. He arranged the meeting." [85]

Admiral Stark's original communication of 4 November, cited above, is of further interest. It provided a new spur for reaching a decision on national policy—although not one, it developed, in exact accord with Admiral Stark's views, for his memorandum, referred by General Marshall to WPD, encountered stout opposition. The Acting Chief, Colonel Anderson, disagreed basically with Admiral Stark's statement of national objectives, thus summarized: (1) preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere, (2) prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, (3) diminution of the offensive military power of Japan, with a view to retention of American economic and political interests in the Far East. The WPD doubted the ability of the United States to sustain all three objectives simultaneously, and proposed, rather, a recognition of the following objectives: (1) identical with the first of Admiral Stark's proposals, (2) aid to Great Britain short of war, (3) making no military commitments in the Far East, and (4) preparing for an eventual unlimited war in the Atlantic in support of Great Britain. Colonel Anderson continued:

> WPD concurs in the opinions expressed: that should Britain lose the war the military consequences to the United States would be serious; that her situation is precarious; that she needs the assistance of strong allies to win; that military success on shore is the only certain method of defeating the Axis powers. . . .
>
> It is believed that United States intervention in support of Great Britain must initially be restricted to reinforcement of the blockade, the establishment of a strong offensive air

[84] Memo cited in Kittredge, U. S.-British Naval Co-operation, Vol. I, Sec. I, Ch. III, n. 25.

[85] Testimony of 6 Dec 45 in Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong, 1st sess, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Pt. 3, p. 1052.

force in England with a possibility of extending air operations into the Mediterranean area via French West or Equatorial Africa. If the United States is prepared to sustain such action over a period of years, the chances of success are considered very good. However, piecemeal action before we are fully prepared might well result in serious reverses.[86]

Both the Stark estimate and the WPD comment were sent to the President on 13 November and on 18 November the Joint Planning Committee, on instructions from Admiral Stark and General Marshall, applied itself to the draft of a statement of national defense policy that could be accepted by both Army and Navy and also could meet Presidential approval.[87] The Navy, feeling the need for interim planning as well as the more distant discussions, now was seeking a statement as soon as possible, and on 22 November Admiral Stark in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff indicated in a sentence the reason for the Navy's pressure: "Over here we are much concerned with the possibility of having a war on our hands due to precipitate Japanese action." His view on that day was that, while the President had asked for a joint estimate of the situation by State, War, and Navy Departments, it would be better (presumably with a view to speed) for War and Navy to agree on an estimate which then would be submitted to the State Department.[88] However, at the following day's meeting of the Liaison Committee he "thought the War and Navy Departments should get the views of Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles before proceeding with the detailed study." Concurring with this view, Mr. Welles expressed his own anxiety that the National Defense Advisory Commission was already discussing a possible embargo against Japan; he felt that any such discussion should be "correlated with the War and Navy Departments' estimate." [89]

The Navy meantime was pushing ahead with its own interim operating plans without waiting for agreement on a policy statement, and was encountering Army opposition, expressed in a 27 November memorandum from General Gerow to the Chief of Staff.[90] Two days later General Marshall informed Admiral Stark: "The War Department cannot fully subscribe to the strategical concept of the war or the opinion set forth in the plan. A serious commitment in the Pacific is just what Germany would like to see us undertake. . . ." He suggested:

[86] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 13 Nov 40, sub: National Policy of the United States, WPD 4175–15.

[87] (1) Notations on papers filed in WPD 4175–15. (2) Memo, CofS for JB, 18 Nov 40, sub: National Defense Policy of the United States, WPD 4175–15.

[88] Memo, CNO to CofS, 22 Nov 40, WPD 4175–15.

[89] SLC Min, 23 Nov 40, item 65, bndr 1.

[90] Memo, ACofS WPD to CofS, 27 Nov 40, WPD 4175–15.

. . . readjusting war plans on the basis (1) that our national interests require that we resist proposals that do not have for their immediate goal the survival of the British Empire and the defeat of Germany; and (2) that we avoid dispersions that might lessen our power to operate effectively, decisively if possible, in the principal theater—the Atlantic. Such a basis might provide

a. that our naval threat should be continued in the Pacific so long as the situation in the Atlantic permits.

b. that, so far as Malaysia is concerned, we should avoid dispersing our forces into that theater. We should, however, assist the British to reinforce their naval setup in the Far East by relieving them of naval obligations in the Atlantic. This would provide a more homogeneous force for Malaysia and would, in effect, concentrate rather than disperse our naval establishment.[91]

On that same day in an answering memorandum Admiral Stark expressed disagreement with the Army views. More significantly, he also gave vent to his concern over the immediate future in an explosive declaration: "Should we become engaged in the war described in Rainbow 3, it will not be through my doings, but because those in higher authority have decided that it is to our best national interest to accept such a war." [92] It was apparent to him that American defense plans in either ocean could not be made without a fuller knowledge of probabilities. In particular he felt that the Joint Planning Committee needed information to assist in the preparation of Rainbow 5, which was to be a thoroughgoing plan for full Army-Navy co-ordination in the event of war. In this same memorandum of 29 November therefore he presented another suggestion to General Marshall. "I consider it essential," he wrote, "that we know a great deal more about British ideas than we have yet been able to glean." [93] Apparently he did not yet know how fruitful had been his earlier suggestion for a high-level discussion with the British, but on 2 December, when General Marshall was replying approvingly to the Stark suggestion, a report came to General Gerow that the British would in fact shortly send to America officers for a secret staff conference.[94]

In order to have America's military policy fully clarified in advance of that event the Planning Committee on 21 December made its own report to the Joint

[91] Memo, CofS for CNO, 29 Nov 40, sub: Tentative Draft, Navy Basis War Plan–Rainbow 3, WPD 4175–15.

[92] Memo, CNO for CofS, 29 Nov 40, sub: Joint Basis War Plans, Rainbow 3 and 5, WPD 4175–15.

[93] *Ibid.*

[94] (1) Memo, CofS for CNO, 2 Dec 40, sub: Joint Basic War Plans, Rainbows 3 and 5, WPD 4175–15. (2) Memo, Col J. T. McNarney for ACofS WPD, 2 Dec 40, sub: Staff Conversations, WPD 4402.

Board in the form of a study plus the draft for a joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.[95] It faced "the possibility that we may at any moment become involved in war" despite a national wish for peace. It summarized the Army-Navy argument for prior concern in the Atlantic thus: "Our interests in the Far East are very important. It would, however, be incorrect to consider that they are as important to us as is the integrity of the Western Hemisphere, or as important as preventing the defeat of the British Commonwealth. The issues in the Orient will largely be decided in Europe." After surveying alternative courses of conduct the committee therefore proposed recommendations from the three cabinet members as follows:

1. A rapid increase of Army and Navy strength, and abstention from steps which would provoke attack by any other power.

2. A decision not willingly to engage in any war against Japan.

3. If forced into war with Japan, restriction of Pacific operations so as to permit use of forces for a major offensive in the Atlantic. Acceptance of no important Allied decision save with clear understanding as to common objectives, as to contingents to be provided, as to operations planned, and as to command arrangement.[96]

The committee's opinion was that if the draft met the views both of the Joint Board and of Mr. Welles, it would receive formal concurrence of the Liaison Committee as such, and then be forwarded via the three Secretaries. (General Marshall withdrew his own suggestion that the recommendations should go, rather, direct from Joint Board to the White House.) When the matter came to Mr. Hull's attention on 3 January the Secretary, while impressed by the whole report, felt that the recommendations were of a technical military nature outside the proper field of his Department. He listened to the argument that the purpose of the recommendations was to set up a policy approved by all three Departments, rather than by the military alone. He did not commit himself, but on the original text of the report, over the initials "GCM" is a notation that, following a Stimson-Hull conference, "it was agreed that the three Secretaries should meet each Tuesday re National Defense matters."[97]

[95] (1) Memo, Joint Planning Committee for the Joint Board, 21 Dec 40, sub: National Defense Policy for the United States in response to a 14 Dec 40 directive from JB. (2) Study of the Joint Planning Committee, 12 Dec 40, sub: Study of the Immediate Problems Concerning Involvement in War. Both documents are part of JB 325, ser 670.

[96] Memo, JPC for JB, 21 Dec 40. See preceding note.

[97] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 3 Jan 41, sub: Conference with the Secretary of State, WPD 4175–15. For the differences over procedure in presenting the estimate to the President see Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 20 Dec 40, WPD 4175–15.

Mr. Roosevelt's Strategy Statement of 16 January 1941

This agreement was at once the effective superseding of the Liaison Committee meetings, and the long-postponed creation, in far more potent form, of a liaison of the three Departments of State, War, and Navy on defense matters. It can be conjectured that the views of the three Secretaries, and the substance at least of the military's recommendations for a clarification of policy, soon reached the White House, for on 16 January the President summoned to the White House the three Secretaries and with them the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff. In a memorandum to Brig. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) L. T. Gerow of WPD the next day General Marshall summarized proceedings as follows:

Yesterday afternoon the President had a lengthy conference with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army. He discussed the possibilities of sudden and simultaneous action on the part of Germany and Japan against the United States. He felt that there was one chance out of five of such an eventuality, and that it might culminate any day.

The President then brought up for opinion and discussion a number of phases of the matter:

What military and naval action we should take in that emergency; he mentioned the "Rainbow" plan and commented on the fact that we must be realistic in the matter and avoid a state of mind involving plans which could be carried out after the lapse of some months; we must be ready to act with what we had available.

He discussed the publicity we might give our proposed courses of action—in relation to the Philippines, fleet, continuation of supplies to Great Britain, etc.

He devoted himself principally to a discussion of our attitude in the Far East towards Japan and to the matter of curtailment of American shipments of war supplies to England. He was strongly of the opinion that in the event of hostile action towards us on the part of Germany and Japan we should be able to notify Mr. Churchill immediately that this would not curtail the supply of materiel to England. He discussed this problem on the basis of the probability that England could survive six months and that, thereafter, a period of at least two months would elapse before hostile action could be taken against us in the Western Hemisphere. In other words, that there would be a period of eight months in which we could gather strength.

The meeting terminated with this general directive from the President:

That we would stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the fleet based on Hawaii; that the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet would have discretionary authority as to how long he could remain based in the Philippines and as to his direction of withdrawal—to the

East or to Singapore; that there would be no naval reinforcement of the Philippines; that the Navy should have under consideration the possibility of bombing attacks against Japanese cities.

That the Navy should be prepared to convoy shipping in the Atlantic to England, and to maintain a patrol off-shore from Maine to the Virginia Capes.

That the Army should not be committed to any aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake it; that our military course must be very conservative until our strength had developed; that it was assumed we could provide forces sufficiently trained to assist to a moderate degree in backing up friendly Latin-American governments against Nazi inspired fifth column movements.

That we should make every effort to go on the basis of continuing the supply of materiel to Great Britain, primarily in order to disappoint what he thought would be Hitler's principal objective in involving us in a war at this particular time, and also to buck up England.[98]

It was with this statement of foreign policy in mind that the Chief of Staff and his assistants now set about Army planning on a somewhat more assured basis. On 29 January 1941, with the British Staff on hand, there were initiated the two nations' Staff Conversations, ABC–1 and ABC–2, which lasted until 27 March, riveted Army and Navy firmly to Rainbow 5, and established an understanding of what British and American elements alike would regard as their respective missions in the event of war.[99]

[98] Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conference of Thursday, 16 Jan 41, WPD 4175–18.

[99] The ABC Staff Conversations are dealt with in Chapter XII.

CHAPTER V

Rearming Begins: A Confusion of Aims

While the War Department in its several functions had the responsibility for planning the preparations for war and then for executing them, between these operations there were two essential intermediate steps, (1) the authorizing of specific preparations and (2) providing of money for their performance. These intermediate steps could be taken only by Congress, but as a normal thing Congress neither provided nor authorized save after receiving recommendations of a fairly specific nature from the President. Thus while the military establishment could make its general plan and submit particular requests to the Secretary of War for transmission to the President, it was the President who by normal procedure adopted the program as his own and forwarded it to Congress recommending action. It also was the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and as the superior of the Secretary of War, who could and on occasion did press upon the War Department a particular idea which the Department thereupon developed into an organized program that the President then urged upon Congress.

In the year preceding the outbreak of World War II this procedure of Presidential initiative was employed by Mr. Roosevelt to meet a situation made much worse by the Munich Pact. On 14 November 1938 he summoned his principal military and civilian advisers to the White House and laid his views before them,[1] and on that occasion the effective rearming of the nation's ground and air forces took its start.[2] Despite the hasty and unshaped character of the

[1] Notes of this conference of 14 November 1938 were prepared by the Chief of the Air Corps who submitted one of the two copies made to the Chief of Staff with a covering memorandum dated 15 November 1938. The memorandum and the notes are filed in the front of the first volume of Minutes of the General Council, OPD files. A second copy of the notes is in CofS file Emergency, bndr 3.

[2] President Roosevelt himself referred to his message of 28 January 1938 as the "beginning of a vast program of rearmament," but it should be noted that he was then chiefly concerned with naval armaments, upon which there had been a considerable start in 1934, largely exceeding the "make-work" Army grants of that year, and that he requested only about $17,000,000 to correct a few of the numerous Army deficiencies. For the message and the President's note relating to it see *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 1938 Volume, pp. 68–71.

President's proposal, which went through many changes, and despite the countless interruptions and alterations and delays which the nation's rearming as a whole was to encounter in the years to come, this Presidential proposal must be regarded as far transcending—in its importance as an impulse to actual acquisition of weapons—the recommendations of the War Department officials, civilian and military, which antedated the November 1938 meeting. On this occasion President Roosevelt abruptly set aside for the time being the Army's carefully considered plans for the rearming of the ground forces. He concentrated his attention wholly upon the air forces, which up to this time had been of secondary consideration in Army planning. Expansion of the air establishment had been reinitiated in 1936 when Congress approved the Baker Board recommendations to the extent of authorizing an increase from a nominal 1,800 planes to an equally nominal 2,320 planes and thereupon, in 1936–38, doubled the average Air Corps appropriations of 1933–35. But authorization does not produce airplanes immediately. By the autumn of 1938 the number of planes on hand was still only 1,600, which was well short of even the pre-Baker objective. The airplane factories engaged on Army contracts still were not up to the necessary production rate, their combined total being figured by the Chief of the Air Corps in October 1938 at 88.2 planes per month. And two years later, in the realm of combat planes acceptable for the new battle conditions, the chief of WPD was to report on hand only 49 bombers "suitable for daylight bombing" and 140 suitable pursuit planes.[3]

Prior to the November meeting there had been numerous formal plans and several well-calculated proposals for the improvement of the Army. These are conspicuous enough in the records where they appear to rank as pioneers in rearming. There has been previous reference to the long-standing and long-ignored program of 1920 (for a lean, tightly organized, and well-balanced force capable of swift expansion) and the efforts of the Chief of Staff's Office in 1933 to move somewhat closer to that ideal. There was the invaluable six-year plan of

[3] These figures applied of course to planes with newly designed features such as special armor. The AAF Statistical Digest of December 1945 (p. 135) shows on hand in October 1940 a total of 87 heavy bombers, 483 mediums, 154 lights, and 581 fighters. For a brief discussion of the prewar development of the Air Forces see Legislation Relating to the A. A. F. Materiel Program, 1939–1944 (Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 22, Nov 44), archives of Air Historical Office. For a discussion of industrial capacity see especially Memo, CofAC for CofS, 21 Oct 38, in AG 580 (10–19–38), "Increase of the Air Corps by Aircraft. Correspondence from 10–19–38 July 14, 1939 Relative to Two Year Program for the Development of an Army Air Corps of Airplanes." For the WPD appraisal of 1940 see Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 25 Sep 40, WPD 4321–11.

1934 (see Chapter II) for redevelopment of prototypes of equipment even when there was no prospect of money for production itself. There was the 1937 General Staff program for an Initial Protective Force of 400,000 men (the Regular Army and the National Guard combined) as the first wave of a Protective Mobilization Plan force of 750,000, plus replacements, which Secretary of War Woodring described in his 1938 annual report. There were in the same year, both before and after Munich, several vigorous stimuli provided by the Assistant Secretary of War, Louis Johnson, whose particular responsibility was to procure the materiel authorized for the Army and who had the advantage of continuous advice from his professionally trained executive officer, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) James H. Burns. One such stimulus led to the naming of the so-called Stettinius Board whose report to the President on the need of industrial mobilization was unfortunately not made public by Mr. Roosevelt and apparently not acted upon. Another stimulus by Mr. Johnson affected Air Corps experimental work at the hands of the National Research Council.[4] Another sought early implementing of the General Staff's $579,500,000 rearming plan. It took the form of getting from the Ordnance Department detailed estimates of the current munitions shortage and of the cost of meeting each separate phase, all of which was incorporated in a memorandum for the President.[5] All these recommendations were based upon prolonged and careful study within the General Staff, where there was a calculation of the armed strength required for carrying out any of the possible war plans, and within the Supply branches, notably the Ordnance Department, where the cost and delivery time of the necessary

[4] This was a letter signed by Mr. Johnson, addressed to the Secretary of the National Research Council, 2 April 1938, asking for investigation and report on diesel engines, rocket and jet propulsion, de-icing, beryllium alloys, and static elimination. In response a preliminary report was made to the Chief of the Air Corps on 27–28 December 1938 by a group of eminent scientists and industrialists; it was a step toward large wartime achievements by this scientific collaboration. SW 651A.

[5] The document referred to was sent to the White House on 29 September 1938, the very day on which began the fateful Munich conference. There had been still earlier memoranda from Mr. Johnson, giving estimates of the materiel needed, and noting the necessity of ordering weapons long before troops could be assembled. The 29 September document summarized the cost of weapons, also of a start in industrial preparedness (supplying civilian factories with gauges, jigs, and special machinery), also of a start in the accumulation of strategic raw materials. Copies of these papers are in the personal files of Maj. Gen. James H. Burns (ret).

Other information about munitions shortages and efforts to remedy the situation is in the budget estimate files for the period (AG 111), in various ordnance files, and in files relating to the Air Expansion Program. See especially: (1) Memo, CofOrd for DCofS, 20 Oct 38, sub: Deficiencies in Ordnance Equipment. (2) Follow-up Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G–4, 21 Oct 38, Deficiencies in Ordnance for the Protective Mobilization Plan. (3) Supporting and related papers filed with copies of the previously mentioned two documents in Ordnance Study File 69, War Plans and Requirements office files. (4) Related papers in AG 580 (10–19–38) Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

weapons and other equipment were computed.[6] Each such proposal was the result of the normal functioning of the Chief of Staff's Office, quickened in the 1938 cases by the Assistant Secretary's pressure for action, applied both to the General Staff and to the President.[7] Evidence is scattered through the files relating to estimates and airplane production, cited above, and in Mr. Johnson's remarks on the aircraft procurement program in the *Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1938:*

> In my report last year I pointed out that the aircraft procurement policy inaugurated in 1934, providing for the acquisition of aircraft in quantity only as a result of competitive bidding, was functioning satisfactorily and that the combat airplanes under construction as a result were in general the best and most efficient airplanes in the world. Now, however, our former technical superiority in aeronautical development is no longer clearly apparent. Recent advances in other countries have equaled if not exceeded our efforts. We have known for some time that foreign nations far surpassed us in the number of military aircraft at their disposal but we also knew that we led the field technically. It now appears that our research and development programs must be accelerated if we are to regain our position of technical leadership.
>
> It appears further, and this, it seems to me, is an aspect of our defensive situation that must be faced, that our current construction program as well as our existing war-time procurement program for aircraft both fall short of providing even the minimum amount of this essential item which any realistic view of the problem will show as necessary. The same remark holds true to an even greater degree with respect to antiaircraft materiel. In my opinion the people of the United States must be awakened to a realization of their weakness in the matter of defense against hostile aircraft and they must be convinced that, if adequate protection is to be provided, they must spend money for the purpose. Anyone acquainted with the facts, who considers the bombing activity which has characterized operations in Spain and in China, must stand aghast at a contemplation of the havoc which a hostile bombing attack could and, in the event of war, doubtless would, wreak on our unprotected cities.[8]

This was in contrast to the generally optimistic report of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. A comparison of the above with the paragraph by the Chief of Staff on airplane procurement in the same report illustrates the confusion of objectives, though neither statement should be accepted as explaining the complex conditions or the thinking of the men involved. The statement of the Chief of Staff is as follows:

[6] The development of the plans and the division of responsibility for action on various phases of them are illustrated by documents in AG 381.4 (5–14–37) . . . War Reserves, Critical Items . . . and in files relating to appropriation estimates made during 1938.

[7] Interv with Gen Burns, 1947.

[8] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938* (Washington, 1938), pp. 26–27.

Great progress has been made toward the attainment of the Baker Board objective. Funds provided in fiscal year 1939 will permit the completion of this objective. The Air Corps is now being equipped with airplanes and materiel that are equal, if not superior, to any military planes in design, speed, endurance and suitability for the military use for which intended. This was convincingly demonstrated in February of this year by the record breaking flight to Argentina by six United States Army bombers of the Second Bombardment Group, to participate in the inaugural ceremonies at Buenos Aires. These airplanes with normal crews, equipment, and training gave a demonstration of speed, range, and navigation accuracy unexcelled by any military planes in the world.[9]

As proposals, formally laid before the President as Commander in Chief, these recommendations from the War Department make an impressive appearance in the official record. They ended, however, as proposals: the President, beyond expressing an interest, did nothing about them at the time, and when the major expansion of the Army and the upbuilding of war industries and the accumulation of strategic war materials actually came to pass, it was much later, and upon another basis. Despite the incidence of dates, the proposals have only an apparent significance. The actual drive toward rearming, so far as immediate effectiveness was concerned, began on a different date, came from different causes, and took a different direction altogether. The date was the one mentioned—14 November 1938. The causes lay in reports brought to Mr. Roosevelt of the special alarm of Great Britain and France over the now well-known expansion of the German Air Force. The direction was toward a rapid upbuilding of the U. S. Army Air Corps and of the Army's antiaircraft defenses for the protection of the Western Hemisphere.

The fundamental importance of all this, so far as America's rearming is concerned, lay in the fact that now for the first time the Commander in Chief, rather than the Army establishment, was pressing for national rearming and was insistent upon starting with a minimum of delay; he, in contrast with the Army, had influence over Congress. There were important differences between his own idea of how it should be done and the professional soldier's methodically designed program for a balanced force, whose stage-by-stage development would be determined largely by the time factor of munitions production. These differences recurred in one form or another over the ensuing years. They called for frequent argument and often for patient adjustment to necessity, and unless

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 34. For further information about the role of Assistant Secretary Johnson see Troyer Anderson, History of the Office of the Under Secretary . . ., MS in Hist Div, SSUSA; and William Frye, *Marshall: Citizen Soldier* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1947), pp. 246–55.

one is aware that they existed it is difficult to understand some of the changes of plan that marked the course of the nation's rearming. Most of these changes of plan, however, were due to altered estimates of the situation, for the vast extent and complexity of the project were such as to call for continuous reappraisal and correction. Even firm requirements of one month were altered in the next month, whether so influenced by accident or by enemy action or by the changes in objective that sprang from hesitancy and doubts about the exact course to be followed. The sequence of events in 1938 affords an example.

The General Staff's study of activities in Europe, plus the pressure of the Assistant Secretary for making the Protective Mobilization Force more than a paper concept, had already served the double purpose of bringing from the Ordnance Department and other branches a close calculation of the ground forces' needs in equipment [10] and of encouraging a study of the air forces' whole organization.[11] The summaries of Army needs, as noted, were placed in the President's hands, and ultimately they would prove useful. But they do not appear to have had any immediate result.

The October 1938 Impulse to American Rearming

The first evidence of acute White House concern over the mounting powers of the Axis as a substantial threat to the security of the United States (about which, it will be recalled, the Standing Liaison Committee of State-War-Navy officials had issued warning) reached the War Department after the return to Washington on 13 October 1938 of William C. Bullitt, then U. S. Ambassador to France.[12] On the following day, Mr. Roosevelt announced that, after having sat up late the night before to hear the report from Ambassador Bullitt, he could not comment on current budget planning because new world conditions had compelled him and his assistants to recheck defense preparedness carefully. When asked specifically for the "reasons that led to this decision to reorganize the whole national defense picture," he replied: "I should say, offhand, that it started about

[10] See n. 5.

[11] In these years the strength and organization of the Air Forces were undergoing almost constant scrutiny. On 2 November 1937 the Chief of the Air Corps submitted a Five-Year Airplane Replacement Program that formed a basis for staff discussion and planning during the ensuing months. See papers filed in WPD 3807, especially Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 22 Jan 38, sub: Five-Year Program for the Air Corps, WPD 3807–21. See also AG 111 Woodring Program.

[12] This statement is based upon the recollections of General Burns as stated to the writer in 1947.

a year ago because of information that was coming in at that time. It has been in progress for about a year and it has, in a sense, been forced to a head by events, developments and information received within the past month." [13]

Mr. Bullitt had a clear impression of French official thinking as to the significance of Hitler's overriding self-confidence at the time of his historic Munich meeting with Premiers Chamberlain and Daladier. The French military chiefs attributed Hitler's confidence to his possession of an air force already large and still capable of rapid expansion by means of the huge German airplane factories already in operation. What impressed the French most was the existence of a German bomber fleet much larger than that of France and Britain combined, and what the French military now wished ardently was a rapid increase of French air resources of every kind, for defense and for counteroffensive. They (and the British as well) knew that a rapid increase could come about only from American factories and they urged upon the United States a development of American airplane production for Anglo-French purchase. With this in prospect, the French promised they would have a better chance of resisting German air attack: they would "dig underground until relief should come." [14] Through Mr. Bullitt's recital of French fears and desires, duplicated to a degree by reports of similar anxieties in Great Britain,[15] President Roosevelt became convinced for the first time that American airplane production should be greatly stimulated with all possible speed. His private remarks to that effect led to conjecture in the press that he would shortly ask for 10,000 airplanes plus a large increase in factories.[16] There is, on the part of a principal participant in later conferences, a firm belief that at that time the President had in mind the creation in the United

[13] See newspaper accounts of the President's press conference of 14 October 1938. See also: *FDR Public Papers and Addresses,* 1938 Volume, pages 546–48, 601; confidential letter of 11 July 1938 from the Ambassador in Berlin, Hugh Wilson, to the President. The Ambassador was emphatic in his discussion of the German air potential. This letter was shown to the Secretary of War, but not until 2 September 1938. SW, 608. See also Memorandum of Assistant Secretary of War for Chief of Staff, 14 October 1938, drafted by Colonel Burns, discussing war requirements for aircraft as contrasted with actual resources. This memorandum estimated a 5,000-plane deficiency which might cost $400,000,000 to remedy. It probably reached the White House. SW, 622.

[14] Interv with Gen Burns, 1947.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] The President did not directly commit himself to a specific program but he did not deny rumors and speculation of an expansion as great as four times the Baker Board objective of 2,320; and there is reason to assume the press speculation was based on advice from well-informed officials. For newspaper and periodical reporting and comment on the new emphasis on national defense see Associated Press Washington dispatch, 5 Nov 38; *The New York Times,* 14, 15, 27, 28 and 30 Oct 38 and 14, 15, 16, 20, and 23 Nov 38; *New Republic,* 32: 24–25 (22 Aug 38) and 32: 11 (19 Dec 38).

States of airplane production facilities whose output would go to Britain and France, enabling them to build up aerial fleets that might overawe Hitler or that, if war should come, could even help to defeat Hitler without American armed intervention.[17] However, it was apparent that government funds could not be employed for erection of plant facilities whose product was declared to be for immediate benefit to foreign countries; if any facilities were to go up, through use of government funds, it would surely be upon the assumption by Congress that they were to be erected for the primary needs of the United States itself. Isolationist Congressmen were already critical of foreign purchases of American munitions on the ground (1) that the purchases might involve the nation in a European war, and (2) that they were taking out of the country materiel which was needed by the U. S. Army or Navy. Only a few months later this antagonism blazed up over an accident to a new light bomber, in whose trial flight the test pilot was killed and the passenger, at first identified as "Smithins, a company mechanic," was injured. "Smithins" proved to be Paul Chemidlin, observer for the French Air Ministry[18] and there was immediate inference that the French were being given access to military aviation secrets; a further charge in isolationists' speeches was that this access, originally denied by Army and Navy officers, had been granted by the President through Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau in the latter's capacity as a civilian procurement authority. General Arnold later informed the Congressional committee that he himself had granted permission "upon request of the Secretary of the Treasury and by direction of the Secretary of War; whereupon I was asked by the Senators 'Who is running your Air Force: the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of War?' "[19] The President promptly announced that he had approved French purchase of an unstated number of modern battle planes[20] and the following day General Craig was reported as saying that no secret devices were shown to the French agents.[21] However (illustrating a belief expressed publicly about Presidential intentions), members of the Senate Military Affairs

[17] This theory was expressed by General Burns in an interview with the writer in 1947. There is no doubt that subsequent to 1938 it was a firm part of War Department policy. The President and his advisers may have been influenced to some extent by the activities and ideas of military purchase missions from Great Britain, France, and China in mid-1938. See Edward R. Stettinius, *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 13–19.

[18] *The New York Times,* 27 Jan 39, p. 5, col. 8.

[19] Ltr, Gen Arnold to Maj Gen H. J. Malony, 31 Mar 49, Hist Div files.

[20] *The New York Times,* 28 Jan 39, p. 1, col. 8.

[21] *Ibid.,* 29 Jan 39, Pt. I, p. 1, col. 6.

Committee were then reported as harboring the fear that "the Administration might have in mind some sort of arrangement whereby the 565 airplanes for which the President had asked Congress . . . would be turned over to the French Air Mission at some later date during a crisis, by legislation which would be sought under the whip of emergency." [22]

The Army Begins Revising Its Ordnance Planning

Much of what the President had in mind after the Bullitt conference—that is, a marked increase in defense expenditures in some form or another—must have been communicated to the War Department, and presumably in fragments, for within a week of the Bullitt report to Mr. Roosevelt there was marked activity in planning. On 19 October the Deputy Chief of Staff conferred with the Chief of Ordnance, who within twenty-four hours submitted an estimate of $125,000,000 to cover ordnance deficiencies.[23] This conference had been initiated by General Marshall as one of many undertaken soon after he became Deputy Chief of Staff in order to familiarize himself with all the responsibilities of his new office. It developed, however, into a discussion of Army responsibility for formulating a rounded program of rearmament. Accordingly, one day later the Chief of Ordnance submitted another estimate, totaling $349,000,000.[24] Both estimates were based upon Staff plans of long standing: the first one presumably met the prevailing view of what the President and Congress might approve as a post-Munich expenditure; the second one took advantage of what now seemed to be an unexpected favoring wind springing up at the White House. The same expanding optimism guided the Air Corps whose chief on 19 October, responding to oral instructions, submitted to the Secretary of War a long-range program for expanding the Air Corps by 4,000 planes.[25] Three days later, again on instructions from the Secretary, he submitted a revision of the short-range program, for the fiscal year 1941, increasing the immediate purchases from 178 to 1,178 planes.[26] One day later the Chief of Staff submitted to the Assistant Secretary yet another

[22] *Ibid.*, Pt. IV, p. 4, col. 8. See Chapter X for further reference to this episode.

[23] Memo, CofOrd for DCofS G–4, 20 Oct 38, sub: Deficiencies in Ordnance Equipment, Ordnance Study Folder No. 69, War Plans and Requirements office files.

[24] Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G–4, 21 Oct 38, sub: Deficiencies in Ordnance Equipment for the Protective Mobilization Plan, Ordnance Study Folder No. 69, War Plans and Requirements office files.

[25] Memo, CofAC for SW, 19 Oct 38, sub: Increase of the Air Corps by 4,000 Aircraft, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

[26] Memo, CofAC for SW, 22 Oct 38, no sub, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

upward revision of budget estimates. This time he proposed to add 2,500 new planes instead of the 1,000 which the Chief of the Air Corps sought.[27]

If this extraordinary flurry of upward revisions indicates a sudden confidence that the President now would support in the new Congress large increases for the ground and air forces, comparable to these granted the sea forces in the preceding session, it also indicates uncertainty and confusion. The language of the communications just cited shows a belief that $500,000,000 would be requested, much more than had been sought for new equipment allotments for many years.[28] The uncertainty was upon the program's distribution over one, two, and three years [29] and upon the manner in which the total amount should be divided between the ground and air components of the Army. Nobody questioned that there was acute need for ordnance materiel to make up for existing shortages in the Army and to provide a reserve in those items which cannot be swiftly produced and hence must be accumulated far in advance of need. But among the advocates of air expansion, who felt sure that the President was in agreement with them, there was equal certainty that there should be a large immediate increase in the number of airplanes on hand and in the provision for many more in the visible future. There was equally persuasive argument for the installation of grand-scale maintenance and training facilities, on the sound reasoning that it would take as long to train efficient crews and pilots as to build efficient planes. All these outlays would certainly use up more than $500,000,000. Accordingly the task of the Chief of Staff was to reconcile these requirements in such a way as to attain a balanced force, as efficient as possible, with necessary adjustment to two controlling factors, (1) the funds which should become available and (2) the exactions of time requirements. His task was not merely to reach a sound judgment on how to gain that balanced force, but to convince the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, and the President's other advisers that the balanced force was a prime desideratum.[30] It was not easy.

[27] Memo, CofS for Asst SW, 25 Oct 38, sub: Modification of Totals of the Special Budget Figures to Include 2,500 Planes Instead of 1,000 Planes, 25 Oct 38, copy in AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

[28] No document has been found that shows precisely when and how this limitation was set, but figures and phrases used in various documents cited above (AG 580) show that it was a practical matter.

[29] See particularly the documents referred to in memos cited by notes 23 and 24.

[30] This point of view is stated emphatically in documents referred to in a "memo for the Chief of Staff to use in conference with Secretary of Treasury and Mr. Bell of Budget"; and an attached *aide-mémoire,* 20 October 1938, used in a conference with the Secretary of the Treasury. Copies of the last two documents, assembled with other papers by the Deputy Chief of Staff, are in AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

The 24 October communication to the Budget office, which called for planes, was also an argument for ordnance, and when the 25 October program for still more planes was given to the Assistant Secretary there was a renewed argument with the President, as well as his advisers, in favor of "balance." [31] The President had already, on that same day, named a committee to report steps necessary to increase military aircraft production, the members being Assistant Secretary Johnson, Charles Edison, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and Aubrey Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Works Progress Administration. The committee reported with surprising celerity on 28 October, presenting memoranda on questions yet to be studied but calling for expansion of the commercial aircraft industry within two years from a current capacity of 2,600 to one of 15,000 planes a year, and for the creation within three years of government-built plants which would produce an additional 16,000 planes a year.[32] The observant chief of the Air Corps became doubtful that even the 2,500-plane program that he had lately urged was sufficient to the new day. On 10 November he phrased a diplomatic memorandum to the Assistant Secretary on "our personal ideas of a method of establishing an Air Force objective and an indication of what such an objective might be." The outstanding items among his personal ideas were a new goal of 7,000 planes, and an outline of means whereby 5,000 of them could be acquired with fair speed.[33]

The Momentous White House Meeting of 14 November 1938

At the White House conference of 14 November were present the President; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau; Harry L. Hopkins, WPA Chief, who had already become the President's principal adviser; Robert H. Jackson, the Solicitor General, already marked for the Attorney General's post; Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War; Herman Oliphant, General Counsel of the Treasury; Gen. Malin Craig, the Chief of Staff, and his Deputy, Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall; Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, the new Chief of the Air Corps; Col. James H. Burns, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary

[31] It was evidently in this period that there occurred the White House incident that William Frye recounts in *Marshall: Citizen Soldier*, pp. 249–51. His recital represents General Marshall as vigorously arguing against the President at a conference on the latter's 10,000-plane program.

[32] Ltr, ASW, ASN, and Deputy Administrator of WPA to the President, 28 Oct 38, sub: Strength of Army Air Forces, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

[33] Memo, CofAC for ASW, 10 Nov 38, sub: Strength of Army Air Force, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

of War; and the President's military and naval aides.[34] The President did most of the speaking, as if his mind had been made up by earlier discussion and appraisal. He remarked that the United States defenses were patently weak; that the first need was the rapid upbuilding of a heavy striking force of Army airplanes; that the Navy could then "float" only 2,000 planes and that it too needed more planes—any new plant construction program would have to allow a factory capacity of 350 to 500 planes per year for the Navy alone. The air situation in Europe he summarized with announcement that France had only 600 modern combat planes and an annual production capacity of 3,600; that Great Britain had 1,500 to 2,200 planes and an annual capacity of 4,800. On the other hand, of the Axis Powers Germany then had 5,000 to 10,000 planes, with 12,000 annual capacity, and Italy had 3,000 planes with an annual capacity of 2,400. In view of those Axis figures, he continued, the United States must be prepared to resist assault on the Western Hemisphere "from the North to the South Pole."

As to the means of resistance, the President said the weakest of all the United States armed forces was the Army Air Corps, and this must be built up quickly. At the same time and of equal importance there must be a rapid upbuilding of antiaircraft artillery units (at that time these units were a part of the Coast Artillery). The need that he stressed, however, was for an increase of air strength. The desired objective was an Army air force of 20,000 planes and an annual productive capacity of 24,000, but, he explained, if he asked Congress for any such amount he would get about half the request. His view was that in order to get the support of Congress there should be present concentration not on the greater objective but on an "acceptable" program that he could present with confidence of Congressional support. He therefore wished the War Department to develop a program for 10,000 planes (the figure that the press already had mentioned unofficially, but certainly with official encouragement) of which 2,500 would be training planes, 3,750 line combat, and 3,750 reserve combat planes. His stated broad objectives were: (1) production over a two-year period of 10,000 planes as described, of which 8,000 would come from existing commercial plants and 2,000 from new plants to be built with government funds and (2) the creation of an unused plant capacity for producing 10,000 planes annually. The second objective, Mr. Roosevelt indicated, could be attained by a plant-construction program that he would leave to Mr.

[34] The discussion of this conference is based on the notes cited in n. 1.

Hopkins, whose WPA experience qualified him for that task; in general, the program called for the erection of seven government-built plants of which two would go into operation (to produce the 2,000 planes referred to in Objective 1) and five would remain idle until needed, the intimation being that they would be needed for an air program later and larger than the 10,000-plane program he was now advancing.

The President's whole emphasis was upon airplanes. There was none whatever on an air force, a much larger thing that is made up of airplanes plus equipment plus pilots and crews and maintenance units, all organized methodically in commands, all supported by supply elements, all integrated with other elements of national defense, all operating in accordance with a prepared plan adjusted through years of experiment and precisely related to available funds and manpower and authority.

In this circumstance is a suggestion of the purpose previously mentioned, which by one of the participants in the conference was believed to be Mr. Roosevelt's—to produce airplanes in great numbers without all these aspects of a balanced air force, for the sufficient reason that the airplanes were, in his mind, principally destined not for the U. S. Army Air Corps but for direct purchase by the air forces of Great Britain and France. However fully formed that Presidential purpose was in 1938, aspects of it reappeared as the war advanced. In 1938–39 the President called for airplanes above all other weapons, despite the grave shortages of ground force equipment.[35] In 1940 he voiced his determination to make large use of American production facilities for aiding the Allies, even to the point of shipping out material that Secretary of War Woodring contended should be retained for the United States forces.[36] In his 16 May 1940 message to Congress the President made his wishes in this respect unmistakable:

> I ask the Congress not to take any action which would in any way hamper or delay the delivery of American-made planes to foreign nations which have ordered them or seek to

[35] This was the tenor of his conference of 14 November (discussed above), and of his speech of January 12. *FDR Public Papers and Addresses,* 1939 Volume, pp. 70–74. Writing in 1941 the President said of earlier rearmament efforts: "First attention was paid to airplanes, because the war in Europe and in Asia had shown the primary importance of air equipment." *FDR Public Papers and Addresses,* 1940 Volume, p. 206.

[36] For the policy of the President in early 1940 see *FDR Public Papers and Addresses,* 1940 Volume, pp. 104–08, and 202. For views of Secretary Woodring see: (1) His note on Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 9 Mar 40, sub: Sale of Surplus Ordnance Materiel to Foreign Governments, G–4/31684. (2) Notes of meeting held in CofS office, 19 Mar 40, CofS file Emergency, bndr 3. For the working out of a policy on release of airplanes and airplane equipment see: (1) The above; (2) Notes of conferences held 20, 23, and 25 Mar 40, CofS file Emergency, bndr 3; (3) Papers in G–4/31687.

purchase more planes. That, from the point of view of our own national defense, would be extremely short-sighted. Our immediate problem is to superimpose on this productive capacity a greatly increased additional productive capacity.[37]

The Army Plans a Balanced Development

But the President's apparent desire in November 1938 to concentrate almost wholly upon airplane construction ran counter to the judgment of his military advisers who favored airplanes in that balance with supplies and training and ground force requirements which has been discussed. Accordingly on the day after the White House meeting of 14 November the Assistant Secretary (momentarily Acting Secretary) directed the Chief of Staff to prepare a detailed budget which, over a two-year period, would achieve the following objectives as far as the air was concerned:[38]

1. An Army airplane strength of 10,000 planes balanced as to types, 50 percent of them to be maintained on an operating basis, including personnel, installations, materials, 50 percent to be kept in storage.

2. Provision for seven government aircraft factories each with an average annual production of 1,200 planes, buildings to be constructed from relief funds but machinery and operation to be provided from Army funds.

3. Necessary supporting materials and services—Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal Corps, and so on.

Significantly this same order went on to call for a further budget estimate on the cost of supplies which would be required to equip and maintain the Protective Mobilization Plan Army.[39] It sought additional estimates that would cover the following items:

1. Completion of the educational orders program.
2. Equipping the existing government arsenals with modern machinery.
3. Completing plans for the factory output of critical supplies.

[37] *FDR Public Papers and Addresses,* 1940 Volume, p. 202. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau two months later, 18 July 1940, sought to make the President's directive applicable to airplane engines as well, despite Mr. Stimson's warning that unless the United States had access to engines originally ordered by France "there will be practically no deliveries of combat airplanes, beyond those now on order to the army prior to Oct. 1, 1941"; a few days later representatives of the various interests concerned met and arrived at an agreement on allocation of aircraft production, including engines. See (1) original Ltr (marginal note: "Superseded by Conference Tuesday"), SW to Secy Treasury, 15 Jul 40; (2) original Ltr, Secy Treasury to SW, 18 Jul 40; and (3) original Memo, CofAC for CofS, 23 Jul 40, sub: Allocation of Aircraft Production. All in CofS file Emergency, bndr 3.

[38] Memo, Actg SW for CofS, 15 Nov 38, no sub, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

[39] *Ibid.*

4. Acceleration of the industrial mobilization program by completing the current surveys and specifications.

5. Providing a reserve of special machinery for the making of essential munitions.

6. Providing stock piles of critical raw materials.

These were considerable additions to an "airplanes-only" program which the President had originally specified, and the Acting Secretary's ignoring of a $500,000,000 limitation evidences a belief that the President might raise his financial sights a great deal. The objectives were not only 10,000 planes but immediate supplies for the Protective Mobilization Plan force and also industrial preparedness for a much larger eventual force.

Two days later the Deputy Chief of Staff provided all assistant chiefs with copies of the Acting Secretary's memorandum and directed prompt assistance to General Arnold (of the Air Corps) in completing his own task, adding: "There is no time for normal General Staff procedure. Speed is essential and your efforts should be informal." [40] He gave specific directions to each of the Staff divisions for its part in the computation work and then, referring to the PMP equipment plan that had been revived by the Acting Secretary's instructions, directed G–4 to recalculate the standing estimate of $579,500,000: this called for deducting from it $110,000,000 for airplane procurement and $42,000,000 for aids to manufacture which, it is seen, the Acting Secretary's memorandum had removed from PMP responsibility. The celerity enjoined upon the several Staff sections by the Deputy Chief of Staff was occasioned by the short time in which the figures would have to be computed and processed through the Bureau of the Budget in order to be ready for the President's message to Congress at the New Year. In the meantime, orders were prepared for bringing to Washington certain Air Corps personnel who were expert in Ordnance, Signal Corps, and other supply branches. Each of these fields offered problems which would have to be mastered before there could be any creation of the balanced air force that was clearly the objective of the Chief of Staff as distinguished from the President's specific desire for 10,000 airplanes. A single office memorandum installed six new executive officers for the Chief of the Air Corps, including Lt. Col. Carl Spaatz, Lt. Col. Joseph T. McNarney, Lt. Col. Ira C. Eaker, and Maj. Muir S. Fairchild, all of whom during the years following would win distinction as general officers.[41]

[40] Statement of DCofS to AC'sofS, 17 Nov 38, sub: Supplementary Estimates, FY 1940, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

[41] AC Office Memo No. 10 38, 17 Nov 38, sub: Additional Officers for Special Duty, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

The balanced air force was not the only concern of the Chief of Staff's Office, any more than of the Assistant Secretary. Rather, the apparent decision at the Chief of Staff's level was to effect something of a balancing of the Army as a whole, such as had been sought for years.[42] In particular, the quest was for arms and equipment the needs for which were already computed in the ordnance estimates referred to, but besides this materiel program, the War Plans Division on 25 November advanced a program for modest enlargement in personnel as well.[43] It was occasioned by the growing uneasiness about Axis plans against Latin America which had been revealed in Joint Board discussions of that month as well as at the Standing Liaison Committee meetings with the State and Navy Department representatives.[44] Even while the President was interested wholly in airplanes, WPD was pressing for three other objectives: (1) improvement of the Regular Army in continental United States, to include the creation of an expeditionary force, with approval of the Latin American states involved, capable of taking and defending potential air bases; (2) improvement of American defenses in the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska (showing a revived concern over possibilities of Japanese aggression); (3) improvement of the National Guard, through raising 27,000 additional men who would be formed into nine antiaircraft artillery regiments plus lesser units of air corps and engineer troops.[45] In the following month (timing the message for guidance in preparation of the new budget) the Chief of Staff addressed to the Assistant Secretary of War a considered memorandum summarizing all the varied needs now under consideration.[46] It stated bluntly that the Nazis and Fascists were penetrating Central and South America, and that the American military obligation had lately become larger and more urgent, requiring preparation to defend against a growing threat not only the continental United

[42] In addition to document cited in n. 24 and 28 see Memo, CofS for Col Watson (White House), 19 Nov 38, sub: Status of Certain Critical Arms and Material, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . . Penciled note indicates that this was delivered personally by the Chief of Staff.

[43] Unused Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 25 Nov 38, sub: Augmentation of the Regular Army and the National Guard to Provide the Additional Forces Considered Essential, with revisions, WPD 3674–10. It is evident from notations that General Marshall gave these matters his personal attention. Copies of these papers and related papers are in AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

[44] SLC Min, 14 Nov 38, Office files of SGS. The Latin American nations' concern over their own security was voiced at discussions in Montevideo and Buenos Aires and in the Lima Conference Declarations of December 1938.

[45] Unused Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 25 Nov 38. See n. 43 above.

[46] Memo, CofS, prepared by WPD, for ASW, 17 Dec 38, sub: Two Year Army Augmentation Plan, WPD 3674–10 and AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps. . . . Correspondence. . . .

States and the outlying possessions referred to, but also the Western Hemisphere as a whole. These combined tasks, it was admitted, the Army was too weak to perform. Accordingly, in order to obtain a balanced military force that could command respect, it needed not one but all of the following: Increased aviation strength, a Regular Army sufficient to perform normal defense and also to provide an expeditionary force, a National Guard sufficient to complement the Regular establishment, numerous critical items of equipment, the placing of educational orders, and the planning of reserve industrial output. Specifically, the Chief of Staff recommended:

1. A total of 5,620 combat planes, 3,750 trainers, and 630 other planes (note the considerable shifting of components in the 10,000 total; the General Staff was in quest of a balanced force). Also 8,040 additional planes by the end of 1941 (not a two-year but a three-year program) attainable by the proposed erection of seven government-operated plants with 10,000 annual output. Also 7,900 officers, 1,200 cadets, and 73,000 enlisted men (currently there were fewer than 20,000 enlisted men in the Air Corps, but the 73,000 mark was destined to be eclipsed by a larger objective in the next two years under a much augmented program).

2. An increase of 58,000 in the Ground Forces.

3. An increase of 36,000 in the National Guard.

4. Materiel for a PMP M-Day force of 730,000, plus 270,000 M-Day-plus-5-months reinforcements; this would take one year to produce.[47]

Obviously this "balanced force" proposal was far different from the 10,000-plane program that alone had been the subject of the President's outline of mid-November, and even the Chief of Staff's memorandum is not all-inclusive for it deals only with Army items. The Navy Department was equally quickened, and from that service came arguments in favor of other large expenditures.[48]

Intimations of what was going on reached the White House and with little delay President Roosevelt summoned his military advisers to another meeting. He informed them sharply that, contrary to the confidence they were showing, it was extremely doubtful whether he could ask Congress for more than $500,000,000 in new armament money for the coming fiscal year: he had stated his desire to spend that upon the production of Army-type airplanes. He now found the Navy asking $100,000,000, the materiel branches of the Army $200,000,000 for immediate outlay, and the educational-orders branch $33,000,000, while unstated amounts were being sought for air bases and air training. He

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] This account is based upon information supplied the writer in an interview with General Burns in 1947.

had sought $500,000,000 worth of airplanes, and he was being offered everything except airplanes.[49]

There followed a careful and thorough discussion of the armed forces' low state and, more particularly, of the futility of producing planes over a long period without producing trained pilots and crews and air bases at an appropriate pace. At the close of the discussion Mr. Roosevelt agreed to find the Navy's $100,000,000 from another source, and to allot to non-air armaments the scheduled $200,000,000 of the main $500,000,000 leaving only $300,000,000 for the air-expansion program. Of that he also conceded $120,000,000 for air bases and other non-plane air items, but warned that all of the $180,000,000 residue must be expended on combat planes with which to impress Germany; he wished 3,000 of them.[50] This was a considerable letdown. Even so, when the Air Corps recomputed its means for spending the money to best advantage, it reported to the White House that of the 3,000 planes scheduled a considerable number would be advanced trainers rather than combat planes. The President said firmly they must be combat planes; he would get other funds for trainers.[51] As late as 14 December the Chief of the Air Corps sent to the Chief of Staff the drafts of five bills calling for a 10,000-airplane program and the related Air Corps improvements. On 11 January 1939 there came back to him, by direction of the Secretary of War, a memorandum directing changes which, most notably, would set a 6,000-plane total for combat and noncombat planes combined.[52] This met the President's reconsidered wishes.

The Effort to Accomplish Too Many Objectives

In this manner the rearming of the United States began. The 1938 confusion sprang from the conflict of pressures to correct long-continued lacks—the weakness in personnel of the Regular Army after years of neglect, the fragmentary development of the National Guard, the paucity of weapons and equipment for even the existing military establishment, the peacetime lack of industrial plants to produce wartime needs. The nation had too long failed to recognize at its full

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Ibid.* See also Frye, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–55.

[52] These and related communications are in AG 580 (12–14–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence . . .; and AG 580 (12–14–38), Legislation for Proposed Expansion Program. They led to Senate Bill 842, fixing the 6,000-plane total.

value the promise of air development, and the General Staff itself had failed to press its convictions aggressively during the years of discouragingly small appropriations. There now arose in various quarters, as a result of Axis threats, a desire to correct all lacks at the same time, despite the slender resources of new money which had to be divided among so many projects.[53] It is not surprising that so sharp a turn of attitude as that of the White House in mid-November 1938 produced confusion; the significant thing is that there was at last a bold step forward on the road to rearming. It was not a sure one, partly because of the basic conflict between the Army's tenacious desire to attain a balanced force, which professional training recognized as essential, and the President's insistence upon air additions first of all. It must be recognized that even to get a balanced force for modern war there had to be an immense addition to its existing air element. The President concentrated on that vital point; the Army emphasized its own and equally sound objective—even though the Air Corps on occasion felt it was receiving from the Staff as a whole less support than had been ordered. A mid-January complaint was that although the Air Corps was working on a plan for a $40,000,000 increase "General Staff people, except G–4 . . . had not been informed of a change" and "it appears that General Staff cooperation with the Air Corps has about died out and the Air Corps is again going it alone." G–4 was in fact, as indicated by a memorandum of that very day to the Chief of Staff, trying to learn the responsibility for getting from the federal WPA funds the amount needed for Air Corps construction.[54]

A great many revisions were made in the President's hasty program, as noted, even before the plan was laid before Congress, and others followed quickly, some of them almost disastrous from the Army point of view. The 12 January 1939 message to Congress recommended immediate purchase of only $110,000,000 worth of new equipment for the ground forces, and this with a small increase was granted by Congress on 2 May, following sharp questioning of

[53] On 1 December 1938 the Acting Secretary of War summarized the three-point program which he understood the President approved, and itemized a short-lived $1,832,000,000 addition to the 1940 budget request. Of this $1,289,000,000 was for a two-year air program producing 10,000 planes; $421,000,000 was to meet PMP needs; and $122,000,000 was to accelerate industrial preparedness. In addition, the Acting Secretary pointed out that the Chief of Staff believed there should be an increase in strength of the ground forces to the extent of 58,000 men for the Regular Army and 35,000 for the National Guard, at a two year cost of $272,000,000. Memo, Actg SW for the President, 1 Dec 38, no sub, AG 580 (10–19–38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

[54] (1) Penciled Memo for Col L. [Loughry] signed M.F.H. [Harmon] re Air Corps Program, 26 Jan 39, and (2) Accompanying Memo, ACofS G–4 [Tyner] for CofS, 26 Jan 39, both found in AG 580 (10–19–38) Bulky, Increase of the Air Corps.

War Department witnesses.[55] The pilot-training objective that finally was approved by the Chief of the Air Corps on 21 December 1938 and supported by the Congressional appropriation of 3 April 1939 was for only 4,500 pilots in two years.[56] Both these programs were small, and thereafter numerous upward revisions were to be made at an increasing pace in the programs for air and ground forces, for personnel and materiel, for long-range and short-range planning. New doubts and delays would furnish serious interruptions to progress. The start, however, was made.

The Obstacles to Thorough Planning

The changes in program, with inevitable loss of momentum, were frequently attributable to hasty judgments based on insufficient data, or to an unpredictable foreign development which completely altered requirements. Some were attributable to understandable efforts to attain too much in a limited time. Some must be recognized as simple errors in professional planning. To regard them all as readily avoidable blunders due to inefficiency would be far from the fact and would miss a major lesson of the war's experience. Far more frequently their occurrence was due to the long years of neglect that affected the General Staff as well as the Army's other elements. The planning of operations for a clear-cut objective in modern warfare is a complex task, which during World War II was entrusted to large, well-trained staffs. Yet the prewar planning of operations for possible objectives, not clear at all as to time or theater or opponent or available resources, was entrusted in 1939 to a handful of officers and men relatively geared in number to the small Army of that day. With numbers so small it was inevitable that too much knowledge and too thorough appraisal would be expected of each Staff member. It happened, further, that a large part of veteran Staff officers' time was required for the mere routine labors of administration with its harassing but necessary details, instead of being wholly available for the deliberative activities that are the proper and exacting function of a peacetime planning Staff. Much of this routine could have been performed as well or

[55] 53 U. S. Stat 642; and House Appropriations Committee, *Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1939: Hearings before the Subcommittee . . .* (Washington, 1939), pp. 434–84.

[56] The pilot-training programs are discussed in Army Air Forces Historical Study No. 7, Legislation Relating to the AAF Training Program, 1939–1945 (revised 1946), Archives of Air Historical Office. Long before the goal of 1939 could be reached it was superseded by the 7,000-pilot program of June 1940.

better by junior officers or by trained civilians, but they were not at hand. The peacetime organization of the General Staff, as of the Army, had been restricted by the prolonged compulsion to save money, even at the cost of a thoroughgoing preparation for a war not yet at hand.

The General Staff was then, as previously, made up of selected officers chosen both for general capacity and for special aptitude in special fields, trained in the various graduate schools, exposed to field experience that would familiarize them with practice as well as theory.[57] Their chief lack, other than that of adequate time for mature study and considered judgment, probably was of a quickening environment. They may have been too exclusively exposed to internal contacts and too little exposed to developments in foreign military establishments, particularly that of Germany where in the thirties revolutionary military thinking, far in advance of 1918 concepts, was under way. The contacts of the General Staff in Washington were largely limited to those afforded through military observers who themselves were few and often junior in grade,[58] and through a smaller number of promising young officers who had been accepted as students in the staff schools of foreign armies on the same basis that representatives of those armies attended schools in the United States.

Even a fuller inoculation of these new ideas within the Staff, however, could hardly have overcome the deadening influence of the excessive economies in military appropriations, which was discussed in Chapter II. Nor could it have enabled the Staff to cope with military uncertainties that lasted as long as the nation's foreign policy remained indecisive. Military requirements were determinable only by a knowledge of the task expected of the military, that is, by a statement of the foreign policies which the military might be called on to support. To determine accurately the Army's materiel requirements, for instance, and to permit procurement on an efficient basis, the first need in 1939 was for a fairly complete knowledge of what was expected of the Army, in what theater, against what possible enemy, and at what time. This would have determined the character of the operations the General Staff should prepare for, and permitted the develop-

[57] The soundness of tactical doctrine as taught in the Army's schools before and in the early stages of the war is evidenced by the fact that it was applied, almost without change, to battlefield practice in 1944–45 with marked success. It was expounded in detail in the field manuals.

[58] The paucity of officers itself limited the number who could be assigned to foreign duty as observers. See Ordnance History MS, Vol. 1, Ch. 2, Origin and Growth to 1919, p. 18, for discussion of the point that specially assigned ordnance officers, for example, would have made more searching reports on ordnance items than a military attaché of general qualifications could provide.

ment of a plan, and the determination of, at least, a troop basis for the execution of the plan and, hence, of the armament necessary for an Army of that size. The Protective Mobilization Plan which the General Staff had evolved under General Craig, and which this new $575,000,000 arms program now was designed to support, was a poor thing if one compares it with the later reality of World War II. It was not a poor thing if one compares it with the still smaller establishment that the nation was then ready to support with money appropriations or even with Presidential encouragement. It was a start toward the far larger goal that maturer planning sighted only in mid-1941.

CHAPTER VI

Rearming Gets Under Way

The military establishment of 1939, while greatly improved from mid-1932 when the Army had 119,913 enlisted men, was still in a state so low that General Marshall in later review felt warranted in stating officially that "continuous paring of appropriations had reduced the Army virtually to the status of that of a third-rate power."[1] At midyear the Regular Army had 174,079 enlisted men dispersed among 130 posts, camps, and stations and in skeletonized units far below strength. About a quarter of the Army (45,128 enlisted men by the Secretary of War's annual report, 1939) was assigned to overseas garrisons, mainly in the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, and the Canal Zone. Theoretically (apart from the Hawaiian Division, on permanent station in Hawaii since 1921, and the Philippine Division, which was partly American troops and partly Philippine Scouts) it had nine divisions of infantry (the field unit customarily employed for estimating an army's combat strength); but of these nine only three were formally organized as such, and each of these three was of less than half the strength that the tables of organization allotted to the "square" division of that day (a modification of Pershing's huge division of 1918, it still was made up of four infantry regiments, plus artillery and other components).[2] One Regular cavalry division was organized, but it too was of less than half strength. The Army's entire tank establishment was one mechanized cavalry brigade of about half strength (2,300 men), plus the tank companies allotted to infantry divisions but not yet fully supplied to them, and the so-called GHQ tank units of 1,400 men (the Armored Force, as such, was organized 10 July 1940). The

[1] *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941, to the Secretary of War* (Washington: GPO, 1941) (cited hereafter as *Biennial Report, 1939–1941*), p. 2. Summary information concerning the size and composition of the Army in 1939 is given in this *Biennial Report;* in the *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1939* (Washington: GPO, 1939); and in the statement of General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff, 24 Jan 39, before House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1940: Hearings*, pp. 4–17.

[2] For a brief summary comparison of the old "square" division with the new "triangular" division see the statement of Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 18 January 1940. Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1940. Hearings . . . on HR 7805*, pp. 53–54.

Regular Army's air components, about to start the expansion discussed in Chapter V, in mid-1939 had but 17,000 enlisted men organized in 62 squadrons.[3] The Reserve officers eligible for duty, increasing year by year since 1921, numbered 104,575 in mid-1939.

In the United States, despite a well-designed "paper" organization, there was no functioning corps or field army. The three organized but underweight Regular infantry divisions were scattered, and there was such a shortage of motor transportation that even divisional maneuvers were impracticable. Although the country was divided administratively into nine corps areas, the nine nominal "corps" making up four nominal field armies, there were virtually no corps troops and almost no army troops or GHQ troops (other than tank and air units), without which the large tactical units of corps and field army cannot function. Equipment was in some respects obsolescent and in others insufficient for fully equipping the National Guard units (including eighteen infantry divisions all far under war strength, training only forty-eight nights per year and two weeks in the field) whose officer and enlisted personnel then numbered 199,491.[4]

Early in 1939, when General Marshall was Deputy to General Malin Craig, who was just concluding his tour of duty as Chief of Staff, the Deputy appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee to emphasize the Army's need for materiel.[5] He then stated in particular the necessity of providing the Regular Army and National Guard with modern equipment, notably with new artillery, with a semiautomatic rifle to replace the rifle designed over thirty years before, with antitank and antiaircraft cannon numerous enough to supply all the troops in training, and with sufficient ammunition to provide target-range practice and satisfactory reserves—the ammunition then on hand not only being limited in amount but in some cases having deteriorated from age. High on the Army's personnel priority list at that time were increases that would raise the Regular Army to 210,000 men and thereby provide necessary increments to the Panama Canal garrison and to the Air Corps. The Air Corps was about to embark

[3] *Biennial Report, 1939–1941,* pp. 1–2, and chart 1 (shows enlisted men only). Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II, p. 15, reports 23,455 officers and enlisted men as of 30 June 1939.

[4] *Biennial Report, 1939–1941,* p. 28. Theoretically there were, in each of the 9 corps areas, 1 Regular Army and 2 National Guard infantry divisions which, with complementary units, constituted an army corps. It was supposed, too, that each area—in time, but not at mobilization—would produce 3 reserve divisions. See also *Annual Report of Chief of National Guard Bureau: 1941,* p. 12.

[5] Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *National Defense . . . Hearings on HR 3791* (testimony of 21 Feb 39), pp. 285–90.

on a 5,500-plane program,[6] which called for periodic additions to personnel. Hardly lower in priorities was the upbuilding of the antiaircraft establishment that had been under way for two years. It still was limited to a distant program for 34 mobile regiments and, of these, immediate personnel authorization was sought for only 5 Regular Army and 10 National Guard units. Only equipment, or rather the bulk of it, was yet being requested for the other 19, so cautious was War Department policy in asking for more than hard experience led it to expect, and so methodical was it in dividing its thin resources among all the hungry arms and branches of the service.[7]

To some members of the Congress the modesty of this program for antiaircraft increases actually was more disturbing than extravagance would have been. In his answer to inquiries of committeemen General Marshall stated that he was fully aware that in the event of an attack upon America there would be from all American cities demands for local antiaircraft protection in the form of permanent batteries. He added: "Many of these demands will not only be impossible to meet, but will be without a sound basis." [8] It was the first encounter of Congress with high professional judgment on that point, and, although World War II was destined to pass without a single enemy air raid over an American city, during the London air blitz of 1940 General Marshall's apparent unconcern was to be remembered with special anxiety by American communities wholly without antiaircraft defense of any sort.

There was further discussion of that point by General Marshall in a colloquy at a Senate committee hearing in May 1940, as follows:

Senator LODGE. I should like to do something to quiet the alarm about our . . . vulnerability to aircraft attack . . . is [it] not much better, if we are threatened by an attack from the air, to go directly and try to root out the land base from which the attack comes, and be equipped to do that, rather than to sit back and wait for them to be on top of us and then shoot at them?

[6] This was the result of the White House conference of 14 November 1938. See Chapter V above.

[7] Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *National Defense . . . Hearings on HR 3791* (testimony of 21 Feb 39), p. 286.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 286. See also records showing War Department's increasing desire to turn over to the Office of Civilian Defense a maximum of responsibility for that defense. See personal Ltr, Actg SW to U. S. Director of Civil Defense, 18 Jul 41, prepared in G–3, approved by DCofS, OCS 15491–42. For the Department's altered attitude later in that year see Memo, G–3 for CofS, 27 Oct 41, sub: Protective Legislation with Respect to Manufacturing of Gas Masks for Civilian Use, approved by DCofS, 6 Nov 41, G–3/34221 and OCS 15491–82; also personal Ltr, SW to U. S. Director of Civilian Defense, 6 Nov 41, prepared in G–3, approved by DCofS, same file; also same to same, 21 Oct 41, prepared in G–2, approved by DCofS, OCS 15491–73; also Memo, G–3 for CofS, 17 Dec 41, sub: Gas Masks and Helmets, approved by DCofS, 6 Jan 42, G–3/34221; and personal Ltr, SW to U. S. Director of Civil Defense, 6 Jan 42, prepared in G–3; copies of last two items in OCS 15491–97.

General MARSHALL. You have given the answer.

Senator LODGE. I think that ought to be made clear. People will say that this bill carries only 138 90-mm. guns, while they have 5,000 around London, and the War Department will be accused of being negligent.

General MARSHALL. In the first place, facilities for the manufacture of antiaircraft equipment are . . . limited.

. . . What is necessary for the defense of London is not necessary for the defense of New York, Boston, or Washington. Those cities could be raided . . . but . . . continuous attack . . . would not be practicable unless we permitted the establishment of air bases in close proximity to the United States. . . .

Senator ADAMS. What we need is anti-air-base forces rather than antiaircraft forces.

General MARSHALL. You might put it that way, sir.

Senator CHAVEZ. Do they not go together, General?

General MARSHALL. The whole thing is interwoven. . . . I have referred to the matter of the practicability of placing larger orders at the moment . . . [and] to the necessity of having a trained, seasoned enlisted personnel. . . . All these matters have to be given proper weight to get a well integrated and balanced whole. . . . Frankly, I should be embarrassed at the moment by more money for materiel alone. . . . It is much wiser to advance step by step, provided these steps are balanced and are not influenced by enthusiasm rather than by reason.[9]

All this was a necessary reminder that in modern war there is no assurance of completely successful defense by fixed means, even for one city, and that emphasis in the American arms program would be laid almost wholly not upon weapons for a static defense at home but upon mobile weapons for combat far from American soil. Even so, the 1939 program was an extremely modest start toward improvement of the Army's antiaircraft weapons, whose real development in quality and in quantity was to come only during the war. It is well to note that in 1919 the United States Army's antiaircraft artillery had been designed to cope with aircraft of that day; in the next two decades of small Army appropriations, despite material progress in ordnance design, actual equipment of mobile field units had been bettered too little to render them capable of coping with the enormously more efficient aircraft of 1939, flying far higher and faster and carrying far better arms and armor. In February 1939 General Marshall noted that the Ordnance Department had developed a 37-mm. gun to replace .50-caliber machine guns in the mobile regiments: "We consider [it] very fine, but at present we have only one gun." [10]

[9] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 9209*, pp. 412–13.

[10] Testimony of 21 Feb 39 before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *National Defense . . . Hearings on HR 3791*, p. 286.

As to field artillery, the great part was of World War I origin, French and American. Its modernization, by means skillfully devised by ordnance experts and well laid out in planning, was still progressing slowly, because of scant funds. A total of 140 of the 75-mm. guns (the infantry division's principal accompanying gun) had been considerably altered, to permit among other things a higher angle of fire, and existing funds would permit like improvement on 600 others. But the mass of these guns had been improved only by changes that permitted their rapid haul over the highway; these changes made them more mobile, but did not improve their firing capacity. The old-time 155-mm. howitzers (making up the infantry division's standard heavy batteries) were likewise being adapted to rapid movement, but purchase of new guns or howitzers of this caliber was on a small scale. The total replacement of the 75 with the heavier and more versatile 105-mm. howitzer, already under way in European armies, was contemplated by the U. S. Army, but not for the immediate future. The reason was one which delayed so many other reforms in that period—the cost of the change. General Marshall himself told the House Committee on Appropriations as late as 1940 that the virtual junking of the 75 and its ammunition, for replacement with the 105 and its ammunition, would be "difficult to justify" from a financial standpoint. The guns would cost only $36,000,000, to be sure, but to replace the current supply of 75-mm. ammunition (6,000,000 rounds) with a like amount for the 105 would cost $192,000,000. Gradual replacement was still the Army's formal recommendation, which Congress approved.[11]

April 1939 Anticipation of War

Despite continuing doubts on the part of public and Congress that there was new need for rearming,[12] the Munich conference left Army planning authorities convinced not only that war would shortly develop in Europe, but that Ameri-

[11] For the status of ordnance equipment in 1939 and 1940 see, respectively, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *National Defense . . . Hearings on HR 3791*, pp. 285–97; and House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings* (testimony of 23 Feb 40), pp. 4–5.

[12] It is not the purpose here to analyze public sentiment, to which there was reference in Chapter II. Isolationist strength in 1938 and 1939 is indicated by the close vote in the House of Representatives on 10 January 1938; it barely defeated the constitutional amendment offered by Representative Louis Ludlow, of Indiana, proposing a popular referendum before a declaration of war (Department of State, Press Releases, January 15, 1938, pp. 99ff); also by the fact that in July 1939 both Houses of Congress rejected the administration request for a relaxation of the arms embargo.

can interests would be jeopardized thereby. A WPD statement in February 1939, revised by the Chief of Staff, in surveying developments, both in Europe and Asia, explained the need for additional personnel to provide the missing elements of a truly mobile army. The statement already mentioned in Chapter IV noted that "dictator governments" were active not only in their homelands but in Central and South America and China, and that "these activities emphasize the possibility of this nation becoming involved in war in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, or in both these areas." [13] The measures that had been taken in late 1938 the Chief of Staff believed to be insufficient, and on 17 April 1939 he directed the War Plans Division to prepare a preliminary study of "steps to be taken in the event that war develops in Europe and that the President adopts a policy of preparedness, (1) as a measure to strengthen his position in dealing with the crisis, or (2) against the possibility of our eventually being drawn into the conflict." [14] WPD's prompt production of the preliminary study made possible the preparation of subsequent instructions to other General Staff divisions to prepare detailed studies of measures "to be applied immediately in event of a European war." [15] G–1 was directed to produce a plan for converting the Civilian Conservation Corps to a semimilitary establishment; [16] G–3 to plan a quickened training for National Guard and Reserve officers; [17] G–4 to plan a quickened delivery of materiel and supplies.[18] To WPD was given the work of making plans for an expeditionary force which then was envisaged for affording protection to Central or South America.[19] In all cases the planning required was a revival and revision of plans on which these Staff divisions had been at work for years as a matter of normal Staff routine, particularly since 1937 under the influence

[13] See reference in Chapter II, p. 22 and in Chapter IV, p. 102 to Ltr, TAG for WPD and others, 9 Feb 39, sub: War Dept Attitude Regarding Additional Men for Mobile Army, and Enclosure entitled "Reinforcement for Overseas Possessions and Need for Expeditionary Forces." These papers, which also indicate the Army's consciousness of its own deficiencies and the means for overcoming them, are filed with related papers in AG 320.2 (2–7–39) and in WPD 3674–13.

[14] Memo, SGS for ACofS WPD, 17 Apr 39, sub: Preparedness, OCS 21060–2. It is probable that the President was kept informed of this planning, but no direct evidence has been found to show that he was actively concerned before August. The Joint Board at this time was at work on the plan which in August was adopted as Rainbow 1 (JB 325, ser 634).

[15] (1) Memo, ACofS G–1 for ACofS WPD, 19 Apr 39, sub: Preparedness, G–1/15588–1. (2) Memo, SGS for ACofS G–1, 26 Apr 39, sub: Preparedness—Use of Civilian Conservation Corps, G–1/15588–1.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Memo, SGS for ACofS G–3, 26 Apr 39, sub: Preparedness—Training of Civilian Components, OCS 21060–4 and G–1/15588–2.

[18] Memo, SGS for ACofS G–4, 26 Apr 39, sub: Preparedness—Supply, OCS 21060–6.

[19] Memo, SGS for ACofS WPD, 25 Apr 39, sub: Preparedness—Expeditionary Force; WPD 4161–1. See also Memo, J. W. Anderson for ACofS WPD, 15 Mar 39, WPD 4161–1.

of the Protective Mobilization Plan of that year. G–4, for example, was at that time keeping up to date its computations of changing requirements, in order to assist understandingly in the making of budget estimates.[20] Accordingly, in answer to General Craig's instructions, G–4 was able to produce on 5 May a program for first-priority items in the event of an emergency such as the impending European war would constitute. The items were those which would be needed by the PMP force of 730,000 men, as then composed (400,000 being the Initial Protective Force of Regular Army and National Guard troops presumably extant on Mobilization Day, and 330,000 the additional men who were to be raised three months after M Day).[21] The amounts stated were large in comparison with recent Army expenditures, including $295,000,000 for "critical" items (needed in war and not available in the open market or from commercial producers), $618,000,000 for "essential" but noncritical items (clothing, tentage, trucks, and the like, available in some quantity from commercial sources), and $69,000,000 to be expended with manufacturers (machine tools, plants, and so forth) for expediting their production. It was upon the broad base of this study of PMP needs that a little later in the year G–4, like other Staff divisions, was able to make new computations to cope with current changes.[22]

A useful start toward increasing the size of the Army was afforded by assurance that Congress would remove the specific limitation as to numbers which had been written into the act approved 26 April 1939 allowing funds to support "an average of not to exceed one hundred and sixty-five thousand enlisted men. . . ." [23] The new bill not only removed the specific limitation to the 165,000 average, but appropriated additional funds for pay of the Army.[24] The Army had already computed that a twelve-months' average of 165,000 men could be made to produce a final month's average of about 180,000, which thereafter was referred to in Army discussion as the current target stage. The added appropriation, likewise, was enough to raise the "average" still further, and to produce a last-month's total of 210,000 men. It is this figure that was employed in Army discussions of the next target stage. The Army proceeded immediately with its

[20] See papers filed in G–4/13765–103.

[21] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 5 May 39; sub: Preparedness—Supply, G–4/31349. Besides the 730,000 in the PMP establishment there was an expectation of 270,000 for replacements, making a total of 1,000,000. By May 1940 this rose to 1,162,000 (see later in this chapter) and then to 1,200,000.

[22] (1) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 19 Aug 39, sub: Measures Requiring Congressional Authorization of Appropriation, G–4/31349–1. (2) Memo, ACofS G–4 for ACofS G–3, 1 Sep 39, sub: Status of Equipment for Troops, OCofS/21060–8, G–4 31349–1.

[23] 53 Stat 592, p. 596.

[24] 53 Stat 992.

long-planned recruiting campaign for expanding the Air Corps and for augmenting the Panama Canal garrison. The progress toward the 210,000-man objective was moderately rapid, but long before the objective was attained a somewhat larger objective was authorized.[25]

War Planning in August 1939

When General Craig on 1 July 1939 began terminal leave prior to his scheduled retirement from active duty, his Deputy, General Marshall, succeeded as Acting Chief of Staff. The plans that had been worked out by the Staff in accordance with the April instructions were now examined in the light of increasing indications that war was near. At a conference on 18 August 1939 the new Chief of Staff gave tentative approval to a score of "immediate action" measures for execution upon the outbreak of a war in Europe, and made the several Staff divisions responsible for detailed plans that those measures called for.[26] There were two classes, one made up of the measures that the President and the War Department could initiate without Congressional action, the other made up of measures that would require Congressional authorization or even appropriation.[27] The latter included such steps as the pay for an increase of Army personnel, construction of Army housing, and purchase of materiel. The President could proclaim neutrality and order steps to enforce it; the Army could provide guards against sabotage, could hasten construction work and procurement which had already been authorized, could speed up training, and could improve the normal co-ordination with the Navy. An accompanying memorandum prepared for the Secretary to send to the President stated:

The purpose of these measures as a whole is to place the Regular Army and the National Guard in a condition of preparedness suitable to the present disturbed world situ-

[25] The recruiting campaign had produced enough new men to raise the actual total of Regular Army enlisted men (excluding Philippine Scouts) to 196,455 on 21 November 1939. This figure was supplied by the Chief of Staff to the House Appropriations Committee, subcommittee on the Military Establishment, at hearings 27–30 November 1939; see citation (2) below. The progress of the increase in size and the relation of actual strength to authorized strength are discussed in (1) House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *Supplemental Military Appropriation Bill for 1940. Hearings . . . on HR 6791–76,* pp. 4, 10, and 23. (2) House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1940. Hearings . . . on HR 7805–76,* pp. 1 and 14–16.

[26] Memo, SGS for AC'sofS (G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, and WPD), 18 Aug 39, sub: Immediate Action Measures, OCS 21060–8, G–1/15588–3, and G–4/31347. See also Memo, Actg DCofS for AC'sofS, 23 Aug 39, sub: Plans for Immediate Action Measures, G–1/15588–3.

[27] These measures were carefully outlined on charts, and various summaries were prepared. Copies of the charts and related papers are in CofS file, Emergency Measures, 1939–40, bndr 1.

ation. They do not contemplate mobilization at this time but proceed only to the extent of completing in its most important features the organization of our Regular Army (at peace strength throughout) and increasing the strength of the National Guard organizations to the minimum at which we believe such organizations can effectively undertake field operations.[28]

Expectations were fulfilled before the rising of September's first sun. At 3:50 A. M. of 1 September an alerting message from the Office of the Chief of Staff to all Army commanders announced: "Fighting has developed on Polish border and Warsaw is being bombed. Precautions will be taken accordingly." [29] On 5 September the President issued a proclamation of neutrality and, by executive order, transferred Panama Canal control from the civil governor to the Army commander.[30] Three days later came his proclamation of "limited" national emergency [31] and an executive order authorizing increases in Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.[32] All these actions were based on the purposes outlined in Rainbow 1.

The September 1939 Troop Increase: Only 17,000 Men

The 17,000-man expansion of the Army that this order permitted was on a scale so modest as to call for scrutiny. Increases to cope with the well-foreseen event of a European war had been contemplated in the General Staff ever since General Craig's instructions of the preceding April. The specific planning of G–3 and WPD, under the eye of the Chief of Staff, had been for a step-by-step development. This was dictated by the paucity of veteran personnel available for training the recruits as well as by the absence of new weapons and other equipment destined for the new units. There had been Staff discussion of whether the first step should be to war strength (12,000 at that time) or peace strength (9,000) for the new triangular divisions, and the persuasive argument

[28] Memo, SW for the President, no sub, unsigned, dated August 1939, CofS file, Emergency Measures, 1939–40, bndr 1.

[29] Note in records, OCS 21060–27.

[30] Proc No. 2348, 5 Sep 39, and Executive Order No. 8233, 5 Sep 39, 4 Federal Register, No. 172, pp. 3809–12, or WD Bull 15, 7 Sep 39.

[31] Proc No. 2352, 8 Sep 39; 4 FR, No. 175, p. 3851.

[32] Executive Order No. 8244, 8 Sep 39, 4 FR No. 175, p. 3863. For text of emergency statutes cited in the executive order and evoked thereby see Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1940. Hearings . . . on HR 7805.* In a press conference reported in *The New York Times,* 9 September 1939, page 6, the President explained that the "limited" emergency was proclaimed in order to release funds already provided by Congress for an increase in military personnel in the contingency recognized by the President.

of Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Jonathan W. Anderson of WPD in late August was for an initial increase only to peace strength. He argued that this would "call forth less adverse criticism" and at the same time would avoid flooding the Army's skeletonized divisions with untrained replacements "so seriously . . . as to materially affect their efficiency." [33]

The first of these two arguments touched a political nerve, for even when war burst over Poland the President was uneasy about the "far reaching effect of a status of 'emergency,' because of the antagonism it might arouse politically." [34] Consulting with General Marshall he sought an alternative to an executive order based upon an emergency proclamation,[35] and in the end prepared both documents with careful restrictions.[36] So adroitly expressed were the restrictions that their intent seemingly eluded General Marshall at the time. On the day following a 4 September conference at the White House, the Chief of Staff informed his council that the "President had authorized the expansion of the Regular Army to National Defense strength," that is, to 280,000 men; he seemed to anticipate no great delay in the attainment of that goal.[37] But on 7 September in a communication to the Secretary of War the Chief of Staff, with apparent misgivings about the 280,000, advanced an argument for an immediate increase, instead, to 250,000 men, plus a 320,000-man National Guard Establishment.[38] What he got in the executive order was considerably less than even that, the first increment of 17,000 raising the Regular Army to only 227,000, while the National Guard was being authorized an increase from 200,000 men only to 235,000. (The National Defense Act of 1920 had assumed a Regular Army of 280,000 men and a National Guard of 450,000.) Also there was immediate authorization of only a few emergency expenditures including $12,000,000 for new motor transportation, little indeed when compared either with the equipment shortage as tabulated by the General Staff or with the astronomical figures of new materiel authorizations that were to follow. The President gave confidential assurance of later additions to the Regular Army, but explained his belief that this small initial expansion "was all the public would be ready to accept without undue excitement." [39]

[33] Memo, Lt Col J. W. Anderson, WPD, 21 Aug 39, sub: Increase of Regular Army, CofS file, Emergency Measures, 1939–40, bndr 1.

[34] Memo, CofS for JAG, 5 Sep 39, no sub, AG 300.41 (9–5–39), and OCS 15758–42.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] 4 FR, No. 175, pp. 3851, 3863.

[37] Notes of meeting in office of CofS, 5 Sep 39, CofS file, Emergency Measures, 1939–40, bndr 1.

[38] Memo, CofS for SW, 7 Sep 39, no sub, AG 320.2 (9–7–39), and CofS file, Emergency Measures, 1939–40, bndr 3.

[39] Memo, CofS for DCofS, 8 Sep 39, sub: Increase in the Army, AG 320.2 (9–8–39).

Without public indication of his own views on this point the Chief of Staff proceeded to make immediate use of the authorizations, such as they were. A few months later, before a subcomittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, far from referring to the mishap to his early September expectations, he declared in obedient support of his superior's wishes that he himself was "opposed to plunging into a sudden expansion of personnel," intimating that in his own judgment no larger addition could have been readily digested by an Army short in both the personnel and materiel facilities for training recruits.[40]

The 17,000 men presented to the Army were added chiefly to the infantry pool.[41] This allocation made it possible to put into immediate effect a radical change that had been designed for the Army's infantry organization—which is to say, the very basis of Army organization and tactics. The Regular Army's old-model "square" division was abandoned in favor of the new-model "triangular" division upon which there had been prolonged study and experiment under the encouragement and scrutiny of General Craig as Chief of Staff. The new unit was smaller in number of men than the "square" division but much more flexible, being subject to use alternatively as a mass or as three separate infantry-artillery combat teams, and possessing a high degree of mobility. Of the old divisions there existed in continental United States nine (one for each of the country's nine corps areas, along with two National Guard divisions for each area), but in reality at that time, as mentioned, of these nine only three could be regarded as genuinely operative and those three were all less than half-strength. By abandoning the old organization and adopting the new, it was possible with existent units to attain five effective divisions of the new type, which could be promptly assembled with complementary troops, and started off to field training as a test of the new organization. This was the Army's first step in a slow change-over of all old-type divisions into the more flexible form.

[40] Testimony of 23 Feb 40, before House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 9209, p. 3.*

[41] The changes in organization, training, and equipment following the "Limited Emergency" Proclamation of 8 September were described by General Marshall and other high Army officials several times in 1939–41. The following summary is based upon: (1) *Biennial Report, 1939–1941,* pp. 2–4, 17–34; (2) House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1940. Hearings* . . ., pp. 1–22, 133–41; (3) Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1940. Hearings . . . on HR 7805,* pp. 47–55. More detailed and more intimate analyses of the changes were given in conferences with army and corps area commanders in late November 1939 and in G–4 justifications for its renewed drive for critical items: (1) Notes for Conference with Army and Corps Area Commanders (November 30, 1939—10:30 A. M.), G–4/31683; (2) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 1 Dec 39, sub: Revised Estimates . . ., 31349–1.

Next, the 17,000-man increase in numbers, small as it was, allowed shifts that made possible the formation of certain units of engineers, heavy artillery, medical regiments, quartermaster trains, and the like. These units were, in some cases, the corps troops needed for creating (with three divisions) a standard army corps, and in other cases the army troops needed for creating (with two or more corps) a field army. Their creation, and certain other authorizations, permitted a few months later "the first genuine corps and army maneuvers in the history of this nation," [42] of which more will be said in later pages. Certain old units, such as horse cavalry regiments whose continued use was increasingly doubtful, were to be converted into corps reconnaissance units using motors rather than horses. The mode of transportation was transformed. There was no change in functions, in which the horse cavalry had been uniquely proficient, and to which the old personnel, retrained for the new mechanized warfare, was well adapted by interest and experience alike. Similarly, numerous coast artillery units were to be converted into mobile batteries of antiaircraft artillery, in the rudiments of which the old personnel already was skilled.

At the same time that the Regular Army infantry divisions were being reshaped on a model that one day would become universal in the consolidated Army of the United States, the National Guard was being aided by the terms of the President's proclamation of limited emergency. Its numbers were increased only 35,000, but its training opportunities were increased from 48 armory drills per year to 60, and from 15 days in the field to 21. Reserve officers were encouraged: 1,306 of them were called for six months' active duty with the Army in the field, and 283 others (and 591 National Guard officers) were given additional schooling in line and staff specialties.[43]

The money granted at the same time for the purchase of motor transportation made possible the acquisition of trucks for the movement of combat personnel and equipment, for lack of which up to then almost every infantry unit of the Army had been limited in field mobility pretty much to the distance its men could move on their own feet in the course of a day.[44] So radical seemed the first proposals for a "motorized" division that (besides the sound objection to the resultant tying up of precious motor transport) there were conservative expres-

[42] *Biennial Report, 1939–1941*, p. 3. The provisional corps maneuvers by the First Army command in September 1939 were not regarded as "true" corps activities.

[43] House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1940. Hearings . . .*, pp. 4–10.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

sions of misgiving lest "unnecessary" use of trucks soften both the traditionally tough leg muscles and the traditionally tough spirit of the infantry and reduce the troops' efficiency. Many old ideas about troop training and equipment were due for alteration as the new and much remodeled Army emerged. There was to be experiment with the techniques of moving troops rapidly—whether by granting to each division all the transport it would need in emergency, or by keeping most of the trucks in pools from which they would be supplied to each division at need—but never thereafter was there any doubt that, by one technique or another, the Army's long-range troop movements on land (when railroads were not available) would be by motors capable of transporting the divisions' infantry, artillery, and all other components great distances at great speed upon demand. The thoroughness with which this doctrine of swift movement was implanted in the new "triangular" divisions—more markedly perhaps than equally important doctrines—was apparent in the 1940 maneuvers, as will be noted.

The preparation of these plans was itself a complex enterprise, understandable in detail only through exploration of the General Staff structure and familiarization with the devices by which the Army tested its ideas, adjusting tactics to instruments and improving the instruments in order to make the tactics more effective. The sequence moved smoothly enough in an ideal situation in which there were available financial means for designing and producing the weapons, for training the troops in their use, for testing weapons, and for testing weapons and formations alike in the field. But in a situation so far from ideal as that of the thirties, when appropriations were insufficient and theory could not be promptly or fully applied and tested, betterments were both slow and uncertain. The planning period for the transition from square to triangular divisions, and from foot marching to truck transport, was prolonged for this reason, and when finally money was on hand it was necessary to effect conversion so quickly that adjustments to the new mechanism complicated the retraining of the personnel. The clumsiness of these and other hasty adjustments was visible at the time. Some of the reasons for haste and confusion were not. The record, however, discloses the energy with which the planning activities of the General Staff under direction of the successive Chiefs of Staff had been carried on, notably in the thoroughgoing emergency studies of 1939 already referred to.[45]

[45] See notes 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24.

Restraint in Requests for Funds

In the six weeks following the outbreak of war in Europe the Office of the Chief of Staff, working chiefly through G–4 and the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, called for supplemental budget estimates to cover critical items, essential items, reserve airplanes, increase of personnel, extraordinary transportation, and procurement planning and industrial mobilization.[46] There was some uncertainty about when these estimates, to total about $879,000,000, would be presented to Congress, but it was evidently the intention of the War Department to present practically all of them immediately.[47] It wished to secure all critical items, at least, in the shortest possible time, and it was understood that two years might not be enough time.[48] The Department may have believed that it had real encouragement from other branches of the government. On 15 September the Chief of Staff asked his staff for data for a "clear-cut basic presentation at the White House as to the Army's needs." [49] A few days later, 20 September, Maj. (later Brig. Gen.) James D. McIntyre, War Department liaison officer with Congress, wrote in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff: "Spoke to several Congressmen yesterday, including Mr. May and Mr. Starnes. Everyone is for adequate National Defense. I firmly believe that now is the time to ask for *everything* the War Department needs. We will get it. Let us strike while the iron is hot." [50] An $850,000,000 armament program was discussed in the War Council with the Assistant Secretary, and the Secretary then discussed it with the President.[51] Meantime G–4, without awaiting the outcome of these discussions, proposed a special $1,000,000,000 program for national defense, observing:

> In view of the possibility that the War Department may be called upon in the near future to present its outstanding needs for building up the National Defense to the proper level demanded by present world conditions, it is believed that the War Department should have available for ready use a simple, sound and logical program, clearly understood by all concerned, in order that a coordinated defense of such a program may be presented.[52]

[46] (1) Various documents filed as OCS/20983–55–65 and OCS/17840–173. (2) Memo, Chief of Finance Branch of G–4 for Chiefs of other Branches of G–4, 5 Oct 39, sub: Supplemental Directive, 1941, Incls A and B, G–4/31190–7.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G–4, 18 Sep 39, G–4/31349–1.

[49] Conf notes, CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 3.

[50] No copy of this document was found but it is noted fully on G–4 tally card 31469.

[51] Notation by SGS, 7 Oct 39 on Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 4 Oct 39, sub: Special $1,000,000,000 Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1.

[52] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 4 Oct 39, sub: Special $1,000,000,000 Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1.

The Chief of Staff returned G–4's $1,000,000,000 program without action because (1) it was not in harmony with the $850,000,000 program that had been presented to the President; (2) it included $150,000,000, for planes, contrary to plans; and finally (3) there was "no assurance of the War Department's receiving an additional $150,000,000 by Joint Resolution during the present session of Congress." [53] This discouraging note was followed within a few weeks by a definite decision by the President that he would ask Congress for no more than $120,000,000 as a supplemental appropriation for the War Department for the fiscal year 1940.[54] Again the inception of a long-range, over-all program was delayed.

When war broke out in Europe the regular War Department estimates for the fiscal year 1941 (beginning 1 July 1940) were so far along on the devious path which federal budgets travel that costs for the expanded Army could not be promptly included. To cover these costs supplemental estimates were prepared. Despite some chafing of officials, these estimates covered only costs arising out of measures already taken as a result of the war in Europe; they did not provide funds for further rearmament.[55] Whatever the origin of this policy, it was affirmed by the Bureau of the Budget.[56]

Despite this policy of cautious requests, the Supply Division, apparently with full approval of the Chief of Staff, continued its computations and rephrased its pleading for critical supplies. In a detailed report, dated 1 December but evidently under consideration before that date, Brig. Gen. George P. Tyner, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, submitted to the Chief of Staff a revised estimate of the critical and essential needs of the Army.[57] In explanation of this revision G–4 recalled that the picture had been altered by two things: (1) the progress

[53] See n. 46.

[54] Memo for the record, 26 Oct 9, G–4/31190–8. This indicates that the $120,000,000 was considerably less than the Department believed it needed for bare necessities in connection with the authorized expansion and the immediate action measures. See also Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1940. Hearings . . . HR 7805*, p. 92.

[55] (1) Memo, Actg DCofS for AC'sofS, 5 Oct 39, sub: Revision of the Regular Estimates for FY 1941, OCS/21052–28. (2) Memo, BOWD to chiefs of estimating agencies, 30 Oct 39, sub: Supplemental Estimates, FY 1941, G–4/31190–7. (3) Memo, ACofS G–4 for ACofS WPD, 8 Nov 39, sub: Supplemental Estimates for Seacoast Defense and Aircraft Warning Service Projects, FY 1941, G–4/31190–8.

[56] Memo, SGS for ASW and AC'sofS, 16 Nov 39, sub: Supplemental Estimates, FY 1941, G–4/31190–7 and OCS/21052–31.

[57] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 1 Dec 39 sub: Revised Estimates—Critical Items for the PMP and Essential Items for the War Department Objective (Balanced Force of 600,000 Men), G–4/31349–1 and AG 111 (12–1–39).

of the various budget estimates presented to Congress and (2) the many changes in Army organization and objectives that had taken place since the declaration of a limited emergency. The estimates were based upon the current objective of a balanced force of 600,000 men (inclusive of National Guard), but critical items (those that could not be supplied from current commercial sources) were requested for a force of 750,000 men. While this report was based upon a survey of both minute and large needs for an objective that had been planned in great detail, G–4 recognized the impossibility and undesirability of an inflexible program:

> It must be kept in mind that the *requirements for any large force will not remain fixed for any length of time.* These requirements change continuously as changes are made in organization, as new units are constituted, as new equipment is standardized, and as changes are made in allowances. Moreover, *an accurate determination of requirements for large force requires considerable detailed computations by the Supply Arm or Service concerned. Any short-cutting in this procedure is made at the expense of accuracy.*[58]

As far as timing was concerned, General Tyner repeated the familiar recommendation for immediate action. He asked:

> That the revised estimates for Critical and Essential Items to be submitted in accordance with . . . [recommendations made in the report] be presented to the Bureau of the Budget as Supplemental Estimates F. Y. 1941, and that the War Department make every effort to obtain the funds as set up in these revised estimates.[59]

In substance the recommendations of the G–4 report were approved by the Chief of Staff and estimates were prepared and submitted to the Bureau of the Budget.[60] Then on 10 January the Staff was advised of the lamentable but not wholly unexpected fate of the estimates:

> Supplemental Estimates covering the "Critical Item Program," the "Essential Item Program" and the "Arsenal and Depot Facilities Program" were submitted to the Bureau of the Budget prior to the preparation of the President's Budget, fiscal year 1941. They were excluded from the budget, in accordance with Executive policy, and it is probable that they will not be included in any further estimates which may be submitted to the present session of Congress.[61]

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] (1) Memo, Actg DCofS for BOWD, 29 Nov 39, sub: Supplemental Estimates for Critical Items Required for the Protective Mobilization Plan, OCS/21052–33. (2) Memo, Actg DCofS for BOWD, 9 Dec 39, sub: Estimates for Essential Items (Non-Critical) Required for the War Department Peacetime Objective (280,000 Regular Army and 320,000 National Guard), OCS/21052–35.

[61] Memo, SGS for AC'sofS, 10 Jan 40, sub: War Department Estimates, FY 1941, OCS/21052–37 or G–4/31349–1.

Isolation Sentiment Still Strong in Early 1940

This was the winter of "phony war." Though Congress relaxed the restrictions of the Neutrality Act, sentiment in favor of American aloofness from Europe's troubles remained widespread. The President's caution may have been out of deference to this sentiment, which he believed to be politically powerful, and it was undoubtedly influenced by other considerations, including the opposition to New Deal spending. General Marshall accurately forecast the situation when, a few days before the House hearings, he told his staff that the impact of economy probably would be "terrific" and added: "It will react to our advantage if our bill is acted on at the latest possible date. It is probable that events in Europe will develop in such a way as to affect Congressional action." [62] Representative Buell Snyder, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, repeatedly expressed the idea that cuts should be made in all budget estimates unless such cuts definitely affected public welfare adversely.[63] Whatever his reasoning, the President, though he pointedly discussed national defense in his annual message and his budget message,[64] did not present all the Army's demands, nor did he emphasize them by any dramatic device such as a special message.

It was a large budget of $853,000,000: approximately $2,000,000 above the Army budget for 1940, expanded as that had been by the costs of Air Corps expansion, rearmament, and the limited emergency measures. Nevertheless, it did not meet the requirements of the Army as judged by the Chief of Staff and his assistants. General Marshall, carefully refraining from placing himself in a position of insubordination, clearly stated at the outset the inadequacy of the budget.[65] His appearance on 23 February was his first defense of a regular appropriation before a House committee. The comprehensive testimony that he gave there was a product of staff work.[66] But it should not be regarded simply as an impersonal staff report for, before his appearance as a witness, General Marshall had made the ideas and the beliefs that he expressed his own by reason of his leadership in assembling them and his thorough comprehension of them. In

[62] CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

[63] House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 9209.*

[64] *FDR Public Papers and Addresses,* 1940 Volume, pp. 6–7, 15–16, and 20.

[65] House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 9209,* pp. 2ff.

[66] There are numerous files that illustrate the complex collaborative work that went into such an effort. Illustrative papers in this particular case can be found in G–4/31190.

this testimony he made the prophetic and often repeated statement: "If Europe blazes in the late spring or early summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere." [67] After a comprehensive review of the budget, he closed his formal statement:

> In conclusion let me state with all the sincerity of which I am capable, that there is no group today in America who view the possibilities of war with more horror, and consider the large appropriations involved with more reluctance than do the officers of the General Staff. There is no thought in our minds to seize upon the dilemma of this tragic world situation as an opportunity to aggrandize the Army. The estimates now before you have been carefully scrutinized by the War Department and by the Bureau of the Budget. Maintenance items are provided for on a modest scale. The augmentation items are particularly modest when compared with our requirements. In view of the gravity of the world situation, it is believed that the War Department budget should be allowed substantially as recommended by the President.[68]

Though it was evident that General Marshall had already won the friendship and respect of committee members, and though aggressors retained the initiative throughout Europe and Asia, the bill as reported to the House on 3 April granted the War Department 9½ percent less for new obligations than the amount requested by the President.[69] The reductions included the amount sought for an Alaskan air base at Anchorage and a large part of the amount sought for new airplanes. After some heated debate, which concerned itself as much with American attitudes toward the European war as with the immediate merits of the bill, the House passed the bill substantially as reported by the committee. Before War Department needs were taken up by the Senate Appropriations Committee on 30 April,[70] however, the war in Europe suddenly lost its "phony" character. On 9 April the German armies moved swiftly into Denmark and Norway and quickened Army concern over the critical items which the Initial Protective Force still lacked. On 10 May, when the Germans began their rush across the Low Countries, the darkness of the prospect was universally recognized. Already, on 15 April, the Chief of Staff had informed the Secretary of War: "The increasing gravity of the international situation makes it appear necessary for me to urge a further increase in our state of military preparation." [71]

[67] House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on* HR 9209, p. 3. See also Ch. IV, n. 48.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[69] House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Report No. 1912* (to accompany 9209).

[70] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 9209.*

[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15, 52. See also Memo, CofS for SW, 15 Apr 40, no sub, AG 111 (9–24–38) (1) sec 1–A; Memo, SGS for CofS, 3 Apr 40, CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 2.

The President approved this request for additional critical items, notably airplane detectors and aircraft warning devices, for existing units of the Regular Army and the National Guard—but not until the original request of $25,000,000 had been cut to $18,000,000.[72]

Congressional Sentiment Begins a Marked Shift

The President and his advisers evidently did not at first grasp the striking change of public sentiment and the implications of that change. In the Senate committee's questioning there was little evidence of penny pinching; rather, as Senator Carl Hayden said: "Anyone who reads the hearings will note that the principal discussion is not what was in the bill, but what ought to be in the bill in order properly to meet the situation which confronts us." [73] When questioning General Arnold about the training of flyers to man the new airplanes, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., a Republican, said: "I am just asking that because I think everyone recognizes that it is the general feeling of Congress, and as far as I can gather, among public opinion throughout the country, to provide all of the money necessary for the National Defense, and so all you have to do is ask for it." [74] For the first time since 1918 the emphasis was not upon "how much can we save?" but upon "how quickly can we get everything that we need?"

The Chief of Staff, as the principal spokesman for the War Department, originally requested the restoration of only about one-half the amount eliminated by the House,[75] but he in no way disguised the fact that, in his personal opinion, more was needed, and he went ahead to say specifically what was needed and why, in men and materiel, and to state his belief that extraordinary measures should be taken to fill the needs, particularly of materiel, in the shortest possible time.[76] One can only conjecture that the partial amount formally requested was limited by higher authority, that is, by the President.

There is other evidence to show that the War Department itself now recognized its estimates as obsolete, but responsible administrative machinery apparently could not shift its direction and speed as rapidly as public sentiment. On

[72] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Hearings . . . on HR 9209*, pp. 14–15, 52.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 403.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 56, 61, 62, and *passim*.

7 May the Supply Division submitted to the Chief of Staff another over-all program for national defense, considerably revised from the program prepared the previous November. It called for immediate preparation of estimates for funds required to provide all initial equipment (critical and essential items) for the newly designed full PMP strength of 1,166,000 men; to raise the Army to that strength; to provide temporary shelter for this force; to provide pay, rations, and maintenance for this force for the first year; to provide normal training allowances for one year and intensive training for this force; and to provide additional airplanes of types recommended in recent studies to establish an air force of 5,806 airplanes.[77] So great was the urgency induced by the astonishing German success in Europe that normal procedures seemed to break down. Now the public, the Senate, and the President were demanding additional estimates. There was particular concern about antiaircraft equipment, and pressure was brought to bear on the War Department in regard to it.[78] The President himself inquired about the status of such equipment and on 9 May in a formal memorandum the Chief of Staff and the Secretary seized the opportunity to impress upon him the equally serious deficiences of other materiel. Again the time lag of two years was pointed out.[79] Though there is evidence that the President was already considering supplemental estimates,[80] the actual figures for the estimates were developed as a result of the communication of 9 May and were arrived at after a series of conferences between President Roosevelt and General Marshall.[81] Members of the Senate Appropriations Committee believed that they were responsible for the new demands.[82] In any case, on 16 May the President personally delivered to Congress a special message in which he applied his own powerful support to the movement for supplemental outlays for national defense.

The total supplemental estimates requested by the War Department as a result of the President's message amounted to $732,000,000. These estimates were to cover the cost of raising the Regular Army from a strength of 227,000 to 255,-

[77] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 7 May 40, sub: Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1. See also relevant papers in WPD 3809–41.

[78] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Hearings . . . on HR 9209*, p. 30.

[79] Memo, SW for the President, 9 May 40, sub: Status of Anti-aircraft Artillery and Ammunition, CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 2.

[80] Memo, CofS for ACofS G–4, 8 May 40, no sub, G–4/31349–1.

[81] Numerous papers relating to these conferences are in CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 2.

[82] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Hearings on HR 9209*, p. 406.

000 and of providing the munitions required for the Protective Mobilization Plan force, now 750,000 men, plus replacements. In General Marshall's explanation of what added funds would accomplish:

> They provide money to erect facilities to break bottlenecks in the production of necessities. Specifically, powder plants, an additional plant for the manufacture of semi-automatic rifles, an ammunition loading plant, an expansion of an existing loading plant, the erection of storage facilities, and certain repairs in existing storage facilities at certain arsenals in order to take care of this mass of materiel. Several other small plants are also included.
>
> Further, it means the procurement of 200 of the heavy bombers, of the most modern type.
>
> It means a material increase in the capacity of the present nine civilian aviation schools which are giving preliminary flying training to flying cadets, and the establishment of additional civilian schools.
>
> It provides for an increase of pilots from the 2,400 in 2 years, set by last year's aviation expansion program, to 7,000 in a year in order to provide replacements against possible war wastage in pilots, so that the present authorized GHQ air force of 1,900 combat planes can be maintained at that strength under conditions of actual campaign.
>
> It provides for the enlisted men and flying cadets that I previously mentioned, to implement the greatly expanded training program.[83]

General Marshall Warns of Further Needs

Again the Chief of Staff stated clearly to the Senate and to the President his belief that even more would be required in materiel and men. On 17 May he said:

> What will be the state of the world in September is something to be determined later. My opinion at the moment is that we will probably find it desirable to further increase the strength of the Regular Establishment, possibly up to 400,000 men, unless we fall back on the mobilization of the National Guard, which should be avoided until the necessity is inevitable.[84]

In Congress, too, regular procedures were cast aside. For three hours on 17 May the Senate Appropriations Committee questioned General Marshall, who was assisted occasionally by his associates, chiefly by General Arnold and Brig. Gen. Richard C. Moore, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, who later became major general and Deputy Chief of Staff. The committee then, without further hearings, reported a bill which in substance included the regular 1941 estimates prepared in the late summer of 1939, the increases (for 1941) resulting from the Limited Emergency measures of September 1939, the supplemental critical item

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 406.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 409. See also papers relating to the supplemental estimate in CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 2.

estimate of late April, the supplemental estimates of 16 May, and additional funds to provide for bringing the Army to its full peacetime strength under the National Defense Act of 1920 (280,000).[85] After two days of debate, during which no substantial changes were made in the committee report, the bill was approved unanimously.[86] The House, without extended debate, retreated entirely from its April opposition,[87] and on 13 June the President signed the act, which appropriated $1,499,323,322 and authorized contracts up to $257,229,636. With only a few notable dissents, the testimony before the committees and the debates on the floor indicated that Congress was willing, indeed eager, to follow the lead of the Chief of Staff.[88]

The king of the Belgians surrendered his army on 27 May, and by that time it appeared that the French forces were shattered and the British forces' position hopeless. Now the much enlarged armament program of early May was recognized as inadequate, and the Army-in-being proved to be in need of rapid expansion. Even before the expanded appropriation bill could clear Congress, a supplemental bill was in the making. On 23 May General Marshall, in indicating further objectives of Staff planning, proposed a fully equipped force of 500,000 men by 1 July 1941, a force of 1,000,000 by January 1942, and a force of 1,500,000 or 2,000,000 by July 1942; the figures are suggestive of those which Colonel Burns had proposed a few days earlier.[89] While this long-range planning was under way the Chief of Staff, working closely with General Moore, Lt. Col. Russell L. Maxwell, and possibly a few others of his advisers, prepared new appropriation requests. In justification he stated:

> These items are submitted at this time as a result of an analysis of information which has come by way of press reports and official reports of our Military Attachés in Europe. Also, preliminary reports from our maneuvers, completed last week have indicated the desirability of a change in organization of certain units of the Protective Mobilization Plan,

[85] As indicated above, the Chief of Staff approved this increase, but he did not make an official request for it. The Senate committee added the provision on its own initiative after listening to General Marshall's testimony. Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Report No. 1630* (to accompany HR 9209).

[86] The vote was 74–0, but of the twenty-two Senators not voting almost all publicly announced that they would have voted "yes" had they been present.

[87] The House Appropriations Committee held hearings at which General Marshall reviewed the history of the bill and again presented Army needs. House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Senate Amendments. Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings.* . . .

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 10, and elsewhere in testimony and debates.

[89] (1) Memo, CofS for DCofS, 23 May 40, sub: Further Objectives for Staff Planning, OCS 20822–77 or WPD 3674–28. (2) Personal Memo, Col Burns for Gen Marshall, 18 May 40, copy in Hist Div files in personal Ltr, Gen Burns to Gen H. J. Malony, 13 Apr 49, reviewing draft manuscript of this volume. The memorandum also suggested like stages of airplane expansion.

which necessitates an immediate start toward acquisition of the required critical items of materiel.[90]

On 28 May the Chief of Staff requested a total of $506,274,000 to supplement the regular appropriation bill still awaiting passage. Of this amount $300,000,000 was to be for 3,000 additional airplanes and much of the remainder for tanks, airplane bombs, and antiaircraft guns. The next day, on orders from the Secretary of War, who was evidently persuaded by Colonel Burns, $200,000,000 was added to expedite the construction of new production facilities. That same day General Marshall, who was working closely with the President, presented the program at the White House. The President approved the request and, in words that echoed those suggested by the Chief of Staff, he placed it before Congress on 31 May.[91] The program was adopted, as the First Supplemental Appropriation for the Military Establishment, Fiscal Year 1941.

General Marshall believed that the new estimates as submitted on 31 May were sufficient to provide for materiel, but he did not believe that they were sufficient for personnel.[92] He had canvassed with his staff the need for additional personnel; he had precise ideas as to why additional men were needed and how they were to be used; and he had tried, prior to his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee, to get from the President approval for a further increase. Apparently the President was unwilling to commit himself but entirely willing for the Chief of Staff to take the initiative.[93] One of the principal purposes of the First Supplemental Appropriation bill was to broaden the base of production: to use to the full the facilities which the change in public sentiment now made available, to create new facilities, and to hasten the production of critical arms, particularly airplanes. The bill as finally approved, without exhaustive debate and with scarcely any substantial opposition, provided for a cash outlay of $821,002,047 and contract authorizations of $254,176,761. It also

[90] Memo, CofS for SW, 28 May 40, sub: Supplemental Estimates, FY 1941, CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 2. Information on the background for the President's message of 31 May is in this document and in other documents in the same file: (1) Memo, SW for the President, 29 May 40, sub: Supplemental Estimate, FY 1941; (2) Memo, SGS for CofS, 29 May 40, sub: Addition of $200,000,000 to Original $506,000,000 Estimate; (3) Memo, SW, prepared by Gen Marshall, for the President, 29 May 40, sub: Draft for Presidential message.

[91] For the President's speech see *FDR Public Papers and Addresses*, 1940 Volume, pp. 250ff.

[92] House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10055*, pp. 68–69.

[93] Communications of 3, 4, and 5 June, CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 2, notably Memo, CofS for Gen E. M. Watson, 5 June, reporting his rewriting of an earlier memo to comply with expressed White House wishes and his declaration to House committee that "I had no authority to ask for such an increase as it had not as yet had Executive approval."

allowed the Army to be increased by as much as 95,000 enlisted men above the peacetime strength of 280,000, though General Marshall had emphasized the immediate need for only 335,000 and though the Army at that time consisted of only 249,441 enlisted men.[94] This act, approved 26 June, plus the regular appropriation act for 1941, provided the War Department a total of nearly $3,000,000,000 for defense expenditure.[95]

Plans for a Rapidly Increasing Army—and a Draft

It will be recalled that in May, October, and November of 1939 the Supply Division prepared over-all comprehensive special programs for national defense. In December 1939 and January 1940 certain portions of that program were submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, but by executive decision they were not placed before Congress. Perhaps the executive decision was correct, for the House was unwilling at that time to approve even the limited program which the President submitted. On 7 May 1940 G–4 again presented a program; this time it provided, in effect, for the mobilization of an army of 1,000,000 men.[96] Events moved so fast that before this program could be approved world conditions had changed Army needs and also the political prospects of having requests for those needs approved, and so new requests were sent to Congress on 16 May. Then on 24 May General Moore, in conference with the Deputy Chief of Staff, was instructed to review the whole program of 7 May and return a revision within fourteen days.[97] This was done, and on 6 June a revision was presented to the Chief of Staff calling for $3,233,000,000 beyond estimates then pending in Congress (1) to "activate, train and maintain the forces in the Protective Mobilization Plan during the first year" and (2) to "establish and maintain for the first year an air force in accordance with the approved WPD Aviation Program." [98]

The Chief of Staff approved the G–4 program of 6 June on 15 June, and by 21 June G–4 had prepared a detailed directive for estimates. Inasmuch as this directive marks the end of a series of plans, some of its features deserve special

[94] (1) Pub 667, 76th Cong. (2) House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10055*, pp. 66, 68, and 69. (3) *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940.*

[95] 76th Cong, 3d sess, Appropriations, Budget Estimates, etc., Senate Doc No. 312, p. 250.

[96] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 7 May 40, sub: Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1.

[97] Memo, SGS for ACofS G–4, 24 May 40, sub: Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1.

[98] Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 6 Jun 40, sub: Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1.

notice for their relations to events of the years preceding and to the weeks of turmoil that were to follow.[99] Only ten days were allowed for completion of the estimates, and General Marshall had already stated on 13 June that it was of "imperative importance" that there be a sufficient rate of production to meet the needs of an army of 1,000,000 men on combat status earlier than 1 October 1941.[100] As had been the case with many other plans prior to this date, an M Day (Mobilization Day) was assumed, but, whatever the concept of M Day may have been in the past, it was regarded now as something imminent. The estimates were (1) to provide recruiting costs, pay, rations, and maintenance for an army to be expanded to about 1,000,000 within eight months of M Day; (2) to provide training for such a force; (3) to provide temporary shelter for it; (4) to provide for the completion of all critical items of seacoast defense at "the earliest practicable date"; (5) to provide a reserve of "critical" items for the PMP force (1,166,715 enlisted men) to insure that the "quantity of each item on hand will be sufficient to meet the actual requirements . . . plus the necessary maintenance until monthly production equals monthly wastage"; (6) to provide "essential" items to meet "initial issues" for an army of 1,166,715 men; (7) to provide for a year of maintenance of such essential items; (8) to provide travel and transportation of additional personnel; (9) to provide additional arsenals, depots, and posts; (10) to provide for an expanded aviation program ($1,111,900,000); (11) to provide for accelerated procurement planning and industrial mobilization; and (12) to provide additional civilian employees. In computing pay, estimates were to be submitted for both a "Voluntary Plan" and a "Selective Service Plan." It should again be noted that although the idea of a peacetime draft was initiated and developed by civilians, not by Army or White House, the Army planners were already making their computations in expectation of draft legislation.[101]

Advance Planning for 4,000,000 Men

To other materiel-minded authorities, however, the planning of the General Staff was not regarded as complete. They wished estimates of total numbers of men who would ultimately be needed, for only with that knowledge could they

[99] Unused Memo, Actg ACofS G–4, for Chief, B&LP Br, 21 Jun 40, sub: Estimates—Program for National Defense, G–4/31773.

[100] CofS note, 13 Jun 40, on Memo, ASW for William S. Knudsen, 13 Jun 40, G–4/31773.

[101] The Draft Act's origins are related in Chapter VII.

compute in advance their aggregate needs in weapons, ammunition, and equipment. In February 1940 this issue was laid before the Chief of Staff in a memorandum from Colonel Burns who then, as at the White House conference of 14 November 1938, was executive officer for the Assistant Secretary of War, and who was on this occasion replying to a General Staff inquiry on the nation's industrial preparedness.[102] Colonel Burns made a reasoned study of the time factor in preparing for war. He stated that the manpower time factor (determined by the period needed to raise and train troops) is exceeded by the supply time factor which includes the time to plan and build factories as well as the time spent in the manufacturing process. He listed time factors for individual supply items needing up to eighteen months, or even three years in one case, to produce, and recommended Staff use of these data in further study of the supplies requirements as well as the manpower requirements for war.

There is no evidence to indicate that Colonel Burns' memorandum had any immediate effect on General Staff planning, for months later the Staff planning had not produced the exact information desired by production authorities about the Army's long-range requirements as distinguished from immediate requirements in weapons and equipment. As already indicated, the Chief of Staff this time did not fail to recognize the new urgency of demand; nor did he fail to understand that the American public was losing some of its earlier complacency. The estimates and plans of mid-May were much more definite than those of earlier date, and the G–4 program that was approved in mid-June was bold and sweeping. But it still was short of the entire need. It did not look toward expansion beyond the 1,000,000-man army; it did not provide, except in a minor way, for new facilities; it did not provide substantially for essential items. Moreover, it did not spell out in detail the time requirements,[103] and the hour was late. The G–4 program was overtaken and replaced by a new program that received its impetus from a different source.

Even before his message of 31 May the President had become uneasy about the existing uncertainty of exact American defense needs and the resultant conflict of American orders with those which had been placed with American factories by British and French purchasing agents. Much the same situation on a smaller scale had led him in December 1939 to create a liaison committee

[102] Memo, Col J. H. Burns for CofS, 1 Feb 40, sub: Industrial Preparedness Essential to Adequate National Defense, SW file, Industrial Preparedness.

[103] (1) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 6 Jun 40, sub: Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1. (2) Unused Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for Chief of B&LP Br, 21 Jun 40, sub: Estimates—Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1.

for reducing the conflict of Franco-British-American orders.[104] Now, in May 1940, he created an Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. The paper "Council" itself did not function. The commission reported directly to the President, and its most useful advice, on arms production, was given also to the War and Navy Departments. On 30 May the Chief of Staff and other top government officials attended the first meeting of the Advisory Commission at the White House.[105]

The production authority on the new commission, William S. Knudsen, reported shortly that if he was to engage in production planning for national defense he would have to be given much more accurate and detailed knowledge of the Army's needs (and the Navy's) not only for the immediate future, but as of later dates as well. Until these amounts were known, he pointed out, there would be no sure progress toward a division of American industrial production among foreign buyers, armed forces buyers, and the civilian market. On 11 June he bluntly informed the War Department, in a conference with the Assistant Secretary of War, that he must have answers to two specific questions: "How much munitions productive capacity does this country need and how rapidly must it become available?" [106]

The effect of this request was to call at last for a fairly precise statement of Army objectives, and such a statement was delivered by the Assistant Secretary of War to Mr. Knudsen two days later.[107] Colonel Burns, who for months had been pressing for clearer and more vigorous planning (as well as performing) of the rearmament program, was chiefly responsible for meeting Mr. Knudsen's wishes, with which he was in exact accord. Upon hearing Mr. Knudsen's inquiry of 11 June, Assistant Secretary Johnson had asked his executive what figures could be supplied, and Colonel Burns wrote them out immediately. In the course of outlining the objectives Colonel Burns stated vigorously his appraisal of responsibilities, and, by implication at least, indicated where lay the ultimate responsibility for deficiencies. In his estimation only the Commander in Chief, with

[104] See Chapter IV.

[105] For information on the revival of the Advisory Commission see Civilian Production Administration, *Industrial Mobilization for War—History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945* (Washington: GPO, 1947), Vol. I, pp. 18ff.

[106] Memo, Executive Asst to ASW (Col J. H. Burns) for ASW, 13 Jun 40, sub: National Policy on Munitions Productive Capacity, G–4/31773. The events leading up to the preparation of this memorandum were described by its author in an interview with the author of this study in 1947.

[107] Memo, ASW for Mr. Knudsen, 13 Jun 40, no sub, G–4/31773.

the support of Congress, could answer Mr. Knudsen's questions which involved policy decisions beyond the jurisdiction of the War Department. The War Department had, however, failed to advise the Commander in Chief as to long-range requirements.[108] Colonel Burns recommended that the situation be remedied by immediate Presidential approval of a stated long-range program—concurrences in which had already been obtained from the Chief of Ordnance and the Chief of the Air Corps. Then a memorandum, following exactly the recommendations of Colonel Burns, was prepared for Mr. Knudsen and signed by the Assistant Secretary. This program, rough in outline but important as the initial step in the development of the first firm statement of long-range Army objectives and as the first statement of objectives effective for American industrialists, was as follows:

Ground Army

Production for a combat army of 1,000,000 men 1 Oct 1941.
" " " " " " 2,000,000 " 1 Jan 1942.
" " " " " " 4,000,000 " 1 Apr 1942.

Air Army

Production sufficient to meet air needs comparable to those of a ground army of each stated size at each date; i. e.

Annual production capacity of 9,000 planes by 1 Oct 1941.
" " " " 18,000 planes by 1 Jan 1942.
" " " " 36,000 planes by 1 Apr 1942.

The air program was arrived at by noting the President's recent decision to seek ultimate plane capacity of 50,000 a year, as mentioned in his address to Congress on 16 May 1940,[109] and deducting from the total the 13,500 planes contemplated for the Navy, leaving 36,500 as the approximate capacity in Army planes set for April 1942. The air program was given only in oversimplified terms of airplanes alone, regardless of production. General Arnold had told Colonel Burns that 9,000 planes would be his view, and felt that war conditions called for a higher proportion of air to ground forces.

When Colonel Burns stated that in General Staff planning to date there was no long-range objective for the ground army, he was referring particularly to

[108] Memo, Executive Asst to ASW for ASW, 13 Jun 40, sub: National Policy on Munitions Productive Capacity, G–4/31773.

[109] On this point see Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 787, for Mr. Hull's impression that it was he who had suggested to a surprised President the aim of 50,000 planes a year.

the timing of the program, since his 1,000,000-man "Combat Army," if that term covered all elements, was in reality an approximation of the PMP force, and the increments were on a scale previously discussed by the General Staff.

A transcript of the memorandum for Mr. Knudsen was taken by hand to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. William Bryden, and handed to him with Colonel Burns' blunt request for written comment within thirty minutes. The comment, signed by General Marshall was: "I concur in the above quantity objectives, but I consider it of imperative importance that means be found to advance the date for the needs of the first million herein scheduled for October 1, 1941." [110]

This program, with rough estimates of the cost involved in this whole enterprise, was transmitted to the President who reduced the general over-all estimate of cost from $11,000,000,000 to $7,300,000,000 and thereafter approved it in substance, (the 20 June program).[111] As far as the ground forces were concerned, the second objective (the 2,000,000-man phase) was the most important, since the first was already provided for in appropriations approved or about to be approved and since the third objective could be achieved only after the successful launching of the second. Within the War Department the Assistant Secretary (now Acting Secretary) evidently retained the initiative and acted aggressively in promoting the 20 June program, for on 24 June he stated again to the Chief of Staff the purpose of the program, warned against changing it, and emphasized that he would discuss amendments or proposed changes with Mr. Knudsen.[112] The General Staff evidently had its first chance for a critical examination of the program on the same date, when General Moore summoned seven officers representing the War Plans Division, G–3 (Operations and Training), G–4 (Supply), and the Ordnance Department.[113] He informed them that the President had reduced the over-all estimates and that the troop basis for the program had been found unsatisfactory. A committee of four, Colonel Anderson, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) R. W. Crawford of WPD, Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) R. W. Hasbrouck of G–3, and Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) Henry S. Aurand of G–4, was

[110] Note on Memo cited in n. 106.

[111] CPA, *Industrial Mobilization*, Vol. I, pp. 41ff. For details of production objectives and the programming of industrial production at this time see also: Programming of Defense Production by the National Defense Advisory Commission and the Office of Production Management, May 1940 to December 1941 (Preliminary draft of Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board Special Study No. 31), National Archives, WPB, 210R.

[112] Memo, Actg SW for CofS, 24 Jun 40, no sub, G–4/31773.

[113] Notes of meeting in the office of General Moore, taken by Lt Col H. S. Aurand, 24 Jun 40, sub: Munitions Program of June 20, 1940, G–4/31773.

named to revise the troop basis and thereafter to reduce or delete items which they should decide were not in urgent need.[114] On 27 June, in patent sequence to the committee examination of the munitions program, the Chief of Staff wrote to the Acting Secretary of War recommending a new revision of the 20 June program, whereby the figure approved by the President should be increased.[115] Already G–4 had instructed the various estimating arms and services to submit by 3 July detailed budget estimates to supply Army requirements for a force of 4,000,000 men.[116]

Discouraging Discovery of Production Barriers

Suddenly on 28 June the whole basis of the figuring was changed and the practical objective became the equipping of a 2,000,000-man rather than a 4,000,000-man army. Available documents do not make entirely clear the various influences at work and the chain of reasoning involved. It appears that a quick and necessarily informal survey of industry by Mr. Knudsen and his colleague, Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in charge of industrial materials, indicated that the arms industries could not be expanded with any such celerity as the program of 20 June contemplated. The chief shortages proved to be in the machine tool output and in basic iron and steel output, the key to all industrial expansion. Operators of steel mills and toolmakers believed that they could take care of immediate needs only if they were relieved of the larger orders involved in the industry expansion that would be essential to meeting more distant needs. If a choice had to be made between speeding the equipment for 2,000,000 men and ultimately equipping 4,000,000, General Marshall favored the former. He, General Moore, and others of his Staff discussed such matters on 26 and 27 June, and at noon on 27 June General Moore called from the Office of the Chief of Staff to ask his subordinates for an estimated figure for the 2,000,000-man program.[117] The same day the Chief of Staff addressed to the Acting Secretary a letter wherein he stated:

[114] *Ibid.*

[115] (1) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 25 Jun 40, sub: Revision of the Munitions Program of June 20, 1940, G–4/31773. (2) Memo, CofS for Actg SW, 27 Jun 40, sub: Munitions Program of June 20, 1940, G–4/31773.

[116] Memo, ACofS G–4 for Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services, 26 Jun 40, sub: Army Requirements for a Force of 4,000,000 Men, G–4/31773. This was rescinded by Memo, ACofS G–4 for Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services, 1 Jul 40, sub: Army Requirements for a Force of 4,000,000 Men, G–4/31773.

[117] Memo, Lt Col H. S. Aurand (G–4) for the record, 9 Jul 40, sub: Munitions Program of June 30, G–4/31773.

The program for 4,000,000 men has been in the War Department plans for many years as the visualization of our maximum effort in man power. In the present situation in Europe and the Far East, and under the 1939 policy of hemisphere defense, a force, aside from considerations of planes and mechanization, of 2,000,000 men would seem more nearly to represent our major necessity as a basis for procuring equipment. It is feared that an over-demand for munitions might have the effect of delaying rather than expediting actual production of the munitions urgently needed before October 1941. . . .

For the present, it is not believed desirable to go further as to the requirements for ground forces, than the 2,000,000-man basis . . . for the reason that the strategic necessities for additional men do not appear sufficiently urgent, as now visualized, to justify complicating the already tremendous task of producing the planes and their related munitions, and the mechanized material, as well as the ground forces requirements, for the 2,000,000-man effort.[118]

The following morning, 28 June, there was a conference of the Acting Secretary, the Chief of Staff, Mr. Knudsen, and Colonel Burns, and thereafter the Acting Secretary called for a very considerable revision of the program so firmly stated a week earlier. The items of the program were now restated:

a. Procure reserve stocks of all items of supplies needed to equip and maintain a ground force of 1,000,000 men on combat status.

b. Procure all reserve stocks of the important long-time items of supplies needed to equip and maintain a ground force of 2,000,000 men on combat status.

c. Create facilities which would permit a production sufficient to supply an army of 4,000,000 men on combat status.

d. Procure 18,000 complete military airplanes (less the 2,181 planes for which funds have already been appropriated), together with necessary spare engines, spare parts, guns, ammunition, radio and other supplies and accessories pertaining thereto.

e. Provide productive capacity available to the Army of 18,000 complete military airplanes per year, together with necessary engines and all other accessories and supplies pertaining thereto.

f. Provide necessary storage for above.[119]

The tremendous labor of revision was delegated to G–4 in co-operation with other offices. Frequently directions were given and information was received orally, and on Sunday, 30 June, G–4 and the Budget and Legislative Planning

[118] Memo, CofS for Actg SW, 27 Jun 40, sub: Revision of the Munitions Program of June 20, 1940. Copies of this memo as it was evidently sent to the Acting Secretary are in G–4/31773. A very much longer and more detailed version is in WPD 4321, Munitions Program (Mr. Knudsen), data accumulated by Colonel Crawford. This WPD file version contains the language quoted above. Markings are not adequate to enable full identification as to origin and use, but it is probable that it originated with the committee appointed by General Moore, perhaps with Colonel Crawford. A further basis for believing that this statement represented the view of the Chief of Staff is the fact that it was retyped (unidentified except by date), in part, and filed in proper chronological place in CofS file, Emergency File, bndr 2.

[119] Memo, Actg SW for CofS, 28 Jun 40, sub: Revision of Munitions Program of 20 June, G–4/31773.

Branch completed a series of documents which contained exactly the information that was furnished the President.[120] The Chief of Staff, using the figures assembled by his subordinates under his direction, recommended to the Acting Secretary a $5,896,971,287 program that provided:

a. All essential items of supplies to complete the equipment of the Protective Mobilization Plan force as revised (800,000 men in units plus 400,000 replacements) and to maintain that force on a combat status $412,027,300

b. Reserve stocks of critical (noncommercial) items to complete the equipment of a ground force increased to 2,000,000 men and to maintain it on a combat status $2,286,254,041

c. Creation of facilities to build up a production sufficient to further increase the Army at the rate of 1,000,000 men every three months and maintain them on a combat status $716,735,000

d. 18,000 airplanes complete with all spares, armament, radios and accessories (less the 2,181 just appropriated for) $1,974,741,376

e. Creation of production capacity available to the Army of 18,000 complete military airplanes per year, together with necessary engines and all other accessories and supplies pertaining thereto $71,520,000

f. Storage capacity and distribution costs ..... [121] $435,693,570

On the same day the program was discussed at the White House and referred back to the War Department for reconsideration of certain points. The President seemed anxious to obtain necessary quantities of critical items of supplies and airplanes, and sufficient productive capacity. On the other hand, he wished assurance that full use was to be made of commercial storage; and he wished to know whether commercially available supplies such as shoes, blankets, underwear, and motor vehicles were needed in such quantities. He desired a limit of $4,000,000,000 for Fiscal Year 1941 of which amount not more than $2,500,000,000 should be in cash (the remainder in contract authorizations).[122] "I can sell the American people a bargain for $3,999,900,000 a lot more easily than one for $4,000,000,000" Mr. Roosevelt is remembered to have said on this occasion. "Keep the total below $4,000,000,000." [123]

The questions raised at this White House conference were considered by the General Staff. The Chief of Staff thereupon submitted to the Acting Secretary

[120] The history of the preparation of these documents is described in detail in a three-page memorandum for the record, dated 28 June 1940, but evidently completed about 30 June, G–4/31773.

[121] Memo, CofS for Actg SW, 1 Jul 40, sub: Revision of Munitions Program of June 20, 1940, G–4/31773.

[122] Memo, Actg SW for CofS, 1 Jul 40, sub: White House Conference, July 1, 1940, reference Munitions Program, June 30, 1940, G–4/31773.

[123] General Burns and General Aurand to the author in 1948.

a memorandum in which he repeated the figures and justified them, but, in accordance with the suggestions of the President, provided a tabulation showing amounts deferred for future financing, amounts for contract authorizations, and amounts for cash appropriation.[124] On 3 July the President approved this elaboration of the 30 June program, with the exception of the transfer of $100,000,000 from cash requirements to contract authorization. At the same time he decided that the personnel program would definitely be entirely separate from the munitions program, and he requested additional information for incorporation in his budget message.[125]

On 5 July hearings were held before the Bureau of the Budget, and there the total request was pared from $5,896,971,287 to $3,911,995,417. This did not necessarily mean disapproval of total requirements; it simply indicated a decision to defer appropriations. The decision, nominally by the Director of the Budget, could actually have been made only by Presidential direction. It is doubtful whether the reduction was fully approved by the Chief of Staff, Mr. Knudsen, or Mr. Stettinius. Minor changes were made at a White House conference on 8 July, and on 10 July the President went before Congress to request funds for "total defense." [126] This was the munitions program of 1940, criticized by administration opponents as being suddenly conceived. Actually it had been worked and reworked by Staff planners for many months.

Insofar as supply problems were concerned, it was the duty of the Chief of Staff to advise the President and Congress of military requirements for national defense. Detailed examination of materiel planning in 1939–40 indicates that within the General Staff able and conscientious officers were constantly keeping plans for supply requirements current and that they were aware of the urgency.

[124] Memo, CofS, prepared by G–4, for Actg SW, 2 Jul 40, sub: Program of Adequate Preparedness for the Army, G–4/31773. The Budget and Legislative Planning Branch recast these figures in a special table which was evidently used at the White House conference. This document as well as other documents used at the White House conferences of 1 and 3 July (some bearing notations in the hand of the President) are in the National Archives, Records of the War Production Board, Policy Documentation File, 212.

[125] Memo, Ex Asst to SW (without address), 3 Jul 40, sub: White House Conference. Munitions Program of June 30, 1940, G–4/31773.

[126] For information about the action of the Bureau of the Budget and the attitudes of Marshall, Knudsen, and Stettinius see: (1) Memo, Lt Col H. S. Aurand for the record, 9 Jul 40, G–4/31773; (2) Memo, William W. Knight, Jr., for John D. Biggers, 25 Jul 40, sub: Munitions Program of June 30, 1940 (based upon information from Col F. W. Browne, BOWD), National Archives, Records of WPB, Policy Document File 210; (3) Ltr of William S. Knudsen and E. R. Stettinius, 5 Jul 40 (submitted to the President at Hyde Park 6 Jul 40), National Archives, Records of WPB, Policy Document File 210.2; (4) Ltr, CofS to E. R. Stettinius, 2 Aug 40, National Archives, Records of WPB, Policy Document File 210; (5) Ltr, E. R. Stettinius to CofS, 3 Aug 40, National Archives, Records of WPB, Policy Document File 210. For the 10 July speech of the President see *FDR Papers and Addresses*, 1940 Volume, pp. 286–91.

It is evident that the Chief of Staff personally directed and co-ordinated the work of his subordinates, who on numerous occasions, with his approval, restudied defense needs, and as a result urged increased armament. General Marshall usually heeded their counsel and advised his superiors of the need. At the same time, it is clear that he was conscious of the limitations of his own authority and of his responsibility to the Commander in Chief, and he consistently avoided going over the heads of his superiors to the Congress or the people. If he underestimated the ultimate need in strength, his judgments were so far in advance of those which governed the nation's executive and legislative authorities that the Army's objectives, as determined by him, were actually such as could be achieved only after delay. If he failed to make his demands early enough or vigorously enough, it can be surmised that any more forceful expression by him prior to Blitzkrieg might well have resulted in complete rejection of his views and reduction of his influence, to the ultimate injury of the whole rearmament campaign.

It is well to bear in mind, as previously observed, that in the politically delicate period of 1940 and thereafter General Marshall was compelled to act with great political discretion. It was of importance that he win and retain the support of Congressmen whose votes on appropriations and authorizations would make or break the Army program. He had to overcome or at least allay to some degree the announced opposition of such an influential figure as a deficiency subcommittee chairman in the Senate who refused on one occasion to defend his own subcommittee report because he, the Senator, individually opposed the rearming then at issue. The fact is that by patience and tolerance General Marshall gradually won over opposition Congressmen and built up their confidence in the Chief of Staff to a point where in adversity he could count upon it, as was to be apparent in the hard days just after Pearl Harbor. Both loyalty and discretion, he appears to have felt, forbade his pressing Congress for appropriations greater than the President favored. Beyond this, General Marshall was convinced that he must guard against asking for sums larger than the Army could expend to certain advantage—sums that would "choke the patient," to use his own metaphor, and that would also tend to produce public overconfidence in the Army's readiness and, later, to risk public condemnation. To his friends he sometimes referred to World War I experience, when a $640,000,000 appropriation for airplanes failed to fill the air instantly with planes, as the public had anticipated, and instead brought on the Army eventual recriminations as extravagant as the blighted hopes had been. Now in 1940 it might have been temporarily

profitable to break with Presidential and Budget restrictions and to press Congress for more than the President approved; it would have endangered the more abiding advantage—Congressional and public confidence in the General Staff and its Chief—and it was the long-term advantage which General Marshall deliberately sought.[137]

The episode of the 20 June munitions program and the brief impatience of the Assistant Secretary with the Chief of Staff illuminated a real weakness in General Staff planning, a deficiency in the consideration of time, and it also emphasized the dangers of divided authority for materiel programs. It is apparent that the aggressive action of Colonel Burns and Assistant Secretary Johnson contributed substantially to the formulation of the 30 June munitions program. Short-lived as were Colonel Burns' proposals for meeting the long-range need, they forced to administrative attention the need for industrial expansion on a grand scale, and stimulated the General Staff to detailed planning for the greater Army to be built around the PMP force, the fruit of which was to be borne in the Victory Program of September 1941. If what was done in mid-1940 to push the PMP had instead been done in mid-1939, much of the 1940 confusion would have been averted.

[137] See undated Memo (April 1949), General Marshall for Hist Div, SSUSA, sub: MS "The Office of the Chief of Staff in World War II," Hist Div files.

CHAPTER VII

Troop-Training Problems of 1940

For the recruitment of an army larger than the Protective Mobilization Plan force of 1,000,000 to 1,250,000 men the Army planners had recognized long before June 1940 that a draft would be necessary, as in 1917. Accordingly in normal routine the Staff did its methodical planning for selective service legislation, making periodic examinations for possible revision, but always on the assumption that, as in 1917, the plans would become operative only when the nation was actually at war.[1] There was a further assumption, traceable to the previously mentioned obsession with the pattern of World War I that guided Army planning for the two ensuing decades and influenced the Protective Mobilization Plan in particular. The situation was thus described by General Marshall himself in explaining the unhappy aspects of troop housing in the winter of 1940–41:

> The Protective Mobilization Plan was developed under the assumption that upon mobilization troops would have to move as soon as possible to a theater of operations, following the precedent of 1917, of all prior wars in which this country had engaged, and the custom of war in general. The plans, therefore, contemplated only essential installations and facilities in the continental United States and left to future determination the installations which would be required in the theater of operations, wherever that might be. Only emergency short-term installations and facilities were planned for the zone of the interior.
>
> Provision was not made for the contingency which now [1941] exists involving a full mobilization in time of peace, with a long and indefinite training period and a peacetime exactitude or solicitude for the physical and recreational accommodations—all involving more expensive structures and more elaborate arrangements.[2]

The discussion was particularly directed to the delay and cost of camp construction which had upset Congress during the winter. It applied as well to the broader aspects of manpower planning which in June 1940 frequently seems

[1] The nature and extent of the continuous Staff planning can be traced in papers filed in G–1/8654. For a concise exposition of the situation in late 1939 see a published pamphlet prepared under the supervision of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee, *American Selective Service: A Brief Account of Its Historical Background and Its Probable Future Form* (Washington: GPO, 1939).

[2] Testimony of 28 Apr 41 before the House Appropriations Committee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1942. Hearings . . . on HR 4965*, p. 3.

to have had equally uncertain contact with current reality. The large munitions program of 20 June and the more precise program that followed in the next month [3] were designed to equip forces much larger than the PMP force upon which since 1937 the planning had been largely concentrated.

Draft or Volunteers for Prewar Recruitment?

The time needed for producing full battle equipment for a 2,000,000-man army was rightly estimated at last, thanks to the sharp exchanges of mid-June among President, Chief of Staff, Assistant Secretary, and Mr. Knudsen, but the manner of raising the men to compose that force was not determined. Two methods—supplementary rather than alternative—had been under consideration by the Army. One was the draft. It had received, as mentioned, the Staff's normal attention and plans for its employment had been methodically drawn, but final policy making had not projected the draft into the prewar scene with any degree of confidence or vigor. On 20 May 1940 during a conference in the Chief of Staff's office attended by G–1, G–4, and Quartermaster Corps representatives General Marshall inquired: "Assuming Congress gave us a Selective Service act, how long would it take to procure 750,000 men?" He was told that 45 days would be required. He then asked about tentage available for housing so large an army as this would mean, the assumption being that summer housing was in mind, and was told that the supply on issue and in storage was ample.[4] Information of this character necessary for decision on the draft apparently had been gathered and co-ordinated by the Staff: the decision to use the draft, however, was not within the Army's power, and this circumstance explains much that took place in June 1940.

The other method of troop raising in contemplation was the "Civilian Volunteer Effort" (CVE), through which the authorities in the forty-eight states were expected to assist in a volunteer recruiting campaign to expedite the enrollment of men for the Regular Army or the National Guard or both. The CVE was looked upon as a means of raising enough men to fill out the PMP and hence adequate for any prewar preparation hitherto contemplated.[5]

[3] Dealt with in Chapter VI.

[4] Notes of Conf of 20 May 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

[5] It should be emphasized that the CVE was purely a prewar measure. The Army did not doubt the need of a wartime draft. In the published *Brief Account* (see note 1) it was concluded: "The Civilian Effort . . . is a stopgap. Selective Service is the only sound measure yet devised for the United States." The mechanism for the Civilian Volunteer Effort had been discussed with the Adjutants General of the

Its political virtue was of a negative sort—it would avert the necessity of going to Congress with a plea for draft legislation, sure to occasion long debate, as the Army rightly foresaw, and likely also to be defeated in a peace-minded Congress. That Congress was still essentially peace-minded to the extent of refusing to consider a peacetime draft was the conviction of numerous leaders of the Democratic majority in the Senate, as was to be made manifest by their refusal to introduce a draft bill, and presumably of the President himself, for he abstained from sending any encouragement in the matter to his legislative lieutenants. If White House and Army alike erred in their judgment of what the 1940 Congress would do in the light of Blitzkrieg's towering flames, it must be remembered (1) that thus far Congress had been reluctant to go the full distance in other respects, (2) that there then was an active pacifist movement in America, and (3) that the Congressional and Presidential elections were only a few months distant, and the Democratic National Convention (where the third term would be a dominant issue) was almost at hand. Also, it must be remembered that in mid-June the Army was pressing for appropriation measures of the most urgent character with which literally nothing must interfere (to permit raising the Regular Army to 4,000,000 men) and was preparing recommendations for still other and far larger appropriations to be introduced shortly. If there was fear that these essential measures would be jeopardized by advocacy of a draft bill traditionally unpopular in peacetime, the fear was understandable. If, therefore, the Army's concern over the war threat tempted it to advocate a peacetime draft without delay, the impulse had to be controlled, for this would mean enunciation of a legislative policy, and no such policy could be advocated unless and until both the policy and its timing were approved by the White House.

There was another practical consideration that influenced professional Army thinking on the subject of troop training. This was the small number of officers and men immediately available for the training of recruits. Three principal sources existed. One was the Regular Army which itself was in process of ex-

National Guard in the several states and was more or less in readiness for use. It emerged from the military cupboard at least as early as 25 May 1940 when an unsigned memorandum advocating it, as a means of training 200,000 men for the Enlisted Reserve during the Fiscal Year 1941, was "delivered to Mr. [Harry] Hopkins by Major McSherry" (Frank J. McSherry, later Maj. Gen.). A few days later the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War were urging it upon the President as a means of expanding the Army and delaying the induction of the National Guard into federal service. See especially the following papers, some with notations, in CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3: (1) Unsigned Memo for Harry Hopkins, 25 Jun 40, sub: Training of Reservists for the Army; (2) Memo, CofS for SW, 3 Jun 40 (revised copy dated 4 Jun 40), sub: Expansion of Forces; (3) Memo, SW for the President, 4 Jun 40; (4) Memo, CofS for Gen E. M. Watson, 5 Jun 40.

panding from the emaciated state of 1939 and which would have its hands full taking care not only of the recently granted increases of 17,000 and 53,000 men, but also of the 120,000 entirely new men it was to ask for shortly (raising the total from 280,000 to 400,000 men). Another source was the National Guard; it now numbered 242,000 men, but many of these were little more than raw recruits, and many others would be discharged for various reasons soon after mobilization. A third source was the Reserve officers, over 100,000 of them, for the most part recent graduates of the college ROTC units with excellent qualifications but only limited field training.[6] It was apparent to the professional Staff planners that, if time permitted, the most efficient way to train a large Army was, first, to give thorough training to a small one which could thereafter serve as leaven to a larger mass. From that mass, later, would be extracted newly trained elements which could then be mingled with a still larger mass, and thus provide the next stage of a step-by-step development. Could this plan be carried out without interference, it was reasoned, a vigorous 90-day training cycle would produce a rapidly expanding army that would be increasingly efficient. Events so effectively blocked the continued pursuit of this plan that, instead of using the Regular Army's best qualified training officers and noncommissioned officers in methodically paced expansion of the existing units, the Army had to scatter its invaluable trained personnel widely and rapidly through a too swiftly increasing flood of recruits. The shortage of fully qualified instructors in the training camps was as apparent to intelligent citizen-soldier recruits as to anyone else and was the subject of vigorous and justified complaints even in 1941. This was true in the National Guard units as well, where veterans capable of giving proper instruction were themselves so few that the Guard divisions, likewise gorged with an excess of raw personnel, had to go through about one year of intensive training. When a core of trained and disciplined men was finally attained, it was possible to recruit as many as 514,345 enlisted men in the single month of October 1942[7] but that was fantastically ahead of possibilities in 1940 or early 1941. Thus, when it was necessary to send antiaircraft elements to Hawaii and the Philippines and engineer units to Alaska, the Regular units in these categories (some of them 90 percent

[6] For all purposes (which means much more than training) the Regular Army had 13,914 officers on active duty on 1 July 1940. On that date the National Guard had 14,561 officers, of whom fewer than half were service school graduates. There were 2,710 Reserve officers then on extended active duty—a number which one year later had leaped to 56,700. Strength of the Army (STM–30), 1 Apr 49; STM–30 predecessor prepared by Returns Section, Misc Div, AGO, an undated compilation; *Annual Report of SW 1940; Annual Report of C of NGB*, 1941, p. 6.

[7] See Strength of the Army tabulation (STM–30), Jul 47.

recruits and insufficiently equipped) patently could not be regarded as fit for efficient overseas duty, nor could they be whittled down to efficiency without grave injury to the whole training program. Accordingly, selected National Guard units were sent overseas, these being demonstrably at a better stage of readiness at the time. The critical need in 1940, if it could be met, General Marshall stressed, was for orderly employment of the existing trained manpower, both of officers and men; the problem was to avoid a too rapid dilution of their mass. General Marshall expressed a desire to organize his new divisions at peace strength (8,500 men) and get them going before raising them to war strength.[8]

The Regular Army's Role in Training

One must not lose sight of the immensely important role that Regular officers of all ranks and arms performed in the training of the new Army. The problem was to spread them widely enough to gain the maximum value of their work as trainers and administrators, and at the same time to keep them sufficiently concentrated, especially in a few combat divisions, to assure that the combat units would remain efficient and ready for emergency duty. Many officers on the retired list were called back to active duty. Many engaged in less important duties were replaced by Reservists, so that the Regulars could be used to greater advantage elsewhere. The course of study at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth (the students at which had been selected because of special promise) was terminated in February 1940 in order to provide particularly well-qualified officers for the new divisions. The school's faculty was retained, however, and given the task of revising and completing some 250 training manuals for aid in the training of the National Guard and draft units of all categories. These manuals established and spread the doctrines that guided the new Army throughout World War II, and the success with which these identical combat doctrines were applied in the field in 1944–45 supplies its own evidence of how sound was the thinking in the Regular Army schools and Staff of prewar days. The Army War College course was continued until June 1940, and its buildings were then taken over for the beginning of GHQ. The Military Academy curriculum was revised to meet new and immediate needs, most conspicuously through the introduction of an aviation course, one purpose of which was to increase the leaven of Regular Army discipline

[8] Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 15 Jun 40, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Supplemental National Appropriations Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10055.*

and standards in an air force that was being enormously expanded. In the Navy amalgamation was relatively easy because of the tight integration of its air and surface personnel both in training and on duty. In the Army the air element's expansion was far greater and its separation from ground forces much more complete. The amalgamation problem which this entailed was correspondingly difficult.

Unfortunately the plan for gradual expansion of all units could not be put into full operation for yet another reason, namely, the official concern over having available an expeditionary corps for possible employment in Central or South America.[9] Rainbow 1, as revised 10 April 1940, provided for an expedition to Brazil, and Rainbow 4 (June 1940) envisaged such an operation anywhere in the hemisphere. The essential characteristic of such a corps would be its readiness for action, with respect both to trained personnel and to complete equipment for action. But to have a corps of, say, 60,000 men ready for overseas duty would require setting apart that considerable number of officers and men in an isolated group. In that state they would not be available as a training force to be broken up and scattered among recruit-training units. It would also require diversion to that corps of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment necessary for their overseas duty with the result that none of this equipment would be available for distribution among recruit-training units. Already there was a shortage of many items of equipment, which the belated program of 30 June was designed to correct only after a considerable time.

Examining all these factors, Staff planners felt that training efficiency necessitated proceeding first with the rapid increase of the Regular Army up to 400,000 men, inasmuch as the Regular Army then existent had a larger number of trained units and a higher percentage of trained personnel than did the National Guard, whose establishment itself would have to undergo a good deal of training before it could advantageously take on the training of new recruits. This view was accepted by the Chief of Staff and enunciated by him in early June 1940, when he was recommending to the Secretary of War, for transmission to the President, the approved technique of training new troop units expeditiously. The increase of the Regular Army from 280,000 to 400,000 was advocated in order "to avoid or delay the necessity of mobilizing any portion of the National Guard," inasmuch as (for an army up to 400,000 men) "trained . . . units . . . can be obtained more rapidly by increasing the Regular Army, than . . . by

[9] See Chapter IV.

mobilizing the National Guard, since we have sufficient unassigned cadres and companies. . . ." [10] The accompanying suggestion was that the 120,000 new troops be raised through the Civilian Volunteer Effort.

Civilian Leadership in Draft Legislation

That there was in this recommendation no suggestion of resorting, rather, to a draft of manpower, which could be obtained of course only by passage of a selective service act, indicates how far from the Chief of Staff's mind at this time was the idea of making immediate use of the draft. The fact is that the subject had been considered and for the moment rejected, but for reasons that are difficult to understand without a knowledge of the political atmosphere of that summer. A few weeks earlier, on 8 May, several members of the Military Training Camps Association met at a dinner in New York to consider a celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first Plattsburg Camp, started in 1915 for the voluntary military training of civilians. These Civilian Military Training Camps had proved a potent influence in producing Reserve officers for the Army of World War I. Grenville Clark, a leading spirit of 1915, now urged that the best observance of the anniversary would be a vigorous civilian campaign for 1940 preparedness against an emergency already as threatening as had been that of 1915. The immediate result of his suggestion was a much larger dinner on 22 May to which other leaders of the training-camp idea, in other sections of the country, were invited. This gathering was attended by Henry L. Stimson, Robert P. Patterson, William J. Donovan, Elihu Root, Jr., and nearly a hundred others, and their hearty support of Mr. Clark's idea brought a decision to urge upon the War Department a call for draft legislation.[11]

[10] The firm belief of the Chief of Staff in gradual, planned expansion was several times expressed before Congressional committees. He also expressed himself in this vein to influential private persons and to the President. See especially the following documents in CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3: (1) Ltr, Maj W. B. Smith (prepared for Gen Marshall) to Bernard M. Baruch, 10 May 40; (2) Memo, SW for the President, 4 Jun 40, with incl, consisting of Memo, CofS for SW, 4 Jun 40, sub: Expansion of Forces. The quoted phrases are from the two documents last mentioned. Yet on 7 June 1940 the Joint Board, recommending approval of Rainbow 4, also recommended calling the National Guard to federal service.

[11] This account of the initiation of the 1940 draft legislation is based largely upon detailed manuscript memoirs of Grenville Clark, which the author was allowed to examine. The meeting of 22 May 1940 was reported in *The New York Times,* 23 May 1940, p. 1, col. 6ff. In a letter of 1 August 1940 to the National President of Military Training Camps Association, the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson, himself one of the most insistent and influential advocates of the draft) acknowledged the association as "the original sponsors of the selective service bill now before Congress." SW Training Camps, 307. The next month a letter from the Secretary thanked Mr. Clark for initiating the movement.

Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer, USA Retired, one of the guests, thereupon proceeded to Washington, called upon the Chief of Staff on 25 May and presented the views of the Civilian Military Training Camps Association. General Marshall was fully informed of the President's unwillingness to espouse any such proposal at the time and hence not free to do so himself. Yet it is significant that, after his talk with General Palmer, he instructed three Army members of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee [12] to proceed to New York to confer with the Military Training Camps Association's executive committee and, as it developed, assist them in the drafting of a bill. The impression was strong that General Marshall contemplated only selective service legislation which would be effective after a declaration of war. Accordingly in the following week Mr. Clark and Julius Ochs Adler called upon the Chief of Staff and urged him to recommend to the President immediate support of the draft.[13] This General Marshall flatly refused to do. Mr. Clark recalled several stated reasons for his refusal, notably the nation's existing commitments which had to be fulfilled. The general was unwilling at that time to break up the Army's few trained units in order to provide cadres for the training of a flood of recruits. This feeling was related to his anxiety over hemisphere defense, which was expected to require the employment of those same trained units, intact, in the defense of South America. There was as previously noted yet another objection to introducing so controversial a proposal as selective service seemed to be. This was the fact that the War Department was at this moment working up its new requests to Congress for large appropriations, the granting of which was absolutely essential to the Army. Nothing, it was felt, must jeopardize the appropriations. The combination of these considerations quite clearly was enough to assure that for the present the Chief of Staff would neither himself support immediate draft legislation nor urge it upon the President, and the two visitors returned to New York with that discouraging conviction. How accurately they gauged the prospect was shown a few days later, when General Marshall addressed to the Secretary his 4 June memorandum recommending the 120,000-man increase in the Regular Army and suggesting use of the Civilian Volunteer

[12] These were Col. Victor J. O'Kelliher, Maj. Lewis B. Hershey (later a major general and the head of the Selective Service system), and Capt. Walter Weible. The committee was a standing organization of the armed services, created to maintain a continuing study of selective service requirements.

[13] The CofS appointment book for 31 May 40 mentions these two visitors at 9 A. M. and Rep. James Wadsworth (who ultimately introduced the draft bill in the House and with whom General Marshall was already in communication) as a 9:30 caller.

Effort for that purpose.[14] There was no mention whatever of a draft, and that its omission was agreeable to the President can be presumed. Later in the month, supposedly at the suggestion of the Chief of Staff, the Acting Secretary of War wrote to the President, undoubtedly with the Chief of Staff's knowledge and approval, suggesting use of the Civilian Volunteer Effort "in cooperation with State authorities" to obtain "voluntary enlistments quickly and in large numbers"; he enclosed a sample telegram for dispatching to the governor of each state.[15] The device was not used, although the suggestion was routed through the Bureau of the Budget for normal clearance.

The chief reason was that on 20 June, after encountering wary evasions by several administration Senators who did not wish to sponsor draft legislation which some of them predicted would have no chance of success without prior Presidential approval, the Training Camps Association's spokesmen turned to Senator Edward R. Burke of Nebraska (a Democrat who was not fully sympathetic with Mr. Roosevelt) as the measure's sponsor in the Senate.[16] Their other coadjutor, the Republican Representative James W. Wadsworth of New York, had from the beginning been ready to introduce the measure in the House. Once introduced on 20 June, the bill proved less vulnerable than expected, for it promptly gained appreciable support in the Congress and in influential newspapers. Two serious obstacles were overcome by the timely intervention of Mr. Stimson in the interim between the date of his nomination as Secretary of War (20 June) and that of his confirmation in July. One of these was the Civilian Volunteer Effort proposal of 25 June which has been referred to. On the urging of Mr. Clark the Secretary-designate successfully counseled the President against approving the plan, and it died forthwith. Still more threatening was a report in early July that a War Department study of peacetime conscription was on the point of being sent to the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and that it would probably be injurious to the Burke-Wadsworth bill. To cope with this difficulty Mr. Stimson, although his appointment was still unconfirmed, hurried to Washington on 8 July, and convened a meeting next day at his Washington residence, attended by General Marshall, by representatives of G–1 and G–3, and by Mr. Clark. The Secretary-designate made clear his desire to compose essential differ-

[14] See n. 5.

[15] Ltr, Actg SW to the President, 25 Jun 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

[16] See n. 11. Mr. Clark's memoirs record in full and sometimes amusing detail the MTCA committeemen's quest of a Senate spokesman. See also in this series of World War II histories the volumes now in preparation by Rudolph A. Winnacker dealing with the Secretary's Office.

ences but to have the Army support the principle of the Burke-Wadsworth bill. It was apparently a decision for which the Army was waiting, for General Marshall promptly went into action.[17]

One of the most surprising aspects of the case is that this measure, a vital impulse to the upbuilding of American defenses more than a year before Pearl Harbor, was designed and given its initial push, not by Army or Navy or White House, but by a mere handful of farsighted and energetic civilians. Nor did the White House give active assistance to the measure until Congressional and public support of the draft indicated that the bill would pass. Once Mr. Stimson, on the eve of taking office as Secretary, asserted his own support of the draft, however, Mr. Roosevelt offered no objection to the Army's doing likewise. Accordingly on 12 July General Marshall spoke before the Senate committee in favor of draft legislation and, as a necessary adjunct, for legislation that would permit calling the National Guard units to active duty—not a part of it for a specific task this time, and not for three weeks of the year as previously planned for summer maneuvers, but all of it for an entire year.[18] His pressure at the end for hurrying the National Guard summons, he later informed the House Committee on Military Affairs, was designed to save the draft bill.

Urgent New Reasons for Early Draft Legislation

This radical change from such a recruitment program as General Marshall had suggested in his 4 June memorandum was due to developments of which

[17] Staff doubts about the adequacy of voluntary enlistment plans were increasingly expressed during June, and by the end of the month all were evidently convinced of the necessity for the draft. (1) Memo, ACofS G–4 for ACofS WPD, 4 Jun 40, sub: Premobilization Objectives for the Regular Army, WPD 3674–30. (2) Memo, ACofS G–3 for ACofS WPD, 10 Jun 40, sub: Premobilization Objectives for the Regular Army, WPD 3674–30. (3) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 13 Jun 40, sub: Premobilization Objectives of the Regular Army, WPD 3674–30. (4) Unused Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for Chief B&LP Br, 21 Jun 40, sub: Estimates—Program for National Defense, G–4/31349–1. When the munitions program of 30 June was presented to the President, a separate statement relating to personnel definitely committed the Army to the idea of the draft. See National Archives, Records of WPB, Policy Documentation file, 212R (log 525) incl H, 30 Jun 40.

[18] Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Compulsory Military Training and Service. Hearings . . . on S 4164,* pp. 330–31. This testimony was on 12 July 40. On 22 and 24 July, before another committee, General Marshall explained the need for the National Guard to train selectees and also for a minimum of four divisions of the National Guard "as quickly as we can get them" for "an entirely different purpose"—for the carrying out of successful training for any emergency. See House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10263,* pp. 126–27; and House Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Providing for the National Defense by Removing Restrictions on Numbers and Length of Service of Draftees. Hearings . . . on HR 217,* p. 25.

the surprising support given the Burke-Wadsworth bill was but one, if a large one. Another development was the revived, if inaccurate, belief that Germany's spectacular successes in Europe might soon make it necessary to dispatch an expeditionary force southward for hemisphere defense: Regular divisions for that purpose could be sent away from American stations but their removal would necessitate protection of those same home stations by other forces, of which none existed save National Guard forces. Therefore, quite probably four Guard divisions should be brought to federal service in order to provide those specific stations with organized troop units.

How seriously the Chief of Staff had for some time regarded this possibility is indicated by his remarks on 4 June 1940 before the House Committee on Military Affairs when, in seeking authority to summon the National Guard in emergency (he then was seeking four divisions only and "thinking exclusively of the Western hemisphere"), he said:

> If we do not have some such resolution as this . . . when you gentlement adjourn, I am then in the position of possibly having to recommend urgently . . . that Congress be reconvened . . . We are talking about . . . necessities in the Western hemisphere . . . To what extent we have to go will depend upon the circumstances and the policies of the Government, and our ability to go.

Asked whether Regular Army troops would not be sent out of the country before the National Guard, General Marshall replied: "That is exactly what we would do. . . . We could not send the National Guard until they had had long training. . . . We could use them for secondary purposes very quickly."[19]

The secondary purposes were the filling of voids within the United States, left by the removal of the Regular divisions for the expeditionary force.

But there were additional and massive reasons for summoning in 1940 not merely those four but all eighteen of the National Guard infantry divisions, then at "maintenance strength" as distinguished from the "peace strength" of the 1920 National Defense Act standard. They were reasons more important, even, than the fact that the Guard unquestionably needed recruitment to peace strength at least, and unquestionably needed the hardening that field duty would provide. These larger reasons were, first, that, modest as was the training of the Guard units in 1940, they were at least organized units which could absorb a large number of entirely raw recruits and provide a degree of necessary training; second, that the National Guard units, like the Regular Army

[19] Unprinted testimony of Gen Marshall on 4 Jun 40 on HJR 555 before the House Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong. 3d sess.

units, possessed a supply of weapons and equipment which was essential for troop training,[20] and of which in the summer of 1940 there was still a shortage. In brief, both in drill personnel and in equipment, the National Guard afforded for the training of draftees such facilities as the Army recognized it could not ignore.

On several counts, then, for the betterment of the Guard itself, for training a large percentage of the prospective draftees, and for the release of certain Regular Army units for possible use in emergency, it was recognized before midsummer that the whole National Guard would have to be summoned for a year's duty and, the 4 June judgment now being laid aside at the White House as well as the War Department, General Marshall proceeded to argue persuasively for summoning the Guard and passing the selective service act.[21]

It must be recognized that here, as in many other instances where political considerations were present, the record does not fully present the case. General Marshall's initial desire for the draft (as distinguished from his public advocacy of it) certainly did not spring from discovery that Congress was prepared to grant it. It is unlikely that anybody acquainted with a major war's requirements in manpower, as evidenced years before in World War I, doubted the necessity of selective service for development of a large army. The Staff's *Brief Account* of 1939[22] had referred to it as "the only sound measure" in such an emergency, and the wish for a draft act at the right time was probably more acute as well as more informed in the General Staff than in any other institution. But the Staff's wish was attended both by a doubt that the American democracy would support a draft proposal in advance of war, and by an official conviction that in order to enjoy public support any movement for draft legislation must be initiated outside the Army rather than inside. Suspicions of "militarism" were still being voiced frequently by isolationist orators, and would undoubtedly have been increased by any overt advocacy by Army spokesmen of a measure that would affect every community and that historically had never before been

[20] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10263*, p. 4. General Marshall testified to the need for utilizing Regular and National Guard divisions in order to afford trainees the personnel and materiel needed for their training. On 5 July 1940, in a conference in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff on the Station List and Compulsory Military Training bill, opinion was expressed that the National Guard should be called in for one year as it was "necessary to secure their equipment in order to train a large group." CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3. See also papers in WPD 3674–28.

[21] Testimony of 12 Jul 40 before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Compulsory Military Training and Service. Hearings . . . on S 4164*, pp. 327–49.

[22] See n. 1.

invoked in advance of war. General Marshall, whose understanding of the civilian point of view and genuine sympathy with it had already been amply demonstrated at Congressional hearings, was himself convinced that too early advocacy of the draft by the Army would be harmful and perhaps fatal. Rather, he was convinced, the initiative for such an idea must come from civilian sources if Congress and public opinion generally were to prove receptive to it.[23] More than his own judgment was involved. The question of supporting a prewar draft was a matter of national policy in which not even the military Chief of the Army had the power of decision, and upon which at such a time he could not with propriety even give expression publicly to his own professional views, save with approval of his civilian superior, the Secretary of War and, more especially, the President. Certainly the political situation was a factor in Mr. Roosevelt's own unwillingness in May and June 1940 to raise the hazardous issue of a draft or to have it raised by anyone in his official family. Mr. Stimson, already contemplated as Mr. Woodring's successor as Secretary of War, was one of the New Yorkers who had attended the 22 May dinner and whose advocacy of the draft measure was well known to the President, but he too was conscious of the need for skillful timing.[24] So far as the Army was concerned, it was traditional that successful legislation of that sort would be contingent upon the Army's self-effacement and upon Congress's assumption of responsibility for initiating the idea. The fact is that, despite the Army's care in remaining in the background and in providing advice on this subject to Congressional committees only on request, an influential Senator was highly suspicious of all the circumstances. General Marshall later recalled the Senator's informing him at the time that the draft was "one of the most stupid and outrageous things that 'the generals' had ever perpetrated on the Congress." [25] On the other hand, an interesting aspect of all this is that so active and devoted a draft advocate as Grenville Clark years afterward remained convinced that the start of draft legislation was achieved in spite of, rather than with, the Army's aid, either open or concealed. It may be surmised that, with all credit to the vigorous and indispensable leadership supplied by Mr. Clark and his civilian associates, the Army's apparent aloofness was of appreciable help to the draft program in that stormy political period.

[23] Based upon Gen Marshall's undated Memo for Hist Div (April 49), sub: MS "The Office of the Chief of Staff in World War II," in Hist Div files; also upon numerous interviews by the author in 1948–49 with Staff members of 1940.

[24] For Mr. Stimson's account of this period see Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, pp. 345–48.

[25] Gen Marshall's Memo for Hist Div, previously cited.

When General Marshall came openly to the aid of both the draft bill and the measure for summoning the National Guard to active duty (being released for that purpose by the sagacious Mr. Roosevelt), it clearly was politically safe for him to do so, and his testimony was as persuasive as it was informed.

Costliness of the Delay in 1940 Draft Legislation

Invaluable as was General Marshall's assistance to both measures, the delay in their passage was considerable (until 27 August and 16 September respectively) and the evil effect of this delay he discussed reproachfully with his Congressional audience.[26] What should have been done in summer, and could have been done had the bills been passed promptly, now could be done only in autumn. In particular, the postponement of money authorizations prevented even preliminary work on the highways and other utilities of the camp sites (some of the purchases were made by borrowing $29,500,000 from the President's personal fund of $200,000,000 for emergency use).[27] This work in particular should have been completed before foul weather added to the time and expense and difficulty of construction and settlement. The soldiers' floundering in the mud that resulted from the delay, and the greatly enhanced cost of construction that came from the necessary haste in acquiring materials and erecting the structures, were the occasion of newspaper and Congressional protest, but the Chief of Staff's calm recital of the contributing causes explained the situation to the apparent satisfaction of Congressional questioners.[28]

[26] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10263*, p. 4. This was testimony of General Marshall on 5 August 1940. Later in the month, in a 24 August 1940 personal letter to Senator Morris Sheppard (OCS 21097–13), General Bryden as Acting Chief of Staff discussed the prospect of equipping Regular, National Guard, and draft troops, all three components totaling 1,000,000 by 1 January 1941. Rifles would be adequate; shelter for 500,000 in barracks (and the remainder in tents suitable to the southern winter) should be available; clothing would have to include substitutes for uniforms, overcoats, and blankets; weapons and equipment were short in tanks, antitank guns, mortars, and other needs, but were "ample . . . for training purposes." This last proved hardly so if a high standard were set.

[27] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941, Hearings . . . on HR 10572*, p. 26. Responsive to urgings from hungry constituents, Congressmen wrote numerous letters to the Chief of Staff, urging location of training camps in their constituencies. Answers were uniformly courteous but often noncommittal; usually prepared by G–4, they were signed by the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff. Normally they stated that site selections had already been made by corps area boards but, when a site was clearly unsuitable, this was firmly pointed out. Dozens of such letters are found in OCS 14586–8.

[28] Testimony of 12 Feb 41, before the House Appropriations Committee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 3617*, pp. 4–5.

Delay of the personnel legislation from June to the end of summer was unfortunate, and again it would appear that in estimating in advance the willingness of public and Congress to improve American military strength—this time in men as well as in dollars—there had been excessive caution at the White House or in the Army or in both places. Nevertheless, the all-important draft act was passed well over a year before Pearl Harbor, thus affording opportunity to start Army training, as well as Army procurement, long in advance of hostilities, contrary to historic precedent and official expectation.[29] The effect of this foresight cannot be measured in terms of dollars or soldiers' lives, but even the invaluable year of training was far from enough. Once war began, the fighting against Japan was purely defensive for months for lack of offensive means as well as because of the strategy laid down in Rainbow 5, and not until 1944 was the western alliance strong enough in men and equipment to permit, with full confidence, the storming of Germany's West Wall.

The Question of How Best to Use Trained Units

Political considerations cannot have been absent from White House thinking in mid-1940, with a Presidential election imminent and the third term already an issue, and one can surmise that they were a factor in the caution with which both the draft and the National Guard issues were approached. But, as mentioned elsewhere, the problem of how to raise and train troops was complicated also by the uncertainty of how many troops should be raised immediately, itself stemming from uncertainty whether the prime need was for a small expeditionary corps of well-trained Regulars for immediate use or for the training of a much larger army for later possibilities. If the latter, the Regular Army would have to be stripped of many training cadres. The shortage of weapons on hand was another controlling factor. Even so important a matter as the summoning of the National Guard seems at times to have been decided upon, not because the Guard's use as a cadre was the prime incentive but because the Guard possessed weapons needed for training recruits, and these weapons could not be put to maximum use except by summoning the Guard along with the weapons.

[29] For the considered judgment of General Marshall that the passage of the Selective Service Law "was a truly remarkable accomplishment of democracy," see House Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Providing for the National Defense by Removing Restrictions on Numbers and Length of Service of Draftees. Hearings . . . on HJR 217 . . .*, pp. 27–28. In this connection General Marshall testified: "Some may say that it might have been done earlier. I do not feel that way about it, though I suffer from the apparent delay."

These factors—veteran officers and men to be used as training cadres, and available weapons with which to equip the recruits—influenced the plans for training and largely determined the numbers of recruits sought for training, and hence the methods of raising those recruits. Changes of mind on 1940 training plans, even in so fundamental a thing as the numbers sought for the Regular Army, simply reflected Army uncertainty about the factors mentioned.

Thus, on 3 June 1940 G–1 submitted to General Marshall two studies with respect to increasing the Regular Army's enlisted strength beyond the 280,000 authorized in the basic 1920 National Defense Act.[30] One was a recommendation in principle, and this was approved by General Marshall. The other was a specific proposal of 500,000 men as a maximum, accompanied by drafts of necessary letters to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Congress; both ideas were disapproved, the Deputy Chief explaining that the Chief of Staff had decided on a 400,000 maximum, instead; he desired in the letter to Congress a fuller explanation of the purposes—making possible completion of nine infantry, one cavalry, and two armored divisions, and the setting up of two army corps, as well as provision for further air and antiaircraft units. G–1 apparently set about the revisions, for on 7 June the Chief of Staff approved a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, prepared by G–1 for the Secretary's signature, asking for 400,000 men and listing the purposes in mind. On the preceding day, however, and for reasons not clear, Representative Overton Brooks had introduced HR 10010, seeking a 375,000 maximum (this was the number of men actually sought, with the 400,000 authorization merely providing a safety margin) and Senator Lodge had introduced an amendment to the pending Senate 4025, asking for 750,000 (this number was desired both by G–1 and WPD, and word of it must have reached the Senator). On 10 June the House Committee on Military Affairs reported favorably on HR 10010 but with an amendment providing 400,000 maximum, and the measure passed the House one week later.

Senator Sheppard, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, now had in hand both the Lodge resolution and the newly completed House

[30] Both studies are titled Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 3 Jun 40, sub: Increase in the Enlisted Strength . . . and filed in G–1/15588–173. In this same file are the papers subsequently mentioned: a copy of DCofS Memo; HR 10010 "to increase the size of the Regular Army" by amending NDA and proposing 375,000 as maximum; a proposed amendment to Senate Bill 4025 for a 750,000 maximum (this is initialed "G.C.M."); the SW letter of 7 Jun 40 to Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee proposing 400,000; Sen Sheppard's 18 Jun letter; and the 19 Jun draft for CofS's reply.

bill, and he wrote to the Secretary of War for his views on "the need for a greater strength of the Regular Army than 400,000." The draft of reply which on the next day G–1 prepared in consultation with WPD accepted the Lodge reasoning and recommended 750,000. Whether or not there had been earlier acceptance of this number, the Chief of Staff declined now to approve it. Instead he had the draft rewritten within his own office, as indicated by a notation marked with the initials of Col. (later Gen.) Omar N. Bradley who then was in the General Staff secretariat. Even this draft was not used, because (as noted long afterward)[31] the rush of draft legislation which soon came about rendered it out of date. An accompanying memorandum of that same day, 19 June 1940, bearing the initials of Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Orlando Ward, then Secretary of the General Staff, and presumably expressing the views of the Chief of Staff, observes that:

> 400,000 will be satisfactory until next session of Congress, assuming that no selective service law is passed. If a selective service act is passed it [400,000] will be inadequate, as units formed under the 400,000 should be immediately raised to war strength.

Even though the draft was not used, there is interest in certain judgments which were expressed in the memorandum, for presumably they were the judgments of the Chief of the Staff at the time:

> . . . It is not believed that a force of more than 400,000 can be secured or maintained by voluntary enlistments. An increase beyond that number would necessitate the simultaneous enactment of a selective service act.
>
> There are no nuclei for new units beyond those units listed above. [The earlier paragraphs contained a list.] In order to organize additional new units it would be necessary to emasculate existing organizations to obtain cadres of trained men. This would mean a decided lowering of efficiency of existing divisional organizations which we believe would be dangerous to our interests under present world conditions.
>
> There is insufficient equipment on hand to organize additional units of the Regular Army at this time, unless equipment is taken from National Guard units. Such action would mean, in effect, a new policy of national defense. It would have a serious, possibly a demoralizing effect on the morale of the National Guard troops, and would necessitate a material change in our present Protective Mobilization Plan.
>
> For the above reasons it can be seen that the authorization of a greater strength [than 400,000] of the Regular army this time without some form of selective military service to supply the necessary personnel, and without the necessary equipment, would appear to complicate rather than improve the situation. Selective service involves a radical

[31] Memo for the Record noted by CofS, signed O. N. B. (Col Bradley), 15 Aug 40, OCS 20822–84, filed in G–1/15588–173.

departure from present national defense policies, and that question should first be settled. . . .[32]

By September, however, the Chief of Staff had a different view, brought about by the Air Corps' discovery that it would not be able to use many draftees to advantage because only one year's service was then in prospect for them and the Air Corps needed three-year men. General Marshall observed that HR 10010 was sleeping rather than dead, and wrote to G–3:

> . . . In view of the dilemma of the Air Corps . . . might not this [HR 10010] be the point of attack for us to secure needed legislation to meet the situation? The 400,000 might be increased by amendment in the Senate. On the other hand it may be that after we get the trainees we could possibly reduce the strength of the ground forces of the Regular establishment in three-year men and pick up adequate numbers for the Air Corps in this manner. I have not done any logical thinking on the question, so I am merely passing this on as a request for information. . . .[33]

G–3 accepted the first suggestion and prepared a study favoring an increase in authorized strength to 500,000 men, but the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, raised a question of whether a limit should not now be placed upon the Regular Army expansion, inasmuch as an increase in its three-year personnel would mean (through fund exhaustion) a decrease in the number of one-year personnel the draft was bringing in.[34] G–1's reply noted the impossibility of predicting what effect the draft act would have on voluntary enlistments and pointed to the certainty that present insufficient housing would serve as a brake upon excessive enlistments in any case; G–1 promised, however, to make later recommendations based upon further study of recruitment trends. A week later the Third Supplemental Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1941 (approved 8 October 1940) made it clear that the only limit on the Regular Army's size was that which cash appropriations would impose. In pursuit of General Bryden's suggestion, however, G–3 made its extended study of the proper relationship of three-year to one-year men in the Army and reached the conclusion that the whole Army should total 1,183,808 men and that 42.3 percent should be three-year men of the

[32] Draft not used. See two preceding notes. The same file (G–1/15588–173) contains Ltr, CofS to Dir Bureau of the Budget, 2 Jul 40 (OCS 20822–84), asking if there was objection to its dispatch, however, and Ltr, Asst Dir Bureau of the Budget, 2 Aug 40, stating there was none; also the Bradley Memo of 15 Aug 40, previously cited, noting that HR 10010 had died in the interim and no report was needed.

[33] Memo, CofS for ACofS G–3, 17 Sep 40, no sub, OCS 20822–89; copy initialed "GCM" in G–1/15588–173.

[34] Memo, DCofS for ACofS G–1, 23 Sep 40, no sub, OCS 20822–89, copy in G–1/15588–173. It refers to G–3 study previously mentioned. Accompanying it is G–1 reply of 30 Sep 40 next referred to.

Regular Army. This approximated 500,000 men, and this long-debated figure was approved by the Chief of Staff on 29 January 1941.[35] One day later, G–1, accepting the G–3 recommendation of strength and noting that the appropriation really determined the limit of personnel, itself recommended no change in the specifications of authorized strength.

Mid-1940 Aids to Materiel Production

For such progress as was made in mid-1940 toward preparing the Army, through additions to personnel and materiel, for events still far distant, the magnitude of the German successes was chiefly responsible, for it alarmed America into these vigorous moves for defense. No such readiness to spend money for armament had been indicated by Congress when the European war was in its quieter stage, nor when the first alarms had been raised over Japanese threats in the Pacific. Nor, for that matter, had any such persistent leadership toward grand-scale arming been displayed previously at the White House. May and June, echoing the German victories, produced not only the materiel programs referred to in Chapter V and the great additions to Army personnel afforded by the June legislation and the National Guard and draft legislation then initiated (Table 2), but other related achievements whose full effectiveness would be apparent much later.

In its consequences one of the most notable events of this period was the creation on 27 June—also from the initiative of a civilian—of the National Defense Research Committee (developing in June 1941 into the Office of Scientific Research and Development).[36] Its prime mover was Dr. Vannevar Bush who already had contributed largely to the advancement of Army aviation. From this organization in the course of the war flowed a torrent of ideas translated into the reality of radar, loran, rocket weapons, jet propulsion, and proximity fuses, whose influence in bringing victory to the Allies on every front cannot be measured. It is memorable that the parent organization for this scientific work, like the draft act, went into operation more than a year before Pearl Harbor. Without the advantage of seventeen months of its labors in

[35] Memo, ACofS G–3 for CofS, 3 Jan 41, sub: Strength of the Regular Army, FY 1942, G–3/43792; copy in G–1/15588–173 bears notation of CofS approval. Accompanied by Memo, ACofS G–1 for DCofS, 30 Jan 41, sub: Proposed Change in Strength.

[36] Bureau of the Budget, *The United States At War* (Washington: GPO, 1946), p. 58.

TABLE 2.—PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF U. S. ARMY STRENGTH BY COMPONENT: 1940–1941 [a]

Date	Actual Strength	Percentage Distribution			
		Regular Army [b]	Reserve Corps [c]	National Guard	Selective Service
31 December 1940	620,774	68.7	3.6	25.0	2.7
Officers [d]	47,930	33.6	46.5	19.9	0.0
Enlisted Men	572,844	71.6	0.0	25.5	2.9
30 June 1941	1,460,998	34.8	4.2	19.4	41.6
Officers [d]	99,536	16.9	61.7	21.4	0.0
Enlisted Men	1,361,462	36.1	(e)	19.3	44.6
30 November 1941	1,644,212	33.5	4.9	14.2	47.4
Officers [d]	121,094	16.9	66.8	16.3	0.0
Enlisted Men	1,523,118	34.8	(e)	14.1	51.1

[a] Data for AUS personnel are included under component to which assigned.
[b] Includes data for Philippine Scouts, Regular Army Reserves, and retired personnel on active duty.
[c] Does not include Regular Army Reserves.
[d] Includes Army Nurse Corps and Warrant Officers.
[e] Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Annual Report of the Secretary of War . . . 1941; U. S. Department of Army, Strength of the Army (STM-30), 1 July 1948; compilations prepared by U. S. Department of Army, Statistics Division, OAC, from data furnished by the Strength Accounting Branch, AGO.

federally organized research, closely co-ordinated with Army and Navy planning, the course of the war would have been less favorable.

The unintended but far-reaching immediate effects of Blitzkrieg included also Mr. Roosevelt's establishment on 25 May 1940 of a low-powered Office of Emergency Management, under authority granted him in the 1939 Reorganization Act of Congress, and three days later his re-establishment of the long-forgotten Advisory Commission to the nonfunctioning Council of National Defense.[37] This was a curious device in that the so-called council (made up of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor) itself remained dormant, and the commission was advisory only to the President. Its lack of administrative powers and even of a single responsible executive left

[37] Civilian Production Administration, *Industrial Mobilization for War*, I, 18.

it weak,[38] made necessary in June the creation of a Co-ordinator of National Defense Purchases (Donald R. Nelson), and thereafter required introduction of a succession of alterations and additions (such as the Office of Production Management in January 1941, Division of Contract Distribution in September 1941, and a Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board in August 1941) until the war forced, in January 1942, the creation of a War Production Board with genuine authority.[39]

Of immediate aid to the General Staff in its planning for production—with its essential relationship to planning on manpower additions—was the preparation of a plan passed by Congress on 25 June 1940, whereby the Reconstruction Finance Corporation could finance the creation and operation of new industrial plants.[40] Out of this authority came much of the physical equipment for the later mass production of airplanes and engines and arms of every category and equipment of a semimilitary but essential character. It was the lengthy process whereby these plants were financed and built, equipped and manned, stocked, and finally operated which composed that "supplies-time" factor in rearming (contrasted with the manpower-time factor) of which warning had been given long before by General Craig.[41] In all respects mentioned—assurance of manpower through the draft, promise of radically improved weapons, enlistment of expert civilian aid in production, creation of wholly new production lines, and funds for Army expansion on an unprecedented scale—the drive toward acomplishment got under way in May and June of 1940. That brief period, which in Europe produced almost unbroken German triumphs and Allied disasters, in America produced the seed for eventual German defeat and Allied victory.

[38] William S. Knudsen, the industrial chief, was given only a co-chairmanship with the labor representative, Sidney Hillman. The plain-speaking Knudsen's inquiry, "Who's der boss?" never was answered.

[39] Civilian Production Administration, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 93, 112, 207.

[40] Jesse H. Jones, at that time Reconstruction Finance Corporation Chairman, discussed the purposes before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee at the 30 May hearing on Senate 3938. In a letter to the author, from Houston on 10 November 1947, Mr. Jones notes: "In the early part of May 1940 the President suggested to me that I buy some rubber and tin for stockpiles. I told him we would need legislation. He said 'Go ahead and get it' and that was all that was said about it. We in the RFC prepared drafts of a bill [which] . . . as finally passed gave the RFC authority to do almost anything under the sun in the interest of our National Defense." It will be remembered that the need for rubber, tin, and a great many other critical and strategic materials had been stated many times by the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, and the list of needs prepared; the difficulty had been in persuading Congress to provide the money for their acquisition.

[41] See Chapter II.

Difficulties in Planning Amid Uncertainties

Only faint vision of such a shining, if remote, future can have blessed the Army at the time, for the summer of 1940 provided the General Staff with little save anxiety. The rapid changes of program had been disconcerting and confusing. The authorization to summon the National Guard to one year's duty which was sought in July did not come from Congress until 27 August; the draft measure came only on 16 September and necessitated further delay by providing that the drawings would not take place before 16 October and that the selectees chosen would then have a thirty-day leave before reporting. Until the acts were actually passed there could be no building of camps, for there could be no certainty of passage. Nor, with limited exception, could there be acquisition of the areas where the camps would be placed, much less any preliminary construction work on roads and facilities and buildings. The construction corps and the Staff sections engaged in the planning of construction had their premonitions of grand-scale trouble which would come with cold weather, but no way of anticipating it.[42]

For other sections of the General Staff there was corresponding anxiety over the early training and equipping of the existing Army, through which it was obvious the later training of the incoming army of recruits would have to be attained. The Regular Army's own weaknesses, apparent to the professional eye in the April maneuvers, were now discernible by the inexpert as well, in the light of lessons taught by Blitzkrieg. The April maneuvers had been notable in two encouraging respects; they were the first actual corps maneuvers which the American Army had undertaken since battlefield operations in 1918, now made possible by the previous winter's modest additions to Army personnel; further, they provided the first field test of the Army's new "triangular" division. They disclosed the need, among others, both for a much larger development of tank units and also for a much more vigorous defense against tanks.[43] More severe criticisms were to be made at the corps-versus-corps maneuvers in May when

[42] Gen Marshall's testimony of 12 Feb 41, before House Appropriations Subcommittee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, . . . *Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings.*

[43] *The New York Times,* 28 April 40, p. 19, and 2 May 40, p. 22. In this respect the observers were apparently ahead of General Staff advisers, for in the same month a Senate committee was told by the Chief of Staff that "the new 37 mm. gun will handle the tank situation very satisfactorily." Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 9209,* p. 29.

the operations were inevitably examined against the background of German successes in Europe. The senior control officer of the Louisiana maneuvers, who confessed that previously he had opposed such a unit, now favored use of "a special striking force as used by the Germans, of scout or armored cars." There was a much stronger recommendation for early substitution of the new 105-mm. howitzer for the old 75-mm. gun as the principal accompanying weapon for the infantry division (long ago announced by the Chief of Staff before Congressional committee as contemplated).[44] Increases were urged in antitank and antiaircraft artillery as well as in tanks, a recommendation manifestly influenced by the reports from European battlefields (Americans' earlier strictures on these subjects had failed to produce such weapons) of insufficient co-operation by the air forces, attributed to "inadequate control of the planes by the ground forces."[45] The observer mentioned that of thirty-four air missions requested by the ground commanders during the maneuver only two were performed, and recommended control of tactical air support within the corps in order to expedite response. This was far from the technique favored by the Air Corps and far from that which came to ultimate use as the war progressed. The recommendation illustrates, first, how largely ground force attitudes dominated Army thinking in that day, and second, how radical were to be the changes of concept involving air command.

Lt. Gen. H. J. Brees, the referee of the May 1940 maneuvers, had made his critique on a thoroughgoing basis. Also he made it public, including passages highly critical of the commanding generals' leadership. So deep was the impression which this made upon official hearers that more than a year later General Marshall requested General McNair, his Chief of Staff, GHQ, and his prime reliance in training matters, to make sure that such a thing did not happen again. He opposed the idea of publishing the whole critique, and he also objected to permitting junior officers to hear such plainly expressed criticism of the two principal commanders.[46]

[44] These criticisms and others were presented by Maj. Gen. Walter Short and Lt. Gen. H. J. Brees in a final critique of 25 May 1940. They noted the need for heavier artillery, the need for more mechanized tank and antiaircraft units, and the need for more maneuvers. They mentioned poor performance in reconnaissance, intelligence, liaison, and road discipline; and they criticized the use of speed at the expense of tactical efficiency. *The New York Times*, 26 May 40, p. 2. While General Marshall and Gen. Charles M. Wesson, Chief of Ordnance, had announced the contemplated adoption of the 105-mm. gun, they had refrained from urging the conversation because of the expense involved. See chapter VI.

[45] *The New York Times*, 26 May 40, p. 2.

[46] Memo, CofS for Gen McNair, 18 Jun 41, no sub, OCS 14440-363.

Training Entrusted to GHQ

The General Headquarters referred to, universally known rather as GHQ, came into existence on 26 July 1940 as a nucleus, made up of a small group of officers selected to perform its initial purpose—supervision of the training of Army units in the United States. GHQ was immediately subordinate to General Marshall in his capacity as commanding general of Army field forces, but its directing head was Brig. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Lesley J. McNair for whom was created the post of Chief of Staff, GHQ.[47] The origins of this establishment reach back to World War I, when General Pershing directed the American Expeditionary Forces through his own GHQ whose organization was almost duplicated in the War Department Staff organization of post-1921. Its name indicates its original purpose which, as envisaged soon after World War I by principals in that war, contemplated the continuation of techniques that had so lately proved successful. When the July 1940 re-creation took place, therefore, GHQ was thought of as the natural medium for whipping into shape some new American Expeditionary Force. As seen in retrospect some years later, "in its function as a training agency GHQ was a headquarters inserted between the War Department and the four armies; as such it put a capstone on the four-army plan." [48] The summoning of the National Guard to active duty and the inflow of draft troops that began later in 1940 provided GHQ with responsibility for training not only the relatively few Regular Army units that had been in existence at midyear but a mass of new units and wholly raw recruits, while later large additions to duties outside the field of training were destined to increase the GHQ responsibilities still further.

When General McNair began his labors as Chief of Staff, GHQ, on 3 August 1940, his initial duties were to "direct and supervise the training of the troops," as later explained by General Marshall. It was a year later that the transfer of officers from WPD (following the 1921 concept of GHQ's destiny) put GHQ "on an operating basis" as well, so that (again in General Marshall's words) "General Headquarters not only supervises training throughout the Army but is being prepared to perform its normal theater of operations functions if required." [49] In these operating functions, which General McNair neither sought

[47] See earlier reference in Chapter III. For a detailed account of GHQ see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops.* On pp. 5ff are recorded the beginnings of GHQ.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[49] *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, 1939–41*, p. 8.

nor desired, GHQ was fated to come into conflict with WPD (which had assumed operating functions of its own) and with the air command as well, and in early 1942 General McNair's organization, redesignated as the Army Ground Forces, returned to the purely training function which had first engaged it.

At the outset even its training duties must have been regarded as being of a most general nature, for only seven officers were assigned to the GHQ staff in August 1940, and only twenty-three officers had been accumulated up to June 1941, when its more rapid development began.[50] General McNair's energy and capacity enabled him and his small staff to translate from precept to practice the Chief of Staff's strong views upon the step-by-step training of the new Army, while coping as far as possible with mountainous handicaps to orderly advancement. The aim was the traditional aim of Army training as outlined by G–3 officers for years—successive grounding in the work of the individual soldier, thorough preparation of the squad and company and battalion, then absorption into the larger combat units, and ultimately the full development of division, corps, and army commands under officers who had themselves mastered the arts of smaller commands. This had been the aim in 1917–18 as well, but in World War I the interval between the soldiers' enlistment and their deployment on the battlefield had been far too brief for training plans to be carried out with thoroughness. In World War II, particularly in the desperate pressure of late 1944 and early 1945, there was again too brief an interval (tragically brief in many cases), but a far better base was laid than in earlier wars, and a far larger number of men provided thereby with the training that they needed before moving off to the theater of operations. Largely this improvement was the result of the draft act passed well over a year before the open declaration of war, combined with the summoning of National Guard regiments capable, despite their thin ranks, of aiding materially in the training work. Fundamentally it was the result of a carefully considered plan for training men, and of a determined effort to carry out that plan in spite of handicaps. This program of methodical training, contrasted with the hasty training of 1918, was one of General Marshall's most important contributions to the Army, and the execution of the plan so far as field necessities allowed must stand as a monument largely to him and to General McNair.

[50] Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff*, p. 324. The entire history of GHQ and its successor is exhaustively treated in the Army Ground Forces volumes, previously cited, to which reference must be made for all save the most cursory discussion appropriate to this chapter.

The Obstacles to Training

Some of the handicaps to the plan's fulfillment have been discussed,[51] notably the initial paucity of weapons on hand with which the units could train. Another serious handicap was the paucity of officers and noncommissioned officers with adequate experience as troop instructors, and the considerable number who had not yet won their men's confidence.[52] Further, there was a disturbing doubt as to whether the emergency called for keeping the best-trained units in reserve as an expeditionary force rather than using them as an ideal training establishment; likewise, an anxiety over whether, in 1941, the whole plan could be carried out, or whether the drafted men and the Reserve officers would be sent home too soon. General McNair stressed the handicap imposed by the time factor itself. In a memorandum to the Chief of Staff in January 1941, when the large new increments of National Guardsmen and trainees were pouring into camp and the training cadres were almost overwhelmed with the task of teaching the fundamentals of discipline and small-unit training, he dealt tartly with a suggestion that the Army should advance its specialized training. He wrote:

> The first phase . . . —expansion—now is conflicting with the second phase—training—but nevertheless expansion should go on until we have an adequate force in being. . . .
>
> Training must be progressive. *Basic and small-unit* training cannot be slighted. *Combined* training in its many modern forms is essential for all units. Finally the coordinated and smooth action of *large units* is indispensable if we envision decisive operations on a National scale. . . .
>
> The need for specialized training such as recommended is not questioned, but it should follow—not precede—the basic and general training indicated. . . .
>
> Subject to compelling international developments, I favor the following general policy:
>
> a. The most rapid possible expansion of our armed forces to a size adequate for our prospective role in world affairs.
>
> b. Then a sound, methodical program of basic and general training at least through the summer of 1941 to include inter-army maneuvers.
>
> c. Then, for those units which demonstrate satisfactory general training, special training to meet the various missions set up by the color plans of the War Department.
>
> In other words, I do not question the need of special training but believe that in general its priority is below both expansion and sound general training. . . .[53]

[51] Chapters II, V, VI.

[52] Memo, CofS for USW, 30 Sep 41, sub: Morale of the Army, AGO 353.8/1, Morale.

[53] Memo, Gen McNair for Gen Marshall, 16 Jan 41, sub: Specialized Training, GHQ 353/136. See also Greenfield, *et al., The Organization of Ground Combat Troops,* p. 39.

Summer Maneuvers of 1940

The summer maneuvers of 1940 came too soon to permit any marked improvement in training techniques, but by bringing together a total of 90,000 troops of the First Army, including Regular and National Guard components, and by offering a natural if unfortunate comparison with current battlefield operations as reported from Europe they evoked far more public attention than had any previous maneuvers, as indicated by the extended accounts in the daily press of that period. It was a public disturbed by discovery that National Guard divisions (the old "square" type), whose wartime strength was listed at 22,000 men each, reported as present an average of 10,414 enlisted men each; that in one of these were 3,000 recruits who never previously had attended field training; that a typical division had none of the new light or heavy mortars, none of the new antitank guns, and only one-fourth its quota of new rifles; that another was drilling still in armory-drill fundamentals; that some of the "cannon" used in the maneuver were merely iron pipes; that many of the "tanks" were actually commercial trucks used in simulation for purposes of the exercise; and that "bomber" planes similarly engaged were light observation planes serving an imagined role.[54] As simulations for maneuver they served well enough. They also served as demonstrations of the Army's critical needs and gave eloquent support to the Chief of Staff's recent arguments for better armament.

Beyond these deficiencies which met the layman's eye were weaknesses which the professional observers pointed out—the deficiencies in tank and plane formations as well as equipment, deficiencies in defense against these instruments of modern warfare, deficiencies in experience, discipline, leadership, supply, communications, reconnaissance, liaison, sanitation, to list the items mentioned by the official observers.[55] An assistant chief of staff reported to his colleagues in Washington that he had "just visited the maneuvers and thought they were lousy. The troops appeared deficient in fundamentals of minor tactics, could not maintain contact with hostile forces, permitted gaps in the line, etc. Combat intelligence was very poor." [56] A distant echo of these judgments appeared a few weeks later in an inconspicuous dispatch from Moscow quoting the Soviet military paper *Red Star* on the low state of training of the American establish-

[54] *The New York Times,* 7 Aug 40, p. 3.

[55] Maj Gen Hugh Drum's critique, summarized in *The New York Times,* 23 Aug 40, p. 9.

[56] Rpt of Brig Gen Sherman Miles, ACofS G–2, in notes of conf in office of DCofS, 27 Aug 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

ment and continuing: "The potential capacity of American industry is tremendous, but it is much more difficult to teach men to use arms in battle." [57]

General Marshall's Attention to Training Program

Certainly every soldier of experience knew the importance of field maneuvers, failure to have which had been one of the most unfortunate consequences of small appropriations over a period of years. In late 1938, as soon as more money appeared faintly over the horizon, the Chief of Staff of that day, General Craig, sent to G–3 his directive for amending plans for the First Army maneuver scheduled for more than a year away (the amendment was for the inclusion of a maximum of the GHQ Air Force in support of ground troops).[58] Early attention by the high command to plans for these long-desired maneuvers certainly was to be expected. However, it was equally important that Congress too should recognize the need for maneuvers. Accordingly in his appearances before Congressional committeemen (from whom would be sought support for further appropriations to permit maneuvers) the next Chief of Staff, General Marshall, found it desirable to explain in layman's terms the necessity of peacetime training of both line officers and staff officers in the handling of large units, by maneuvers, and this he did in a series of Congressional hearings.[59]

He pressed also for joint Army-Navy exercises. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations he explained his eagerness for a joint exercise more than a year away, for the training not only of the personnel in the landing operation but of the joint Army-Navy staff in the planning and support. Specifically he wished to simulate such an operation as the Joint Army and Navy War Plans contemplated. A somewhat pathetic touch in the letter, suggestive of the state of affairs in peacetime America already described in Chapter II, was his request that the proposal be regarded as confidential "due to strong local and political pressures to block removal of troops for training concentrations." [60]

[57] *The New York Times*, 4 Oct 40, p. 4.

[58] Memo, OCS for ACofS G–3, 15 Oct 38, sub: First Army Maneuvers, FY 1940, signed by Asst SGS, OCS 14440–239. This same point was stressed by General Craig's successor in his discussion of the 1940 maneuvers; see note extracted from CofS to ACofS G–3, 6 Jun 40, OCS 14440–311.

[59] Testimony of Gen Marshall before HR Subcommittee (Appropriations), 27 Nov 39. Also that of 30 Nov 39, and of 26 Feb 40. Also Senate hearing 29 May 40, and orders on this subject in Memo, CofS for G–2, 5 Jan 40, OCS 20983–86.

[60] Memo, CofS for CNO, 7 Nov 39, sub: Joint Army-Navy Exercise, OCS 19715–94. Note also Memo, CofS for CNO, 9 Sep 41, no sub, OCS 14440–389, inviting Marine Corps participation in the coming maneuvers of 14–30 Nov 41.

How far ahead the peacetime Army had to look in its maneuvers planning, because of precise budget exactions, is suggested by a memorandum of November 1939 with regard to maneuvers under consideration for the 1942 fiscal year. The Staff recognized that army maneuvers in all four army areas each year would be "too heavy a load on the National Guard," and also would leave too little time for the Guard's training of smaller units. It therefore contemplated army maneuvers in 1941, but none in 1942.[61] Events of the coming months changed all that.

The Chief of Staff's continuing personal attention to the maneuvers and to the lessons extractable from them is indicated by continuing memoranda of instruction to G–3, which had responsibility for the maneuver planning.[62] His reliance upon the sound judgment of General McNair in all these matters is shown by a significant communication in December 1940, enclosing General McNair's comments on the recent maneuvers, apologizing for keeping them so long unanswered, and mentioning a number of indicated changes in the draft. The memorandum proceeded:

> I do not know that any of [the changes] are entirely justified, but I return the papers to you to be reworked and issued at such a time as you think best. The matter need not be referred to me again for approval. Your judgment will be determining.[63]

In the list of weaknesses that the 1940 maneuvers revealed were few to surprise the General Staff, for they were weaknesses inevitable from inexperience, and the bulk of the junior reserve officers newly attached to troops for the first corps maneuvers had been given scant opportunity to acquire experience. The training schedule that the Staff was now mapping out would remedy that. As for advanced training in the altered techniques which new weapons and new formations would call for, much would have to be done even before the new weapons should come to hand. Accordingly in the Staff offices at Washington there was extended discussion of the work to be done with National Guard personnel during the time remaining before the selective service trainees should become available for assignment to existing units. It was important that when the trainees arrived they should find the waiting personnel of the Guard unit, as of the Regular unit, well trained and disciplined and hence able to

[61] Memo, DCofS for ACofS G–3, 21 Nov 39, sub: Field Exercises . . . signed Gasser, OCS 14440–262.

[62] See Memo, OCS for ACofS G–3, 10 May 40, sub: General Plan, Third Army Maneuvers, Reciting Amendment Ordered by CofS, OCS 14440–303; also Memo, CofS for ACofS G–3, 6 Jun 40, no sub, OCS 14440–311, directing simulation of full air participation. See also Memo, OCS for G–3, 6 May 40, seeking data for correction of inaccurate press report of costliness of maneuvers, OCS 14440–306.

[63] Memo, CofS for Gen McNair, 9 Dec 40, OCS 14440–340.

impart knowledge and skill and spirit to the incoming recruits without undue delay. At the General Staff level the discussion on this important matter was of principles and policies only. The techniques were left explicitly to GHQ, which was responsible for training new men as well as old.[64] However, the evolving of techniques themselves called for almost continuous discussion of policy. A conversation with General McNair in early October led to an informal memorandum from General Marshall to his principal training officer on the grand plan for getting the National Guard's divisional training well started by starting at the top:

> The more I think of the proposition of bringing in the National Guard division staffs ahead of time, the more important it appears to me that we do it. I think they should be out for a full month, and I think they should bring with them their headquarters personnel, and possibly be allowed to fill up to war strength.
>
> A further phase of this might be the bringing in of the brigade headquarters and staffs, and regimental headquarters and staffs, three weeks and two weeks respectively, in advance of their full organizations.
>
> All of this I am assuming will be done on the basis of the quarters being supplied locally in armories, etc.
>
> The various reports of inspectors and your report and the further details that have come to me since I saw you two days ago convince me that much of the trouble will be avoided by something like the foregoing arrangement. Certainly such an advance mobilization of the various controlling headquarters would be a help to corps area commanders in securing necessary data for full provision of supplies and equipment.[65]

The Timing of Troop Inductions

With legislation complete for the summoning of National Guard and selective service troops the Chief of Staff's Office still had to consider and establish the procedure by which the new personnel would be called to service, transported, supplied, and made available for training, and to do so in the continuing uncertainty of when or whether the training of the mass Army might be interrupted to supply a complete, trained, volunteer corps as an initial expeditionary force. The uncertainty of the primary training objective, which could be altered

[64] Notes of conf in office of CofS, 9 Sep 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3. The immensity of the training task, performed initially by GHQ and, after the March 1942 reorganization, by the Army Ground Forces, is discussed in detail elsewhere in this series, in the volumes recording the History of the Ground Forces.

[65] Memo (informal, signed GCM), CofS for Gen McNair, 15 Oct 40, OCS 16810–175.

almost without notice by a shift in state policy, continued for many months one of the most serious handicaps to the training program.

The program was beset from the beginning with more acute anxieties, related chiefly to the housing of the National Guard troops who would be brought to field duty at irregular intervals during autumn and winter, and that of the recruits who were drawn in from civilian life as rapidly as training facilities became available. The housing problem was rendered difficult by the delay in legislation, as General Marshall had warned his Congressional audience it would be.[66] Costs greatly exceeded estimates, in part because of the unpredicted rise of material costs and in part because of the necessary haste of construction against the approach of winter, occasioning both penalty payments for overtime labor and mass employment of ill-trained artisans incapable of doing normal journeyman's work in either quantity or quality. Press criticisms of Army personnel were numerous, but Congressional tolerance of the Army's performance, hampered as it was at times, was impressive evidence of the esteem in which Congress as a whole continued to hold the Chief of Staff, responsible head of the Army establishment. There had been ample understanding of the difficulties that would attend the summoning of the National Guard and the selectees, even before the bills were passed, and many of the difficulties had been explained to Congress at the time. In August, before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, for instance, it was explained that the new men would have to be summoned in relatively small blocks—55,000 National Guardsmen in mid-September, 55,000 in mid-October, 65,000 in mid-November, and 40,000 in December,[67] a pace which experience had to slow only slightly. The intake of selective service trainees General Marshall had then estimated at 75,000 in mid-October, 115,000 in mid-November, 115,000 in mid-December, and 95,000 in January.[68] This intake had to be slowed down considerably.[69]

By February, when the Chief of Staff went to Congress to defend the requests for new appropriations to cover the greatly increased cost of housing, he knew

[66] House Appropriations Subcommittee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 3617*, pp. 3–4.

[67] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 10263*, p. 238, testimony of 15 Aug 40.

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] House Appropriations Subcommittee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 3617*, p. 7. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Edward H. Brooks reported a current total in February 1941 of 430,000 in the Regular Army, 210,000 in the National Guard, and 110,000 trainees.

approximately what the final costs would be, and was able to argue that the added cost was due to the causes mentioned and not to either inefficiency or waste.[70] With the candor which had repeatedly won for him as an individual and hence for his cause the sympathy of Congressmen traditionally opposed to "militarist" views, he explained that the General Staff had learned much from recent European developments and had altered its early plans to fit the new reality.[71] The use of Fort Dix, N. J., as a training center in the northeast, utilizing a large part of the $29,500,000 which General Marshall himself had acquired from the President's fund in order to get construction started swiftly, he now admitted had not been well advised.[72] His Congressional audience did not even murmur a criticism, and Congress' own attitude may have guided the public toward patience, for the criticisms of housing costs that had been appearing copiously in the press soon subsided appreciably.

By December 1940 it became apparent to the Staff that the federalizing of the National Guard would be spread over a considerable period (a few units were not summoned until late spring of 1941) and that as a result the units first summoned to duty would complete their scheduled year of service long before the others. The more disturbing realization was that the year of those early units would end long before any large number of non-Guard military units would be in readiness, and long before any large proportion of the Selective Service trainees had been given their year of training. This meant not only that the demobilization of the early Guard divisions would reduce the potential M-Day force to a small, ill-balanced total, but that it would remove from operation a large part of the Army's training mechanism for the Selective Service recruits. This would have a manifestly serious effect upon the entire training program which was only just getting under way.

Extension of Service Term Is Considered

Accordingly, the G–3 section of the Staff began studying plans both for maintaining Selective Service on a continuing basis rather than for the one-year term prescribed in the act of 16 September 1940, and for coping with the situa-

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4, 11. See also discussion in CofS office, 3 Jan 41, on causes of monthly construction costs. Notes on Conf, OCS Emergency Papers, bndr 10.

[71] House Appropriations Subcommittee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 3617*, pp. 12, 13.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

tion when and if the National Guard should in fact go home at the end of its one-year service as contemplated in the act of 27 August 1940.[73] When this was discussed at a 13 December 1940 Staff conference the plans for Staff conversations with the British (ABC) were well advanced; also Army and Navy estimates were then contemplating the possibility that America would be in the war by 1 April 1941. It does not appear that either of these extensions of service was then being pressed as a specific plan; rather, that the possibilities were foreseen, and that routine Staff planning against the possible, rather than merely against the assured event, led to consideration of that contingency and how to handle it.

Later in the winter the same possibility occurred to others, and to some of the National Guardsmen themselves, for individual letters of inquiry were addressed to the War Department. In March, when General Marshall was testifying upon appropriations requirements, Representative Joe Starnes asked him the direct question of what was contemplated with reference to the National Guard troops.[74] Did General Marshall contemplate keeping them in service longer than the year for which they were summoned? To this the Chief of Staff replied "I would not use the word 'contemplate.' We do not know yet. It depends entirely on the situation. If the Lord is good to us, they will be returned to their homes." [75] His questioner apparently had heard rumors of a proposal, in the event the Guard was demobilized, to strip the divisions of their equipment, in order to use it for training the non-Guard divisions. General Marshall gave prompt assurance that, in the event of defederalization of the National Guard divisions, they would be allowed to retain the equipment needed for such of their numbers as were returned to the states: they would not keep the additional equipment which had been provided the divisions for the use of the infiltrated trainees, who were not being sent home.[76] Two days later a Washington newspaper stated that the War Department would ask for a six- to twelve-month extension of Guard duty, and the Department issued a denial of such a plan.[77]

[73] The question was raised on 13 December 1940 at a Staff conference of Deputy Chief of Staff Bryden with the several division representatives. See notes of the conference in CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 6. See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War,* Cordell Hull's *Memoirs,* and Stettinius, *Lend-Lease,* pp. 63–65 on the interdepartmental discussions of the subject.

[74] House Appropriations Committee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, 5 Mar 41, *Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941. Hearings . . . on HR 4124,* p. 16.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] *Ibid.,* pp. 16–17.

[77] Press relations statement, 7 Mar 41, in Notes on Conf, CofS file, bndr 4.

The official view that there would be need for only the one-year service period, both for National Guardsmen and for selectees, continued dominant in April, when the Chief of Staff made a voluntary statement on that subject before a subcommittee considering the revised military appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1942.[78] "Present plans," he said, "contemplate the demobilization of the first increment of the National Guard September 15, 1941; the first increment of trainees will be discharged about the middle of November." He went on to explain that the trainees left behind by demobilization of the Guard would be taken over by Regular Army units existent and yet to be organized. The eighteen Guard divisions would remain in reserve, but not on active duty. The Chief of Staff agreed with a questioner that "there must be further legislation if it should be deemed wise or necessary to hold men beyond 12 months," and proceeded: "The decision does not have to be made until about three months before the first units of the National Guard have completed 12 months of service. That would be in June. Until that time we are going on the assumption that the National Guard will return to its home station at the end of 12 months." [79] Representative Francis Case, a committeeman, revived a suggestion that had already been made on the floor of Congress—that "if we took certain action to authorize convoys, it would create a situation whereby the period of service would be extended automatically." To this the Chief of Staff replied, in what was recognized at the time as a warning:

> That is a legal question that I would not attempt to answer now. The situation as I see it is this: Members of the National Guard naturally want to get back to their business if there is not a crisis. They equally expect to remain in the service if the crisis continues. We have, as I have just stated, a plan for adapting ourselves to the circumstance of their returning home. We are also working on plans to adapt ourselves to circumstances of their remaining in active service beyond the period of 12 months. We have gone on the basis that a decision would not have to be reached before June and that final decision will depend on the world situation as it exists at that time.[80]

The warning, if it was so intended, evoked no immediate comment in the committee nor conspicuously in public discussion as reflected by the newspapers, although correspondence and events of May and June indicate that within the Guard itself there were rumors that the year of service would probably be extended. Queries were so widely and anxiously expressed that on 17 May

[78] House Appropriations Committee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1942. Hearings . . . on HR 4965*, p. 10.

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

[80] *Ibid.*

Maj. Gen. J. F. Williams, Chief of the Army's National Guard Bureau, wrote to the Chief of Staff: ". . . Ordinary rumor and the continuance of the present grave international situation raise in their [Guardsmen's] minds a doubt as to whether the date of their return will be postponed. . . . Some National Guard Officers feel that their training is inadequate. . . . The Guard generally is willing to remain in service but desires to know if it *is* to remain." [81] Meantime the Chief of Staff was aware of the dilemma as it affected the upbuilding and training of the defense force. On 5 May Colonel Ward informed him that "if the National Guard Divisions go home" there would be available for other assignment some 143,000 Selective Service trainees who as individuals had been assigned to those divisions but still had some months to serve. "On the other hand, if the National Guard stays in" there later would be need for new trainees to fill the assignments referred to.[82]

On 5 June the House committee recommended its record-breaking $9,800,000,000 military appropriation bill, including in it an unprecedented provision permitting the Chief of Staff to order tanks and other equipment for the new Armored Force in the degree he deemed justified, and further provided him what amounted to a blank check for $25,000,000 for other outlay of an emergency character. Added to this evidence of the committee's respect for the Chief of Staff's judgment and responsibility was mention in the accompanying text of the "magnificent job" which he was doing.[83] At the same time the committee made public the recent testimony, quoting General Marshall's significant remark: "I believe that selective service provides the only practical and economical method of maintaining the military force that we inevitably are going to be required to have in the future." [84] With regard to the retention of the National Guard in service, news dispatches of the same day mentioned that decision was yet to be made.[85] On 17 June in a press conference at the White House the President confirmed that the government was studying a plan to keep the

[81] Memo, CofNGB for CofS, 17 May 41, sub: Retention of the National Guard in Service, OCS 16810–293. For expressions of discontent and inquiry by Guardsmen see letters of this period as indicated in numerical log of CofS files, OCS 16810. For a letter that is apparently an expression of General Marshall's ideas and methods in such relationships see letter of Col. W. B. Smith to Pvt. J. M. Sealy, 5 May 41, OCS 16810–281.

[82] Memo, SGS for CofS, 5 May 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 15.

[83] House Appropriations Committee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill. FY 1942* (House Report No. 741), pp. 1, 6, 9. For news report see *The New York Times,* 6 Jun 41, p. 12.

[84] House Appropriations Committee, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1942. Hearings . . . on HR 4965,* p. 39.

[85] *The New York Times,* 6 Jun 41, p. 12.

National Guard in service for over one year, and that Secretary Stimson was to make him a report on that subject.[86] On 20 June General Marshall sent to the Secretary a summary of reasons for a swift decision in behalf of the Guardsmen, their families, and employers, in behalf also of the states that would have to plan on Home Guard organizations if the Guard should be kept in service, and in behalf also of the Army for its personnel planning and for its construction program.[87]

Marshall Asks for Retention of Guard, Reserves, and Draft Troops

Four days later the War Department completed its entire report and forwarded it to the President. It asked that the officers and men then in the National Guard, and the Reserve officers then on active duty, be kept in service beyond the stated year. The statement observed that the "War Department has been flooded with queries from the field." It was "presumed" by the press that there would soon be a decision with regard to the trainees as well, and at the Capitol Representative Wadsworth, who had fathered the draft bill a year before, was reported as saying that Congress would quickly authorize an additional year's training for draftees if the administration requested it.[88] His forecast in this case was not borne out.

Startling as was this formal decision by the War Department with regard to the Guard and Reserve officers, with the implication of a later announcement about the trainees, it brought almost no public reaction visible in the newspapers of succeeding days. The explanation was simple: the newspapers of 22 June presented reports on a great many things other than the War Department's decision, and some of these other events were of overpowering interest. The State Department had ordered the Italian Embassy to close all Italian consulates in the United States. It also had made public the note denouncing German "piracy" in the sinking of the U. S. S. *Robin Moor*. And, far more conspicuously, the newspapers of that day reported the opening of the German war on Soviet Russia, the magnitude of which continued for days to distract most public attention from the details of American rearming and at the same time to increase

[86] *Ibid.*, 18 Jun 41, p. 1.
[87] Memo, CofS for SW, 20 Jun 41, no sub, OCS 16701 to 17500.
[88] *The New York Times*, 22 Jun 41, p. 1.

in many minds the awareness that this rearming would now proceed at swifter pace.[89] On 3 July General Marshall issued his first biennial report as Chief of Staff. It was a memorable statement of what had been achieved in two years of Army expansion. It was memorable too for its inclusion of a dignified declaration of what the Chief of Staff now felt to be a requirement of the immediate future and was prepared to ask for in spite of political complications that kept Mr. Roosevelt silent on the subject. What General Marshall sought in the report was "authority to extend the period of service of the selective service men, the officers of the Reserve Corps, and the units of the National Guard." [90] His argument proceeded:

. . . When and where these forces are to serve are questions to be determined by their Commander-in-Chief and the Congress, and should not be confused with the problem of their readiness for service. . . . The materiel phase of our task is generally understood. The personnel phase is not, and it is here that legal limitations, acceptable at the time of their passage, now hamstring the development of the Army into a force immediately available for whatever defensive measures may be necessary.

He illustrated his argument by reference to the possible necessity of using certain task forces that were in training (it was already reality rather than possibility, but he could not say so). He explained that

. . . the Regular Army divisions contain from 75 to 90 percent Reserve officers whose term of service is legally limited to 12 months. In other words, some 600 officers in a division under the law would soon be entitled to drop their present duties and return to their homes. . . . Must we replace most of the trained officer personnel of a division—the leaders—at the moment of departure for strategic localities? In two of the Regular divisions we have restricted the enlisted personnel to 3-year men but in the others, of necessity, the number of selectees varies from 25 to 50 percent. The problem here is the same as for the Reserve Officer personnel. The National Guard units involve three distinct limitations as to personnel—that for the National Guard unit, that for the 10 percent Reserve officers in their regiments and now being increased, and that pertaining to selectees who comprise more than 50 percent of the men in the ranks. While we may select regular units as the divisional components for task forces, we must utilize National Guard organizations for the special supporting units, antiaircraft, heavy artillery, engineers, etc. . . . Add to this problem the fact that plans for large units must cover every conceivable emergency, based on the means available; that time is required to prepare such a force; and that under present

[89] *Ibid.* The War Department announcement was recorded in *The New York Times* well down in column 2, while the State Department actions were near the top of column 1. The headings for the Russian war dispatches covered the tops of all 8 columns.

[90] *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff . . . July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941* (Washington: GPO, 1941), p. 11.

conditions we must submit these plans to the time-consuming business of public investigation and debate—along with the advertisement of such plans to the world at large—and I submit that the limitations referred to should be removed as quickly as possible if we are to have a fair opportunity to protect ourselves against the coldly calculated, secret and sudden action that might be directed against us. . . .[91]

The Fierce Fight on Draft Extension

Persuasive as the argument ultimately proved to be, it failed to elicit swift approval, but, instead, evoked the charge that in seeking to extend the draftees' service beyond the originally scheduled twelve months the Army was guilty of a breach of faith. To this charge General Marshall, summoned to a meeting of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, gave swift reply.[92] He quoted from the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940: "Each man . . . shall serve for a training and service period of 12 consecutive months unless sooner discharged, except that whenever the Congress has declared that the national interest is imperiled, such 12-month period may be extended by the President to such time as may be necessary in the interests of national defense," and proceeded:

> The situation which existed at the time of the passage of the . . . Act is quite different from the situation that confronts us today. That act set up a peacetime training system whereby we would be able to train a large reserve of soldiers. Each soldier, after 12 months of active service, would be transferred to a trained reserve, unless a national emergency existed. In the opinion of the War Department such an emergency now exists. . . .
>
> I do not think anybody at that time (1940) had in mind that . . . we would release the trained men from our forces on the brink of a national emergency. The law itself is quite clear on that point. The question is, Do you think the national interests are imperiled? I do, most decidedly.[93]

The Staff was warned against action that might even indirectly jeopardize the success of the bill extending the term of service. An example was that of 1 August when WPD, working up the plans for sending troops to Iceland a month later, was considering issuance of a warning to the unit commanders concerned. The Chief of Staff refused to authorize the warning as it "would give away the fact that we were preparing to send troops to Iceland and would

[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.

[92] Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Strengthening the National Defense. Statement of General George C. Marshall in Connection with Retention of Selectee and Reserve Components in the Military Service Beyond One Year*, p. 4 (Testimony of 9 Jul 41).

[93] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6.

militate against the legislation now being considered by Congress for extension of service." [94]

At the time of his biennial report General Marshall had prepared no bill to meet his service-extensions objective, but had merely made his proposal to the Secretary of War, who forwarded it to the President. He offered the Senate committee two alternative solutions to the problem, to pass such a resolution as the 1940 act had contemplated, or to make a revision of the law imposing the restrictions. (The committee elected the latter alternative, offering Senate Joint Resolution 92 to remove the term restriction on selectees and Senate Joint Resolution 93 to authorize extension of service by the Reserve components.) Having sensed that isolationist Congressmen were particularly opposed to authorizing departure of troops from the Western Hemisphere, he had consented to a separate consideration of that recommendation, lest its defeat cost the Army also the extension of the time period.[95] Politically this step was well regarded by the insiders, for on 14 July the President discussed the situation at a White House conference with Congressional leaders, General Marshall attending, and although no official statement was issued the newspapers' informed judgment was that the administration was prepared to shelve the recommendation for abolition of territorial restrictions on employment of selectees.[96] General Marshall issued no statement of his views, but the same dispatches noted, on an equally informed basis, that the territorial recommendation was merely being shelved for a time, not canceled. The following day, at a press conference, the President indicated his support of the compromise,[97] and at the same time portions of General Marshall's testimony before the Senate committee were made public, notably his warning that disbandment or immobilization of large percentages of the forces then in training "might well involve a national tragedy." [98] It was on this occasion that he explained to his hearers the meaning of the term "task force" then coming into current Army use:

> . . . I thought it was time that the public should become accustomed to the term. . . . We determine for a particular, a possible mission the size and composition of the force necessary to carry it out. It may be 5,000, or 15,000, or 30,000. It is, as I have explained, a self-contained, self-supporting force. Instead of waiting until the last moment to assemble

[94] 1 Aug 41 entry in office diary of Brig Gen (later Lt Gen) L. T. Gerow (ACofS, WPD, at the time) for 28 May–6 Sep 41, WPD files.

[95] Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Vitalization of the Active List of the Army. Hearings . . . on SJR 88*, pp. 13–14.

[96] *The New York Times*, 15 Jul 41, p. 1.

[97] *Ibid.*, 16 Jul 41, p. 1.

[98] Statement of Gen Marshall before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 9 Jul 41.

such a force, as we have always done in the past—for the Santiago campaign in Cuba, the Philippines in 1898, for Siberia and Russia in 1918, and for France and Italy in 1917—we are deliberately organizing them now so far as we can foresee the possibility and are training them for their possible employment. The public or the press has confused a "task force" with an A. E. F., and also has added some political implications. The resulting confusion of thought is extremely embarrassing for the War Department, and for me personally. We have been proceeding in as practical and businesslike a manner as possible to discharge our duty of training and preparing our military forces.[99]

The effort to present the training situation realistically in order to allay alarms aroused by isolationists did not accomplish a great deal to overcome House opposition. This attitude General Marshall had ample opportunity to observe while he was at the Capitol arguing for a bill that would enable the Army to promote competent officers more quickly by discarding the less efficient.[100] Even on this reasonably simple issue he encountered an occasional barrier to his progress, as in the case of a stubborn Representative who expressed his fear of Army "injustice." The Congressman illustrated his anxiety with the offhand remark that "General Mitchell was tossed out of the Army on a matter that we all agree on now," upon which the sorely tried Chief of Staff broke in sharply: "Well, I don't agree with you. An army is an army. It must have backbone to it, and a soldier cannot spread himself on the front page of a newspaper, or it is not an army." After another inquiry about "injustice" in general he snapped: "I think you will find the Army has been too fair; in other words we have leaned so far backward in favor of the individual that we have not done right with the Army," and the discussion shortly came back to the point at issue.[101] This was a relatively minor matter.

General Marshall's Role in the Legislative Battle

The important question in mid-July was whether the legislation extending the terms of service for National Guard and Reserve officer and Selective Service trainees would pass, and of this there was grave doubt despite the recent confidence of Representative Wadsworth. Apparently no one knew this, or the tactics needed, better than did the politically sagacious Mr. Roosevelt. His watchfulness is referred to in a memorandum which on 16 July General Marshall wrote to the White House, as follows:

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] See Chapter VIII.

[101] House Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Vitalizing the Active List of the Army. Hearings . . . on HJR 203,* p. 11.

With reference to your informal direction to me of last Monday morning, to ascertain the suitable time for a message by you to Congress regarding the removal of the legal limitations now adversely affecting the Army . . . opinion appears to be that a message as soon as possible would be highly desirable; in fact they believe this will be necessary to a favorable consideration. . . . There is evidently a much better understanding of the seriousness of the situation. . . .[102]

This appraisal of Congressional sentiment, impressively accurate as time was to show, was much more hopeful than other Army observers were offering at the time. One of the General Staff liaison officers at the Capitol, sampling the views of timid lawmakers, reported a forecast that if the extension bill should come to immediate vote it would lose by five to one. He mentioned that a veteran Congressional secretary in his forty-one years' experience never had seen so much fear of legislation; that a vote for the bill would be political suicide.[103]

In a situation so threatening, by either appraisal, it appeared that much would depend both upon the Chief of Staff's persuasive arguments in committee and upon the timing of the President's formal support. Until Mr. Roosevelt was ready to throw in the weight of his influence (which finally came in the form of a message on 21 July)[104] his desire apparently was to remain wholly out of the fight, for General Marshall continued to accept publicly all responsibility for advocating the legislation, counting perhaps upon Congressmen's repeatedly demonstrated esteem for his military judgments. On the day after his note to the President he again appeared before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and took his first opportunity to protect the President from charges of "militarism." Reminding his hearers of his previous discussion in the 1 July 1941 report, which had called for immediate action to protect imperiled national interests, he continued:

It might be well to go back to my original recommendation in my biennial report. . . . It may clarify the atmosphere for me to explain that I made the specific recommendations regarding the extension of the 12-month period of service for the three categories (National Guard, Selective Service, and Reserve officers) purely on the basis of a military necessity. . . . The Commander-in-Chief, that is, the President, had no knowledge that I was going to make them.[105]

[102] Memo, CofS for the President, 16 Jul 41, Gen Marshall's personal file.

[103] Memo, Maj C. V. Allan for Col R. H. Brennan, 17 Jul 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 19.

[104] *The New York Times*, 22 Jul 41, p. 1. The message stated that disintegration of the Army would follow failure to take action: "The responsibility rests solely with Congress."

[105] Gen Marshall's testimony of 17 Jul 41 before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Retention of Reserve Components and Selectees in Military Service Beyond Twelve Months. Hearings . . . on SJR 92 . . . and SJR 93*, p. 3.

Later in the hearing, the witness did a little more clarifying:

The idea I meant to convey was that the President has been very conservative. It has not been a case of my being overridden, it has been more a case of my accepting that conservative attitude. I find myself in exactly the same relation to my advisors. . . . There is a normal divergence of views. Someone must figure out the correct course, and that is my responsibility in the War Department. . . .

The same situation exists with relation to my dealings with the Commander-in-Chief. All that I was trying to do was to counteract the feeling that some seem to have, that there is a desire on his part to greatly . . . magnify the Army. Quite to the contrary, his attitude has been decidedly conservative.[106]

Disarming a potential opposition in the committee, General Marshall took pains to assert his awareness that his responsibilities were military only and that he was seeking to keep his views of military necessity separated as widely as possible from "political considerations which are matters for the consideration of the President and the Congress." [107] He explained by patient and exact illustration the effort which the Army had made to adjust itself to the crippling restrictions of time and territory that the existing law imposed on use of reserve components. Thus, efficiency would have assigned National Guard units to garrison duty in the Atlantic islands, but the law dictated otherwise, and the 6th (Regular) Division had been stripped of half its personnel in order to place volunteers in those areas; the 6th now had to be wholly reconstructed. For Hawaiian assignment no Regular unit was available, and so a National Guard regiment was sent, but now the bulk of its personnel had to be started homeward in order to satisfy the twelve-month limitation, while many of its individual personnel, with terms unexhausted, would remain in the islands for reincorporation in some other unit.[108] He pressed for early action on the National Guard resolution, on the ground that otherwise initial steps would have to be taken by 1 August in order to get the men home.[109] Indeed, during the July hearings he mentioned several matters not previously stated with such frankness. He was reminded of a recent statement that "you called for the National Guard 2 weeks or a month earlier than you felt was necessary [in 1940], for the purpose of securing the passage of the Selective Service Act," and answered with complete composure:

For the purpose of preventing its defeat. I was very intent on arranging matters in an efficient manner, but I had to send troops intended for New England to camps down in

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.
[107] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[108] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Texas. It was necessary for me to arrange matters personally in order to meet the legislative situation. I had been reliably informed that had we delayed as much as a week in putting the men in camp we would have been charged with not being ready. We would have had a volunteer system forced on us instead of securing a democratic selective service system, or, at least, the selective service system would have been put off until after election, and then possibly would have been fatally emasculated into some volunteer compromise method. The emergency at that time did not permit of such delay or legislative compromise, in my opinion.

So I had to accept the situation and do the best I could to manage things, accepting all the hazards involved. Later I had to meet the recriminations and criticisms but I expected that.[110]

In pressing for decision on the National Guard by 1 August he seems to have spoken indiscreetly, for he asserted that "we considered that June 1 was our deadline on the decision as to the future of the National Guard." [111] This may well have been the General Staff plan and the Chief of Staff's personal judgment; however, he had not won the President's consent to any such proposal on 1 June, and not until his biennial report, published on 3 July, had he himself made any firm public declaration of the need to keep the Guard in service. If his ensuing remark, "However, we did not have a decision on June 1; it is now the middle of July and still we have no decision," was intended as a reproof, it could not with propriety have been directed wholly against the Congress. But the Chief of Staff pressed no further the question of that responsibility. He returned tactfully to the matter at issue with a plea for proceeding "in the same public-spirited manner that marked the passage" of the acts of 1940.[112]

By example after example he pointed out the difficulty, verging on impossibility, of maintaining the overseas garrisons while the personnel clearly needed for those garrisons was legally not available. The garrison currently in Iceland was made up of Marines for whom the situation did not call. "The troops merely occupy the country. Marines are trained for another purpose, for carrying out landing operations from a fleet against hostile resistance. There was no such situation in Iceland." [113] He went on to explain that Marines were used in Iceland because no Army units were available:

[110] Testimony of 22 Jul 41 before House Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Providing for the National Defense by Removing Restrictions on Numbers and Length of Service Draftees. Hearing . . . on HJR 217*, p. 28.

[111] Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Retention of Reserve Components and Selectees in Military Service Beyond Twelve Months. Hearings . . . on SJR 92 and SJR 93*, p. 6.

[112] *Ibid.*

[113] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

We had one division composed almost entirely of 3-year men but that division had approximately 400 Reserve officers in it. We would have had to line them up, as it were, and ask them to volunteer for this purpose. Now there were two objections. . . .

We should not have advertised the movement of that convoy by asking for volunteers. We could not hazard the men on those ships to some hostile act. That was of paramount importance but equally important was the fact that we must not line up a military force to vote on whether or not the individuals will participate in a military operation . . . for if we do we will have moved into the military system of another country which system I do not think we are prepared to copy. An army is an army. It is not a political group. It is not a citizens' meeting.[114]

These remarks, impressive at the time, were equally applicable later in the year when pacifist-isolationists were urging selectees to write protesting letters to their Congressmen. Of the progress being made by the young Reserve officers at this time the Chief of Staff spoke with admiration, impulsively declaring that "the most valuable asset we have had in this emergency has been the product of the R. O. T. C." and adding that "if we lost these officers at a critical juncture such as now, the result, to my mind, will be catastrophic." [115]

Among the noisiest arguments against the extension bill, it now was recognized, were those in behalf of certain drafted troops more than twenty-eight years of age and others whose absence from home was demonstrably causing more hardship at home than benefit to the Army. The Chief of Staff bent his efforts toward removing the reason for these protests and hence whittling away the opposition to his main program. To his Senatorial audience he said:

This plan also permits us to release men whose continued absence from home is causing real hardship. We are planning to accomplish the same general result with the temporary officers of the National Guard. We are planning to do, or we want to do, very much the same thing with regard to the 28-year and older men who are now in the Army under the Selective Training and Service Act. We want to release them and if we are permitted to do it in our own way and in our own time, it can be done without destroying efficiency. If we are forced to release them in accordance with an arbitrary rule the result will be a great loss of efficiency. I repeat that we want to release those men whose continued absence causes undue hardship at home, and we also want to release the men over 28 years of age in the Selective service. Their dilemma does not help their morale or the morale of their associates.[116]

He was questioned on his intentions as to the size of the new Army. He answered by reminding his questioner that "the amount of money appropri-

[114] *Ibid.*
[115] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.
[116] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

ated by Congress limits the size of the Army as we are forbidden by law to create a deficiency for personnel," [117] but proceeded amiably to state that the immediately foreseeable need was for only 150,000 more men than already authorized, to restore the outlines of units recently depleted or wholly exhausted in providing the overseas garrisons. He continued in impromptu apologia for 1940–41 policies in the Army:

My principal concern is with the efficiency of the numbers we now have rather than with a great expansion with a possible superficial result.

I would like to say, however, that I am under constant pressure, and have been for the past year and a half, to demand increases in a very large way for almost every purpose. I have remained flatly opposed to such a procedure, because I have felt that there was the time to permit an orderly development instead of a superficial, hasty one. I wanted to go through the difficult first steps of expansion deliberately rather than hastily. The same idea was applied to money, as to how much money could be efficiently spent, and in the initial phases I was criticised for not asking for enough. My feeling at that time [was] that the situation resembled a kindling fire. If too much wood were piled on suddenly the fire would be put out. I did not want to put out the fire. I wanted to build it gradually to where it could accommodate large quantities of wood. I have been criticised by a great many people in public life, by a great many experts of one kind or another, because they have felt that I have dealt in too small numbers. But we have tried, and I think pretty well succeeded, in going forward in an orderly way rather than in a hasty, superficial manner. Mere numbers do not interest me. I am interested in efficient results.[118]

Returning to the size of the Army currently contemplated, he warned against regarding this view as unchangeable. "We must not lose sight . . . of the great conflagration in Europe and Asia," he said. "Conditions of warfare are changing with great rapidity and I do not want to create the impression that I am committed indefinitely to an Army of the size indicated regardless of future developments. At the present time, however, I have no intention of recommending a further increase." [119] He then introduced an interesting expansion to his previous defense of moderate increases and the President's part in them:

I would like to state, for the benefit of you gentlemen, that it has been difficult at times to get through the Budget and through the President additional numbers, because of their reluctance to approve large increases. I think it is permissible for me to state that the attitude of the President has been against tremendous increases if it were possible to avoid it. He always demanded convincing proof of the necessity of the increase.

The President cited—I hope it is permissible for me to quote the President without specific permission—he cited the other day at a conference at the White House, his having

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[118] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15
[119] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

required me to reduce the numbers sent to the various bases, because he would not approve garrisons of the size I recommended. While he recognized the possible necessity of increasing them later, he made us reduce our first estimates. His reaction has been reluctance to large increases, which is quite contrary to the impression that seems to be in the minds of a great many people.[120]

So much from the published record of the period. In amusing, if perhaps irrelevant contrast, is an observation attributed to the Chief of Staff upon this general subject in 1940. On that earlier occasion in Staff conference he mentioned recent instructions by the President to send an additional division to Hawaii and proceeded: "We are opposed to doing this, and the Secretary of War succeeded in stopping it. . . . I saw the Secretary when he returned from the White House and we decided that rather than appearing to disapprove all suggestions made by the President, we might send something. . . ." He asked whether it would be possible to send one National Guard regiment of antiaircraft artillery and received an affirmative answer from his Staff.[121] In April 1941, when Mr. Roosevelt was inclined to assign large overseas duties to an Army still insufficiently trained and equipped for such work, and General Marshall's restraining influence was sought by Harry Hopkins, there was another fleeting outburst of irritation with the President and also with the State Department. General Marshall's views on this occasion were almost certainly not intended for the record but they found their way into the files of Staff Conference notes. There it is reported that a conference was being arranged for Mr. Roosevelt so as to "inform him as Commander-in-Chief of national strategy for the future, without regard to politics. . . ." [122]

If there were many such disagreements in prewar days, there is no record to prove it. Certainly in the summer of 1941, fighting vigorously for the extension of the service period of men making up half his new Army, the Chief of Staff avoided mention of discord of any nature, but rather, as on this occasion, dwelt on harmonious relations. He reserved his fire for those organizations and individuals who were trying to use complaints from querulous draftees as a club over wavering Congressmen. Appearing before the House Military Affairs Committee at a time when the resistance to Army proposals was acute, and when sentimentalists were publicly bewailing the difficult life of the reluctant warriors whom the draft had caught, General Marshall spoke at some length

[120] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

[121] Report of Conf in office of CofS, 8 Oct 40, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 6.

[122] Note of Conf, in office of CofS, 16 Apr 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13. The episode is dealt with more fully in Chapter XII.

of the problems with which the Army was grappling. He referred to inaccurate newspaper accounts in the recent past and proceeded: "It is exceedingly difficult to develop military forces because soldiers are only human; they read the papers. Like all of us humans, with a little encouragement they can feel very sorry for themselves." [123] He interjected a mildly amusing anecdote from his own experience dealing with the old soldier's excusable habit of complaining of his lot, and then came to grips with the subject that was worrying his hearers:

> Today, to have the men stirred up and agitated by outside influence is a most unfortunate business because under those conditions soldiers are very apt to feel sorry for themselves. The business of the soldier as I have found it involves mud, or extreme heat and irritating dust. It involves missing meals, long marches, bad weather, insects and discomforts. It involves a great many inconveniences; it interferes with social affairs and sometimes it very seriously affects personal relationships. All of that is inevitable and is part of the life of the soldier. We have tried in every way in this expansion to avoid the worst of these, to an extent that has never before been attempted. . . .
>
> At the present moment we are undergoing a very depressing, a dangerous experience. Yesterday afternoon I received a radiogram from General Drum that he had issued these orders as Commander of the First Army: "There appears to be an organized effort from some source outside the Army to have petitions signed by members of the military forces and sent to the Congress in an effort to oppose legislation proposed by the War Department to continue the service of the National Guard and the Reserve officers in the service. Any such action by those in military service violates the provisions of Army Regulations."
>
> As you may have read in the press some of these young men were led into this business. We cannot continue to ignore such actions. We must treat them as soldiers; we cannot have a political club and call it an army. I regard these disturbing activities from outside the Army, gentlemen, as sabotage of a dangerous character.[124]

Sensing the effect of his dramatic recital, he bluntly informed his hearers that he could not take the whole responsibility for maintaining the morale and discipline of the Army in periods of legislative uncertainty, such as the current one, and asked them to reach an early decision—unless the Congress was prepared to alter the military policy and maintain a large professional Army, than which (as he certainly knew) no solution was further from legislators' minds.[125] Delay in action, he warned, would do serious harm to the development of the Army.[126] He proceeded with an analysis of the letters of complaint and abuse

[123] Testimony of 22 Jul 41 before House Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, *Providing for the National Defense by Removing Restrictions on Numbers and Length of Service of Draftees. Hearings . . . on HJR 217, p. 4.*

[124] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[125] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

[126] *Ibid.*, pp. 6ff.

that had come to him, without venturing the suggestion that it might apply as well to letters that the Congressmen had received. The analysis showed that the bulk of his letters came from a relatively few citizens, that the post cards in particular used frequent and exact duplication of phraseology, that a petition bearing twenty names was obviously signed by not more than four individuals, that in several cases letters mailed from different addresses were obviously written by the same person.

Pressed by questions from an opposition Congressman who apparently was trying to kill the draft extension bill, the Chief of Staff answered each question clearly and completely, and then nailed down his argument with an unsought answer:

> You were talking about the materiel phase being better understood by the public than the personnel phase. I can get billions of dollars with comparative ease, but when I get down to the practical proposition about personnel, then my real difficulties begin. I can go before a committee and get billions, and we have urgently needed them. Also, they appall me in their amount, but the point is, everyone seems willing to do business on those terms. But all of that effort, all of those billions are futile unless you provide the highly trained personnel.[127]

Two weeks later the Senate, without great difficulty, passed the act.[128] Interest now centered on the split in the House, where the pacifist-isolationist opposition was known to be relatively strong and where there was continuing doubt as to how a few critical votes would be cast. Decision came on 12 August—an eventful day when German troops reached the Black Sea east of Odessa, when Pétain committed France to collaboration, when Britain and the United States warned Japan to stay out of Thailand, and when the Atlantic Conference of British and American chieftains was in progress. Amid extraordinary excitement the bill with a few unimportant amendments was passed, with only one vote to spare, 203 to 202.[129] By that narrow margin a bill without which the American defense would have been gravely crippled finally squeezed through and was sent to the Senate. A political, rather than a military history would record in detail the skill with which the measure was then handled. The House bill was not identical with that which had passed the Senate, and after their breath-taking victory of 12 August, House leaders warned their Senate colleagues that, as repassage by a closely divided House could not be guaranteed, the Senate must accept the House version without alteration. This agreed upon, the Senate

[127] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[128] *The New York Times*, 8 Aug 41, p. 1.
[129] *Ibid.*, 13 Aug 41, p. 1.

leaders made sure of an impressive majority, larger than legally necessary, by sending airplanes to bring back as many friendly Senators as possible, and, in the case of several who could not return to Washington, arranging to "pair" them with opposition Senators whose votes would thus be neutralized. On the day of the vote two friendly Senators (Harry S. Truman and Sherman Minton) held the floor and thus deferred the vote until given the assurance that a maximum majority was on hand.[130] On the day when the bill went to the White House for approval, there was another event of importance: the text of the Roosevelt-Churchill "Atlantic Charter" was made public.

Attention to Soldier Morale

While the fate of the Service extension bill was still uncertain, and when purely political considerations would have called for the greatest caution in relations with the National Guard's leaders, General Marshall, instead, addressed the several division commanders with marked bluntness in informing them of weaknesses within units of the National Guard. This was in a 30 July letter warning them that "the next three months will be the most critical period in the development of National Guard divisions," among which "efficiency varies from excellent to poor," with the general average appearing to be "far too low." He had received critical estimates from GHQ inspectors, from army and corps commanders, and from numerous other observers, "but more generally from an overwhelming reaction through civilian channels." Young officers and noncommissioned officers were deficient in tactical training or general education, and standards of discipline were too low, reflecting the "unwillingness of leaders who knew their subordinates in civil life to hold them to a strict compliance with military orders." Deficiency in methods and capabilities made it necessary to repeat the basic training of some units. Morale was uneven. A "large number" of Guard officers were too old and should be transferred. In contrast no similar reports had come in against Reserve officers. It was, the letter concluded, "imperative that the general standards [of the National Guard] be raised immediately." [131]

To the problem of soldier morale, there mentioned fleetingly, the Chief of Staff had directed attention consistently since the National Guard call. On the

[130] Recollections of Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons as recounted to the author in 1949.

[131] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen Ralph Truman, 35th Division, 30 Jul 41, OCS 16810–310. Similar letters were sent to other National Guard division commanders.

eve of the draft he addressed a letter to the commanding generals of armies, corps areas, and departments on means of developing a "unified efficient fighting force of citizen soldiers," observing:

> First in importance will be the development of a high morale and the building of a sound discipline based on wise leadership and a spirit of mutual cooperation throughout all ranks. Morale, engendered by thoughtful consideration for officers and enlisted men by their commanders will produce a cheerful and understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team. This is the essence of the American standard of discipline, and it is a primary responsibility of leaders to develop and maintain such a standard. To this end, commanders of all echelons will study and apply the provisions of Mobilization Regulations 1–10, regarding Morale.
>
> . . . It will tax the skill and wisdom of leaders of all ranks to mold these citizen soldiers into a unified Army prepared to accept cheerfully the rigors of long hours of training, the fatigue of marches, and the discomforts and hardships of service in the field. . . .
>
> In accomplishing the foregoing there must be no pampering of individuals, no distinction between men because of their previous military experience or condition of entry into the service. . . .[132]

There was a continuing pressure on commanding officers to recognize their own responsibility for troop morale, regardless of the supplemental work of "welfare and morale" agencies external to the Army. These agencies (other than the Red Cross, which helped enlisted men in each camp with their personal and family problems) were not installed in the camps because, as General Marshall explained, the Army desired to retain responsibility for morale and recreation.[133] This objective was first sought through the Morale Division of the Adjutant General's Office, to which General Marshall referred various suggestions for troop recreation, but early in 1941 the Secretaries of War and Navy appointed a Joint Committee on Welfare and Recreation, headed by Frederick Osborn (later commissioned brigadier general), to co-ordinate the leisure-time activities of the recruits. In announcing this, General Marshall made sure that the field commanders would not think their own responsibilities had been lessened, radiograms informing them:

> . . . Both the Secretary of War and I are intensely interested in this objective and have assured the committee of utmost cooperation on the part of commanding officers. . . . Obviously nothing must interfere with troop training, but [it is] equally important that leisure-time activities be well organized. . . . Morale is primarily a function of command,

[132] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Lt Gen Hugh A. Drum, CG First Army, 16 Oct 40, and to all CG's Armies, Corps Areas, Depts, OCS 16418–144.

[133] Personal Ltr, CofS to Dr. Paul D. Moody, 8 Jan 41, OCS 19246–19.

and leisure-time activities in the camps will continue as the full responsibility of and under direction of military commanders. . . .[134]

The Chief of Staff's desire to keep this activity under his own observation was made clear by a letter to all commanders in March 1941, when the work then being done within the Adjutant General's Office was transferred by secretarial order to a new Morale Branch of the Army which "shall function directly under the supervision and control of the Chief of Staff."[135] Morale officers were to be on the commanders' special staffs and because of "the importance of their staff function" would be diverted by no other duties. That he found time to give personal attention to details in this field is indicated by a memorandum of a few days later, seeking to make sure that newly activated units would have company funds without delay.[136] To him The Inspector General made personal report on the state of mind (generally favorable) of drafted men in nine different divisions in the summer of 1941 when they were questioned about their views on an extension of service. With his approval a little later G–4 prepared for the Assistant Secretary's signature a proposal for the Federal Works Agency to establish service clubs in communities adjacent to camps.[137] Division commanders were taken to task in an identical personal letter to all, which noted that in many cases selectees suffered "a serious drop in morale" after being transferred from the replacement training camps to tactical units. General Marshall suggested it was due to careless assignment of incoming personnel, that "men have been especially trained as clerks, for example, and have been assigned to duty as truck drivers," and that the "outstandingly high standards of discipline, morale and training" at the training centers should be met or surpassed in tactical units.[138]

[134] (1) Memo, CofS for ASW, 8 Oct 40, sub: Use of Civilian Volunteers in Developing the Morale Factor, OCS 19246–9. (2) Memo, CofS for TAG (Morale Branch), 15 Jan 41, no sub, signed "GCM," OCS 16577–2. (2) Rad, CofS to all corps area commanders, 18 Feb 41, OCS 19246–21. Similar instructions to commanders of field armies, Air Force, Armored Force, same date and file.

[135] Ltr, TAG to CG's GHQ AF, Depts, and Corps Areas, 14 Mar 41, sub: Creation of a Separate Branch for Military Morale, AG 353.8 (3–3–41) M–A–M. A reminder of that directive went out a few weeks later in the form of personal letters, Gen Marshall to CG's, 24 Apr 41, OCS 15473–9. See also personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen W. S. Grant, 14 May 41, OCS 15473–10, and to Lt Gen Hugh Drum, same date, 15473–11.

[136] Memo, CofS for Chief of Morale Branch, 19 Mar 41, no sub, signed "GCM," OCS 16449–23.

[137] (1) Memo, TIG for CofS, 23 Jul 41, sub: Morale of Selective Service Trainees, OCS 16418–248. Also Memo, Act TIG for DCofS, 26 Aug 41, no sub, OCS 21177–28 2B. (2) Personal Ltr, ASW to Administrator FWA, 26 Aug 41, prepared in G–4, approved by CofS, G–4 31830–13, copy in OCS 19246–55. See also detailed reports to CofS on morale in Memos of G–1, 26 Jun 41, OCS 15473–13; of 9 Jul 41, G–1/14201–77; of 5 Sep 41, G–1/14201–95.

[138] Personal Ltr to each division commander, 4 Sep 41, OCS 16418–258.

During the trying summer of 1941, when inadequate training facilities brought idle periods in the camps, and these gave rise to querulous letters and newspaper reports, the word "morale," which has a profound meaning to a general, took on a host of inferior meanings in common parlance. G–1 proposed a tightening up of terminology as well as of discipline, and recommended to General Marshall that certain unnamed commanders in high positions should begin putting first things first. Many of them, said the Personnel chief, appeared to put the Army's concerns in this series of priorities: tactical proficiency, technical efficiency, troop leading, recreation and welfare, "real morale." He proposed that they be told that the priority should run, rather: real morale, technical capacity, troop leading, tactical capacity, recreation and welfare.

> A great deal has been published and a great amount of time has been expended in the name of morale. However, . . . this effort lies almost entirely in the field of welfare. Real morale, which springs from the pride which an individual feels for the army, and more especially for his unit, has been greatly neglected. . . . The enlisted man's morale is substantially and solidly enhanced if each day he becomes a better soldier and if each day the unit to which he belongs becomes a better military organization.[139]

G–1 promptly concurred a few weeks later in suggesting that the name of the Morale Branch be changed to Recreation and Welfare Branch, its memorandum again expressing resentment over degeneration of the word "morale." [140] Something of this same attitude was shown by The Inspector General in his report the next month on troop disorders in Alexandria, La., when the end of maneuvers coincided with pay day, with resultant uproar in two divisions. He reported no serious morale situation among the troops but poor disciplinary action by the corps and division commanders. On General Marshall's copy of the radiogram is a penciled note to the Personnel Chief of the General Staff. It reads:

"Haislip—re: IV Corps change. G. C. M." [141]

This personal attention to morale, under whatever meaning, continued. Under instructions the Secretary of the Staff reminded the Morale Branch chief of the desirability of arranging for camp shows during the winter at the chilly new bases in Newfoundland, Iceland, and Alaska, and of the need for

[139] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS 19 Aug 41, sub: Real Morale. Noted by CofS. G–1 15942–47, copy in OCS 19246–54.

[140] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 10 Sep 41, sub: Designation of the Morale Branch, G–1 15942–47, copy in OCS 19246–58.

[141] Rad, TIG for CofS, 15 Sep 41, OCS 19246–60.

caring for installations in the Caribbean. That harassed official was also called on for comment on a letter that General Marshall had received from the Commission on Chaplains, stating that the morale officers seemed "pretty much at sea regarding deeper matters which affect morale." In October 1941 the Chief of Staff turned over $206,000 from his contingent fund for operation of the Army recreational camps, and on that precedent a still larger amount was provided during the winter as an advance on the Morale Branch's prospective allotment for recreational activities of the troops overseas.[142]

If General Marshall's concern over morale had not developed spontaneously, his attention would have been directed to it otherwise, for the subject was inevitably a matter of common discussion. From the Under Secretary of War in mid-August came a memorandum, with accompanying papers, containing suggestions so far-reaching that the paper was circulated through the Staff for examination. To it General Marshall himself made reply analyzing the causes of low morale, particularly in National Guard divisions:

> . . . Morale is a function of command. Therefore, as far as the efforts of the Army itself are concerned, the initial corrective measure to be undertaken is improvement of officer personnel. We are attempting to accomplish this not only by elimination of the incompetent but, of greater importance, by gradually sending all our officers to the service schools. . . .
>
> The Regular Army is not bothered by poor morale because its officers have attained professional knowledge either at schools or through practical experience. National Guard officers have not had these opportunities. . . . Of approximately 25,000 . . . only 6,800 have completed a course of instruction at a service school. . . . At the Infantry School there are now 2,450 officers undergoing instruction. Of this number 1,400 are National Guard officers and 600 are Reserve officers. . . .
>
> . . . Considering the limited training facilities and equipment available and also a scarcity of qualified instructors, I do not feel that we can both increase the number of officer candidates and pursue a policy of educating officers now on the rolls. As a measure for increasing efficiency and morale, I consider the latter project to be far more important.[143]

This view that morale was a function of command, and that efficient officers were a first need, found support in another report from the field which was given to General Marshall by The Inspector General. It sprang from a dis-

[142] (1) Memo, OCS for Chief of Morale Branch, 28 Nov 41, no sub, OCS 19246–80. (2) Same for same, 30 Oct 41, no sub, OCS 19246–71. (3) Memo, Chief B&LP Br for BOWD, 16 Oct 41, sub: Allotment from Contingent Fund, OCS 21281–4. (4) Memo, B&LP Br for CofS, 17 Jan 42, sub: Funds for Operation of Welfare . . . Overseas, approved by DCofS, 2 Feb 42, OCS 21281–25.

[143] Memo, CofS for the Hon Robert P. Patterson, USW, 30 Sep 41, sub: Morale of the Army, OCS 19246–62.

cussion by the son of the executive officer of that department, the son being a trainee of eight months' service. The youth reported the majority of the enlisted men in his division to have been so low in spirit that they contemplated absenting themselves without leave: the timely arrival of a veteran Regular as commanding general of the division had been followed by increased consideration of the enlisted men, better facilities for their leisure time, better administrative procedure—and a complete change in the men's attitude.[144]

To assist the officers in performing this particular function of command, as well as to develop among the soldiers themselves a larger sense of their responsibility, General Marshall encouraged greater use of the opportunity that the field maneuvers afforded. The lack of weapons and other equipment, the slowness of developing air-ground liaison, the lag in mechanization, all were apparent to enlisted men as well as observers. Beyond this, General Marshall became conscious that the ranks were densely ignorant of the tactical purpose of the maneuvers in which they themselves were engaged and resultingly critical of their own and higher commanders. To remedy this situation to some degree the Chief of Staff impressed on the army commanders the good that would be served by having company officers inform their men of the maneuver situation in which they were a part, and of the value of maneuvers, even with simulated arms, in training the command itself.[145] On the following day he instructed The Inspector General to observe whether, as a result, the enlisted men were receiving any such instruction, and within two weeks had a report showing wide variation in the results.[146] Accordingly, at the next maneuver he reminded the field commanders to "take steps to insure that officers of all echelons take positive action" in this respect, and a month later circulated among various commands the letter in which he had commended Lt. Gen. Ben Lear of the Second Army for his effective compliance. General Marshall was convinced that "we will have no trouble with morale if the men themselves understand what they are doing and the reasons why they are doing it." [147]

[144] Memo, TIG for CofS, 8 Oct 41, sub: Salutary Effect on Morale, OCS 21177–288.

[145] Rad, CofS to CG First, Second, Third, Fourth Armies, 26 Jun 41, OCS 14440–364.

[146] Memo, CofS for Gen. Virgil L. Peterson (TIG), 27 Jun 41, OCS 17633–36, and Memo, TIG for CofS, 9 Jul 41, sub: Information of Maneuver Situation, same file; also same for same, 16 Jul 41, same sub, but filed OCS 14440–395.

[147] (1) Rads, Marshall to Krueger and Marshall to Lear, 12 Sep 41, and Bryden to Lear, 17 Sep 41, all in OCS 14440–394. (2) Personal Ltr, Marshall to Lear, 7 Oct 41, and Memo, OCS for TAG, 7 Oct 41, no sub, both in OCS 14440–403.

Last and Largest Maneuvers of the Prewar Period

The August maneuvers of the new Army, planned months before as a step in the large-unit training sequence, were already under way when the Congress was considering the extension bill and a few days after its passage the maneuvers of the Third Army were completed. The official observers again noted serious defects whether viewed against a background of modern conditions or against the standards common to armies in wars past. Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commanding the Third Army, noted the troops' "stupid disregard" for the requirements that modern aerial warfare now imposed upon road discipline and dispersal routine; Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, commanding the VIII Corps, spoke sharply of the poor leadership asserted by many of the officers.[148] But the next month, September, brought the great maneuvers in the Louisiana–Texas area, employing 400,000 men of the Second and Third Field Armies, by far the largest the Army had ever held and the last, save one, of the large maneuvers to be held in the prewar training area.[149] By this time there was a better basis for training, thanks to the August legislation. The threat of losing both the National Guard personnel and the Selective Service trainees as soon as their individual terms of twelve months were served, was now thought—mistakenly[150]—to be a thing of the past, for under the terms of the new act, all these recruits would be subject to retention for a total of two and a half years.

Accordingly, maneuvers that had been planned in the disturbing fog of uncertainty now could be conducted with understandable confidence that the trainees of all ranks would remain in the Army long enough to warrant this systematic training. Field commanders whose immediate concern hitherto had been with the indoctrination of recruits with the first principles of soldier discipline and with the rudiments of field work by small units, were reminded by the Chief of Staff that the second stage was at hand.[151] They no longer would

[148] *The New York Times*, 22 Aug 41, p. 7.

[149] The 400,000 estimate is that of History of the Second Army, Study 16, Hist Sec AGF, pp. 23–26. A lecture by Brig. Gen. (later General) M. W. Clark, undated but filed in AG 353 (515–41) Sec 1 c, describes the Second Army at one phase as made up of 123,000 men in 2 triangular divisions, 3 square, 1 cavalry, and 1 armored division, and the Third Army as of 219,000 men in 8 square divisions, 1 triangular, 1 armored, and 1 reinforced cavalry division, plus other units.

[150] The unexpected order to reduce the number in training came on 20 September 1941. See Chapter XI, pp. 362ff.

[151] Memo of General Instructions, CofS for Army, Corps, and Division Commanders, 17 Oct 41, no sub, OCS 19246–67.

receive in their units almost raw recruits but men qualified in basic training. The immediate problem was a correction in fundamental weaknesses disclosed at the recent maneuvers, plus a tightening of discipline, and the Army could now make better progress toward field efficiency than had previously been possible. Inferentially the field commanders could begin to think for the future in terms of tactical operations, with experienced officers in charge of disciplined troops provided with new weapons and ready to be employed in the new-type organizations toward which the Army had previously been working experimentally. More attention could now be given to soldier athletics and other diversions as set out in Army Regulations 210–10 and to public parades too, which meant that there should be more attention to individual soldierly appearance and good conduct.

The triangular infantry division, the swifter and more powerful armored unit, the wholly mechanized transportation, the airborne detachment in fledgling form, the incipient mountain-trained battalion, the task force created for special missions including amphibian operations, all these now were realities.

The air elements, replacing each augmentation with a larger one, were increasing in numbers, efficiency, and ambitions. Their pilots were seven times as numerous in late 1941 as they had been when Poland was invaded, and the once "impossible" program of 30,000 pilots a year was about to be replaced by a new program for 37,000 a year. Most significant of all was the fact that the air establishment was about to take its place as the equal of the Army's ground force.

The three incomplete infantry divisions that General Marshall had mentioned as the force available in 1939 were now changed to thirty going divisions complete in numbers and improving in quality, backed by six armored divisions.

The old cavalry units had been converted variously into infantry or artillery or armor or reconnaissance units, plus one vestigial type that lingered briefly; this was a "horse-portee" unit, in which the horses were bodily transported in motor vans for the long road hauls and then unloaded for use in local reconnaissance. This device, totally abandoned in February of 1942 as fantastic, was the last effective struggle made by the American cavalryman in behalf of his horse's place in the overseas combat forces. For decades the mounted service had been the mainstay of frontier fighting and the school in which some of the Army's most distinguished and aggressive field commanders both in World War I and World War II had received their tactical training; the horse cavalry

now was finished as a major arm, but the boldness and resourcefulness that had been the essence of cavalry doctrine were carried over into the doctrines both of the mechanized reconnaissance elements and of the armored force, with glorious results to be harvested in the 1944 campaign across France.[152]

With seeming assurance at last that personnel would remain in service as needed, the Army was now free to fit itself for all kinds of combat and to assume something of the shape that the Staff had been industriously designing for it. The 400,000-man maneuvers proceeded in the better state of mind that this circumstance created for the command—and to some extent for the rank and file as well, it would seem, for the published whinings about the soldiers' sorrows and about the mud or dust perceptibly dwindled. Newspaper columns recorded, rather, the exploits of the men engaged in the mock maneuvers of the Second and Third Armies in the Sabine River valley. General Marshall's comment on the situation, following his brief visit there, was that "morale is mending." [153]

The next maneuvers, in the Carolina area, employed fewer troops but made more concentrated use of armor and for this reason were of lively interest to Washington. On their termination the Secretary of War summoned a conference in his office "to familiarize the officers present with the lessons which had been learned from the maneuvers and to exchange views, also to determine the most important training plans for the Army for the coming year." [154] Held on 3 December 1941, this conference reveals the points of largest concern to the Department in the realm of troop training less than a week before the declaration of war. Among those present in Mr. Stimson's office were Under Secretary Patterson, Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary for Air Robert A. Lovett, the Chief of Staff, and all three Deputies (Generals Bryden, Moore, and Arnold), the Chief of Staff, GHQ (General McNair), and his Deputy (General Clark), whose large function was troop training. The record of the meeting touches on these points:

(1) There was still dissatisfaction with the training of small units, and this training was to be stressed in coming months.

[152] The total elimination of the horse, it happens, was premature. In 1943, in the mountains of Sicily and Italy as well, there proved to be a critical need for pack animals. The 3d Division's resourceful commander, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Lucian Truscott, acquired Italian animals and pack saddles, raked up horsemen from within his division, and employed the emergency "cavalry troop" with striking success.

[153] *The New York Times*, 29 Sep 41, p. 8.

[154] CofS file, Notes on Conf, bndr 29, 4 Dec entry.

(2) The outstanding question was the struggle between tank and antitank, fairly well tested in Carolina by the use of 865 tanks and armored cars, against 764 mobile antitank guns and 3,557 other pieces of artillery;[155] the tactical employment of antitank weapons called for restudy, armored units likewise had not been sufficiently massed for field operation, and there was a demonstrated need for a higher ratio of medium tanks.

(3) The horse units had not proved their value.

(4) Tactical air forces were poorly co-ordinated with the ground units they were to support.

(5) Motor transport was used without a realistic sense of limitations that actual field maintenance would impose.

(6) Larger and earlier use of mines was called for.

(7) Radio communications from ground to air were "awful," in General Arnold's judgment.

(8) Communications generally were too slow.

In the main, the maneuvers were declared to be better than earlier maneuvers, which was to be hoped for at this late date, and there was a difference of the judgments of air and ground officers as to the responsibility for the admittedly poor co-ordination of those elements. One hopeful situation was pointed out: the ammunition plants were beginning to function more fully, and during the winter there would come to hand a far better supply of small arms cartridges for the training of the troops.

On this theme the War Department ended the maneuver season of 1941 and looked toward training plans for 1942. The succeeding week end provided the Pearl Harbor disaster and a new theme.

[155] Greenfield *et al.*, *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 60.

CHAPTER VIII

Officer Selection, Promotion, and Rejection

The enlargement of the Army in 1940 gave rise to many problems of officer personnel, not least of which concerned the efficiency of Regulars whose physical condition and mental alertness, adequate for peacetime routine, were below the requirements of an emergency. With National Guard and Reserve officers the difficulty was quickly correctible, for in regulations affecting them, based upon the National Defense Act, there was ready authority for retiring or discharging unsatisfactory officers.[1] In the Regular service this was less easy, the only means at the time being that provided by the National Defense Act for designating an officer as in Class B, indicating that he was unfit for active duty and subject to retirement. In operation this was a frail reliance. Tabulations made by G–1 in the winter of 1940–41 revealed that during the five-year span of 1936–40 only 61 officers of the Regular Army had been provisionally placed in Class B under statutory proceedings, and of these 24 had been restored to duty; only 37 had finally been removed. These 37 "reclassifications," averaging 7.4 a year, were manifestly few in relation to the 14,000 members of the 1940 officer corps, and the Chief of Staff became convinced both that they were too few, and that the trouble lay partly with the slow-moving machinery (provided by the act) and partly with the protection it afforded the officer who chose to appeal from the decisions affecting him.[2]

[1] "Under existing law the commissions of officers of the Officers' Reserve Corps may be revoked at any time in the discretion of the President, and federal recognition of the officers of the National Guard may be withdrawn by the President upon the recommendation of a board of officers appointed by the Secretary of War"—Extract from Ltr, Gen Marshall to Hon Harold D. Smith, Dir Bureau of the Budget, 25 Jun 41, G–1/14349–50, copy in OCS 15636–476. Sections 37 and 76 of the NDA provide the authority.

[2] The relevant papers include: (1) Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 24 Aug 40, sub: Revision of Class B Law, copy in G–1/14349–50; (2) Memo, OCS for TAG, 29 Nov 40, sub: Revision of Class B Law, signed by SGS at direction of CofS, OCS 15636–474; (3) Tabulations prepared by Statistics Branch GS, 2 Dec 40 and 13 Mar 41, on Regular Army Officers (Provisionally and Finally) Placed in Class B . . ., G–1/3615–12; (4) Gen Marshall's prepared statement on HJR 203 in G–1/14349–50; (5) His testimony before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong, 1st sess, 9 Jul 41, on SJR 88, and before House Committee on Military Affairs, 15 Jul 41, 77th Cong, 1st sess, on HJR 199; (6) Ltr, Gen Marshall to Dir Bureau of Budget, 25 Jun 41, noted above. The National Defense Act deals with Class B designations in Section 24 b.

In late August 1940 G–1 provided General Marshall with a memorandum holding that

> . . . the initiation of selective temporary promotion and efforts to vitalize the commissioned personnel of the Regular Army should be accompanied by a more effective system of elimination. . . . Any . . . procedure that involves action by five boards, the Secretary of War, and the President before an officer can be removed from the active list will never fully accomplish the purpose for which it is intended.

The memorandum proposed the establishment, rather, of "one board of general officers that shall recommend removal from the line of promotion for any reason deemed by it to be good and sufficient," with the officer facing honorable discharge a year after his removal. Following an inquiry to the Judge Advocate General on 29 November as to its legal sufficiency and constitutionality, a bill to create a board with such powers during the emergency period, and to place dismissal authority in the Secretary's hands, was prepared by the Staff. It was supported by General Marshall, who told a Congressional committee:

> In normal peacetime the burden of personal deficiencies in quality can be borne without fatal consequences. But not today when every officer of the Regular establishment, particularly the senior field officer, is an example for others to imitate. . . . The development of our young soldiers must not be jeopardized by insufficient or ineffective leadership. . . .
>
> . . . We find it takes from six months to a year and a half to process one of these cases and after it reaches the stage of final approval it is sometimes held up for six months by various pressures that are brought to bear. . . .
>
> [The desire is] to proceed on the basis of maximum efficiency . . . and to place the Regular Army officer personnel on a status similar to that now authorized for the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps as concerns elimination to improve efficiency.[3]

The bill met with Congressional approval (Public, 190, 29 July 1941). General Marshall gave assurance that he expected its operation to affect only about 1 percent of the officer corps of the Regular Army, mainly colonels and lieutenant colonels, and this proved to be a fair estimate. The board (initially referred to as the Removal Board and later, because of added functions, less ominously known as the Appointment Board and eventually becoming the War Department Personnel Board)[4] was headed from the outset by General Craig, the former Chief of Staff being returned to active duty for this important function. Its recommendations met with little opposition. For this the board's distin-

[3] See n. 2, items 4 and 5.

[4] Memo, OCS for TAG, 17 Jan 42, sub: Title of Gen Craig's Board, OCS 16912–116. On the original board, besides General Craig were Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron and Maj. Gens. Walter S. Grant, Walter L. Reed, John H. Hughes, and William E. Cole.

guished membership no doubt was largely responsible, but an added factor was the statement of policy under which it acted, enunciated at the outset in G–1 recommendations that bear the penned initials of General Marshall. It read:

> . . . It should be clearly understood that the mission of the board is not to weigh a long and successful career against a failure in 1940 or 1941. It is not the function of the board to determine how good a man he has been, rather it is to determine the worth and value of the individual to the Army today. Critical times are upon us. . . . The measure must be today's performance.[5]

It was this statement of policy that greatly facilitated the board's work. As was foreseen, numerous officers scheduled for separation had friends who were active in their behalf, and many letters were received in protest against compulsory retirement of veterans with excellent records. Some of the letters to the Chief of Staff, urging reconsideration, came from members of Congress, to whom for the most part went carefully worded replies patterned after the language of the G–1 memorandum.[6] There was a misguided newspaper protest also that the measure was directed against the National Guard, which was not in fact affected at all by the new statute.[7] Even so, need for periodic re-examination of the fitness of National Guard and Reserve officers, as of Regulars, was so apparent that in September, soon after the Louisiana two-army maneuver, the Chief of Staff decided that procedure should be spurred. He accordingly wrote twenty-six letters to the commanding generals of armies, corps areas, departments, and schools, enclosing G–1 charts on reclassification which he said "depict a shocking lack of attention to the important matter of handling such proceedings expeditiously." [8] There seems to have been no discrimination either for or against the inefficient Regular as distinguished from the inefficient Reservist, and the work of conscientiously weeding out from all active lists such officers as were no longer capable of doing satisfactory work met with support from within the civilian components. The commanding general of one of the National Guard divisions addressed to the Chief of Staff a letter whose tone won this approving reply:

[5] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 21 Aug 41, sub: Matters to Discuss with the Removal Board, G–1/3615–24.

[6] Letters from several Congressmen are filed in G–1/3615–53 and G–1/16252–370. See also Memo, CofS for G–1, 22 Apr 41, no sub, OCS 15636–475, for a somewhat similar episode.

[7] Copy, with accompanying 1 Jul 41 letter from Maj Gen A. H. Blanding, with Gen Marshall's 14 Jul 41 reply, in G–1/3615–12.

[8] Personal Ltrs, Gen Marshall to all commanders having reclassification jurisdiction, 29 Sep 41, G–1/3615–37.

You are certainly right about the desirability of releasing from active duty, in certain eventualities, the type of officers referred to in your letter—and of doing this if at all possible without humiliation of the affected indivdual.[9]

Precautions Against Discriminatory Treatment of Reserve Components

To win the support of the Reserve groups for methods directed toward their own improvement the Chief of Staff announced in mid-June the intention to create an advisory board to guide the Secretary of War in exceptional cases involving the reclassification of senior National Guard and Reserve officers with unsatisfactory records. The board was to be made up of distinguished ex-officers of the Reserve components for the specific purpose of protecting the War Department from charges of hostility to these services.[10] The potency of this particular safeguard was illustrated in September in the case of a brigadier general in the Army of the United States whom the division commander, supported by the reclassification board, the army commander, and G–1 of the War Department, relieved of his command for "unsatisfactory performance of duties." He had been absent frequently on political matters (he was a member of his state legislature) and in the judgment of his superior had neglected the divisional training and failed to eliminate unsatisfactory officers under him. However, he declined to resign voluntarily as asked by the reclassification board, and G–1 recommended that he be honorably discharged. The Advisory Board felt otherwise, and its canny judgment was shared both by the Chief of Staff and by the Secretary. The Departmental order simply reassigned the offending general to other duty.[11] There was similar reluctance on the part of the Chief of Staff to deprive of federal recognition all those officers who were eliminated from the active list by reason of having passed the revised age-in-grade, General Marshall expressing the view that, as the emergency increased, these older but experienced officers might be useful in other capacities, as in fact hundreds of them proved to be in administrative posts, particularly for the Air Forces.[12] A

[9] Ltr, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen George A. White, CG 41st Div, 21 Jun 41, OCS 16810–290, copy in G–1/16172–597.

[10] Ltr, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen John F. O'Ryan (CG, 27th Div, World War I), 13 Jun 41, copy in G–1/3615–13.

[11] Memo, CofS for SW, 3 Sep 41, with brief of reclassification and related documents, G–1/16083–54.

[12] Memo, CofS for CofNGB, 5 Sep 41, sub: Separation from Active Duty, G–1/16172–665. In curious contrast to this reasoning one notes record of a 2 December 1941 conference of the Chief of Staff and a Reserve Officers' Association official upon permitting voluntary resignation by senior Reserve officers after twelve months' active service. General Marshall favored acceptance but G–1 two days later held it to be

tabulation in August 1941 indeed showed that already 139 colonels, 252 lieutenant colonels, and 111 majors from the over-age promotion list of the Regular Army were on troop duty.[13] In the following spring, with war under way, a report of officers on duty in the corps area commands (as distinguished from troop commands) showed how largely younger men had been winnowed out for field service. Of the 18,084 assigned to the corps areas 2,979 were of troop age and 15,105 (83 percent) were over-age.[14] Some higher commanders failed to forward recommendations for promotion of over-age officers, "apparently under the erroneous impression that such officers cannot be promoted." They were advised that officers who were "over-age for present grade only may be recommended for promotion if otherwise qualified." [15] At approximately the time when General Marshall was predicting that older officers would in time be found amply useful, he was finding a special opportunity to use a few of them in a measure of officer economy. He wrote the several army commanders directing them to establish a permanent board of four over-age senior officers at each army headquarters to take over work that currently was being assigned to *ad hoc* boards whose members were sufficiently occupied with urgent training duties. Each board was to be made up of a major general from the National Guard, two Regular Army colonels, and one Reserve colonel.[16]

A summation of final action by reclassification during the summer and autumn of 1941 reveals that from June to November 195 Regular Army officers were in fact removed from the active list by discharge or forced retirement. This was more than five times as many as had been removed in five years' operation of the Defense Act, and represented 1.3 percent of all Regular Army officers, or slightly more than General Marshall had estimated. Nearly all were field officers, the list recording 31 colonels, 117 lieutenant colonels (a part of the promotion list's embarrassing "hump" in that category resulting from World

contrary to the apparent intent of Congress. Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 4 Dec 41, sub: Acceptance of Resignations, G–1/8615–34 A. This was before Pearl Harbor. Later in the month General Marshall ruled that the declaration of war precluded such resignations, and that it was inadvisable to accept any because of the wartime value of trained officers. Ltr, Gen Marshall to Lt. Col. James P. Hollers, Pres of Reserve Officers' Assn, 22 Dec 41, G–1/8615–34 A.

[13] Tabulation "Over-Age Promotion List . . . on Troop Duty," compiled on 20 Aug 41, G–1/16347–394.

[14] Tabulation "Age-in-Grade Status of Officers . . . Apr 20, 1942" which is Tab A with Memo, CG SOS for CofS, 1 May 42, sub: Troop-age Officers on Duty, SPGA 16347–394, filed with G–1/16347–394.

[15] Memo, ACofS G–1 for TAG, 21 Feb 42, sub: Promotion and Reassignment of Over-Age Officers, G–1/16347–394.

[16] Ltr, 4 Sep 41, and related papers filed with Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 11 Oct 41, sub: Duties of Army Board, G–1/3615–13.

War I additions to the corps), 31 majors, and 16 captains. In that same period 269 National Guard and Reserve officers had been similarly reclassified, these, however, being mainly company officers, the list running: 6 colonels, 8 lieutenant colonels, 14 majors, 60 captains, 84 first lieutenants, 97 second lieutenants. Of these, 33 National Guard officers had been reclassified and 94 had resigned; 68 Reserve officers had been reclassified and 74 had resigned. The 127 National Guard officers thus dropped represented three-fourths of 1 percent of the Guard's officer total; the 142 Reserve officers dropped represented one-fourth of 1 percent of the Reserve officers on active duty. In each case, somewhat unexpectedly, the separations from service were fewer, both absolutely and relatively, than the forced separations from the Regulars.[17]

The General Staff itself on occasion felt it necessary to warn against relieving young Reserve officers from duty with too great celerity, before they had time to prove fitness in an unaccustomed environment. A regimental commander in early 1941, for example, in discussing personnel matters wrote to G–1 his view that while in general the Reservists constituted excellent officer material, some 10 to 20 percent of them were so lacking in aptitude, physique, personality, or other attributes as to be unsuitable for commissioned officers: he wished some simple method of relieving them from active duty, instead of wasting money and effort on them for their normal year's tour. G–1, in a reply which must have echoed instructions from above, observed:

> . . . Certain limitations regarding the elimination of inefficient officers of the Reserve components were deliberately adopted. We consider that every officer should have at least three months in which to demonstrate his personal efficiency. . . . The War Department believes that it would be unwise at this time to institute a more speedy system such, for instance, as the one operated in the AEF during the World War. If we were to organize a second Blois [named from the French city in which A. E. F. officers were swiftly reclassified in 1918] at this time, the Regular Army would almost certainly be accused of conducting a pogrom rather than a reclassification of inefficient officers. . . .[18]

Complaints to the Chief of Staff in person with regard to the fitness of Regular officers brought a variety of actions which the situations presumably called for. They ranged from sharp rebuttal to a sometimes surprising agreement as in the case of a Harvard Law School Reserve officer who had written to Justice Felix Frankfurter criticizing War Department conduct. In replying, via

[17] See press release, initialed "G. C. M.," prepared on 27 Nov 41 for publication in the service papers, G–1/3615–37.

[18] (1) Personal Ltr, CO 9th Inf to Brig Gen Wade H. Haislip, ACofS G–1, 11 Mar 41. (2) Reply to same, 2 Apr 41. Both filed in G–1/13864–441.

the White House military aide, General Marshall said with unaccustomed harshness, but with the transparent aim of furthering current legislation:

> Major Simpson's criticisms stem from the fact that his Army contacts have been principally with superannuated Regular Army officers on duty with the Organized Reserves. I frankly agree that most of our senior officers on such duty are deadwood and should be eliminated from the service as rapidly as possible. Steps to do this will be taken promptly under the Promotion-Retirement bill [HR 9243] if this bill is approved by the President.[19]

Expediting Promotion of the Specially Deserving

Hand in hand with the effort to eliminate unfit Regular officers moved the effort to hasten promotion for the exceptionally fit. Special attention was needed because, unlike that of the Navy, the Army's prewar promotion system (save in selection for general officers) operated by seniority only. A crippling complication was provided during the thirties by the "hump" of officers who had originally entered the Army in great number during World War I and remained in it, with the result that within an age group of a very few years were still some 4,200 officers, almost one-third of the entire Regular Corps. Inevitably the "hump" slowed promotion of individuals within and below that group to a discouragingly laggard pace. In 1940 these 4,200 included the lowest 400 files of lieutenant colonel, all the majors, and the upper 900 files of captain's rank. More than 1,000 officers whose age and years of service were appropriate for lieutenant colonel were still captains.[20] A War Department proposal fitting grade to years in service, which was designed in April 1939 to provide promotions automatically on a time schedule, was approved by the President but defeated in the Congress because its operation would necessarily have forced the retirement of many officers of under sixty.[21] The idea was merely set aside, so far as the War Department was concerned, and a better-organized proposal to accomplish the needed result was initiated for presentation under more favoring conditions of the following year.

Without waiting beyond July, however, the principle of promotion by selection, if only at a high level and in a limited number of cases, was advanced

[19] Memo, CofS for Gen Watson (Mil Aide to Pres), 14 Jun 40, sub: Letter from Maj. S. P. Simpson, OCS 20197–6. See also Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 97–103.

[20] Statement of SW before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 8 Apr 40, copy in G–1/14349–43 A.

[21] *Ibid.*

before Congress by General Marshall who then was Acting Chief of Staff. He explained that, in line with the general rule of seniority, the commander of each of the four field armies then in nominal existence attained his position automatically by being the senior corps area commander in his army area. Possession of that important post therefore might depend on a few months' longer service and nothing more, and might be subject to early change because of the senior officer's retirement for age. In neither case would outstanding merit be the controlling factor. General Marshall's plea was for a reform measure which would substitute efficiency for routine or the accident of a birthday. And he supported a House bill to create four lieutenant generals to command the four field armies.[22] The new rank was to be retained only while the individual commanded the field army, and each vacancy was to be filled by Secretarial appointment in order to place in it the most suitable officer, irrespective of seniority. General Marshall identified the bill as one of great importance, designed to increase efficiency and "to develop more rapidly . . . practical preparation for war." Asked whether its denial of the traditional Army privilege of seniority might not have a bad effect, he replied calmly, "We will have to do that if we are going to get efficiency . . . the thing is just cold business." [23]

This forthright presentation of the principle of selection for efficiency, even on a limited scale, paved the way for proposing further promotion reforms. Accordingly the Department reintroduced in the following March the April 1939 proposal to provide grades in relation to years of service, in order to expedite normal promotion in field officer and higher grades. The plan also sought to make retirement mandatory for officers in upper age brackets.[24] Stimulated by the sudden revival of the war in Europe the legislative committees met promptly for consideration of the proposal and summoned the Secretary of War (then Mr. Woodring), General Marshall as Chief of Staff, and Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) William E. Shedd, his G–1. Said the Chief of Staff:

> . . . Some legislation of this nature should be accomplished at the earliest practicable moment. Otherwise we are getting into a rather impossible situation so far as the general efficiency of the officer corps of the Army is concerned. And I mean particularly the leadership. . . .

[22] See testimony of DCofS before House Committee on Military Affairs, 11 July 1939, at hearing on HR 7093 to provide rank and title of lieutenant general.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Memo, CofS for SW, 29 Mar 40, G–1/14349–34. In same file are the resultant bills: S 3172, 3 Apr 40, and HR 9243, 4 Apr 40.

As it stands now, the officers in that last group . . . will be so old when the time comes that they might eventually reach the grade of colonel and lieutenant colonel so limited in experience in handling men except in small groups that it would be a very unfortunate thing for the Army to have them suddenly jump to positions of high command and control. . . .

When we move troops in the field under the difficulties of a campaign, aggressive leadership is absolutely vital to success . . . the efficiency of the whole army depends upon leadership. . . . We must have those leaders; and they will not be developed under the present system.[25]

Before the House committee he spoke on the relationship of age to physical endurance:

. . . Leadership in the field depends to an important extent on one's legs and stomach and nervous system and on one's ability to withstand hardships and lack of sleep and still be disposed energetically and aggressively to command men, to dominate men on the battlefield. . . . [In World War I] I saw 27 different divisions of ours engaged in battle—we employed 29—and there were more reliefs of field officers . . . due to physical reasons than for any other cause . . . their spirit, their tenacity of purpose, their power of leadership over tired men, was broken through physical fatigue.[26]

A New Bill for Selective Promotion

The bill was enacted into law on 13 June 1940.[27] Obviously it would do a good deal to push the younger officers upward in mass. It still would do nothing to provide special advancement for individuals of outstanding merit, and in the summer of 1940, as the Regular Army increased in numbers and as added responsibilities for training great numbers of draftees appeared in prospect, it became evident that some such selective advancement was required. The Staff prepared a bill for revising the National Defense Act in such a way as to provide selective advancement and at the same time to assure uniformity of promotion methods throughout the Army, that is, permitting promotion of Regular officers as well as National Guard and Reserve officers to higher temporary grade, in emergency as in war.[28]

[25] Statement, Gen Marshall before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 8 Apr 40, on S 3712, 76th Cong, 3d sess, pp. 12–13, G–1/14349–43 A.

[26] Testimony of Gen Marshall before House Committee on Military Affairs, 9 Apr 40, at Hearings on HR 9243, 76th Cong, 3d sess, pp. 18–19, G–1/14349–43. See also argument for 31 new generals for command purposes in Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for ACofS G–1, 11 Jun 40, sub: Commissioned Personnel, G–115588–185, copy in WPD 4052–1.

[27] Pub 612, 76th Cong.

[28] S 4207, which revised par. 7 of sec. 127a of the National Defense Act, introduced in Senate on 25 Jul 40 and enacted into law by act of 9 Sep 40.

General Marshall was to be away from Washington while the Congressional hearings were in progress, and he designated his G–1 (General Shedd) and G–3 (General Andrews) to attend such sessions as should be called in his absence. A memorandum left word that "the Chief of Staff wishes a very strong presentation to be made" and directed emphasis on, first, the need for such legislation to provide leadership, second, the insignificant cost, third, the fact that it sought authority like that already possessed by National Guard and Reserve. He added: "If it is considered necessary to insure the enactment of the bill which he believes vital to the national defense, General Marshall will return to testify." [29]

He did in fact return to press his views. In support of the measure he employed arguments almost identical with those used the previous year in advocating the selection for lieutenant general of the best available officers rather than the oldest in service. He explained the desirability of promoting officers currently holding rank not commensurate with their posts, and pointed out that all the way from lieutenant to brigadier, as a result of increased responsibilities of 1940, officers were holding positions that called for higher rank than was permitted by the permanent-grade law which was then in effect. In a personal letter to the Senate Military Affairs Committee which was weighing the Department's request, General Marshall urged early action:

> . . . The Regular Army is in process of expanding from a strength of 227,000 to 375,000 without any corresponding increase in permanent commissioned personnel. It is essential therefore that we have authority to utilize our present officer corps to the best advantage. Officers with knowledge, initiative, drive, and leadership must be placed in important command and staff positions. We have the officers and they can be so placed, provided authority is granted to select and redistribute them without the normal peacetime restrictions as to seniority. . . . Such authority now exists in wartime. It should also exist during an emergency.
>
> . . . Leadership in the field, and especially during the hurried organization of the urgently needed new units, must not depend on seniority, meaning age.[30]

In the letter and in his discussion of the bill before the committee a few days later [31] he pointed out that (as was the case with the elimination of unfit officers) existing legislation met the needs of National Guard and Reserve organizations for temporary promotion. There was no corresponding law to meet

[29] Memo, OCS for G–1 and G–3, 9 Aug 40, no sub, OCS 21151–2.

[30] Ltr, CofS to Chairman, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 16 Aug 40, G–1/16252. See also Memo, SW for the President, 18 Jul 40, OCS 21151–1, stressing urgency of promotion legislation.

[31] See Testimony of Gen Marshall before Senate Committee on Military Affairs 20 Aug 40, 76th Cong, 3d sess, on S 4207.

identical needs in the Regular Army. He remarked that currently seven divisions were under command of brigadiers, rather than major generals; so was the Armored Corps (of two divisions); numerous colonels were performing brigadiers' duties; lieutenants of ten years' experience were commanding companies because, although a 375,000-man army called for 4,697 captains, existing legislation allowed only 2,483; prospective summoning of the National Guard would call for creation of corps and hence for the selection of corps commanders from a group of already underranked division commanders. A source of his argument appears to have been a G–1 compilation of material containing additional data and an occasional sharp expression such as this: "We are left in the position of according command purely on the basis of seniority of colonels, which means that field command where leadership is most important would go usually to the least vigorous physically."

An accompanying tabulation noted the need for 21 additional major generals and 35 new brigadiers to complete the organization for an army of 375,000.[32]

With the bill's passage questions relating to its application mounted steadily, many of them coming before the Chief of Staff for his decision. They included such odd and personal items as a request from one of the newly named and temporary lieutenant generals for additional allowances similar to those granted by law to the four field army commanders, a suggestion that General Marshall laid on the shelf:

> . . . We requested authority for temporary promotions solely for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of command. It was realized at the time that the result would be temporary inequalities in pay and allowances, but the pay question is one which we prefer to leave quiescent at the present time.[33]

There was a considerable burst of letter-writing from Congressmen, old Army acquaintances and others, suggesting to the Chief of Staff the names of candidates for consideration as brigadiers. Many of these letters General Marshall answered personally,[34] despite the time required for such correspondence. When

[32] Both memorandum and tabulation are found in G–1/16252. Neither is dated or signed, but they apparently were prepared in July or August 1941 for use of the Chief of Staff at the hearings. It is worthy of note that even with later and larger authority for promotions there was a surprising lag in Presidential advancement to general officer grades. A memorandum from the Secretary of War (prepared in OCS) for the President, 11 Feb 42, sub: Temporary Promotions, reports an accumulation of numerous vacancies "some of more than 6 months' duration," and appends a list of 16 division commanders, then brigadiers "usually junior to the other brigade commanders in the same division," and 34 brigade commanders; also a corps area commander for a vacancy existent since May 41. Filed in OCS 17336–144.

[33] Ltr, CofS to Maj Gen Emmons, GHQ Air Force, 14 Dec 40, OCS 20564–22, copy in G–1/16083–18.

[34] For a typically courteous but discouraging reply, observing that temporary promotions were limited to those "absolutely necessary to fill command positions," and that in consequence "very many excellent

the Staff undertook to relieve a much-pressed Chief of Staff of unnecessary interruption by solicitous but ill-informed visitors, he sometimes resisted. There is flickering humor in an example. To an officer who offered his advice to General Marshall, G–1 drafted an appropriate reply, which the Chief of Staff dutifully signed, as follows:

I would be very glad to have any suggestions you may have in regard to temporary promotions. However, I find that there are hardly enough hours during the day to meet the many demands on my time and, as I know you are also busy, I would suggest that instead of taking the time to come down here, you let me have a letter setting forth your views on this question.

So far, so good, but at the bottom of the letter to this old acquaintance General Marshall added:

G–1 drafted this. If you care to come down, and will be satisfied with ten minutes, and take a chance on when I can give you that time, I will see you. G. C. M.[35]

Pressure for information on reasons for the promotion policy and on their justification, and of course for the advancement of individuals, continued, and eventually a letter explained at some length the aims of the emergency promotion system. It was drafted by G–1 for signature by The Adjutant General, but it bears the impress of the Chief of Staff's policy direction:

Promotion based on length of service is satisfactory only under the normal conditions of peacetime. In an emergency, in a period of rapid expansion of the army, or during actual war, that system of promotion is much too slow. Already the temporary selection of Regular officers has far outstripped permanent promotion based on length of service. Under present conditions, and in actual war, promotion must be based primarily on demonstrated ability, and must be as rapid as the current situation demands. While expansion is taking place promotion is accelerated. After expansion is completed, the rate diminishes. . . . No system of promotion based on service-in-grade could adequately meet the needs of an emergency army.

The fact that promotion by selection, based upon demonstrated ability and adjusted in tempo to the varying needs of the Army, leaves some officers of long service in their present grades is recognized as a regrettable but unavoidable result. We cannot let our sympathy for these officers divert us from the prime necessity of preparing a larger number of younger officers for the responsibilities they must assume when the shooting begins.

We cannot well operate two systems of promotion—one on the basis of selection, demonstrated ability, and available positions, and the other on length of service irrespective

officers have not been selected," see Ltr, Gen Marshall to Sen Morris Sheppard, 15 Nov 40, copy in G–1/16252–19. Letters in similar terms are found to McMillan in G–1/16252–9, to Wells in 16252–10, to Whittington in 16252–22, to Connor in 16252–122, to Bland in 16252–129, to Gov Lloyd C. Stark of Missouri in 16252–364.

[35] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Col L———, 18 Oct 40, G–1/16174–101.

of any other consideration. Such a dual system would bring us little but confusion, and the great surplus of senior grade officers that would thus be created could receive no adequate training.

The whole problem of promotion is the subject of continuous study in the War Department, and present policies are subject to change as conditions permit. We consider that we are now in a transition stage from the peacetime promotion system to which you refer to the uniform and adequate emergency system which our present situation demands.[36]

Policy Determining Selection and Promotion

Within a week of the selective-promotion act's passage on 9 September 1940 G–1 submitted a statement of policy on temporary promotions and General Marshall approved it. Impressive in that initial declaration are the statements that general officers should be selected without respect to grade or rank; that Regular lieutenants should be promoted to fill only Regular Army vacancies (not those in National Guard units); that their selection should be determined by a combination of seniority and fitness; that in the case of all Regulars considered for promotion, other than generals, the recommendation of their chiefs of arm or service would be called for; that eventually a single system of promotion by selection for all components of the Army should be established.[37]

The principle of promotion for proved capacity only, in each component of the Army, could not be successfully assailed. The same principle was early applied to the selection of new officers as well, being laid down formally by Secretary of War Stimson in October 1940, within a month after passage of the draft act and the summons to the National Guard.[38] These instructions were somewhat strengthened more than a year later, following G–1 recommendations to the Chief of Staff, by new and formal instructions to much the same effect, approved both by Secretary Stimson and General Marshall. The new instructions outlined procedure which would assure that

No commission will be given when the job in question can be performed by the individual in a civilian capacity.

No commission will be given for political reasons of any nature.

No commission will be given for personal reasons of any nature.

No action will be taken on the recommendations of an individual for commission.

[36] Ltr, TAG, prepared by G–1, to Rep Thomas E. Martin, 17 Nov 41, copy in G–1/16172–698.

[37] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 12 Sep 40, sub: Temporary Promotions, approved by CofS 17 Sep 40, G–1/16252, also in AG 210.2 (9–12–40). Origin draft with penciled notations bears an "OK–G.C.M."

[38] Memo, SW to ASW, CofS, and TAG, 14 Oct 40, sub: Appointment to Officers Reserve Corps, OCS 15102–554.

Only the recommendations of the Chief of the Arm or Service or War Department Bureau or Agency will be accepted for action.[39]

A month later General Marshall had his own rule tested by an application from Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York (an officer in World War I) for a new commission in the Reserve Corps, for possible service should military government be established abroad. G–1 advised the Chief of Staff that such appointments had been suspended and opposed exception to the rule, especially as no such vacancy existed or was in early prospect. General Marshall accordingly informed Mayor LaGuardia that such an appointment was undesirable at the moment: it could be made, when needed, with dispatch.[40]

Such were the inflexible principles governing the selection of new officers which now, with war actually in progress, were firmly stated for guidance also in promotion matters. The officer must have proved his capacity and acquired the needed experience. But, beyond this, the advancement in grade should be granted only when the Army's interests were served thereby. That these rules had been generally applied even before Pearl Harbor is well established but that infrequent exceptions were made to the several rules, not surprisingly, is equally true, for such things happen too in civilian life. Because of their relative infrequency the Army exceptions are the more conspicuous in the record. Thus, a quartermaster major doing excellent work was recommended for promotion out of turn, partly because in the higher grade he would gain better standing with officials with whom he dealt, and G–1 believed that "the best interests of the service will be served by making an exception"; so did the Deputy Chief of Staff, who approved it.[41] Again, a state governor holding a captaincy in the Reserve was recommended by his state adjutant for promotion, despite the fact that he lacked certificate of capacity, having failed to complete the necessary courses until the Reserve requirements had been changed; also there was no vacancy. G–1 supported the recommendation, noting the governor's "untiring effort" in matters of interest to the Army and holding that these activities should serve in lieu of active duty, despite existing regulations. The Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs refused to concur, contending plausibly enough

[39] Memo, OCS for G–1, 3 Jan 42, sub: Procedure to be Used for Submitting Applications for Commissions, OCS 21325–30, copy in G–1/16455 (1–5–42).

[40] (1) Memo, CofS for ACofS G–1, 3 Feb 42, signed by Gen Marshall, no sub. (2) Reply, 5 Feb 42, sub: Appointment of Mayor LaGuardia. (3) Personal Ltr, CofS to Mayor LaGuardia, 28 Feb 42. All in OCS 15102–875.

[41] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 3 Dec 41, sub: Temporary Promotion of Major ——— and related papers, G–1/16252–429, copy in OCS 21151–120.

that the recommendation was motivated by political considerations, and that the promotion would be unfair to 339 other Reserve captains. The Chief of Staff overruled him and supported G–1.[42] It may be assumed that there also were White House requests which were not opposed. On the other hand two promotion requests by the current chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee were refused, both in personal letters from General Marshall himself. The first was expressed with noticeable gracefulness:

> . . . On the face of it, waiver of the service requirement for the promotion of a Quartermaster lieutenant who is otherwise qualified seems a small thing to do for the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. Actually this is one of the cases where more is involved than the advancement of a single individual.
>
> There are a great many able junior officers, Regular, National Guard, and Reserve, who are filling positions of equal and greater importance and whose qualifications compare favorably with those of Lieut. ———. Like him, these officers do not meet the requirements for promotion, and the Quartermaster General is convinced that to single out one individual as an exception to our widely announced policy would have a most unfortunate effect. . . .
>
> . . . I would be placed in a most embarrassing position if we ordered the immediate promotion of Lieut. ——— contrary to the recommendation of the Chief of his own branch. I can assure you, however, that he will be promoted at the earliest possible moment that this can be done without causing unpleasant repercussions.[43]

The other letter referred to, addressed to the same Senator, was in response to a personal call on the Chief of Staff some weeks after Pearl Harbor in behalf of a lieutenant colonel who had been passed over for promotion. General Marshall wrote on the same day that the Senator had made personal inquiry. He announced that, whereas the officer's record included a number of "excellent" ratings, nearly 65 percent of the officers in his corps were on the "superior" list and the recommendation board had proposed for promotion no officer with ratings comparable to his. Inquiry also showed that the officer's General Efficiency Rating for the past ten-year period placed him in the low fifth of his grade and arm. In sum General Marshall found that the officer in question was not qualified for "promotion under our present system of selection based on demonstrated efficiency." [44] Even a memorandum from the Under Secretary,

[42] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 2 Dec 41, sub: Recommendation that Gov Sam H. Jones of Louisiana. . . . Be Promoted, G–1/16252–422, copy in OCS 21151–124.

[43] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Sen Robert R. Reynolds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 26 Nov 41, OCS/21151–116.

[44] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Sen Reynolds, 15 Jan 42, OCS/21151–148. A less brusque letter to Representative John L. McMillan, 28 Jan 42, discouraging his recommendation of a promotion to brigadier, was firm in its statement that selection must be of "the man most fully qualified for the specific vacancy." OCS 17336–123.

reporting the high qualifications of Regular Army field officers in his office and recommending that for promotion none be passed over by a junior, was answered with a report some weeks later that the board's current promotion lists for colonelcies and lieutenant colonelcies were complete, but that in the next wave careful consideration would be given the officers referred to.[45]

The source of recommendations rarely controlled the Chief of Staff's action, but it often determined the degree of friendliness in his reply. Thus, both to a colonel seeking his own promotion and to the sister of a colonel for whom she was urging advancement went discouraging replies, but in different tones. To the sister General Marshall wrote:

> . . . I regret that I can give you but slight hope at this time of favorable action in the matter of his promotion. The laws and policies are so restrictive that many fine officers, through no fault of their own, are placed in an unfortunate position when selections are made.
>
> As you state, your brother's age works against him. . . .
>
> Colonel ——— has an excellent record. It shows him to be an officer of the highest type, devoted to his profession, steadfast in his duties, and unusually active for his age. His record has been and will continue to be given every consideration under the laws and policies governing promotion to general officer.[46]

A much different letter went to the other colonel, who had spoken more favorably of himself, it would appear, than General Marshall felt warranted:

> When the appointment of a general officer is in prospect, extremely careful consideration is given to the record of every qualified and eligible colonel. This procedure is followed as a matter of principle. It is unnecessary for an officer personally to bring his qualifications to the attention of the War Department and, frankly, I consider such procedure inappropriate.
>
> . . . Also, due to the great distances which separate many conspicuously efficient officers from personal contact with me, the War Department, and other government officials in Washington, as well as [to] a proper reluctance on the part of officers to introduce the personal element in this matter, I am all the more careful to concentrate on the written record of each individual's career.[47]

To Vice President Henry Wallace shortly after Pearl Harbor went another frigid letter, signed by the Secretary of War but prepared by G–1 and the Chief

[45] (1) Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 17 Sep 41, sub: Temporary Promotions, referring to a 28 Aug 41 communication from USW, OCS 21151–59. (2) Memo, CofS for USW, 22 Sep 41, same sub and file. See also Memo, ACofS G–1 for SGS, 19 Feb 42, no sub, noting that CofS had approved only 57 percent of USW recommendations for general officers and 54 percent from chiefs of arms and services, G–1/16083–251, also in OCS 17336–146.

[46] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Mrs. O———, 2 Apr 41, OCS 17336–64.

[47] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Col ———, II Corps Area, 28 Feb 40, OCS 17336–32.

of Staff's Office and dispatched from the latter. Mr. Wallace had urged the promotion to brigadier of a lieutenant colonel serving in one of the numerous nonmilitary defense agencies. He argued that the officer needed the higher rank in order to deal with other officers. The reply, conforming to the policy laid down by the Chief of Staff, follows:

I have given your request careful consideration and I feel very strongly that this promotion of a very junior officer engaged in non-combatant duties would be extremely detrimental to the morale of the officer corps of the Army, many of whom are at this moment actively engaged against the enemy.

The number of general officer appointments is not unlimited. In fact many important command assignments and key positions for general officers of the line are now filled by officers of lower grades. Obviously the War Department must give first priority to conferring general officer grade on officers filling these critical military positions. . . .

. . . I hope you will understand the considerations which force me to disapprove your request.

It is my earnest desire that officers of the Army assigned to your organization perform their duties in a most efficient manner. If Lieutenant Colonel ——— or any others of these officers are unable to cooperate and work in harmony . . . I will upon your request relieve them and provide you with more suitable replacements.[48]

Because of the importance of especially high capacity among the officers to be named brigadier, the Chief of Staff awaited with special interest the recommendations of the board of officers named for that purpose. General Shedd discussed with him in December 1940 the basic qualifications to be set and in writing suggested:

that the Board consider the records of all colonels and lieutenant colonels of 28 years' service with "superior" ratings;

that outstanding qualities of leadership be noted;

that age be recognized as important, the officer being young enough to reach a major general's grade and serve there for several years (55 was the maximum for Reserve brigadiers as determined a year later, on 6 December 1941);

that every doubtful case should be eliminated;

that failure to appoint an officer previously listed as eligible should call for reconsideration.[49]

Whether before or after General Marshall's discussion with the board, three added suggestions were made:

[48] Ltr, SW to Vice President Wallace, 29 Dec 41, OCS 17336–111.

[49] Summarized, not quoted, from Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 16 Dec 40, no sub, G–1/16083–62 (12–16–40). Initialed "G. C. M." and marked "Explained to officers." See also Memo, G–1 for TAG, 6 Dec 41, sub: Brigadier General Eligible List, G–1/16083–62.

to have a trial list for comparison by the board to make sure that no injustice had been done in elimination;

to evaluate the reporting officer too;

to determine the physical ability and alertness of selected candidates.[50]

There were other principles to govern the advancement in all grades, which the Staff kept voicing. Now, it was the need for proof of necessity for promotion that was laid down by G–1 in the first winter of the National Guard's mobilization.[51] Now, on the other hand, there was need to urge less severity of judgment than the Selection Board was applying in its preparation of a list of Regular Army lieutenant colonels for promotion to colonel. Some 2,521 had been scrutinized before 800 of them were put on the eligible list—a rejection of two out of three. A total of 56 who had received a "Superior" rating for ten years were passed over altogether and G–1 made formal protest.[52] Now in an attempt to salvage as many good officers as possible, G–1 recommended reconsideration of officers who had failed to win promotion at the outset, and a series of these recommendations the Chief of Staff approved. In a personal letter to an officer who had failed to make the first promotion list he observed: "I purposely left the door entirely open for the later promotion of those who were not promoted on the first list." [53] As time went on, and the need of trained officers became more obvious, promotions were recommended on a more uniform basis.

Efforts to Stimulate Promotion of National Guard Officers

It was recognized early that special attention should be given, not only to the clear needs, but also to the sensibilities of the National Guard, whose call to federal duty would provide large cadres for no less than eighteen infantry divisions plus a number of other organizations. In October 1940, accordingly, through General Marshall's approval of G–3 suggestions, it was decided that as far as practicable the Guard's officers should be retained, and vacancies in these

[50] *Ibid.*, but on a separate slip attached to the other (likewise summarized).

[51] Memo, ACofS G–1 for TAG, through SGS, 7 Mar 41, sub: Promotion of Certain Officers, G–1/16252–163. See also Ltr, DCofS (Gen Bryden) to Maj Gen E. D. Peek, CG IX Corps Area, 11 Apr 41, G–1/16252–190.

[52] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 17 Jun 41, sub: Eligible List of Regular Army Promotion-List Officers . . . to the Grade of Colonel, AUS, G–1/16252–179, copy in OCS 21151–43. Appd by CofS 24 Jun 41.

[53] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Lt Col X. H. Price, Hq V Corps, 8 Jul 41, G–1/16252–259. See also preceding note and instructions to the Selection Board for Temporary Promotion to the Grade of Lt Col, Regular Army, appd by CofS 24 Dec 41, OCS 21151–144 and Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 2 Jan 42, sub: List of Majors, Promotion-List Branches, G–1/16252–446, copy in OCS 21151–144.

organizations should be filled not from non-Guard sources but by the promotion or appointment of personnel from within the same Guard units, and upon recommendation of the division or separate unit commander.[54] The 1940 assumption was that the National Guard would be on federal duty for only one year and then go home. This was an added reason for keeping its personnel intact so far as possible. A great many promotions were going to be needed to bring the National Guard units to war strength, a G–1 tabulation of early September indicating the need for 158 promotions to lieutenant colonel, 303 promotions to major, 1,564 to captain, 3,481 to first lieutenant, and 1,011 to second lieutenant, a total of 6,517.[55] As training advanced, and the entire National Guard was summoned by installments to federal service, with a prospect of duty prolonged beyond the twelve months of the original call, this principle of promotion from within the Guard where possible (except for general officers) was kept in effect and affirmed in August 1941, as follows:

1. Vacancies in National Guard units for commissioned officers in grades above the lowest will be filled by assignment or promotion of qualified personnel within the division or separate unit in which the vacancy occurs. Vacancies for which qualified personnel is not available within the unit concerned will be filled by assignments from other sources. . . . All vacancies for general officers will be filled by the War Department.

2. Twelve months satisfactory active military service in grade will be prerequisite for promotion of National Guard officers to the next higher grade [this could be waived on recommendation of superior officer] and professional examination for authorized promotion will be dispensed with. Officers from the National Guard not on duty with National Guard units may be promoted under the regulations and requirements applicable to members of the Officers' Reserve Corps on active duty.[56]

At about the same time the Chief of Staff approved the application of age-in-grade principles to the Reserve components of the Army, whereby they would share in the improvement that the Regular Army itself had thereby experienced. And once more, to protect the Guard personnel in its natural desire for promotion to vacancies thus created, he reminded G–1 of this policy.[57] Both before

[54] (1) See Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 3 Oct 40, sub: War Strength Commissioned Personnel for Inducted National Guard Units, G–1/16172–72. Appd by CofS 23 Oct 40 with "OK – G. C. M." (2) Ltr, TAG to CG's of armies, corps areas, departments and commanders of divisions and separate units inducted from National Guard, 24 Oct 40, same sub, AG 210.31 NGUS (10–3–40) M M–A.

[55] See Tab B to Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 12 Sep 40, sub: Temporary Promotions, G–1/16252, also in AG 210.2 (9–12–40).

[56] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 31 Jul 41, sub: Personnel Policies Affecting the National Guard, appd by CofS 2 Aug 41, G–1/16172–626.

[57] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 28 Aug 41, sub: Revised Personnel Policies Affecting the National Guard and accompanying papers, appd by CofS ("O.K., G.C.M.") 9 Sep 41, G–1/16172–626, also AG 210.31 NGUS (8–28–41).

and after World War I General Marshall had been assigned to duty with the National Guard and had a profound understanding of National Guard traditions and views. Now as Chief of Staff he warned his Staff against the use of unreasonably high standards for the promotion of National Guard officers. This view he expressed strongly in a letter to an army commander who was weighing the merits of a candidate for promotion:

> In considering the capabilities of a National Guard officer to command a National Guard unit, it is not believed that we should compare him with the best available Regular Army officer. Rather we should consider, in my opinion, whether or not the National Guard officer is capable of discharging the duties of the position in a creditable manner. If he can qualify under that standard, I feel that the National Guard officer should be selected.[58]

Despite the apparent desire to encourage National Guardsmen in their proper hopes for promotion, there was no relaxation of the principle that fitness should be the determining factor. There was an illustration of this in the case of a vacancy in the command of one of the National Guard divisions, the original commander of which was relieved from duty on 1 November 1941. The basic policy was stated often, not only with reference to this episode but to a great many of the same general nature, thus:

> The Chief of Staff is committed to the policy that any vacancy occurring in a National Guard organization will be filled by a National Guard officer if a qualified officer can be found in the unit. This policy applies to all positions, including that of division commander. . . .[59]

In that first sentence the "if" is to be noted. In examining the three brigadiers in the division, in order to determine which was best suited for the higher command, there was apparently a strong desire on the part of the Chief of Staff to advance one of the two National Guard brigadiers but, the corps and army commanders regarding neither of them as fully qualified, the command was given to the third, a Regular Army officer. In the records of this case is an unsent letter addressed to the commanding general of the Second Army, in which the division in question was a component. Although it was not used by

[58] Ltr, Gen Marshall to Lt Gen Ben Lear, CG Second Army, 23 Oct 41, copy in G–1/16083–91. The policy was laid down in connection with the selection of the commander for one of the National Guard divisions (see later mention) but is here expressed in the broad terms of policy. It follows the spirit of a suggestion in Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 18 Oct 41, sub: Successor to Gen H———, appd by DCofS, 21 Oct 41, G–1/16083–91, copy in OCS/20241–239. Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons in 1949 recalled that General Marshall frequently sent back promotion lists that had been sent him for approval, the return slip directing that there be further search of Reserve and National Guard personnel to produce men from those components who deserved promotion.

[59] Memo, OCS (signed by Col Walter B. Smith, SGS) for USW, 18 Nov 41, sub: Assignment . . . to Command the ——— Div, G–1/16083–87 (11–18–41).

General Marshall, a shorter note being actually dispatched, the view which it expresses in the second paragraph was in fact a statement of policy which was carried out:

It is regretted that ——— does not measure up to the minimum standards for a division commander. I had hoped, in the case of ——— Division, to find a qualified commander from among the National Guard officers of that unit.

However, we cannot deviate from our sound policy of insisting on adequate leadership. Where no satisfactory National Guard officer is available, I shall have no hesitation in placing a Regular officer in the National Guard vacancy.[60]

Recalling resentments within the National Guard during World War I over the War Department's frequent reassignment of National Guard officers whom it regarded as too old or otherwise unsuited for battle command, the Chief of Staff was anxious in 1940 to avert recriminations. He insisted therefore that the Regular or Reserve officer assigned to a vacancy should possess the qualifications which the former commander lacked. His particular desire was that no Regular be given such a regimental command unless his fitness justified the replacement and warranted his receiving the full respect of the National Guardsmen in the regiment. The G–1 directive on this point was painstakingly clear:

Whenever an Army Commander has decided to place a Regular Army officer in command of a National Guard regiment, he will assign an officer under fifty years of age whose ability and whose record of service are beyond reproach. This directive does not apply to officers now assigned as regimental commanders nor to National Guard officers assigned in the future, but will apply without exception to all officers of the Regular Army who are hereafter assigned as regimental commanders of National Guard units. If officers of these qualifications are not available within your Army in sufficient numbers, request for the assignment of the additional officers needed will be made to the War Department.[61]

[60] Unused Ltr, Gen Marshall to Lt Gen Ben Lear, CG Second Army, 7 Nov 41, G–1/16083–91 (11–7–41). See also Ltr, Gen Marshall to Rep J. Buell Snyder, 5 Feb 42, G–1/16083–53, on a major general who had been summoned to a retiring board, promising only that "should Gen ——— be found qualified for further active duty, every effort will be made to give him an assignment appropriate to his rank and dignity."

[61] Memo, G–1 for TAG, through SGS, noted by DCofS, 22 Sep 41, sub: Assignment of Regimental Commanders, copy in OCS 16810–336. It instructed that substance of this quotation be sent by radiogram to the four field army commanders. Even before the National Guard was called to active service there was consideration of a plan for improving its staff by infiltration from the Regular Army into one key post of each division—but only with approval of the National Guard itself, as permitted under the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 (Sec. 65). Application of this policy to his own organization was initiated by the commanding general of the 45th (National Guard) Division, Maj. Gen. William S. Key, in March 1940. In June of that year General Marshall considered a fuller application of the principle. For relevant correspondence see: (1) Memo, Actg DCofS (Gasser) to G–1, 21 Mar 40, sub: Regular Army Officers as Chiefs of Staff of NG divisions, OCS 18107–32; (2) Unused draft of Ltr, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen John F. Williams, Chief NGB, undated, filed with OCS 18107–33; (3) Personal Ltr, same to same, 8 Jun 40, same file.

Within the National Guard there was an understanding of War Department effort to treat the National Guard officers with consideration, and on occasion there was evidence of a reciprocal desire for the welfare of Regular Army officers assigned to that component. An example is afforded in the case of Lieutenant Colonel ——— of the Regular Army who, assigned as instructor to one of the field artillery regiments of the 29th Infantry Division (Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and District of Columbia), was given command of the 176th Field Artillery Regiment. The division commander thereupon recommended the officer's promotion to colonel, citing as argument the fact that a National Guard lieutenant colonel assigned at the same time to command of an infantry regiment had already been promoted. G–1 objected, noting that the Regular officer referred to was not on the current list of 800 eligibles and that, accordingly, his promotion would mean his passing over many officers above him in rank and eligibility. General Marshall directed G–1 to discuss the matter with the division commander. The latter accepted G–1's explanation, but stated his desire to retain the officer as regimental commander even in his current grade, and added with appropriate solemnity that "his principal interest was to make certain that no Regular officer would feel that he had been discriminated against while on duty with his Division." [62]

There were also less genial exchanges on the subject of the Regular's attitude toward the Guard and the Guard's toward the Regular. At the other extreme was the Chief of Staff's letter to a Senator who had forwarded copies of letters from querulous members of a National Guard division, then at Camp Claiborne, who had complained of Regular Army treatment of the Guard. On this point General Marshall wrote:

> Sixth: The writer of the letter mentioned in this paragraph is concerned with "the thinly veiled arrogance of the Regular Army and their constant efforts to put the Guard in a hole." There have been very few Regular officers at Camp Claiborne since the ——— Division arrived, and most of them have been subordinate to National Guard commanders. The Division itself has had six Regular officers, five of whom were rated "superior" and one "excellent" by the National Guard general in command.[63]

[62] (1) Memo, ACofS G–1 for TAG, through SGS, 10 Jul 41, sub: Temporary Promotion of Lt Col ——— FA; (2) Accompanying note for record; (3) Memo, ACofS G–1 for TAG, through SGS, 19 Jul 41, same sub. All in G–1/16252–218, copies in OCS 21151–51. See also Personal Ltr, Maj Gen Charles H. Grahl, President Adjutants General Assn, to SW (Woodring), 27 Mar 40, OCS/16810–91, personal copy to Gen Marshall, expressing thanks for latter's co-operation and reporting members "unanimous in the feeling that Gen Marshall has a thorough understanding of the problems of the National Guard."

[63] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Sen Chan Gurney, 15 Aug 41, OCS 20197–54.

The first wave of promotion in the National Guard had inevitably brought advancement to a high percentage of officers, first, because the transformation from a peacetime to a war-strength organization automatically created vacancies and, second, because resignations and reclassifications left still other posts to be filled. With these advancements made, the promotion pace naturally slowed and unwarranted new fears of discrimination found expression. G–1 provided The Adjutant General with information upon which to base a reassuring answer to a Congressman's inquiry:

> The promotion system applicable to National Guard officers, referred to in your letter of October 7, is in general still in effect. It is true that the number of vacancies to which promotions can be made under this system rapidly decreased as promotions were made to replace eliminations incident to induction and full commissioned strength was attained. Recent application of the age-in-grade policies to all components of the Army will, however, create several thousand new vacancies in National Guard units, which will be filled to the greatest extent possible by the promotion of qualified National Guard officers.
>
> In addition, many officers of the National Guard are being reassigned to available positions elsewhere, and these transfers create vacancies in National Guard units which will maintain some promotion for those still serving with such units. . . .
>
> It is recognized that this will leave some National Guard officers with long service in grade, who cannot be promoted because of the absence of an appropriate vacancy. This is unavoidable. . . . However, the promotion system that has been and is still provided for the National Guard has operated to the advantage of National Guard officers.[64]

A Halt in Promotions to Attain Uniformity

While National Guard promotions were being thus encouraged, the Department suddenly suspended altogether the permanent promotions of Reserve officers to lieutenant colonel and colonel and revised the rules for promotions in lower grades in the interest of equalizing the promotions of Reserve officers with those of the Regulars.[65] This action was something of a shock to the Reserve Officers' Association, whose members throughout the emergency had been hearing general favorable things of their "splendid contribution"; in fact, as early as December of 1940, Reserve officers constituted almost 90 percent of the

[64] Memo, ACofS G–1 for TAG, containing substance of letter for Rep Thomas E. Martin, 23 Oct 41, sub: National Guard Promotions, copy in G–1/16172–698, also AG 210.2 (10–7–41).

[65] See Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 26 Jun 41, sub: Equalization of Promotion and Temporary Promotion, with brief dated 28 Jul 41, appd by CofS 19 Aug 41, in G–1/16252–193. See also related Memo, DCofS (Bryden) for Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 22 Sep 41, sub: Promotion of Reserve Officers, same file.

lieutenants and almost 60 percent of all officers on active duty with units in the Regular Army.[66] The president of the association therefore made protest against the War Department letter of 25 August that had put into effect the order suspending permanent promotions in the Reserve. The situation again was one which called for General Marshall's personal reply. He explained that the suspension applied only to permanent promotions and was itself a temporary ruling (the Department already having in mind a common system of temporary promotions for all components). He proceeded:

> In the early stages of any emergency Regular Army officers are at a disadvantage as to grade, in comparison with Reserve and National Guard officers. National Guard officers receive their mobilization grade when the National Guard is expanded to War strength. Reserve officers already have their mobilization grades. Regular Army officers on the other hand enter the emergency with the grades appropriate to a small peacetime Army.
>
> The purpose of the suspension of the Reserve Corps permanent promotion to the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel is to permit the War Department to advance a relatively small number of specially selected Regular Army lieutenant colonels and majors to the temporary grade of lieutenant colonel and colonel, and to make these promotions gradually and deliberately. During the months required to advance these Regular Army officers to temporary higher grade, it was believed advisable to suspend the automatic promotion of Reserve majors and lieutenant colonels. It is not the War Department intention, however, to suspend the temporary promotion of Reserve officers to the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel, and the War Department has not followed such a policy. A number of temporary promotions to these grades has been made in recent months and the War Department shall continue to make such temporary promotions where it is in the interest of the efficiency of the Army to do so.[67]

Attention to Complaints from Within the Service

The autumn of 1941 produced complaints from a great many others, less well organized than the National Guard or the Reserve officers, over the extension of service beyond the originally stated twelve months, over the discomforts of training camp, over the inadequacy of training or of weapons, over assignment to this or that unit. For the most part they were answered by routine handling of one question at a time but in September 1941 the Office of the Assistant Secretary referred to the General Staff a letter complaining of so many aspects

[66] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to President, Reserve Officers' Assn, 13 Dec 40, OCS 15102–583.

[67] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall (prepared in G–1), to Lt Col James P. Hollers, President, Reserve Officers' Assn, 10 Nov 41, G–1/16252–387, also in AG 210.2 ORC (10–21–41).

of troop morale, training, assignment, and promotion that G–1 was instructed to prepare a considered statement upon each point of complaint in order that it might be used as material for reply to this and other incoming letters. In late October Brig. Gen. (later Gen.) Wade H. Haislip provided an extended discussion on twelve specific complaints:

1. Troop morale was low.

Answer: Reports of dissatisfaction had been exaggerated. Recent maneuvers demonstrated that in field efficiency and "real morale" the Army was moving ahead.

2. National Guardsmen had been imposed on by extending their active duty without concern for family needs.

A: Their original state enlistment committed them to serve the nation in emergency. Concern over economic consequences had been shown; officers and men had been released before induction, and others afterward.

3. Selectees had been discriminated against in National Guard units.

A: In some instances, no doubt, but not as a rule and not for long, because already selectees began to outnumber the original National Guard members in each unit. Many such selectees had been promoted. Their assignment to the Guard units was unavoidable (if the Guard units were to be built to strength) and also this was sound practice; training of selectees was a prime reason for summoning the Guard.

4. Selectees should have been trained in Organized Reserve units, instead.

A: No Organized Reserve division was prepared to begin such training, as Reserve officers knew long ago, following 1939 discussions. On the other hand, National Guard units had been organized, equipped and trained for years for this exact service and enlisted strength in 1940 exceeded that of the Regular Army.

5. National Guard units resented assignment to them of officers from other components.

A: True to a small extent and unavoidable, but likely to end with the elimination of distinctions in uniform and official reference. Creation of one Army was essential and unattainable save by mingling components. A related complaint that Reserve officers were, man for man, better than Guard officers was denied in fact, and evidence given of Guard officers' superior rating at the Staff School and their more consistent training.

6. National Guard officers outranked Reserve officers.

A: Rank was based by law on length of service, of which Guard officers usually had more. In permanent promotion, however, Reserve officers had fared so much better than either Guard or Regular officers that their gain in grade overcame their deficiency in rank.

7. Temporary promotion provided no additional pay, except in time of war.

A: This applied to the Regular Army, not the Reserves.

8. Organized Reserve officers received lower travel pay.

A: Only in exceptional cases when on Organized Reserve duty, the same being true of Regulars. In other official travel the higher rate obtained, and was likewise applicable to all officers alike.

9. Reserve officers enjoyed no disability benefits if on active duty for less than 30 days.

A: Incorrect: they benefited from Employees' Compensation. Disability benefits were defined by law, and distinguished between pensions to a man injured on, say, a 4-day tour and one who had served 40 years professionally.

10. Individual experience in a newly enlarged division had been unhappy.

A: Regretted. The division had lately received a large inflow of inexperienced officers unready for their large responsibilities.

11. The President had vetoed a bill to provide Reserve officers with uniforms.

A: No discussion of the President's motives. Such an allowance was still under discussion, although no such benefit was enjoyed by Regulars.

12. Age was not a determinant of an officer's fitness for field duty.

A: On the contrary, it was a determinant, in important armies. Over-age officers could and would be used in nonfield duty as needed.[68]

Declaration of War Brings a New Promotion Policy

Little more than a month later the actual declaration of war provided new impulse to the rapid expansion of the Army. It called both for a proportionate increase in the number of officers, with resultant promotions, and for a fully ordered and consistent procedure applicable to all components of the Army.[69] For a basic policy applicable to wartime, the General Staff reached back to planning of two years earlier. A War Department Circular of 1 January 1942 discontinued completely the peacetime promotion systems of National Guard, Reserve Corps, and retired officers (on active duty) of the Regular Army, and put into effect for all officers of the Army of the United States the system prescribed in Appendix B, Special Promotion System, Mobilization Regulations 1–3, which had been prepared on 30 October 1939.[70] This was the relevant part of the voluminous Mobilization Regulations prepared in advance for just this situation. Minor changes of the 1939 text of these regulations made allowance for the Armored Force, which had been greatly altered in the two-year period, and also allowed other selection methods for general officers. The new policy, as a normal thing, introduced the principle of trying out a candidate for six months in higher grade before recommending him for promotion to it, but

[68] Summarized, not quoted, from a restudied Memo, ACofS G–1 (Gen Haislip) for ASW, 27 Oct 41, sub: Information on Which to Base a Reply to All Matters Discussed in Letter Dated 13 Sep 41 from Mr. Jacob Rubinoff, G–1/8165–13–A. The Rubinoff letter, addressed to ASW McCloy, is found in ASW unclassified file 353.8 Morale-General, 1941–43.

[69] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Wartime Promotion in the Army of the United States, G–1/16252–446, copy in OCS 21151–127.

[70] WD Cir 1, 1 Jan 42.

when efficiency directed otherwise exception was permitted. There was another important change: paragraph 7a of the 1939 version encouraged, as during the prewar training period, the filling of a unit vacancy by promotion from within the unit, with the division commander retaining discretion to seek an officer from elsewhere in the division if desired. Paragraph 7 of the new circular, however, stated that this procedure of routine promotion from within a regiment would be used

> . . . only to the extent which will promote the best interest of the Service and the efficiency of the Army. When, in the opinion of a higher commander, the efficiency of the Army will be best served by the promotion of the best fitted officer in one unit and his transfer to another to fill an existing vacancy therein, this procedure will be followed. The primary purpose of temporary promotion is to enhance the efficiency of the Army by promotion of the best fitted to fill existing position vacancies.[71]

Within a week spokesmen for the National Guard in a joint letter made new protest, partly because of misunderstanding. General Marshall wrote a new letter explaining the situation, this time in necessary detail:

> When National Guard units were called to Federal Service, qualified officers who did not hold such rank were authorized immediate promotion to their mobilization rank under the policy governing promotion in the National Guard, to fill position vacancies in their units. National Guard units were also authorized to fill new position vacancies as they occurred, by promotion of National Guard officers under their governing policy. At no time has promotion in National Guard units been stopped. As a result, National Guard units, as of January 7, 1942, have promoted a total of 7643 of their officers, a few of them as much as two grades since induction. This figure included 1542 promotions to field grades. In addition to these promotions, there is still a considerable number of promotions to be made in National Guard units of officers who qualified for promotion under policies existing prior to the adoption of our wartime policy on January 1, 1942. Each of these promotions will be made by the War Department as rapidly as each recommendation is processed.
>
> Regular Army units were expanded to war strength and inactive Regular Army units were activated, but mobilization rank was not immediately granted to Regular Army officers. Hence a great number of positions which called for higher grades were filled by junior officers. It was decided to fill a part of existing position vacancies in the grade of colonel and lieutenant colonel by promotion of officers whose records clearly indicated their fitness for promotion, by small increments over a period ending June 30, 1942.
>
> Upon the declaration of war, the problem of an early and rapid expansion confronted us. As a first step in meeting the demands of this problem, the War Department decided to fill as far as possible the existing position vacancies in the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel in Regular Army units and installations immediately instead of pursuing its previous

[71] *Ibid.*, par. 7.

policy of filling them by small increments over a long period. This step was imperative in order to equalize rank and responsibility in the Regular Army.

Your information that promotions in the Regular Army were made en masse, is somewhat in error. All temporary promotions to grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel have been made from eligible lists prepared by a board of officers secretly convened for that purpose. Of the total number of lieutenant colonels whose records were examined by the board, only an average of two out of five were considered to have records sufficiently superior to warrant their temporary promotion. Likewise a conclusion that promotions were without regard to existing position vacancies is in error. There have been approved positions for all grades to which promotions have been made, which have been filled for many months by junior officers. In fact, the officers recently promoted were not sufficient in number to fill the existing vacancies. No officer has been promoted simply as a reward for merit or to give him rank comparable to his professional background and attainments. The War Department has consistently refused to promote officers to higher temporary grades unless position vacancies actually existed for those grades. This policy is to be continued, as is indicated in the published wartime promotion policy.

During our current expansion, the outstanding officers of the National Guard to whom you refer in your letter of January 6, will undoubtedly be placed by Army commanders in positions which carry rank and responsibility commensurate with their recognized attainments. Such procedure is contemplated and specifically provided for in Circular No. 1. That directive definitely provides for seeking out and promoting the best fitted to higher positions, regardless of the component in which they are currently serving. However, in order to insure that no injustice is done a lieutenant colonel of the National Guard, if you will secure and send to me the names of the 75 to 100 lieutenant colonels to whom you refer, I will have their records carefully examined on the same basis as were those of the lieutenant colonels of the Regular Army. Each officer whose record measures up to the standard demanded of the Regular Army officers recently promoted will be ordered promoted to the grade of colonel to fill existing position vacancies.[72]

In the following month, in answer to a related inquiry from a Senator, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) J. H. Hilldring, as G–1, again outlined both the old and new policies of Guard promotion, thus:

Upon induction of the National Guard, each unit was instructed to bring its officer personnel to war strength by the promotion of qualified personnel from National Guard sources. At that time plans contemplated the release of the National Guard from Federal Service at the end of one year's training of each unit. This condition required a system of unit promotion to provide each unit with officers trained in the higher grades to fill vacancies which might exist when the Guard was returned to State control.

Under this system of promotion, the following number of officers in the National Guard have been promoted to include January 31, 1942:

[72] Identical Ltrs, Gen Marshall to the President, Adjutants General Association, and Vice President, National Guard Association, 14 Jan 42. Copies in G–1/16172–626 and also in AG 210.2 (1–6–42). In same AG file is joint letter to which these are an answer.

36 lieutenant colonels to colonel
403 majors to lieutenant colonel
1,184 captains to major
2,153 first lieutenants to captain
4,305 second lieutenants to first lieutenant.

When war was declared and it became evident that the National Guard would remain in Federal Service indefinitely, the War Department immediately adopted a system of promotion based on selection of officers of demonstrated ability to fill all position vacancies without regard to component. The new method of promotion was announced in War Department Circular No. 1, and became effective February 1, 1942. As a result, National Guard officers may now be promoted on the recommendation of their immediate superiors to fill existing position vacancies within or without their own units. In the formation of new divisions, National Guard units are furnishing officer cadres in the same manner as the Regular Army divisions. As a result it may be expected that even greater numbers of National Guard officers will be promoted in the future. The criterion is demonstrated capacity to perform the duties of the higher grades.[73]

Corresponding data accumulated at about the same time provided statistics on the Reserve officers, showing that promotions of Reserve officers on extended active duty from 1 July 1940 to 31 January 1942 were as follows: colonels 78, lieutenant colonels 548, majors 3,758, captains 8,730, first lieutenants 12,250, total 25,364.[74] Thereafter promotions were made without regard to the component in which the officer had been commissioned.

Controlling the Inflow of Young Officers

At the outset of rearming, in 1940, there had been no recognized shortage of Reserve officers. So little was any foreseen that in December 1940 the Staff was discouraging talk of increasing the program for officer procurement from that source—partly because any substantial increase in ROTC units would require the detail of additional Regular officers for their training, and Regular officers were already in acute demand for the training of the expanded combat forces.[75] G–1 estimated that of the 106,000 Reserve officers then eligible for active

[73] Ltr, ACofS G–1 (Gen Hilldring) to U. S. Sen Albert B. Chandler, 11 Feb 42, copy in G–1/16172–698. Further breakdown of this 8,081 National Guard promotion total is in an AGO tabulation in that file.

[74] AGO tabulation (signed George C. Wolfe, 1st Lt AGD) "Promotion on Extended Active Duty–July 1, 1940, to Jan 1, 1942, incl," filed in G–1/16172–698.

[75] The officer shortage then worrying G–1 was that of Regulars. A Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 14 Jun 40, G–1/15588–187, also in AG 320.2 (6–14–40), proposed conserving Regular officers for duty with troops by closing the War College, Industrial College, and Command and General Staff School, and sending no more officers to the Naval War College and civil schools—conserving 175; by reducing the stay at service schools to three months—conserving 450; by using Reserve officers to replace Regulars at senior

duty only half would be summoned by the following June, by which time 8,000 more would be commissioned, so that "for the contemplated Army of 1,400,000 there are more than enough Reserve officers to provide for the turnover for the next two years." [76] This view prevailed in the following spring, when a Senator wrote critically of the War Department's delay in summoning to active duty senior Reserve officers, who apparently had made their complaint to the Senator. General Marshall in reply declared that the reserve of officers for emergency was then "more than ample to meet our current needs" and that it "would be an uneconomical use of public funds" to call any officer "until the need for his services had actually developed." He spoke warmly of the Reserve Corps as "probably our greatest asset during this present expansion." [77]

The number of young Reserve officers available on order, already selected, disciplined, trained in ROTC, and needing only the harder training of the 1940–41 camps, was in itself one of the encouraging factors of 1940, if not literally the "greatest asset" of General Marshall's impulsive estimate. It made possible, to a degree unknown in 1917, the Army's insistence upon proved capacity as a requirement both for original commissioning and for promotion. It is not surprising that Reservists were summoned to active duty in such numbers that in October 1941 their inflow passed the budget allowance and had to be suspended temporarily.[78] The suspension order was dictated wholly by budgetary restrictions since the need for officers was still mounting, even though a new source of young officers was developing in the Officer Candidate Schools.

ROTC units—conserving 250. The same memorandum recommended procuring Reserve lieutenants of under 30 years for the arms, and those under 35 for the services, using captains under 40 if necessary. The suggestions were approved by CofS. See Ltr, TAG to chiefs of arms and services, 15 Jun 40, sub: Procurement of Reserve officers, AG 210.31 ORC (6–15–40) M–A–M; also attached radiogram same date and subject to corps area commanders; also related papers in G–1/15588–187 to 189 inclusive. Further replacement of Regulars at ROTC units, both by returning retired officers to active duty and by using Reservists, was recommended in Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 17 Sep 40, sub: Personnel Policies in Connection with New Units, appd by DCofS (Bryden), 26 Sep 41.

[76] Memo, ACofS G–1 for Chief, Public Relations Branch (through SGS), 19 Dec 40, sub: The ROTC, G–1/14165–105.

[77] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Sen James J. Davis, 6 May 41, OCS 15102–705, in answer to a 23 Apr 41 letter not on file. A tabulation made in that month by G–1 reported 80,730 Reserve officers then approved for allotment, of whom 23,660 were approved for troop units, 18,291 for corps area service commands, 9,955 for War Department overhead, 3,062 for overseas, 21,437 for Air Corps and 4,325 for Air Corps Services. It did not include 17,000 to be ordered to duty later. Tab A of Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 10 Sep 41, sub: Military Program Regarding Reserve Officers, OCS 15102–795.

[78] Memo, OCS for ACofS G–1, 30 Oct 41, sub: Suspension of Ordering Additional Reserve Officers to Extended Active Duty, OCS 15102–819.

These last named schools had been opened both as a means of getting new officers and as a quickener of trainee morale. The program for them was laid down in September 1940 by General Marshall and pushed through over the surprisingly strong objections of G–1, G–3, and chiefs of arms, who felt that the Officers Reserve Corps was already large enough to meet requirements for the visible future, and that additions to it would make officer eliminations unnecessarily difficult.[79] General Marshall, in a memorandum to General Bryden, pointed to the high disciplinary value of training in the ranks, and to the certainty that commissioning from the ranks would increase the popularity of the Selective Service Act. (A year later Under Secretary Patterson protested that in selecting draft troops for the schools the schedule was too slow for morale purposes, and General Marshall defended the current pace as one geared to other developments in an Army already short of materiel. Time was to show that in this matter, as in materiel, the Under Secretary was setting his sights for distant needs which actually came to pass). The value of this early start in the production of new junior officers and particularly in the development of draft troop morale was high. Appointments to the schools were given to trainees giving greatest promise of leadership, selected on a unit-allotment basis by commanders of the units to which the recruits were assigned and after they had received six months' training.[80] This arrangement, it was soon realized, provided no immediate opportunity for youths in the replacement training camps (as distinguished from those sent direct to field units for their training), and General Marshall, after discussion with the Chief of Field Artillery and others, proposed that quotas be allotted to those camps also, and to recruits of only four months' service, instead of six. To G–1 he expressed the belief that this might bring to attention a number of men highly qualified for leadership and—perhaps dominant in his thinking—a further belief that "this procedure is almost vital to the morale problem we are going to have on our hands this fall and winter." Again G–1 opposed the suggestion stoutly and, with G–3 concurrence, argued both against relying on replacement training centers as candidate-sources and against reducing the qualifying period of service below six months. A study to this effect was prepared, but the Chief of Staff held to his views and

[79] See AG 352, 9–19–40 (1) Sec. 1 for relevant papers, notably Memo, CofS (signed GCM) for Gen Bryden, 28 Oct 40, sub: Officers Candidate Schools; also Memo, USW (Patterson) for SW, 18 Sep 41, next referred to. See also Palmer *et al., The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops,* pp. 327–28.

[80] For basis of selection see Palmer *et al., The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops,* p. 95, including n. 10.

they went into effect in February 1942, thanks in part, no doubt, to the increased pressure for officers that the war brought to pass.[81] The incident affords an example of controversial suggestions originating at the top of the General Staff with General Marshall himself, and pressed through in spite of Staff objections.

From the foregoing excerpts of letters signed by the Chief of Staff in person it can be seen that in matters of personnel as in many others he frequently dealt with performance as well as policy, and with the particular as well as the general. The examples illustrate his disposition to answer directly and in a nonroutine manner all inquiries of Congressmen, friendly or otherwise, and the demands from pleaders for the National Guard and Reserve which he was desirous of merging completely in the new Army of the United States. All these personnel attentions he apparently regarded as in the public interest. Further, he was so intent on guarding against variations from stated policy in the matter of officer appointment that until mid-1941 he examined a great many individual papers, dealing with Reserve Corps appointments that for one reason or another did not conform to policy. G–1 took the initiative in relieving him of that detail, requesting authority to take final action where G–1 regarded the waiver of existing policies as not desirable; where affirmative action was recommended, however, final action would still be taken by the Chief of Staff. This procedure was approved.[82]

Special Attention to Important Personnel Assignments

If the policies governing the selection of new officers and the promotion or elimination of old ones ranked high in General Marshall's interests, inevitably the assignment of officers to important posts did also. Assignments to the General Staff of the War Department the Chief of Staff historically has regarded as a personal concern not satisfied wholly by statement of policy. In May 1939, for example, General Craig laid down a policy of selecting incoming replacements so as to keep the Staff alert to the needs of the field. New officers for the Staff should be those with "extensive and recent troop experience" and the majority of them should be under forty. Some of them "should be officers who are not graduates of the Command and General Staff School or the Army War

[81] (1) Memo, CofS for Gen Haislip, G–1, 1 Aug 41, no sub, OCS 21167–39, filed with G–1/14679–42. (2) Study of G–1, attached, marked "Not used." (3) See n. 80 on *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*. (4) WD Cir 48, 19 Feb 42, par. 4 and par. 14.

[82] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 15 Jul 41, sub: Procedure to be Followed on Applications for Appointment in the Officers' Reserve Corps. Appd by CofS 19 Jul 41, G–1/8165–921.

College." This was done apparently in the desire to stress knowledge of the line and recent experience in it, to a greater extent than had been the case in the past.[83] The German success of May 1940 did not lessen the need for new men, but it added to the need on the General Staff for officers who were experienced in its operations and in its current planning. As a result General Marshall decided for the time being to waive those restrictive policies which forbade more than a four-year tour of duty in Washington and required a three-year lapse between General Staff details as well as between Washington assignments.[84] In August, when it appeared that something more than temporary authorization was called for, there was a formal suspension of these restrictive policies and of certain others that had limited Staff "repeaters" to 25 percent and forbidden assignment to Staff for officers who had not yet served a two-year minimum in current assignments. There also was a restatement of the policy for proportionate representation of the Air Corps in each Staff division. In recognition of large 1940 additions to the Army's field forces, it was recommended that additional National Guard and Reserve officers could profitably be assigned to the Staff,[85] in excess of the limited number that Section 5 of the National Defense Act assigned to the Staff. As a result, Staff officers wholly familiar with recent military developments and with the Chief of Staff's views, and hence of great value in their current positions in the Army's mechanism, could be retained instead of being sent away on completion of their normal tours of duty. Other experienced Staff men who by the normal rule were not yet eligible to return to Washington, however great the need for them, now could be brought back to the Staff. These were general authorizations, the need for which had been clear enough to catch General Marshall's attention. His concern with specific cases of individuals considered for the Staff was equally sharp, and the record reveals the regularity with which candidacies were submitted to him for his personal approval.[86]

As the preparations for war advanced, General Marshall, with the apparent desire to make the Staff more responsive to the views of the Army's branches,

[83] Memo, OCS for ACofS G–1, 6 May 39, sub: Increase and Replacements for WDGS, OCS 9643–848, and G–1/15466–12B.

[84] Memo, ACofS G–1 for TAG, 1 Jun 40, G–1/13804–6.

[85] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 20 Aug 40, sub: Policies Governing Detail . . . to WDGS, appd by SW 26 Aug 40, G–1/15776–66. It was implemented by Memo, TAG for chiefs of arms and services, 30 Aug 40, same sub and file, also in AG 210.61 (8–20–40) A. –0.

[86] A number of these individual cases are filed in G–1/15776, items with subentries 66, 70, 94, 95, 162, 182, 183, 196 affording examples, each being a recommendation of detail to one division or another of the General Staff, marked with the approval of CofS or DCofS.

asked G–1 to consider the wisdom of obtaining Staff replacements in part from the offices of the chiefs of arms and services. General Staff officers were occasionally in conflict with the specialists, and the aim was apparently to reduce this friction. The suggestion received only limited encouragement from the Staff divisions. G–3 opposed wholesale assignments from the branches, and WPD warned that the plan might cause an undesirable turnover in those offices. The Personnel chief found further objection to General Marshall's suggestion, expressing bluntly his doubt that an intimate knowledge of the branch chiefs' office affairs was a qualification for Staff duty; rather he felt that it might encourage an excess of "branch consciousness" injurious to Staff thinking. His recommendation, in lieu of the original suggestion from General Marshall, was that Staff officers be chosen carefully from officers "with recent close contact with the field forces or with one of the civilian components," and that officers currently on duty with the chiefs of arms and services be chosen "only where the qualifications of the individual concerned especially fit him for such detail." This revision was an almost complete rejection of the original suggestion, but it apparently convinced General Marshall, for he approved it.[87]

The Chief of Staff's scrutiny of individual candidacies for the Staff at Washington was no more intensive than his attention to major assignments in the combat forces. There has been reference to his insistence upon high qualifications for division commanders and, in specific replacement cases, for regimental commanders. With him rested the final responsibility for the choice also of divisional chiefs of staff, even though it was still the Department's stated policy "to permit division commanders to select their chiefs of staff in order to insure good cooperation, teamwork, and efficient functioning of the headquarters." [88] (Divisional staff officers below the chief of staff were not so chosen.) Things did not work that way in 1939–41. Routine procedure indeed called for the division commander to name the officer he wished, or provide a list of those desired in order of his preference. But G–1 then reviewed the suggestion, checked the officer's qualifications, eligibility, and availability, and made recommendation to the Chief of Staff. Normally the G–1 recommendation was approved but this was not an invariable rule, and on occasion the recommendation was initiated by General Marshall. In the files examined no divisional

[87] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 23 Apr 41, sub: Selection of Part of Officers for WDGS from Officers on Duty in Offices of Chiefs of Branches, G–1/15776–157, also in AG 210.61 (4–8–41), appd by CofS 2 May 41.

[88] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 23 Oct 39, sub: Chief of Staff 5th Division, appd by DCofS 24 Oct 39, G–1/15777–2, also AG 210.61 (10–19–39).

chief of staff was selected without approval of the Chief of Staff or his deputy.[89] It would appear that corps area chiefs of staff also were so approved, as were the president of a Second Army reclassification board, an associate professor at West Point, and the like.[90]

This same intense attention to individual cases was applied in many instances to regimental commanders, both as to appointment and relief. Of the latter sort one may note the case of an infantry colonel whose assignment to duty as assistant commandant of the Infantry School, recommended by the Chief of Infantry with G–1 concurrence, was referred to the Chief of Staff for final approval, which was given. The critical consideration appears to have been that it involved taking away an officer from a regimental command in the field, an action not to be taken hastily: beyond that, the assignment to the school was one of the things upon which a Chief of Staff meticulous about personnel details desired on occasion that he himself, or surely his office, be consulted.[91]

There was less maneuvering necessary to dispose of requests for or against reassignments that were sought only for the convenience of individuals. Some of the requests came from members of Congress. They were normally disposed of by routine, usually in letters that were prepared for General Marshall's signature, and usually as polite rejections.[92] The existing emergency provided a useful explanation of necessity, as follows: "During the present emergency I

[89] Specific examples, all in G–1/15777 and in AG 210.61 in the form of Memos from ACofS G–1 for CofS, include recommendations for CofS, 2d Div (item –6), 6th Div (item –24), 4th Div (item –25), 7th Div (item –32), and 8th Div (item –32). The cases initiated by Gen Marshall include (1) that of the Hawaiian Div CofS, in Memo, OCS for ACofS G–1, 18 Mar 40, OCS 9643–927, G–1 circulation slip 18 Mar 40, G–1/15777–16, and Memo, OCS for TAG initialed "G.C.M.," 11 Apr 40, copy in G–1/15777–15B; (2) that of the VI Corps Area, Memo, OCS for TAG, 1 May 40, OCS 9643–935 (signed Gasser) and in G–1/15777–22.

[90] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 25 Jun 40, sub: CofS, V Corps Area, G–1/15777–27, AG 210.61 (6–17–40); same for same, 27 Nov 41, sub: CofS I Armored Corps, G–1/15777–217, AG 210.61 (11–22–41); same for same, 30 Sep 41, sub: President of Reclassification Board, Second Army, G–1/3615–13; same for same, 21 Jul 41, sub: Detail Associate Professor, G–1/15776–182B.

[91] Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 27 Feb 42, sub: Assistant Commandant, Infantry School, initialed "OK, GCM," G–1/16083–273, copy in OCS 20241–457. See also action by Deputy in Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 7 Feb 42, sub: Assignment of Colonel ——— to the Office of the QMG, G–1/16083–205, copy in OCS 20241–392. In this case the Deputy approved transfer of an artillery officer to a transportation post of prime importance, despite the wishes of the Chief of Field Artillery. See also Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 10 Jul 40, sub: Assignment of Lt Col ——— to School and Replacement Center, Armored Force, appd by CofS 10 Jul 40, G–1/16249, and Ltr, TAG to Chiefs of Arms and Services and CG, Armored Force, 25 Jul 40, sub: Priority in Assignment of Officers, AG 210.31 (7–12–40) A–O. These sought to preserve an officer's position in an important combat unit, but to permit occasional assignment elsewhere in proved need.

[92] As examples, Personal Ltrs from Gen Marshall to Sen Morris Sheppard, then chairman of Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 28 Feb 41, in OCS 20241–145; to Sen Claude Pepper, 16 Dec 41, in OCS 17336–101, and to Sen Joseph F. Guffey, 28 Mar 41, in OCS 21178–21, this last being the one next quoted.

have, through force of circumstances, been required to assign general officers to details which I knew were not entirely to their liking, but the basis on which we have been forced to operate has been that personal wishes must be secondary to the interests of the service. . . ."

On occasion it was an appointment by a general, rather than of him, which came to the Chief of Staff's personal attention—as in September 1941, when he learned that some general officers had assigned personal relatives to their staffs. In nineteen identical memoranda to commanding generals of corps areas, armies, departments, and branches he directed that, throughout the command of each, steps be taken "informally and quietly" to have all such relatives assigned to other duties before the end of the year.[93]

The records of 1940–42 indicate that in assignments as well as promotions of general officers instructions were repeatedly issued by the Office of the Chief of Staff. The directing memoranda, generally signed by General Bryden, the Deputy Chief of Staff, covered almost every character of assignment and were so numerous as to suggest that often the initiation of action, as well as the decision, was that of the Office of the Chief of Staff. Suggestions from G–1 also appear in the record; but in such of these cases as have been examined the recommendation was approved or disapproved by the Chief of Staff or his Deputy. One of the memoranda alone listed assignments for seventeen major generals and thirty-three brigadiers.[94]

Although recommendations from field commanders or staff advisers were sought and were accepted much more often than they were rejected, decision on assignment of general officers was no simple item of routine. Frequently recommendations from the corps commander, from the chief of arm, from GHQ, and from G–1 were in conflict as to priority if not as to actual endorsement. In such cases the view of G–1 or GHQ was likeliest to be supported, but on occasion the Chief of Staff made a wholly different choice. An extreme example is found in the case of a group recommendation from G–1 for five assignments for brigadiers; General Marshall struck out one altogether and, while approving the other four, gave to them all assignments different from those recommended by G–1.[95] This, as stated, was an extreme example. Normally there was great reliance upon G–1 guidance, but the case cited illustrates the

[93] Memo, CofS for CG, First Army and others, 18 Sep 41, no sub, OCS 21320–1.

[94] These memoranda from mid-1940 to February 1942 are interspersed through OCS 20241, ranging from item 11 of that binder to item 457.

[95] *Ibid.* The odd episode last mentioned is in papers attached to Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 17 Feb 42, sub: General Officer Vacancies, OCS 20241–420.

intensity with which General Marshall himself examined what might be thought of as "routine" Staff decisions. In this instance it was a matter of assignment to duty: comparable attention was given in numerous cases of promotion and relief of officers in posts of even moderate importance.

CHAPTER IX

The Movement Toward Air Autonomy

The prolonged discussions in the summer and autumn of 1940 on the summoning of the National Guard, the enactment of the Selective Service Act, the enrollment of the 16,000,000 in the draft registration, and the hurried construction of cantonments for the housing and training of the new soldiers—most of whom were intended for the Army ground forces—tended to obscure from public view momentous events which at that same time were under way in the air establishment. The German Air Force's large part in the swift march from the Rhineland to the English Channel in May and June and its initiation of the heavy bombing raids over England again quickened the American air program, the progress of which since the late 1938 alarm had been but moderate. New pressure was put upon the Air Corps to speed the training of more pilots, and upon industry to speed the output of planes. It was pressure for airplanes rather than for ordnance which brought about the National Defense Advisory Commission, previously discussed. It was the Chief of the Air Corps whom President Roosevelt summoned to the White House with the Chief of Staff on 14 May 1940 in order to learn his personal views about a more energetic air training program. The result of that meeting was the replacement of the old program—not yet developed [1]— which had originally been designed to produce 4,500 pilots in two years with a new program (outlined by the Air Corps late in May and started immediately) under which 7,000 pilots would be produced in one year.[2]

[1] This program had resulted from the November 1938 White House meeting that initiated grand-scale rearming (see Chapter V). The 4,500-pilot schedule was approved 21 December 1938, granted appropriation by Congress on 3 April 1939, and inaugurated on 1 July 1939. Under it a pilot graduation rate of 1,750 per year had been attained in May 1940, when the program was superseded. At that time the 4,500 figure had been lost sight of and General Arnold's 15 May memorandum (see next note) spoke of the existing program as "set up for the training of 2,400 pilots." For a summary of successive pilot quotas see Procurement of Aircrew Trainees (AAF Hist Study No. 15), pp. 7–9, Archives of the Air Historical Office.

[2] On 15 May General Arnold supplied the Chief of Staff with an outline of the plan which the President had approved the day before, whereby 7,000 pilots per year could be trained. It involved (1) doubling the number of civilian elementary schools and adding seven new civilian primary schools, (2) establishing five additional training centers for basic and advanced training, (3) enlisting 12,000 cadets (which involved examining 60,000 to 70,000 candidates), (4) enlisting and training 7,000 enlisted men, and (5) purchasing 2,200 training planes. The cost was computed at $106,000,000. See informal Memo, CofAC for CofS, 15 May 40, sub: Outline of Plan for Training 7,000 Pilots per Year, CofS files, Emergency File, bndr 2.

The 7,000 were produced on schedule, too, but this goal itself had been superseded meantime by the Presidential direction on 8 August 1940 of a 12,000-pilot program, and this in turn by the 30,000-pilot program of 17 December 1940. Yet these immense bounds in the plans for new personnel, and attendant bounds in the plans for plane and engine production, were not by any means the sum of 1940 achievement by the Army's air establishment.

Whatever the method of measurement—in men or machines or cost or destructive power or diversification—the largest wartime development of all existing elements of war was that of the Air Forces. The magnitude of their growth following the potent impulse of the White House conference of 14 November 1938 and the merit of their performance are recognizable in the factual records of number of men trained, number of planes produced and engaged, bomb tonnage dropped, enemy planes felled in battle, and other data. That there should have been some such expansion was inevitable, in view of the enormous increase in air power in other countries.

The development in American Army air power, however, was not merely an expansion of a lesser arm of the Army (smaller in numbers in 1939 than the field artillery and less than one-eighth of the whole Army)[3] into a very large arm (larger in numbers after 1941 than any of the older combat arms and by 1946—if all its personnel was counted—exceeding all other combat arms combined). Along with this growth in size came growth in authority almost to the point of autonomy as a recognized requisite of efficient operation: complete autonomy, with Air Force co-ordinate with Army and Navy, did not come into being until 1947.

In neither respect was growth spontaneous, nor wholly generated from the air establishment, insistent as aviators in and out of the service had been for many years upon the establishment's "right" to autonomy in varying degrees up to full separation from the rest of the Army. Before World War II the idea of a separate Air Force was unacceptable to the Army as a whole.[4] Certain air functions such as local liaison and artillery observation were recognized, after warm argument, as an essential part of ground force responsibility.[5] Others,

[3] As of 30 June 1939 the combat arms numbered: Cavalry, 10,425; Coast Artillery, 19,649; Field Artillery, 23,621; Infantry, 59,543; and Air Corps, 22,387. The Army, including all branches, totaled 180,711. (Figures exclude Philippine Scouts, Warrant Officers, and Army Nurse Corps.) See *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939*, p. 52.

[4] The discussion of Army air organization prior to 1937 is based upon Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907–1935 (AAF Hist Study No. 25) and Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1935–1945 (AAF Hist Study No. 46), both in Archives of the Air Historical Office.

[5] See Greenfield *et al.*, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 102ff.

such as local tactical support for infantry, it could be argued, were subject to full control by the commander of the ground forces concerned, under the tactical theory then prevalent. That there was a semi-independent character in long-range bombing was recognized as early as 1923, but performance of the semi-independent function was not regarded as a sufficient cause for giving the Air Force autonomy in all functions, or any. Even a grant of partial autonomy would have required a reshaping of the War Department's organization and there was wide disagreement among the aviators themselves on how reorganization might be brought about. They were of two minds as to which aviation function, operations or design-and-supply, should be dominant, much of the historic disagreement on that subject being traceable to strong personal differences between leaders in the operating force and the supplies branch.

Attitude of the New Chief of Staff in 1939

On the eve of World War II a new factor began to advance the interests of the Army Air Forces, not by supporting the principle of separation from the ground command but, rather, by seeking a more efficient integration of air and ground elements of the Army, and by accepting a greater measure of air autonomy as a means to that end. This factor was the new Chief of Staff himself, as the military head of an Army which included all elements of air and ground forces alike. Before assuming the Chief of Staff's duties General Marshall made a tour of air stations and manufactories with General Andrews of the Air Corps, learning much more of the air elements' needs than was commonly understood by ground officers. More receptive than his predecessors to the arguments of the Army aviators (themselves more tactful than some of their predecessors had been), General Marshall channeled the air spokesmen's abundant energies into programs that approximated aviation objectives and yet were tolerable to the leaders of ground-force opinion. In January 1941 another factor, external to America and wholly fortuitous so far as America was concerned, was largely responsible for gradually endowing the Air Forces with practical equality with Army and Navy in strategic planning and eventually in operations as well. This was the mere fact that the British armed services were themselves already organized as distinct autonomies when the several representatives of the British Army, Navy, and Air Force came to the United States for the military discussions which became known as ABC. It was this circumstance that suggested

ultimately the formal creation of a Combined Chiefs of Staff on which would be these representatives of the British Army, Navy, and Air Force and, correspondingly, representatives of the United States Army, Navy—and now of necessity Air Force as well. At the Atlantic Conference of August 1941, in something like a foreshadowing of later organization, the Chief of the U. S. Army Air Force sat opposite the representative of the Royal Air Force and also alongside the U. S. Army Chief of Staff and the U. S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations. (The President's personal Chief of Staff was added in mid-1942.) Under these circumstances it was inevitable that at intervals when the British and American Chiefs separated into two national groups for wholly national discussion the Chief of the U. S. Air Force would continue to sit with his American colleagues on terms of equality, and also that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus composed, would survive as a necessity of war planning. By this easy transition the Chief of the Army Air Forces (Gen. Henry H. Arnold) who in all other respects was subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Army (Gen. George C. Marshall) became thus early a co-ordinate member with him of the Combined (British-American) Chiefs of Staff which devised the grand strategy of the war, and as well of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff which directed the preparation and employment of American forces in pursuit of the grand strategic program. That this co-ordinate rank would soon have been achieved anyway, because of Air's mounting importance, was inevitable (General Arnold was frequently summoned to the White House for consultations in 1940), and that General Marshall himself came to feel that this relationship for the land-based air forces was as desirable as it was inevitable is likely. Certainly, however, the American Air Forces' advance toward autonomy was greatly facilitated by the circumstance that the Royal Air Force had already attained autonomy and an "opposite number" in the Combined Chiefs of Staff was desired.

For portrayal and appraisal of the enormous role of American Army air power in World War II, in strategic missions, in tactical operations, in combat and transport alike in all their varied forms, one must turn to histories of the Air Forces. But in the Office of the Chief of Staff before the war began was the responsibility for planning the military establishment that national policy required, and hence for the balancing of the Army's air, ground, and service elements in such a way as to carry out the plan. This responsibility called for determination of the means whereby the Army's air component, as well as its infantry or artillery or any service component, could develop highest efficiency

for its recognized individual functions as well as for co-operative enterprise. Properly exercised, this responsibility would have recognized that full development of air power called for more than a mere increase in the numbers of men and planes; that the employment of air power called for more intensive knowledge of air power's capacities and limitations than was possessed by the most enlightened of ground-trained officers, and at the same time for more diversified staff experience than the air personnel of the prewar Army possessed. This had been the contention of numerous air power advocates for two decades; it was long resisted in the Army and it was in fact formally accepted as the basis of a new organization only in 1941. From that time forward the Air Forces moved with greater speed and directness of purpose toward combat efficiency, which was the primary aim, and likewise toward the full autonomy which rationally could come to pass only upon evidence both of the whole military establishment's actual need for it and for the Air Forces' readiness to exercise it. This readiness was slow in coming. Air officers capable of performing high command and staff duties could not be developed instantly. Organization suitable for grand-scale operations never before essayed could not be created without study. Planes which were indispensable for advanced training of the new torrent of eager young pilots had to be sent, rather, to overseas Allies already engaged in combat, and throughout much of the war General Marshall had to cope, on the one hand, with advocates of granting still larger foreign shipments (President Roosevelt among them) and, on the other, with passionate advocates of more planes for home training. The shortage in factory production was obvious; a large number of insufficiently informed but highly vocal critics attributed it to Army opposition to air development.

The Slow Progress Toward Air Autonomy

The steps toward autonomy, and the changing views of Army command on that subject down to 1940, can be swiftly reviewed with after-the-fact perspective free from the passions that distorted much of the discussion of this subject during the twenties and thirties and which by their vehemence may have deferred Air Force autonomy quite as much as they promoted it.

The flight of the first airplane was followed by Army examination of the military significance of flight as a new means of observation and communication. This limited initial purpose explains the early development, from 1907 onward,

of aviation within the "Aeronautical Division" of the Army Signal Corps (which for some time had been using balloons). In 1914 the division became the "Aviation Section" of the corps, and in 1918 it gained a separate status from the Signal Corps as the "Air Service." As early as 1919 the Crowell Board (headed by Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell) advocated an air force separate not only from the Signal Corps but from the Army as well. This separation was opposed by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and also by the Army board (headed by Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, Chief of Air Service 1920–21), which in 1920 was created to study the situation and prospects. The issue was kept very much alive, however, by the widely publicized complaints of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell and by the battleship-bombing tests of 1921, with the result that in 1923 a new board, headed by Maj. Gen. William Lassiter, was directed to make a new study of air needs. With notable foresight it recommended a ten-year plan for building up simultaneously the Air Service personnel and the nation's aircraft industry, looking toward a force of 4,000 officers, 2,500 flying cadets, and 25,000 enlisted men, and also toward an American airplane industry capable of quick production in emergency, this last recommendation, neglected though it was, being the fruit of painful experience with airplane nonproduction during World War I.

With extraordinary prescience the Lassiter Board conceived for the Air Service two functions, which in its judgment involved a partition of command. Function 1 was to aid the ground forces: therefore the air elements involved would serve as an integral part of divisions, corps, and armies except for a reserve air force retained under GHQ. (Here was a burgeoning of the Tactical Air Force of two decades later.) Function 2 was to serve a strategic mission in areas remote from the ground forces: hence it called for great mobility and justified the creation of "a large, semi-independent unit." (Here is the burgeoning of the Strategic Air Force of World War II.) The far-reaching character of this proposal so impressed Secretary of War John W. Weeks that he proposed for Congressional consideration the working out of a joint Army-Navy aviation program, which met with no support from the Navy Department and died forthwith. Feeble and short-lived progress was recorded in the 1926 Air Corps Act, which again changed the air establishment's official title with the apparent purpose of recognizing in name, if nothing else, the distinctive field of Army aviation. Besides form, the act possessed modest substance to the extent of adding air personnel to the General Staff in judiciously small numbers, encour-

aging the preparation of a five-year program (rather than the ambitious ten-year program of the Lassiter Board's recommendation) and creating an Assistant Secretary for Air (this post to be abandoned in 1933 in the economy wave, but re-created when World War II proved the imperative need for it).

It was, however, a season of national apathy over the military establishment in general, and from this apathy the Air Corps suffered as seriously as did the rest of the Army. Against its discouragement advocates of an independent service continued to argue and in 1934 the whole issue was again put in the hands of a board, this time headed by Former Secretary of War Baker, which undertook a "once-for-all" decision, without attaining it. The Baker Board opposed a separate air force, a separate staff, a separate promotion list, and a separate budget. It held firmly to the traditional and prevailing view of a close integration of air and ground establishments, with ground forces overwhelmingly dominant in numbers and influence. It did, however, approve the creation of a GHQ Air Force which as a combat element would be distinct from the supply and training aspects of the Air Corps. This GHQ Air Force remained (so far as policy was concerned) under the General Staff of the Army (in which, as noted, ground force personnel was overwhelmingly dominant) and had no immediate normal contact with the Chief of Staff himself, who in successive installations had historically been far closer to the ground forces than to the air. Even so, there was prompt recognition in and out of the air establishment that the GHQ Air Force which came into being in 1935 marked a major advance toward ultimate attainment of that co-ordinate rank of air with ground forces upon which airmen unceasingly set their sights.

Numerous bills continued to be advanced in Congress, seeking either a single Department of National Defense in which air, ground, and sea forces would be co-ordinate, or an independent air force free even of that form of co-ordination. None of them won War Department support or, for that matter, any extended support in Congress itself. Independent of these proposals, a larger measure of autonomy for the Air Corps was being hewn out within the existing organization of the War Department. The slowness of its development no doubt was chiefly due to the conviction with which the Army as a whole held to its views on the necessity of close integration of air-ground operations, with ground forces dominant, as in the past. But also, and in considerable measure, the delay was due to uncertainties within the Air Corps itself.

After two years of trial, both the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, and the Chief of the Air Corps were dissatisfied with the administrative organi-

zation of the air arms as set up in 1935. The Chief of G–3, after studying their reports, observed to the Chief of Staff: "There is no single controlling head for the Air Corps below the Chief of Staff. This is the crux of the matter and the root of many present difficulties." [6] He believed that the defects of organization could be remedied only by placing the GHQ Air Force under the command of the Chief of the Air Corps in time of peace (in war he would inferentially be immediately under the Commanding General of the Field Forces) and he so recommended. This proposal, made early in 1937, was the basis of a reorganization that the Chief of Staff approved in principle in mid-1938 and ordered placed in effect 1 March 1939.[7] The Chief of the Air Corps was authorized to exercise direct supervision and control over all Air Corps activities (including the GHQ Air Force) not specifically exempted by the Secretary of War. This movement may have been hastened or delayed by the influence of personalities and by old animosities and rivalries, but its culmination at this time was, in the words of The Adjutant General's letter, "to meet the difficult problems relating to personnel and training due to the augmentation of the Air Corps." [8]

It would appear that centralization of control was the principal objective in early 1939, but wider authority for the Air Corps was also envisaged. In the unused (but initialed) memorandum of General Craig, then Chief of Staff, for the Secretary of War, evidently prepared in mid-1939, there was the proposal "to assign certain functions of a Deputy Chief of Staff to the Chief of the Air Corps." [9] It was clearly not acceptable at the time. The prospect in Europe, however, brought a revival of demands, in and out of the Air Corps and in and out of Congress, for a separate air force. They became stronger and more frequent when the German Air Force's successive sweeps across Poland at the very outbreak of war destroyed Polish air resistance, blinded the Polish command, and paralyzed Polish ground operations. The Luftwaffe's powers were demonstrated still more convincingly in 1940 over the Low Countries and northern France, and this stimulated anew in America the clamor for a separate air force on the broad assumption that a separate air force would inevitably be a more powerful air force.

[6] Memo, ACofS G–3 for CofS, 5 May 37, sub: Control of the GHQ Air Force, AG 320.2 (9–13–34) (1) Sec 2.

[7] Documents relating to this change are in AG 320.2 (9–13–34) (1) Sec 2. See especially: (1) an undated and unused TAG letter with covering Memo, initialed by CofS for SW, sub: Organization of GHQ Air Force; (2) Draft of TAG Ltr initialed by CofS, with accompanying Memo, ACofS G–3 for CofS, 15 Feb 39, sub: Control of GHQ Air Force by the Chief of the Air Corps.

[8] TAG Ltr, 1 Mar 39, sub: Organization of the Air Corps, AG 320.2 (2–15–39) (Misc) (C–M).

[9] See n. 7.

General Arnold Advises Against Haste

This public clamor, the resulting Congressional agitation, and most important, the War Department's own observations of military events forced a reconsideration of the place of the air arm. Within the Air Corps itself, however, it was skillfully guided by General Arnold, a distinguished pioneer in Army aviation who certainly had never been backward in pressing the Air Corps' major claims, but who wasted no effort on untimely causes. When pressed at Congressional hearings on the expansion program, early in 1939, he expressed the belief that any radical organizational change might impede the program.[10] Early in 1940 the Plans Division of his office, when making studies to implement the Air Board Report, emphatically declared its dissatisfaction with the existing relationship between the Air Corps and the War Department, but, with equal emphasis it concluded "That no radical changes should be made or proposed in the organization of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps at this time." [11] General Arnold agreed, and as late as June he stated in private that he did not favor current suggestions for a Congressional reorganization of the armed forces designed to provide air force autonomy. "Right at this minute it looks to me as if it might be a serious mistake to change the existing set-up when we are all using every facility available in order to take care of the present expansion of the Air Corps." [12] Such cautious opposition to separation movements put an effective damper on well meaning friends of the Air Corps but did not silence them.

This softening of Air Corps militancy on the separation issue may have resulted from a feeling of well-being that accompanied expansion, from a genuine conviction that reorganization would be harmful to the Air Corps and the country, or from a knowledge of changes contemplated by the Chief of Staff. Regardless of any unrecorded exchanges between General Arnold and General Marshall, the former, and all interested observers, could anticipate sympathetic treatment from a Chief of Staff who had selected Gen. Frank M. Andrews for his Chief of Operations and who had welcomed and approved the Air Board

[10] Testimony of 21 Feb 39 before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *National Defense: Hearings . . . on HR 3791*, p. 58.

[11] Memo, Chief of Plans Div, AC, for CofAC, 9 Jan 40, sub: Organization of the Air Corps. The quotation is in the original signed by Col. Carl Spaatz, but at General Arnold's request the entire section was removed from subsequent copies. AAG 321.9 Org & Reorg of the AC . . . 1939–40.

[12] Ltr, CofAC to Gen Walter P. Story, Los Angeles, 14 Jun 40, AAG 032 M Legislation.

Report of late 1939.[13] General Arnold was anxious, therefore, that Staff planning be allowed to proceed without Congressional interference. How sound was his foreknowledge is shown by the development of later months, when air power achieved within the Army organization much of the authority which airmen had been saying could come only through separation.

These changes did not come easily, however, and their timing may have been influenced by events and personalities outside the General Staff. In mid-September of 1940, G. de Friest Larner, presumably speaking for the National Aeronautic Association, pointed out to Assistant Secretary Patterson that, though he was a warm admirer and friend of General Marshall, he believed that ground officer attitudes in the General Staff were responsible for serious bottlenecks in air matters.[14] He suggested that it would be possible and desirable to nullify current newspaper criticism of the Air Corps, without taking cognizance of such criticism, by certain shifts in organization. Specifically, he recommended the appointment of General Arnold to a new post called Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, giving him wide authority previously exercised by the General Staff, and the appointment of Gen. George H. Brett as Chief of the Air Corps. After obtaining the advice of Col. J. H. Burns, the Executive in his office, the Assistant Secretary, in a memorandum to the Secretary, 18 September 1940, endorsed the idea and observed: "There has been considerable agitation for a separate air force. There has also been the suggestion that an Assistant Secretary of War for Air be appointed. Changes along either of these lines may be unnecessary but the criticism may well cause us to look over our present organization and see whether our air force could be handled more effectively." [15] The Secretary noted his approval and prior to 1 October forwarded the communication to the office of Chief of Staff, who received it with some irritation, not because of any opposition to General Arnold, but because he disliked "outside" interference with his staff. At a conference on 1 October the Chief of Staff stated that he understood that General Arnold and Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons of the Air Corps were both opposed to the idea,[16] but he evidently was misinformed.

[13] For illustrations of the close and generally harmonious relations between General Marshall and General Arnold see especially: (1) Memo, CofS for CofAC, 1 Oct 40, AAG 321.9D Org AC & GHQ; (2) CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3, *passim*.

[14] Notes on Air Defense Co-ordination, 16 and 18 Sep 40, ASW 320.2 (1940–1941).

[15] (1) Memo, ASW for SW, 18 Sep 40, AG 210.61 (7–20–40) Gen Staff. (2) Memo, Ex ASW for ASW, 18 Sep 40, sub: War Department Organization, AG 210.61 (7–20–40) GS. (3) Note for record, 23 Sep 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

[16] Notes of conference in office of CofS, 1 Oct 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 6.

On 26 September the Chief of the Plans Division of the Air Corps had already requested his staff to prepare a study to show why the GHQ Air Force and all other air units should remain under the Chief of the Air Corps. He added that the present organization was unsatisfactory, and continued: "An organization which would meet our minimum requirements would be a Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, with an Air Corps General Staff which is in effect the organization we now have in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps but which operates under the General Staff instead of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Air." [17] When General Marshall asked General Arnold about the proposal of the Assistant Secretary,[18] General Arnold forwarded on 5 October a four-page memorandum, which, with acompanying papers, attempted to demonstrate the inadequacy of the existing organization, the need for appointment of the Chief of the Air Corps as a Deputy Chief of Staff, the need for certain other changes, and the need to seek legislative authority to put his proposed reorganization into full effect at once.[19]

After citing current delays, stating the need for the "most efficient organization possible to train personnel . . . and secure materiel," and referring to "ever increasing cries" for a separate Air Corps, General Arnold outlined the desired organization. He proposed three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one each for Ground, Air, and Services, each to have control of all activities in his field under broad authority delegated to him by the Chief of Staff, and each to issue orders, through The Adjutant General, in the name of the Secretary of War. Various devices were suggested for reconciling differences among the three Deputies, but the Chief of Staff was to be the final arbiter. A War Plans Council and a War Department Budget Section were to be created directly under the Chief of Staff. The Ground and Air Deputies were to have their own general staffs, built from existing staffs, and the Service Deputy was to have a special staff. It was recommended that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air remain Chief of the Air Corps, that an acting chief be appointed to carry out certain functions, and that command of GHQ Air Force be given to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air until the time when elements of it should be allotted to theater commanders in order to meet specific situations.[20]

[17] Memo, Chief of Plans Div AC for Col Wilson, 9 Sep 40, AAG 321.9 Org & Reorg AC . . . 1939–40.

[18] Memo, CofS for CofAC, 1 Oct 40, AAG 321.9D Org AC & GHQ.

[19] Memo, CofAC for CofS, 5 Oct 40, sub: War Department Air Organization, AG 210.61 (7–20–40) GS. See also, in the same file: (1) Memo, CofAC for CofS, 2 Oct 40; (2) Memo, CofAC for CofS, 4 Oct 40; (3) List of organizations, committees, and boards connected with Army aviation.

[20] *Ibid.*

The Chief of Staff referred General Arnold's plan to the chief of his G–1 Division and to his two Deputies. Those officials were emphatic in their opposition. The two Deputies pointed out: "The present tendency has been a rapid organization toward a separate Air Corps with reference to jurisdiction, stations and separate service detachments. The proposed Staff organization will virtually complete this by the organization of a separate Air Corps in the War Department directly responsible to the Chief of Staff alone." [21] They probed close to the heart of the issue when they observed: "The Air Corps believes that its primary purpose is to defeat the enemy air force and execute independent missions against ground targets. Actually, its primary purpose is to assist the ground forces in reaching their objective." In their opinion there were only two good reasons for the creation of the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Air: (1) to soothe adverse public opinion, and (2) to meet the need for an arbiter between the Chief of the Air Corps and the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, when the latter might be removed from the control of the former. All three officials advocated removal of the GHQ Air Force from control of the Chief of the Air Corps; Brig. Gen. William E. Shedd (G–1) specifically recommended that it be placed under the recently established General Headquarters.[22]

An Unsuccessful Compromise in October 1940

The Chief of Staff had to resolve the differences and somehow keep a working team. This he did by a compromise, which may have met public criticism but which did not stand the test of practical operation. General Arnold was appointed an Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, but the unity and control that he sought were lost. The GHQ Air Force was removed from the control of the Chief of the Air Corps and placed under GHQ (as G–1 had suggested); the Chief of the Air Corps remained in approximately the same position as the chiefs of other arms; and the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air was "to operate with relation to the General Staff and to the Chief of the Air Corps as do the other Deputies." [23] Fortunately General Marshall and General Arnold were

[21] Memo, DCofS (Gens R. C. Moore and William Bryden) for CofS, 9 Oct 40, AG 210.61 (7–20–40) GS. See also, in the same file, Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, undated, sub: Organization of the WDGS. General Moore's duties as Deputy included a good deal of air co-ordination, and he remained particularly close to General Arnold in the work of building up the administrative offices of the air establishment.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] (1) Memo, CofS for DCofS, 15 Oct 40, sub: Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, AG 210.61 (7–20–40) GS. (2) Approved draft of Memo announcing the appointment of an additional Deputy Chief of Staff, AG 210.61 (7–20–40) GS. The new status of the GHQ Air Force was prescribed by WD Ltr to CG's, CofS,

able to maintain personal relationships in such a way as to overcome defects in the administrative machinery, but they were not able to quiet fresh demands for changes in the establishment.

General Arnold apparently accepted outside criticism unperturbed, and suggested "that the present organization be given an opportunity to prove itself before any more readjustments are made." [24] Whatever satisfaction existed among the air power proponents themselves was transitory. Less than two months after the changes of November, General Brett, now Acting Chief of the Air Corps, revived General Arnold's recommendations of October and forwarded them again to the Chief of Staff. While his report detailed new instances of imperfect operations arising out of defective organization, its only new feature was a proposal that there be three Assistant Secretaries of War to correspond to the three Deputy Chiefs of Staff.[25] Already steps had been taken, quite independent of the General Staff, to carry out this suggestion. Robert A. Lovett, whose voluntary and independent study of the possible role of heavy bombardment in the European war had attracted respectful attention, in December 1940 became Special Assistant to the Secretary on all air matters; [26] in the following spring he was advanced to the re-established post of Assistant Secretary of War, vacant since 1933, but now destined for extremely important work. He undoubtedly gave the discussion on reorganization considerable momentum when, after a conference on 10 March 1941, he submitted to the Secretary a fresh and forceful exposition of the differences between the airplane and the older weapons of war. He concluded that "to be fully effective to the General in Command of the Armies, this weapon needs a tight-knit, flexible organization as modern as the instrument itself." [27] About a week later Col. Robert Olds, of the Air Corps, wrote a memorandum in which he advocated a separate department of aviation. He introduced his memorandum as follows: "Action

GHQ, etc., 19 Nov 40, sub: Orgn, Tng, and Adm of the GHQ Air Force, AG 320.2 (11–14–40) MCM. Copy in AAG 321.9D GHQ Air Force. See also Office Memo, OCS, 1 Nov 40, no sub, signed by SGS at CofS's direction, allocating responsibilities among DC'sofS, OCS 15758–53.

[24] Memo, CofAC for CofS, 22 Nov 40, sub: Letter from Mr. John Gilbert Winant to the President, OSC 14110–40. For evidence of continued activity in Congress, see papers in WPD 635–55.

[25] Memo, Actg CofAC for CofS, through DCofS (Air), 26 Dec 40, sub: Organization, AAG 321.9D–Org AC & GHQ.

[26] (1) Memo, USW for DCofS (Air), 27 Dec 40, sub: Designation of Mr. Robert A. Lovett as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, G–4/27277–92. (2) CofS files, tally card 17327–11.

[27] Memo, ASW (Air) for SW, 10 Mar 41, ASWA 320.2 (3–20–41). See also accompanying attachments and revisions.

should be postponed no longer, leading toward the creation of an air force in this country prepared for efficient and effective operations. . . ." [28]

General Marshall's Move of March 1941 Toward Solution

The turning point in the movement for autonomy and unity of the air forces came in March of 1941. One day toward the end of the month, while General Marshall and General Brett were waiting at the Capitol to appear before the Senate Appropriations Committee on matters pertaining to the Air Corps, General Brett indicated that it was very difficult to get action from G–3 and G–4 on Air Corps matters, and a general discussion followed. Thereafter, in lengthy conferences on 26 and 27 March General Brett and General Arnold elaborated upon their views, which remained consistent with those that they had expressed again and again during the previous year.[29] General Marshall now appeared to have his mind made up and, as usual, his concern was with results rather than forms. He did not immediately put into operation the plans of the Air Corps, but instead issued a simple directive that said in effect that the Chief of the Air Corps would thereafter prepare for final action all papers, studies, memoranda, and other particulars pertaining to purely Air Corps matters, except those pertaining to war plans and intelligence; and that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air would be responsible for co-ordination in air matters.[30] In conference General Marshall left no doubt as to his determination to bring about a genuine reformation. He was quoted as saying:

> In brief, I want this new procedure put in force without delay. The Air Corps has a tremendous procurement program tied in with new developments and now has a tremendous personnel problem—a great school set-up. In a few weeks, they will be turning out pilots at the rate of 7,000 a year. . . . It involves 152,000 men, and we have to operate on a simpler basis than our present system. I want to make a better use of the DCS for Air and make it easier on General Brett. This directive . . . is properly placed in general terms, and I desire to proceed on a basis of evolution and general understanding between all. Specific decisions as to its method of operation will have to be made as we progress. . . .
>
> We are not operating. The big thing is planning. . . .[31]

[28] Memo, Col Robert Olds, presumably for ASW (Air), 19 Mar 41, sub: Reorganization, ASWA 320.2 (3–19–41).

[29] Notes of conferences in office of the CofS, 26 and 27 Mar 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 11.

[30] Memo, SGS for CofAC, ACofS, G–1, etc., 28 Mar 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 11.

[31] *Ibid.*

General Marshall was emphatic in his assertion that G–1, G–3, and G–4 should not delay matters affecting the air establishment and in the expression of his belief that co-ordination of these matters should be through General Arnold. General Brett was of the opinion that the changes would engender among the air people a feeling that they were being brought into the center of planning activities, and that this would result in greater co-operation. Although these conferences produced no structural changes—no formal organizational orders were issued—they mark a decided step in the movement toward autonomy for the Air Forces.[32]

The basic principles decided upon at the March meetings needed implementing, and General Brett, in co-operation with his staff and Assistant Secretary Lovett, quickly prepared charts of proposed organization. These he presented to the Chief of Staff on 3 April, and there ensued a long conversation, chiefly between Mr. Lovett and General Marshall, during which the Chief of Staff, directly and by implication, presented his views on the question of a separate Air Corps.[33] In general these men were in entire agreement. Both were conscious of the need for change; both knew the magnitude and complexity of the job; both saw what they regarded as a need for autonomy and unity in the air forces; both believed that sudden autonomy or separation without proper organization and resources was dangerous. General Marshall, as usual, stressed the necessity for getting results:

> I am sincere in wanting someone of your qualifications, which will permit these fellows to work . . . at present they are battered around in a maelstrom. As to the organizational part, . . . it is a desperate thing to settle. For instance we have the destructive effect on Emmons. We ripped up his air force to send planes to Alaska. Then we had to do the same thing for Hawaii. He blamed Arnold. Arnold didn't do it. I did it. However, I didn't do it because I wanted to but because of the Japs. . . . The problems are all interrelated. If I have to spend my time battling others, I am lost. Offhand, this plan looks all right to me. However, I want to study it more.[34]

The First Step: Consolidating the Air Elements

In accordance with understandings concluded in March and April, study of reorganization continued, chiefly in the Plans Division of the Air Corps. It was

[32] The scope and significance of the change as it affected actual plans are shown in papers relating to the transfer of responsibility for the implementation of the Army's Second Aviation Objective from G–3 to the Air Corps. Memo, Chief of Plans Div, AC, for CofS (with incls), 23 May 41, sub: Army's Second Aviation Objective—Strength of Units, AAG 321.9–E Org AC & GHQ.

[33] Notes on conference in office of CofS, 3 Apr 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

[34] *Ibid.*

evidently the intention of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff to place the entire air arm under one head, and thereby dispose of the old internal discord between combat and supply units. Steps were to be taken to provide the ground forces with air elements that would encourage and develop joint operations. The air force was to be permitted autonomy "in the degree needed," an expression purposely vague in order to permit further consideration of numerous proposals and an experimental approach toward the goal of autonomy. From outside the military there still came renewed agitation for a separate air force, sometimes based on incomplete or inaccurate citations of experience in the European war and often based upon faulty estimates of the immediate readiness of air force personnel for assuming independence. Within the Air Corps itself there was so full a knowledge of essential preliminaries to autonomy that responsible air chiefs opposed immediate separation as an "injury to preparedness" for war.[35]

In May the Air Corps submitted a draft revision of Army Regulation 95–5, the basic regulation defining the status, functions, and organization of the Air Corps.[36] By 20 June 1941 an interim organization designed to carry out the earlier agreements had been hammered out, and it was announced to the public shortly thereafter. Army Regulation 95–5, as issued on 20 June 1941, created the Army Air Forces, headed by a Chief who was also the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and who possessed authority to co-ordinate the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, the Air Force Combat Command (successor to the GHQ Air Force), and all other air elements. The new organization served the essential purpose of co-ordinating combat work with training and supply, it created an Air Staff to encourage more intelligent planning for the future, and it provided more of that freedom of action of which air advocates had long been desirous.[37] Unhappily it still permitted conflict between the General Staff (at that time still numerically dominated by ground force officers) and the Air Staff. Also, this and related changes operated to keep the Air Force Combat

[35] Throughout its existence the air establishment had been guided largely by the Army's General Staff (chiefly ground officers) and dependent upon the Army's supply and service branches for most of its requirements, and had not been called upon to develop its own personnel or techniques in these respects. The learning process was necessarily prolonged. The Air Corps' unfortunate experience in its brief responsibility for taking over the air mails without any logistical preparation was due largely to that lack. See Gen Marshall's remarks to ASW Lovett on 3 Apr 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

[36] Memo, CofAC for CofS, 13 May 41, sub: Proposed Organization of the Air Component of the War Department, AAG 321.9E Org AC & GHQ. The discussions of May and June are documented in an informal collection of documents known as History of Organization of AAF, AAG 321.9 Organization (Dec 31, 1941).

[37] AR 95–5, 20 Jun 41, AG 321.95 (6–18–41).

Command, despite its change in name, subject to the same ground force direction that the aviators had previously found onerous.

It was on this last question that differences of opinion became so great as to give rise to further changes. The Chief of Staff, in accordance with his ideas as expressed to Mr. Lovett in April, allowed his subordinates to iron out details, and he expected Mr. Lovett to carry the burden of the public relations problem—including relations with Congress on air matters. On occasion, however, the Chief of Staff himself laid down in explicit terms the Army's views, which the Office of the Secretary loyally supported. In the autumn of 1941, when the orderly establishment of the Air Corps on its new basis was being jeopardized by further irresponsible talk of a separate air force, the Army's military and civilian chiefs co-operated in discouraging such a movement. A letter from Secretary Stimson to the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee was drafted in General Marshall's Office. The Chief of Staff's feelings, even then, on the necessity for unity of command in military affairs (they were still more strongly expressed later in his fight for unification of the land, sea, and air forces) are evident in the letter:

> The War Department in previous reports to the Congress had opposed the proposal to separate the aviation forces from the Army or the Navy, either as one of three components charged with national defense or as one of the three components of a single department of national defense. To date, nothing in the current European war has caused the War Department to alter its opinion. . . .
>
> In German military thought it is fundamental that the creation of a single high military command for all forces, whether of the land, sea or the air, is the first requirement for success in modern war. . . . In fact the key to the military success of Germany in the present war has not been the operation of the air forces on an independent basis but rather the subordination of air power to the supreme command of the armed forces. . . . This system of combining air, ground, and naval forces when required, under one commander for training and combat operations has resulted in the marked German successes. . . .
>
> . . . The British system . . . is intended to provide union of command approximating unity. In reality the result is a three-way partnership which becomes increasingly less effective as the theater of operations is more distant from the Prime Minister's and the Chiefs of Staff's immediate supervision and control. . . . The recent disastrous setbacks in theaters of war other than in the immediate vicinity of the British Isles are directly attributable to lack of real unity of command, and have forced the establishment of a ground cooperation air arm to be placed under the direct tactical control of the commander of the armed forces. . . .
>
> The Army Air Forces now occupy within the framework of the War Department an autonomous status. The Chief of the Army Air Forces, who is also Deputy Chief of Staff

for Air, has full responsibility for every phase of Army aviation. . . . Coordination and unity of command is obtained through the Chief of Staff, and the organization of the "Task Forces" for training and combat operations, under GHQ.

It is the considered opinion of the War Department that the organization now in effect will permit free and unrestricted development of an air arm under the full control of qualified officers and at the same time permit the very keystone of successful military operations, Unity of Command. . . .[38]

Command Responsibility Requires a New Arrangement

The problems of politics and public relations which have been referred to could be divided with other officials. The problem of command, newly critical but not new, was one for the Chief of Staff himself. Prior to mid-1941 questions of training and supply remained uppermost, and the direction of troops in actual or potential theaters of operations remained a secondary consideration. But the movement of forces to Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland brought new and complex problems to GHQ, and in late July Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) H. J. Malony in that headquarters recommended the creation of theaters, and the placing within those theaters of means to operate them under the control of theater commanders.[39] General McNair's endorsement of this idea raised anew the whole question of the command powers of GHQ, and the Chief of Staff directed a restudy of that institution's functions, responsibility, and authority. The WPD tentative recommendation (of 30 August 1941) that there be no enlargement of GHQ functions, but rather certain reductions, pleased no one. General McNair, Maj. Gen. Wade Haislip, and Gen. Carl Spaatz disagreed in numerous respects,[40] but General Spaatz' comments, an outgrowth of the continual organizational planning in the Air Staff, were extensive and explicit. He recommended the elimination of GHQ, the placing of over-all command in the Chief of Staff, and the delegation by him of responsibility to commanding generals of Ground, Service, and Air Forces (the last already in existence).

[38] Personal Ltr, SW to Sen Reynolds, 19 Sep 41, prepared in OSC and appd by CofS. Copy in OCS 16600–73, together with copy of identical letter of same date to Rep James A. O'Leary, chairman of Committee on Expenditures in Executive Depts.

[39] Memo, Lt Col E. N. Harmon, G–4, for Gen Malony, GHQ, 22 Jul 41, WPD 4558. For an account of the GHQ dilemma, see *Organization of Ground Combat Troops,* specifically pp. 134–41.

[40] (1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 30 Aug 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558. This is stamped "not used," but that evidently means only that it did not reach CofS for it is the basis of comments of other offices. (2) Memo, CofS GHQ for ACofS WPD, 2 Sep 41, sub: Functions, Responsibility, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558. (3) Memo, ACofS G–1 for ACofS WPD, 15 Sep 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558. (4) See n. 41.

The General Staff would then confine itself to certain duties of a broad nature, which General Spaatz outlined.[41] Nothing effective was done, however, and in November General Arnold and General Spaatz were still insisting: "It is clear that the advisability of continuing GHQ as an agency under the War Department for control of Theaters of Operation and Task Forces is open to question. Therefore, it is most important, at this time, that the organization of the War Department be modernized and streamlined to insure maximum efficiency in the prosecution of war. It is recommended earnestly that the most careful consideration be given to the type of organization referred to in previous recommendations from this office." [42]

Meantime the Air Forces were consolidating their gains of June, appraising their basic deficiencies with regard to autonomy and preparing directives to eliminate such deficiencies. By early November there had been drafted a revision of Army Regulations which for a time seemed to satisfy every desire of the air people insofar as relations within the War Department in Washington were concerned.[43] It provided for an Air Staff completely co-ordinate with the General Staff. The chief of WPD took strong exception to this proposal, chiefly on the grounds that there must be one General Staff to co-ordinate all activities and that the Air Force plan would, in effect, create two General Staffs.[44] The War Plans Division had, for some time, been concerned with units of command and was aware of a connection between autonomy for the Air Forces and the necessity for an over-all command agency.[45] The Air Forces recognized the WPD criticism as having some force and submitted a revised proposal which provided for a "*superior* coordinating staff, embracing both ground and air personnel," provided unity of command within the Air Forces, unity of command in the Ground Force, and a Military Policy Staff to assist the President. On advice from General Embick, WPD concurred in numerous broad principles to be sought in a reorganization of the War Department but opposed the creation of a Presidential staff. General Marshall and Mr. Stimson thereupon approved an

[41] Memo, CofAS for ACofS WPD, 24 Oct 41, sub: Functions, Responsibility, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

[42] Memo, CofAS for ACofS WPD, 14 Nov 41, sub: Proposed Revision of Directive to GHQ, WPD 3209–10.

[43] (1) Conference notes for 23 Oct, 30 Oct, and 6 Nov 41, AAG 337–C. (2) Draft of AR 95–5 with attached note dated 21 Oct 41, ASW (Air) 320.2 (1940–1941).

[44] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 12 Nov 41, sub: Revision of AR 95–5, WPD 3774–20.

[45] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 7 Nov 41, sub: Improvement Organization of the Armed Forces of the United States, WPD 4532–1. See also log cards, OCS 21278.

exploration of the other parts of the air proposal and WPD was charged with developing details.[46]

The Air Forces' plan was still under consideration when the attack on Pearl Harbor, temporarily causing great confusion, actually embarked the Army upon activities so enormous as to force a rearrangement of the entire Army organization. The coming of war changed the political and legal circumstances that might affect organization. The First War Powers Act of 18 December 1941, for example, gave the President sweeping authority to reorganize the government. This act gave the Air Forces another opportunity to state their case—by this time a case for a separate Air Force under a Department of National Warfare. The air establishment was clearly dissatisfied with its degree of autonomy under Army Regulation 95–5.[47]

No Autonomy, but Great Progress Toward It

The drastic reorganization of 9 March 1942 did not satisfy all the demands of the air power proponents, but it did create a three-force Army and a greatly reduced General Staff in which the dominant section, Operations, would in fact have a considerable representation of air personnel.[48] One cannot examine this 1942 structure without recognizing its strong resemblance to the basic structure which in various forms had been proposed by the Air Forces spokesmen during the previous year or more. It provided approximate equality for Air Forces and Ground Forces under the Army Chief of Staff. The creation at almost the same time of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, previously referred to, had the odd and inconsistent effect of putting the Chief of the Air Forces on a still higher level than was contemplated in the March reorganization. For in the Joint and Combined Chiefs assemblies, in the realm of strategic planning he had an equality of rank with the chief military officers of the Army (General Marshall) and of the Navy (Admiral Ernest J. King).

[46] (1) Memo, SGS for ACofS WPD, 25 Nov 41, WPD 4614. (2) Memo, Executive WPD for SGS, 28 Nov 41, sub: Reorganization of the War Department, WPD 4614. (3) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 18 Nov 41, sub: Organization of the Armed Forces for War, WPD 4614. This includes, as inclosures, copies of the Air Forces' plan and the memo of General Embick.

[47] Undated Memo of unidentified origin (but apparently within the Air Forces) for CofS, containing recommendations "submitted pursuant to directive of Jan 9 42 from the Chief of Staff to the Chief of the Army Air Forces," WPD 4646.

[48] The March 1942 reorganization will be discussed in much greater detail in the succeeding volume, the second on the Office of the Chief of Staff.

In these two all-important respects the air establishment between 1939 and 1942 made most of the distance toward its long-sought goal of autonomy and absolute equality with the ground and sea services. It had made this progress without excessive rancor in the air establishment itself and without recourse to Congressional legislation, but simply through directives of the War Department, based upon recommendations of air chiefs and the two Assistant Secretaries and decisions of the Army Chief of Staff uniformly approved by the Secretary of War. The war was just beginning, so far as American participation was concerned, and developments of the next three years were destined to disclose by test of battle the wisdom of this deferment of absolute autonomy until the Air Forces' own organization and personnel, modified to the changed and changing environment, were prepared to exercise it. The immense role of the Air Forces in the war now was integrated with the role of the Ground Forces (and the Navy) rather than a part of it, but certainly was not separated from it even in field performance. That there would have been wisdom in actual separation in 1940, doubtful at the time because of the paucity of staff-trained air officers, is still doubtful. On the contrary it is difficult to see how in 1942–45, by any larger degree of autonomy than then acquired, the Air Forces could have developed from their 1940 status more effectively than they did. The 1942 reorganization was brought about for the efficient operation of the armed forces as a whole in their conduct of the war. It was only secondarily for the benefit of the air establishment as one element. Both objectives were attained.

CHAPTER X

Aid to Britain versus Rearming of America

Numerous as were the Army's troubles in 1920–39 by reason of insufficient funds, its training operations in those years proceeded without disproportionate handicaps. If officers capable of transforming recruits into well-disciplined troops were few by wartime standards, so were the recruits they were called on to train. For so small an establishment there at least was a relative sufficiency of officers, of camps, and of weapons necessary for basic training. Army anxiety over weapons was over the newer types of weapons that were not on hand, and over American industry's unreadiness to produce promptly the great quantities that a wartime mobilization would require. In late 1939 the outbreak of war in Europe greatly multiplied these two anxieties over weapons of the future. But to these two was soon added a new anxiety, over the weapons of the immediate present. It became increasingly clear that materiel of certain types that had been sufficient for the basic training of a small peacetime establishment was far from sufficient for the advanced training of a large one.

The first strain came upon the air element, because of the sudden increase of airplane orders from Britain and France, not only exhausting the free production of American factory output for export, but encroaching on the production of planes that the Air Corps itself needed for its training operations.[1] These early foreign purchases had been encouraged, not by the Army, but by the President who, as noted, had in November 1938 initiated the program to increase the manufacturing capacity of the American airplane industry. Little encouragement of the sort could have been given by the Army up to this time, for military appropriations had been too spasmodic to provide a steady flow

[1] See Chapter V for discussion of airplane supply in 1938–40. The history of foreign purchases of American-made munitions is complex, and in this volume only phases pertaining to the Office of the Chief of Staff are mentioned. A useful record of events is provided in Historical Study "Activities of The Clearance Committee ANMB, and Defense Aid Division OUSW" in International Division Files, Department of the Army, Drawer 3185.

of orders to the airplane industry. Even after 1938 the War Department seemed slow to recognize that a sufficiency of orders for foreign delivery would itself provide increased productive capacity from which, in time, the Army also would be in a position to benefit. A factor in this apparent unawareness may have been the circumstance that the prewar Secretary, Mr. Woodring, was himself notoriously less eager than was Mr. Roosevelt to provide munitions for Great Britain and France.[2] To this circumstance may be attributed the fact that, when Mr. Roosevelt established the first informal cabinet liaison between foreign arms purchasers and American producers, he gave the responsibility not to the Secretary of War but to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who was well known for his anti-Hitler views. The nominal reason was that the Procurement Division of the Treasury was already experienced in grand-scale purchases.[3]

As the western Allies experienced greater and greater need for airplanes, guns, ammunition, and other supplies, they sought an increased proportion of the American output. In the ultimate victory over the Axis time would show American factory production to have been an immense factor. Early foreign orders also greatly expedited the enormous development of American industry to the long-range advantage of the Army. Yet this later benefit does not alter the fact that in diverting abroad much of the flow of new equipment those early orders temporarily retarded the equipping and hence the training of the new United States Army units whose performance in battle would one day prove a requisite of Allied victory. In this uneasy period, it is true, the War Department was dutifully and unfailingly consulted on export of arms, but its views were not binding, and on occasion its legally necessary consent was given only under protest.

Sharing "Secret" Weapons with Other Nations

The Army's initial concern with munitions exports, and the public's as well in large measure, was over the possibility that in acquiring American-made planes, under the "cash-and-carry" rule imposed on them by the 1 May 1937 Neutrality Act, foreign purchasers would acquire items or designs of a secret nature. In May 1938 the Air Corps opposed the British request for an early model of the B–17 bomber, but was overruled by the Chief of Staff (General Craig), his deputy (General Embick) and his G–4 (General Tyner) concurring;

[2] See p. 304 below.
[3] See n. 3, Ch. XII.

the Chief of Staff's permission carried the conditions that the British order would not delay Air Corps deliveries and that the planes would go nowhere save to England.[4] In January 1939 there was a more serious involvement of secrecy maintenance, with angry expressions in Congress over disclosure that the French purchasing mission had gained, over War Department opposition, the right to negotiate for purchase of a new and secret plane.[5]

This disclosure and the resultant inquiry brought to wider attention the multiple responsibility of the Army in the realm of foreign sales and raised large questions of policy. How closely must secrecy be guarded and for how long (experts testifying that when a plane took to the air its design secrets vanished)? Under what conditions should foreign orders be permitted (even when deliveries interfered with deliveries to the Army)? And, basically, what encouragement should be given to foreign sales as a means of building up the American airplane industry? The Chief of Staff (then General Craig) dealt cautiously with the first two questions, but the inference was that in matters of secrecy he was guided by the technical knowledge of the Chief of the Air Corps and in matters of sales by the political decision of his civilian chief, the Secretary of War. On the third point General Craig supported fully the President's views, which had supporters in the Air Corps as well:

> . . . regarding the advantages we would derive from selling planes abroad, I think, and have thought before, that it is the soundest kind of proposition for the United States to seek the placing of its airplane products in foreign markets. It would settle the question that has been brought up about maintaining work on a permanent basis in our factories. It settles the question which is a terrible bugaboo, of obsolescence of planes. . . . That is a part of the President's policy. . . .[6]

Although General Marshall, then Deputy Chief of Staff, did not testify before the Senate committee on this occasion, he made it clear in March that the War Department supported the State Department's plan for aiding South American nations with military supplies; he pledged that this program would

[4] Memo, Executive WPD for Gen Kruger, 11 May 38, WPD 2091-36. See also OCS Tally Card 15270-428.

[5] See Ch. V, p. 133, for account of this episode.

[6] Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, *Hearings on HR 3791*, pp. 127-28. This committee combed over every detail of the incidents relating to the French mission in hearings on six different days in January and February. It is remarkable that General Marshall, though Deputy Chief of Staff and intimately concerned with the matter, was not called upon to testify. In addition to the *Hearings* other sources are: (1) Edward R. Stettinius, *Lend Lease: Weapon for Victory*, pp. 14ff.; (2) Henry Morgenthau, "The Morgenthau Diaries," *Colliers*, 18 Oct 47, pp. 16-17; (3) Papers filed in envelope of CofS Conf files, marked "Statement before Senate Com. 1/28/38 French Air Mission"; (4) Papers filed in AG 452 (6-7-38).

neither endanger military secrets nor interfere with Army deliveries.[7] In this same month he came face to face with the issue of whether it was possible to maintain complete secrecy and at the same time to build up production at top speed. He put to Gen. Charles M. Wesson, Chief of Ordnance, "the proposition of reconsidering all items of ordnance and other munitions—on the basis of the relative advantage of secrecy versus the opportunities of civil industry to become familiar with the manufacture of the items concerned." [8] One month later the French purchasing mission's request for the right to make large purchases of American-made artillery reached the office of the Assistant Secretary of War and led to discussion among Mr. Johnson, his executive, Colonel Burns, and Generals Craig, Marshall, and Wesson. This in turn led to General Marshall's formulation of a policy that would prevent future French munitions purchases from interfering with America's rearming:

1. No objection will be raised to the placement of orders by the French Government with specified companies unless our current procurement program would be seriously delayed thereby.

2. Available or new facilities used or created by reason of the orders placed by the French Government with American firms would not be interfered with, unless the United States becomes itself involved in war, and such interference was subsequently found to be necessary to the best interests of the United States and its allies.[9]

When the French shortly afterward made inquiries about heavy purchases of the new Allison motor, General Marshall obtained G–2 guidance about the secrecy of the device, Colonel Burns' guidance about possible effects on Army deliveries, and General Arnold's advice on both aspects of the problem. By all he was reassured, and particularly by General Arnold's judgment that the order might stimulate plant expansion by the manufacturer.[10] Increasingly the Army and Navy now supported the idea of encouraging foreign orders as a means of adding to American industrial output, the Assistant Secretaries of both Departments eventually assuring the President that "judicious distribu-

[7] Memo, DCofS (evidently for SGS), 22 Mar 39, sub: Joint Resolution on Sale of Ordnance to South American Republics, SJR 89, AG 400.3295 (22 Mar 39). See also OCS 21654, G–4/31317, and sources cited in n. 13 below.

[8] Memo, DCofS for CofO, 3 Mar 39, OCS 15270–560.

[9] Memo, Executive, ASW, for record, 11 Apr 39, sub: Prospective Procurement of Artillery from American Manufacturers by the French Government, SW files, 681.

[10] (1) Memo, DCofS for ACofS G–2, 15 Apr 39, sub: Export of Allison Engines, OCS 15270–591. (2) Memo, Col J. H. Burns, Executive, ASW, for record, 19 Apr 39, sub: Prospective Purchase by the French of Allison Engines, SW files, 686. See also papers filed with the two documents here cited and papers filed in G–4/16494–313 and G–4/29070–2.

tion of such orders to domestic industry can be made to serve a very useful purpose in advancing our own plans for national defense." [11]

The Army Declines to Endorse Further Exports

After the actual outbreak of war in Poland, the United States was not alone in its concern over Axis intentions in South America.[12] Chile, in particular, made requests for immediate shipments of American-made arms of various kinds—not as orders to manufacturers for later delivery, however, but as pleas to the War and Navy Departments for weapons already made and purchased by the Army and Navy. The Army was compelled to inform the State Department that it could not release anything other than surplus (the Chileans did not wish obsolescent materiel), and it could not without special legislation permit Army arsenals to make munitions for other nations. Pressure continuing even when General Marshall (now become Chief of Staff) had reached the limit of his ability to declare weapons to be surplus, in February 1940 he met with State Department representatives to explain to them the Army's position.

. . . He said that much of the materiel needed to equip completely . . . even the first force [the Initial Protective Force] was still lacking, and that though orders had been placed for much of the materiel, both in Government arsenals and with private firms, some of the needed deliveries . . . would not be deliverd until 1942. General Marshall pointed out that the greatest difficulty in event of a conflict in which the army was forced to participate is the procurement of equipment rather than the training of men, and that most of the equipment, even the most antiquated, on the surplus list was of value for training purposes if not for actual replacement. . . .

General Marshall stated that aside from his own conscience, the War Department would naturally and rightfully be subject to the most serious adverse criticism were it to dispose of modern equipment which it needed to a foreign country, and he mentioned as an instance the demand which had been made that the United States supply Garand rifles to the Scandinavian countries and Finland. His position would be untenable, he said, if . . . we should later be drawn into a conflict and would not have a sufficient number on hand.[13]

[11] Memo, ASW and ASN for the President, 30 Jun 39, SW files, 811. For opinions in the Assistant Secretary's Office and in the Air Corps, see especially: (1) Memo, CofAC for Col H. K. Rutherford, OASW, 22 Jul 39, G–4/16494–47; (2) Memo, ACofAC for ASW, 26 Jul 39, sub: Proceedings of Aircraft Procurement Conference Held at Washington, D. C., July 10, SW files, 728a.

[12] See Chapter IV.

[13] Memo of conversation, 21 Feb 40, sub: Sale of Arms to Chile, SLC Min, 2 Feb 38–23 Dec 40, item 50. For other information on sale of arms to Latin American countries see items 19, 27, 33–35, 41, 45–50, and 63 in the same binder.

The Chief of Staff expressed sympathy with the State Department aims in behalf of Chile and gave his promise to continue co-operating within the limits set for him. The War Department had already permitted munitions factories to deal both with the belligerents and with the anxious South Americans during the winter,[14] and the Chief of Staff's readiness to continue was apparent. There was no doubt of the President's wishes in these matters. He had been instrumental in the passage of the new Neutrality Act of 4 November 1939 permitting American ships to carry munitions to belligerents so long as they stayed out of proclaimed "combat zones." Secretary of War Woodring, however, resented the sales and said so, notably in his reluctant endorsement of a G-4 memorandum recommending a price policy favoring the foreigners:

> I approve the above paper as a method of carrying out the policy determined by higher authority for the sale of surplus property. But I continue, as for several years, to absolutely disapprove of the sale of any surplus U. S. Army property. I insist, regardless of any higher authority direction, that if Army surplus property is to be sold that it be sold only by this govt. to another neutral govt. and negotiations be between our State Dept. and foreign govt. and not between Army or War Dept. and foreign govt. and directive come to our files of approval by the State Dept. Also that no army surplus property be sold to any individuals if to be sold—but only to a neutral government direct.[15]

Foreign Shipments Provoke a Departmental Crisis

Mounting requests from the French for airplanes and airplane equipment, some of it so new in design that it was not past the experimental stage, impelled Mr. Woodring (who in this matter as in several political relationships was at odds with Assistant Secretary Johnson) to call for a reconsideration of the airplane release policy. To the Chief of Staff on 19 March 1940 he expressed a willingness to release recent designs for export in order to make available to the Army still later designs, but he insisted on the protection of Army secrets and also upon delaying the delivery abroad of one type until a later type was actually under manufacture for the Army.[16] On the same day at a press conference President Roosevelt restated his intention to supply modern planes to the Allies as a means of improving American industrial defense. His casual

[14] For papers relating to the drawing up of successive lists of surplus and the establishing of prices see papers filed in: (1) AG 400.703 (2-20-40); (2) G-4/26057-2; (3) G-4/31684.

[15] Endorsement of SW, 11 Mar 40, on Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 9 Mar 40, sub: Sale of Surplus Ordnance Materiel to Foreign Governments, AG 400.703 (2-20-40) (conf).

[16] Notes of conference in CofS office, 19 Mar 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

oral reference to the importance of providing new types to friendly foreign purchasers was so variously interpreted by his hearers that in the next day's Staff conference at the War Department there was an angry dispute between Secretary and Assistant Secretary over precisely what had been said. A telephone call to the White House elicited the President's refusal to make a general rule upon classifications of weapons to be released: he said he would decide disputed cases singly and on their merits.[17] It again remained for a tactful Chief of Staff to formulate for the guidance of the Army a statement of policy acceptable to his various civilian superiors. It read:

> When it is to the advantage of the National Defense the War Department will negotiate for deferred deliveries of contract planes. If manufacturers take advantage of foreign orders, then, prior to release for sale abroad, manufacturers shall agree to accept change-orders on existing War Department contracts. . . . Any authorized delays must not interfere with delivery of equipment for units immediately necessary. The release policy . . . will be liberalized to . . . further stimulate production capacity and to insure improved types of planes for the Air Forces. Each case must be decided on its merits.[18]

German Victories of May 1940 Accentuate Disagreements

With the German Army's sweep across the Low Countries and the British troops' retreat to the Channel in May, the pleas of the new Churchill government for American airplanes went far beyond previous limits. The quest now was not only for future deliveries from the manufacturers but for immediate deliveries of planes actually in Army service. After consultation with the Air Corps and G–3 General Marshall on 22 May informed the Secretary of the Treasury (still charged with this liaison) that the Air Corps now had in service only 160 pursuit planes for 260 pilots, and 52 heavy bomber planes instead of the 136 needed; that the training of squadrons in both categories was already hampered by dearth of planes; that replacement of any existing planes would be slow; that continuing uncertainties in the Western Hemisphere combined with other causes to forbid the release to Britain of planes in service.[19] On this occasion the planes were not released.

[17] Notes of conference, 20 Mar 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

[18] This policy statement was carried to the White House by General Marshall in company with Secretary Woodring and Mr. Johnson, and there approved, on 25 March 1940. Despite that date, the text of the policy and notes of the events are to be found in CofS files, Misc Conf, May 20–Sep 25, 1940, bndr 1.

[19] The "160 pursuit planes" referred, presumably, to late types regarded as fully ready for duty. The Air Force reported at that time 459 fighters of all types. For the handling of the British plane requests see especially the following documents in CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr. 4: (1) Memo, CofAC for CofS, 17 May

In mid-June, however, the defeat in France having gravely jeopardized Britain, Mr. Roosevelt raised the question of transferring to the British as many as twelve of the Flying Fortress (B–17) planes. To this there was prompt and spirited objection from the Army, General Marshall reporting the "unanimous opinion of the War Department officers concerned, that it would be seriously prejudicial to our own defensive situation to release any of these ships." The President accepted this judgment at the time, but two months later, in response to further British pressure, he authorized release of five of the Fortresses.[20] This decision, which was not immediately translated into action, brought from the Chief of the Air Corps a complaint against the release of any B–17's whatever and a declaration that such a release "dictated by authority higher than the War Department" would seriously affect national defense.[21] Nevertheless, as a part of the destroyer-base trade of 3 September 1940 the Secretary of War agreed to turn over the five planes, and immediate British acquisition of them was thwarted only by the Secretary of State's unintentional omission of this item from the exchange document.[22] The President's wishes were made clear enough to the Chief of Staff in a conversation instructing "even-Stephen" division of bombers with the British.[23]

The Chief of Staff's effort now was to make the best of the situation and find virtue in necessity, much as he had done in the spring of 1940 when he was explaining to a Senate committee the value of the change-order policy of that day, under which the United States "could release planes for foreign sale, accept deferment of contract deliveries, and thus get more modern planes; we may in turn again defer delivery and get still more modern planes."[24] This time, in the fall of 1940, it was possible to discern the usefulness of increased

40, sub: Sale of P–36 Type Airplanes; (2) Memo, CofS for Secy Treas, 18 May 40, sub: Release of P–36 Type Airplanes, Now in Service, to the British Government; (3) Memo, CofS for Secy Treas, 22 May 40, sub: Release of Bombardment Aviation Now in Service to the British Government. Copies of some of these, as well as related documents, are filed under OCS 15270.

[20] Notes of conference held in CofS office, 20 Aug 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3, and Foreign Sales, bndr 4. For more on this episode and for a comprehensive discussion of the destroyers-for-bases transaction as a whole, see Kittredge, U. S. Defense Policies cited in Chapter IV, specifically Chapter X, Section B of that manuscript.

[21] Memo, CofAC for CofS, 17 Sep 40, sub: Release of B–17 Type Airplanes, AAG 452.1B Sale of Planes Abroad.

[22] Notes of conference in CofS office, 17 Sep 40, sub: Release of Planes to British, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3.

[23] Entry of 17 Sep 40 meeting in CofS office, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3. Two months later Assistant Secretary of War Patterson, opposing an increase in British priorities, referred to "the President's instruction in regard to production on a 1–1 basis." Entry of 16 Nov 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 6.

[24] Senate Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong, 3d sess, *Hearings on HR 9209*, 30 Apr 40, p. 38.

production and, quite as important, the value in submitting untried planes to the critical test of battle.[25] To General Brett, therefore, General Marshall mentioned encouragingly that "battle tests are better than peace tests," to support his view that the United States would profit to that extent by giving initial rather than postponed delivery of these battle planes to the British.[26] That he was making the best of a painful situation, and that in fact he did not like the "even-Stephen" distribution of the invaluable B–17's was apparent in his instruction to General Arnold to examine Secretary Morgenthau's argument for this method of impartial distribution of the new Fortresses. "See if there is anything more we dare do," he said. "What will this do in blocking training of pilots? If the British collapse there are certain things of theirs we can seize, but we can't seize trained pilots. We will be the sole defenders of both the Atlantic and the Pacific. What do we dare do in relation to Britain?" [27]

WPD anxiety over the delay in getting the planes was equal to his own, for there was agreement that giving half to the British would reduce by one-half the number of American pilots who could be efficiently trained.[28] The cynical comment of General Brett a few months later was: "We have a school at Shreveport, instructors, schedules, students, everything except planes." [29] General Marshall made a sardonic reference to the President's debonair attitude toward necessary but disagreeable detail connected with the arrangement for dividing

[25] (1) Notes on "Decisions Reached in Office of Chief of Staff September 27" with accompanying "Notes on B–17, B–24 Situation." (2) Memo, SW, on conference with the President, 12 Nov 40. (3) Notes of conference between CofAC and CofS in office of CofS, 13 Nov 40. (4) Notes of conference between representatives of Atty Gen and CofS in office of CofS, 13 Nov 40. (5) Notes of conference between CofS, CofAC, and Gen Brett in office of CofS, 14 Nov 40. (6) Memo, CofAC for CofS, 30 Sep 40, sub: Export—Heavy Bombardment Airplanes and Sperry Bomb Sights. (7) Memo, CofAC for CofS, 2 Oct 40, sub: Change in Delivery Schedules of B–24 Heavy Bombers and 1820 Engines for Installation in B–17 Heavy Bombers. (8) Memo, CofAC for CofS, 14 Oct 40, sub: Reallocation of B–24 Heavy Bombers to the British in Exchange for R–1820 Wright Aeronautical Engines. (9) Memo, Col W. F. Volandt, AC, for Secy ANMB, 2 Nov 40, sub: Reallocation of B–24 Heavy Bombers. This contains a "review of the essential steps and decisions in connection with the subject." (10) Notes on conference in office of CofAC, 19 Nov 40, sub: Transfer of Boeing B–17 Heavy Bombers—British Purchasing Commission. (11) Certificate of CofS, 5 Dec 40, relating to the release of the B–24's. (12) Certificate of CofS, 17 Dec 40, relating to the release of the B–17's. These last two documents were in accordance with the Act of 28 Jun 40, Pub 671, 76th Cong, and the opinion of the Attorney General, 27 Aug 40. Items 1–5 above are in CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 6; items 6–12 are in AAG 452.1B.

[26] Notes of conference between CofS, CofAC, and Gen Brett in office of CofS, 14 Nov 40, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 6.

[27] Notes of conference between CofAC and CofS in office of CofS, 13 Nov 40, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 6.

[28] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 14 Nov 40, sub: Effect of Turning Over to the British, WPD 4323–6.

[29] Notes of conference in office of CofS, 9 Jan 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 8.

planes with the British. At a White House discussion the Chief of Staff asked pointedly whether the British share should be computed as half of the planes scheduled for delivery or as half of those actually delivered, and exhibited a chart to show the wide difference between orders and deliveries. To this the President's breezy reply appears to have been: "Don't let me see that chart again." [30]

Among isolationist Congressmen was a growing suspicion of a Presidential purpose to conceal intentions. In late October a Senator lately defeated for renomination directed two questions to the Secretary of War:

> First, is it true that the Government of Great Britain or military authorities of Great Britain have been given access to the air bomb sight as definitely reported from official circles?
>
> Second, is it true that England has been promised Flying Fortresses as soon as the election is over? [31]

The aggressiveness of the Secretary of the Treasury, originally named as head of a liaison group only, became apparent to the Air Corps at this season, and elicited from General Arnold a sharp protest to the Chief of Staff, as follows:

> 1. At the meeting yesterday of Secretary Morgenthau, Judge Patterson, General Brett and Major Lyon, the Secretary of the Treasury announced that as a result of a conversation with the President on Monday it had been decided that every other B–17 complete with all equipment including bomb sight would be turned over to the British. . . . Furthermore that at a later date every other B–25 and B–26 would probably be turned over to the British.
>
> 2. I believe that such procedure is entirely wrong, when the Secretary of the Treasury does this business with General Brett and the Assistant Secretary of War on some matter that very vitally concerns the whole Army. It should be done with the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.
>
> 3. I am now making a study to determine just what effect this will have on the organization of our tactical units.[32]

A note dated six days later indicates that at a 7 November conference General Marshall told the nettled Arnold: "At the Treasury this morning I found that the plan to release every other plane . . . originated with Mr. Morgenthau and not with the British. Mr. Morgenthau asked the President . . . and was told to help the British all we possibly can." [33] Worse was to come, from the Air Corps point of view. On 8 January 1941 a memorandum from General Arnold to the

[30] General Marshall's report of a 2 Dec 40 conference, CofS files, Notes on Conf, Emergency, bndr 6.

[31] Memo, Col R. H. Brennan for SGS, on remarks of Sen Rush Holt of W. Va., 22 Oct 40, CofS files, Notes on Conf, Emergency, bndr 6.

[32] Memo, Gen Arnold for Gen Marshall, 7 Nov 40, CofS files, Notes on Conf, Emergency, bndr 6.

[33] *Ibid.* Conference note is dated 13 November, though recording event stated to be on 7 November 1940.

Chief of Staff warned of a "very strong possibility of Great Britain asking for additional B–17's from our tactical units. . . . It is urgently recommended that such a request be disapproved." [34]

European Pressure for Other Weapons

Little success had attended Army efforts in the spring of 1940 to halt the release abroad of other Army-owned munitions for which the hard-pressed Anglo-French mission was then pleading. On 22 May, the day when General Marshall resisted the Treasury's airplane proposal, the Chief of Ordnance provided the Chief of Staff with a list of ordnance items that might be released without imperiling the national defense. It was strikingly close to an Anglo-French request of the day before, and included 500,000 Enfield rifles, 100,000,000 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition, 500 75-mm. guns, 35,000 unmodified machine guns and automatic rifles, and 500 3-inch mortars with 50,000 rounds of ammunition. It is noticeable that the list, submitted in answer to a request from the Chief of Staff and resubmitted that day to the President, was made up of items far larger than ever before mentioned as surplus. General Marshall based it on Ordnance and G–4 estimates of what *would* be surplus to the needs of a 1,800,000-man army, reckoning on new equipment to be produced before the 1,800,000 total was attained.[35] Accepting both the reasoning and the estimate, the President asked General Marshall to consider legal means of transferring to the British the declared surplus, and accordingly the Chief of Staff took up this matter with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. They agreed that the goods could not legally be sold direct to the Allies, and parted for separate consideration of that dilemma.[36] To his Staff advisers General Marshall mentioned his further remarks on that occasion:

[34] Memo, Gen Arnold for Gen Marshall, 8 Jan 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, Emergency, bndr 8.

[35] Memo, CofOrd for CofS, 22 May 40, sub: Availability of Ordnance Materiel for Release Without Adversely Affecting National Defense. The original, bearing notations of Generals Wesson, Moore, and Marshall and of President Roosevelt, is in CofS files, Emergency, bndr 2. The basic list prior to this date was that of 1 March, a copy of which is filed with OCS 15270–896. That list mentioned 100,000 Enfield rifles (instead of 500,000), no .30-caliber ammunition (instead of 100,000,000 rounds), 300 of the 75-mm. guns (instead of 500), 237 3-inch mortars (instead of 500). The figures for machine guns and mortar shells are not strictly comparable for the two lists. For General Marshall's reckoning of the surplus see his memorandum (April 49) for Historical Division, previously cited.

[36] (1) Memo, CofS (presumably for the record), 25 May 40, sub: Regarding Release of Ordnance Materiel to the Allied Purchasing Agent, CofS files, Emergency, bndr 2. (2) Memo, CofS for WPD, ACofS G–4, and Gen Wesson, 23 May 40, sub: Sale of Airplanes and Ammunition to Allied Purchasing Agents, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4.

. . . I explained to Mr. Welles the situation regarding aircraft, that we could not jeopardize the completion of our augmentation of operating units by releasing planes under process of manufacture for delivery to the Army; that the situation with regard to pilots would become an impossible one in a very few months if we did not receive deliveries of planes. He agreed with this. I told him that in the smaller matters of accommodating them regarding engines and things of that sort we would do practically all of this as desired by the Allies.[37]

Search for Legal Authority for Sale of "Surplus" Arms

A report on legal methods of accomplishing the President's wish was made by General Moore, of G–4, who explained that an exchange of old for new ammunition could legally be effected only in the case of deteriorated or unserviceable ammunition; other items could be declared surplus by the Secretary of War and then sold to a domestic corporation which could resell abroad. He warned that it could not be done without public knowledge, but that formal public advertisement was not compulsory. The method subsequently outlined by General Marshall met the approval of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, but the Secretary of War complied with Mr. Roosevelt's wishes only under order. He dutifully signed the transfer to the U. S. Steel Export Co. on 11 June—when the ordnance had already been assembled for shipment to Britain—but this was after he had asked for legislation to designate the Secretary's future responsibilities in such a situation.[38] It was not long afterward that Mr. Woodring was replaced in office—not by Mr. Johnson, who had expected the higher post, but by Henry L. Stimson.

Mr. Woodring's desire for clarification was understandable, and isolationist Congressmen were in sympathy with him. The record of export of "surplus"

[37] Memo, CofS for WPD, 23 May 40, sub: Sale of Airplanes . . . Ammunition, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4.

[38] Laws relating to the sale, lease, or exchange of War Department property are systematically cited and summarized in papers filed in G–4/33184. General Moore's opinion on the legal question is in Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofS, 27 May 40, sub: Release of Certain Equipment and Munitions for Use by Foreign Governments, CofS files, Emergency, bndr 2. While this document is dated 27 May, General Marshall, in a memorandum of 25 May, indicated that General Moore had earlier prepared a similar memorandum that had been given to the Secretary of the Treasury. See Memo, CofS, 25 May 40, sub: Regarding Release of Ordnance Materiel to the Allied Purchasing Agent, CofS files, Emergency, bndr 2. Copies of the opinion of Green H. Hackworth for Secy State, 29 May 40, with related papers, are in AG 400.703 (5–28–40). The basic documents relating to the orders of the Secretary of War to proceed are: (1) Memo, SW for President, 31 May 40, AG 400.703 (5–28–40), and (2) Memo, SW for CofOrd, 5 Jun 40, Ord 400.3295 Misc. The legal basis for transfer of arms is discussed in a limited way in: (1) International Division, ASF, Lend-Lease as of September, 1945, Chapter II, and (2) Ordnance Historical Section: How the Ordnance Department Aided Britain after Dunkerque. A copy of (1) is in the files of Historical Division, SSUSA, and of (2) in the Ordnance Historical Section.

munitions during the preceding months was confusing even to the Army. In March Finland had sought a shipment of 75-mm. guns; three hundred of them had then been declared surplus for foreign sale, and fifty were loaded aboard a Finnish ship on 13 May. The 22 May surplus listing by the Chief of Ordnance, previously mentioned, contained five hundred of these guns and on 4 June another hundred were added.[39]

Within that interval the German advance had plunged through to the Channel, Belgium had yielded, most of the British Expeditionary Force and surviving elements of the French Army had been evacuated from Dunkerque, and Britain was preparing for Hitler's threatened crossing of the Channel. The arguments for exporting weapons (this time to England) therefore were now much more persuasive than they had been on 21 May when WPD—already skeptical of France's ability to stand—bluntly discouraged approval of the French plea for 75's from the U. S. Army supply. The WPD memorandum of that day stated, not quite accurately in view of the Finnish transactions, that "no 75 mm. guns had been declared surplus . . . [and such a declaration] would be difficult to justify. War Plans objects to the sale of any of our present stock."[40]

WPD was not alone in its concern over export of this particular weapon, which at that time, and until the 105-mm. came into production in May 1941, was the principal accompanying gun of the infantry division. On 11 June, in trying to resist the British pressure for another lot of 500 to meet the admittedly grave threat of invasion, G-4's chief told General Marshall: "No further 75 mm. guns should be declared surplus, obsolete, or placed in any other category that would render them available for sale. . . . It would take 2 years for production to catch up with requirements. . . . It would be dangerous to national defense to decrease the number of 75 mm. guns available."[41] He added that there were now on hand 3,450 guns, which meant a shortage of 3,220 (computed against

[39] (1) Memo, AG for CofOrd, 11 Jun 40, sub: Surplus Ordnance Materiel Available for Sale to Foreign Governments, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4. (2) Memo, SGS for CofS, 21 May 40, sub: Foreign Purchases of 75-mm. guns, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4. Contrary to the statement made in William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947), p. 6, it appears that the French were not granted any 75-mm. guns in 1940. See Disposition Slip, G-4, 11 Jul 40, sub: Replacement of Field Guns Shipped to Allies, G-4/29485-95, and Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 6 Jun 40, sub: Surplus Ordnance Materiel Available for Sale to Foreign Governments, G-4/26057-2. There are related papers in the same file. See also Reports of the the Chairman of the Clearance Committee, ANMB, on Foreign Inquiries for Production of Munitions, particularly Nos. 32 and 38, AG 400.3295 (10-20-39).

[40] Memo for CofS, 21 May 40, CofS files, Misc Conf and Info.

[41] Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 11 Jun 40, sub: Sale of 75 mm. Guns, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4.

field needs of the Army for one year in advance) and he reported WPD as in agreement with his estimate. The extent to which these sober warnings were disregarded when Maj. (later Lt. Gen.) Edward H. Brooks and Maj. (later Lt. Gen.) Walter B. Smith took the memorandum to Secretary Morgenthau is recorded in a note to the Chief of Staff signed with Smith's initials:

> Mr. Morgenthau handed me the Allied request for 500 75 mm. guns and appropriate ammunition to take to General Watson [the President's aide] for the President's decision. I gave it to General Watson who spoke over the phone with Mr. Morgenthau in my presence. General Watson then asked what I thought about the transaction before he took it in for the President's decision. I replied that if the War Department could be assured that we would not be called upon for a general mobilization within two years . . . the transaction was perfectly safe, but that if we were required to mobilize after having released guns necessary for this mobilization and were found to be short in artillery materiel . . . everyone who was a party to the deal might hope to be found hanging from a lamp post. Whereupon General Watson took the paper in to the President, who ok'd the transaction.[42]

The additional 500 guns were included in that day's turnover to the Steel Export Co.,[43] making a total of 1,095 guns of this type sold as surplus in 1940,[44] and orders were issued for expediting the delivery of the 105-mm. howitzers which the Ordnance Department had been developing as an ultimate improvement on the 75.[45] Secretary Woodring on 17 June prepared a protest to the President but did not send it.[46]

The Critical Shortage in Small-Arms Ammunition

Another item in these 1940 "surplus" lists calls for examination; this is the small-arms ammunition, of which 100,000,000 rounds were declared by General Wesson on 22 May to be releasable. Arrangements were made on 4 June to make the shipment, but in the next two days further exchanges of information, of which General Marshall was told, led to the conclusion that the Protective Mobilization Plan requirements were still exceeded by 30,000,000 rounds and these were added accordingly to the previously declared surplus. Further, the Chief of Staff then promised another 58,000,000 rounds to be delivered before

[42] Memo for Information of CofS, 11 Jun 40, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4.

[43] Memo, SW for CofOrd, 11 Jun 40, sub: Surplus and Exchange Materiel, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4.

[44] Disposition Slip, G-4, 11 Jul 40, sub: Replacement of Field Guns Shipped to Allies, G-4/29485-95. See also papers in AG 472.1 (6-12-40) (conf).

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] Unused Memo, SW for President, with note, 17 Jun 40, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4.

December, to be replaced by 50,000,000 rounds on order, but only 8,000,000 rounds of that total were in fact delivered.

Two circumstances intervened to prevent full delivery. One was an amendment to House Resolution 9822, the amendment prohibiting transfer of any more munitions except after certification by either the Chief of Naval Operations or the Chief of Staff that the munitions in question were not essential to defense of the United States. The other circumstance was the recognition in late July that there was present need for much more .30-caliber ammunition than had been previously estimated for training, for Philippines support, and for emergency supply. On 9 August Lt. Col. Orlando Ward, then Secretary of the General Staff, in a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff noted a current proposal to release the remaining 50,000,000 rounds for shipment abroad, and predicted that "G. C. M. [General Marshall] will not certify it as surplus." He was right, for a 16 August memorandum from the Chief of Staff stated that no more .30-caliber ammunition should go to Britain from Army stocks, because there now was a shortage of 1,077,000,000 rounds.

This startling admission, two months after the June tender, can be attributed to belated recognition of a fact, or else to a considerably altered situation. The Congress had passed the new appropriation bills for an Army much larger than the PMP force for which previous ammunition calculations had been made, and the National Guard and Selective Service calls were both in prospect. This appreciably changed the situation which had prevailed in June. Even so, General Marshall relented slightly four days later when, after discussions with G–4 and Ordnance officers, he agreed to release for shipment 5,000,000 rounds of the July-December allotments previously promised the British. The entire 50,000,000 allotment "I now consider too essential to our defense to permit the transfer." A directive he had issued on 14 August shows how thriftily he was dividing equipment at this time among the Army units, so that the demands of first-line troops would not absorb the supply to the total exclusion of second-priority units. The directive ordered a general distribution up to one-fifth of organizational allowances but only after full priority had been given to the Alaskan defense, to the Armored Force (so far as tanks were concerned), and to the antiaircraft units.[47]

On 20 September G–3 reported at a Staff meeting that the Army's current supply of .30-caliber ammunition was down to 520,000,000 cartridges, of which

[47] Memo, SGS for AC'sofS, 14 Aug 40, CofS files, Misc Conf and Info, May 20–Sep 25, 1940.

135,000,000 were in overseas departments. One year of normal training would require 468,000,000. This distribution would leave nothing for the much talked of expeditionary force or for emergency, and no new stocks of importance were expected for a year. To several of the Staff this disclosure was as surprising as it was disturbing, and they were informed with a good deal of bluntness that the shortage stemmed from previous overseas shipments that had been made "in opposition to recommendations of certain members of the General Staff . . . [and] because of pressure exerted by the President," through Mr. Morgenthau. Colonel Burns, the principal authority on procurement, warned that the recent loss of a large powder plant at Kelvin, N. J., was a further blow to production; that although steps had already been taken for a series of huge new powder and loading plants, designed with special precautions against communicating explosions, no large increases in output could be expected for a full year.[48]

Need for Allocations and Accurate Scheduling

It was the shortage of powder that in November 1940 brought to a head the long-developing dispute among the Army, the Navy, and the British over conflicting orders for the means of production, rather than for immediate production itself. The controversy involved orders for British airplanes, Navy cruisers, and Army antiaircraft artillery and ammunition. These would seem to be noncompetitive items, but they had one common point of contact in the

[48] Notes on meeting in DCofS office, 20 Sep 40, CofS files, Emergency, Misc Conf, bndr 3. The following are listed as additional sources for information on the transfer of small arms ammunition in mid-1940: (1) Memo, CofOrd for CofS, 22 May 40, sub: Availability of Ordnance Material for Release without Adversely Affecting National Defense, CofS files, Emergency, bndr 2. (2) Status of Caliber .30 Ball Ammunition (Pencil note: "Used by CofS 6/6/40"), CofS files, Emergency, bndr 2. (3) Memo, ACofS G–4 for CofOrd, 6 Jun 40, sub: Exchange of Deteriorated Ammunition (under Act of June 1, 1926), G–4/16110–6. This contains an accompanying 3-page Memo for the record and a copy of SW Memo of 5 June. (4) Ltr, Secy Gen Anglo-French Purchasing Commission to Chairman, President's Liaison Committee, 17 Jun 40, sub: Small Arms Ammunition, AG 400.3295 (6–17–40). Papers in the same file summarize all the transfers up through July. (5) Notes on conference in DCofS office, 23 Jul 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3. (6) Memo, SGS for Gen Bryden and Gen Moore, 9 Aug 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3. (7) Memo bearing initials OCS, WBS, GCM, 16 Aug 40, sub: British Arms and Ammunition, CofS files, Foreign Sales, bndr 4. (8) Two sets of notes of conference held in CofS office, 20 Aug 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3, and Foreign Sales, bndr 4. (9) Notes of conference in DCofS office, 17 Sep 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 3. (10) Memo, DCofS for CofOrd, 23 Sep 40, sub: Production of Small Arms Ammunition, G–4/31773 (likewise in OCS/13951–152). There are two accompanying papers in this file. (11) Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for ASW, 3 Oct 40, sub: Production of Small Arms Ammunition, G–4/31773. (12) Office of CofOrd, Small Arms Ammunition, Vol. 2, pp. 321–32. Copy in files of Hist Div, SSUSA.

hard-pressed machine-tool industry whose output was required variously for plants producing the several end products mentioned. The Army's case was pressed by the Chief of Staff and by the new Assistant Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson (later Under Secretary and still later Mr. Stimson's successor as Secretary). It was a difficult case for the Army to press successfully. On the one hand there was unquestioned and urgent British need for search planes for use against the submarines, and on the other the President's interest in the Navy's long-range expansion was well known. The Chief of Staff, however, proceeded to argue vigorously. In support of his complaint that the British emergency priority was being put "ahead of everything" Col. Charles Hines of the Army-Navy Munitions Board added that the proposals also put "the new Navy ahead of us except for the Regular Army-National Guard based on a strength of 600,000." The Navy's case was weakened by the fact that the cruisers in question were not scheduled for completion until 1945, whereas the Army's need was for the equipping of a 1,400,000-man army in 1941, as was pointed out in a Staff meeting by Col. (later Maj. Gen.) J. W. Anderson of WPD. General Marshall insisted that "we can't afford to build up an Army without a reasonable amount of equipment and ammunition." Mr. Patterson asserted that postponement of the flow of ammunition "would cause a break-down of the Selective Service system; if these men don't get their equipment their morale will go down tremendously." [49] On this occasion the fight for Army priority was won.

How grave the training situation was becoming is indicated by the report of 19 February 1941, when General Marshall was facing a new British request for 900,000,000 rounds of American-made ammunition. "We have had to reduce the amount of ammunition for training to about 60 percent" of requirements, he said to his General Council.[50] He also confessed his anxieties over the Philippines defenses, and over Hawaii where "they have to be prepared against any surprise attack," to which he referred at two smaller conferences of this period.[51] At about this time, still insistent on the antiaircraft needs of the new army, he explained to the President the serious effect which a shortage in certain items of equipment could have not only on the unit involved but on the whole Army, whose parts have a balance and a relationship to each other. Thus, the proper ratio of antiaircraft artillery to the whole Army was determined on the basis

[49] Entry for 16 Nov 40 in CofS files, Misc Conf, bndr 6.
[50] Entry for 19 Feb in CofS files, Notes on Conf, Feb 1941, bndr 10.
[51] *Ibid.*, 6 Feb 41 and 25 Feb 41 entries.

of past and present experience: the equipment on hand and in sight would suffice for the antiaircraft artillery component in an army of 600,000 men; it would be far below the amount necessary to arm the antiaircraft artillery component of the projected 1,400,000-man army. Failure to acquire the additional amount needed, then, would pin the new army, for which Selective Service trainees were now being drafted on an increasing scale, to the smaller number, already outgrown. The argument was intended to win the President's support for providing all items needed under the Protective Mobilization Plan, for the first 1,400,000 men. Support for that installment of the new army was needed immediately, to prevent its development being blocked by the British "10-division program" then being pushed. Support for the much larger later army was to be sought, similarly, as the year progressed, when it proved hard to get.

Britain's Fruitful Proposals for Co-ordination of Effort

The 10-division program had been devised in late 1940 to reduce to a degree the often encountered competition between British and American orders which was handicapping American Army training. This competition had repeatedly developed with regard to airplane purchases, until reason compelled Britain to seek from American plants only those aircraft items that were common to American and British needs alike, and to satisfy purely British requirements from British plants. With a view to similar co-ordination in other purchases Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, in July 1940 discussed with the President the immediate and full interchange of information between American and British services on short-wave radio research—this being the work in radar whose fullest development was critically needed by Britain at the time when the aerial Battle of Britain was being mounted.[52] The remarkable success of the resultant scientific and technological pooling of the two nations' resources in this respect may have encouraged a further step in joint planning, for on 2 October Sir Walter Layton, Economic Adviser to the British Purchasing Mission of that day, wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury (still

[52] An *aide-mémoire* was left with the President on 8 July 1940, the subject was discussed with the Cabinet, and the proposal was approved on 11 July. WPD 4340-3. For the rich fruit of this discussion see the Joint Board's recommendations in October 1940 for full interchange of scientific and technological information (JB 310, ser 661) and the corresponding agreement affecting Army, Navy, and National Defense Research Committee on 25 October, dealt with in James P. Baxter, *Scientists Against Time*, pp. 119ff.

the chief liaison official of the Cabinet in these matters) enclosing a report on the subject from the British War Cabinet.[53] "It is essential that the programmes of the United States and British requirements be as much as possible co-ordinated so as to prevent competition arising in the industrial field," wrote the British agent. "To this end we must seek a common programme agreed and adjusted to the conflicting requirements of immediate and ultimate needs."

The letter and the accompanying report from London were referred immediately to the Secretary of War and on 3 October, by the Chief of Staff's direction, Sir Walter and three associates were invited to the first of a series of discussions with General Strong of WPD, General Burns of the Under Secretary's office, Brig. Gen. Eugene Reybold of G–4, and Colonel Hines of the Army-Navy Munitions Board. In General Strong's ensuing report to the Chief of Staff it appears that by all his colleagues there was immediate recognition of the desirability, from motives of self-interest, of maintaining the British Empire at least until the American arms expansion program was complete; also of the desirability of that expansion's proceeding with minimum interference from British purchases.

To this end, it was quickly agreed, British aircraft production would be integrated with American, and would take care of such British orders as could best be produced at home; British orders to American plants for equipment not standard in the United States would not be looked on with favor. This reasoning was then extended to consider a two-nation agreement on ordnance items, and General Strong reported the American consultants' resistance to pressure for American factory production of purely British types. There were two reasons. Not only did the Americans regard the British 25-pounder as inferior to the new American 105-mm. howitzer, but American plants could at this time turn out three of the latter to one of the former. The American 155 likewise was held to be almost equal to the British 5.5-inch howitzer and far more easily produced here. Antiaircraft artillery needs of both could be met by the American 90-mm. gun.[54] The American 37-mm. and 75-mm. antitank weapons were preferred to

[53] Included in Memo, Gen Strong for CofS, dated only "October, 1940," WPD 4340–3. Also in records of the President's Liaison Committee, Record Group 169 in National Archives. See particularly folders labeled "Munitions Program" (Box 16) and "Reports by Sir Walter Layton" (Box 11).

[54] General Moore, as Deputy Chief, warmly supported the Chief of Ordnance in his insistence upon retaining the 105, the 155, and the 90-mm. weapons. This stand arrayed him against the British consultants and also against the Secretary of the Treasury who for some reason supported the British argument. General Moore won.

the British 2- and 6-pounders. The British Enfield .303 rifle might be replaced by the more numerous American .30-caliber weapon, a matter of large concern when mass production of the proper ammunition was considered.

This conference and the later discussions springing from it led to a better awareness on the part of the British that if America's great industrial machine was to produce the hoped-for results for both British and American requirements, its energies could not be scattered. Best results could never come from dividing production between 25-pounders and 105-mm. howitzers, with the different ammunition lines they would require, if their purposes and employments were practically identical. The same was true of the almost identical .303- and .30-caliber small arms and their ammunition, and a host of almost parallel weapons.

A trial solution was offered by Sir Walter Layton—that a block of ten British divisions be newly equipped with wholly American weapons, produced by American factories without interruption to the factories' normal methods. In principle this satisfied the basic demand of American production authorities. Now the question was when the new plan would become operative, and at what speed. The answer had to await a re-examination of U. S. Army orders now banked up at the various factories, and of the priorities already allotted to U. S. Army units which were waiting for their equipment. On 2 December a statement of joint supply policy met the views of the conference, and was approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. It provided:

a. No deliveries [to Britain] prior to July 1, 1941 and no deliveries . . . until the minimum training requirements of the Army of the United States [PMP force and replacement centers] are filled.

b. During July 1–Sept. 14, 1941 minimum training requirements of the British 10-division program will be filled as far as practicable.

c. Following fulfillment of initial training requirements for the British, no additional items . . . until the full American requirements of the PMP and replacement centers are filled.[55]

A Restatement of the Plan for Army Expansion

The changing military estimates of succeeding weeks and the discussion of President Roosevelt's Lend-Lease proposal immediately after its presentation to Congress on 6 January 1941 suggested to the General Staff that this newly planned outpouring of American munitions to foreign consumers could gravely

[55] Memo, DCofS (Moore) for CofS, 25 Feb 41, JB 325, ser 692.

embarrass the Army's own development and operations. General Marshall's expression of concern on 19 February (over a British request for 900,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition) has already been mentioned. Even before that, on 3 February 1941, the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Moore, had suggested a formal restatement of American defense objectives: He felt that cognizance should be taken of developments in recent months affecting the now-eclipsed munitions program of 30 June 1940, of which the British 10-division plan of 2 December was a conspicuous example. Ten days later, accordingly, with General Marshall's conditional approval appended on 14 February, there was a revised statement of defense objectives, still directed primarily at the attainment of PMP strength of 1,400,000 men, but projected this time to include a first augmentation to a 2,800,000-man total and a second augmentation to 4,100,000 men.[56]

This was a considerable alteration from the June 1940 rule-of-thumb stages of one, two, and four million men that had dealt with mere totals instead of items. The February 1941 program was specific. Its first phase contemplated 2 field armies (1 in operating condition), 9 corps (5 operating), 27 infantry divisions (9 in operating condition), 4 armored divisions, 2 cavalry divisions (incomplete), and 1 cavalry brigade; units not in operating condition were to be 80 to 90 percent complete in men and materiel. The air element was to have 54 groups. It was recognized that the principal shortages would be in air equipment and in ammunition. The stated objective was "to provide critical and essential equipment and maintain it [the 1,400,000-man PMP establishment] on combat status for one year."

The first augmentation (no time scheduled) aimed at completion of the 2 field armies and the 9 corps already organized. It would retain the 2 cavalry divisions and the 54 air groups of the original force. Its additions were to the infantry divisions (now totaling 45) and the armored divisions (now 8). It was recognized that the ammunition shortage would continue.

The second augmentation aimed at completion of 4 armies, 14 corps, 69 infantry and 12 armored divisions, and "over 100 air groups." Again there was no statement of the time objective. The uncertainty with which all three phases were viewed by General Marshall was indicated by the language of his 14 February paragraph of approval:

[56] AG 381 (2-17-41) M-F-M. See related documents filed under OCS 21145-13 and G-4/31752-1.

. . . with the exception that a decision as to the matter of the Air Corps strength in combat squadrons will be deferred until the question of the Lend-Lease Bill has been settled. [It was then under debate in Congress and did not pass until 11 March 1941]. Furthermore a general decision as to material in connection with British requirements under an approved Lend-Lease Bill will have to be taken at the proper time.[57]

On 25 February General Marshall received from his Deputy a suggestion for radical alterations of the 2 December policy, which had sought to expedite delivery of American-made equipment to the ten British divisions. General Moore proposed that paragraph c of that statement be modified to provide that no additional items be furnished the British "until full American requirements for certain task forces are completed. Following completion of such deliveries to task forces, further deliveries will be apportioned according to the situation existing at that time." [58]

The "certain task forces" were contemplated as a possibility, although there was then no assurance as to whether they might be employed for purely hemisphere defense or for projected expeditions to Iceland or the Azores. The recommendation was approved immediately by General Marshall along with a memorandum of the previous day from General Moore listing such items of ordnance as could be spared to the British.[59] It is of interest to see that by early 1941 there was a different attitude on the 75-mm. gun which in May 1940 had been regarded as indispensable. General Moore was prepared to grant British needs for scout cars and tractors, but still doubted the advisability of releasing the 75's of the unconverted American type, "even though we have a surplus over and above the requirements for 2,000,000 men"—unless he could assume that no force larger than that would go into combat before 1 September 1942. If that assumption could be made, he favored releasing 200 of the 75's, 300 of the 155's, and 434 of the 8-inch howitzers, along with 460,000 rounds of ammunition in those calibers. Much heartier support was offered by the Chief of Field Artillery who "would be glad to get rid of 200 American 75s; they are not very good. . . . I don't want to give any French 75s." [60] The change of views since

[57] *Ibid.* The statement of objectives carrying this approval was circulated to the chiefs of arms, services, and divisions of the War Department General Staff in accordance with a 17 Feb 41 Memo, SGS for TAG, sub: Defense Objectives, OCS 21145-13.

[58] Memo, Gen Moore for CofS, 25 Feb 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, Emergency, bndr 10, with related papers in JB 325, ser 692.

[59] Approval noted in document attached to previously mentioned Memo of 25 Feb 41; also mentioned in 25 Feb 41 entry, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 10.

[60] In same conference of 25 Feb 41.

May 1940 is simply explained by the fact that, as General Moore mentioned, the new 105-mm. howitzer, destined to replace the 75 in the American infantry divisions, was due to go into production in May 1941.[61]

Two weeks later decisions in related matters were reached by G–4 and Ordnance authorities and on 10 March the Chief of Ordnance was formally instructed by the Secretary of War to prepare for aiding the British by manufacturing the British 6-pounder, the 40-mm. Bofors, and the 37-mm. antiaircraft gun. The new 105 would be made available to the British. The Chief of Ordnance was asked to test the 4.5- and 4.7-inch guns for efficiency, and he was informed that manufacture of the .303-caliber rifle was possible, but not yet required. Manufacture of ammunition for that caliber would continue, for British use. There would be no production of the British 3.7-inch antiaircraft gun, the .55-caliber antitank gun, or the .303-caliber machine gun.[62] If Britain needed them they would have to come from British plants.

Lend-Lease Fails to Solve the Problem of Satisfactory Allocations

On the following day the Lend-Lease bill became law (Public 11, 77th Congress), and problems that had harassed the General Staff and the various supply agencies now were inherited largely by the new organization. To meet immediate needs the Secretary of War issued an office order to co-ordinate the functioning of the War Department with the Lend-Lease Act requirements by means of a Defense Aid Division created in the office of the Under Secretary.[63] It was a temporary and an unsuccessful measure. Indeed there was no easy solution at hand. There remained in the minds of Staff, War Department, and President alike that same confusion as to the nation's main objective which had complicated production problems from 1939 onward. The pressure for immediate aid to Britain continued to interfere with America's long-range planning. Training of the existing Army for early use of an expeditionary force continued to call for weapons and personnel required elsewhere for the development of a much larger army of the future. Hemisphere defense still could not be provided save by endangering other defense. Airplane production still called for machine

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] Memo (signed Gen Reybold) from SW to TAG, for transmission to CofOrd, 10 Mar 41. CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 11.

[63] Office Order SW, 8 Apr 41, JB 325, ser 692. See also Ltr, SW to Chiefs of Divisions, 10 Apr 41, AG 020.1 (3–29–41) MM, Tab A.

tools equally needed for producing Navy equipment or British equipment or Army equipment or civilian goods.[64]

If there had been only confusion about priority of requisitions whose total was identical with total production the situation would have remained difficult. Actually matters were much worse, for the total of the various demands on American industry exceeded the visible supply. There was recognition of the need for apportionment and co-ordination and even temporary reduction of demand but no agreement on how it was to be attained. The President's advancement of the Lend-Lease idea had been due chiefly to his desire to finance the purchase necessary for British defense. Among procurement authorities, however, and probably in the President's mind as well, there was an attendant conviction that a Lend-Lease plan should also promote an effective co-ordination of purchasing programs, such as Sir Walter Layton had mentioned the preceding October but such as certainly was not being achieved. British pressure for larger and larger allotments increased this desire for co-ordination at the same time that it developed within the War Department itself both an irritation with the British and a conflict of judgments as to what really should be the primary objective of American production—to save Britain or to arm America. The irritation had already been expressed by General Marshall himself in early January when the British asked for 50,000 planes by the end of 1942—a demand whose fulfillment he said was impossible, with Mr. Knudsen in apparent agreement.[65]

The conflict of judgments was exemplified a few days later at a conference in the Deputy Chief's office, attended by John J. McCloy (at this time a special assistant to Secretary Stimson but later made Assistant Secretary of War with large responsibilities for overseas matters), Generals Moore, Arnold, Burns, and Lewis, Colonels Aurand, Brown, and Quinton, and Major Robinett. Mr. McCloy asked whether the new British requests would fit into the production capacity of the Army's 4,000,000-man program (apparently assuming that arms designed for that program would be partly diverted to Britain). Ignoring Lend-Lease purposes, General Moore inquired pointedly how Army orders in excess of Army needs could be explained to the American people. General Burns and

[64] In July 1940 the President had restricted the export of machine tools (SLC Min, 12 Aug 40, SLC bndr 1, item 55), but the domestic shortage continued so acute as to be a factor in the Chief of Staff's call for the Strategic Estimate of 25 September 1940 and an ensuing warning from General Burns. Memo, Ex ASW for CofS, 4 Oct 40, sub: Plan for Coordinating . . . Machine Tool Requirements, AG 004 (10-4-40).

[65] Meeting in CofS office, 9 Jan 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 8.

Colonel Aurand in more direct fashion replied that in some items the British request would exceed the capacity of the 4,000,000-man figure. "You may be bound by that, but it does not impress me," the notes quote Mr. McCloy's reply. "The President has announced that this country will become an arsenal for democracy. We are out to top Germany, in peace or in war." [66]

The date of this meeting is of interest, showing that even before General Moore's 3 February suggestion for restating defensive objectives the Secretary's office was grappling with that problem. The General Staff had not been consulted in the drafting of the Lend-Lease bill, but Mr. McCloy, who had been active in the task, saw to it on 5 January that a copy was made available for the Staff study which began immediately.[67] Initially, it appears the Staff was skeptical. A whimsical note was penciled to the Secretary of the General Staff by Col. R. H. Brennan when the bill by which America was to grant unlimited aid to Britain received its official number in the House docket. "By a strange coincidence the number . . . is 1776," observed Colonel Brennan.

Despite initial doubts, it took the Staff, and particularly G–4, little time to recognize that the measure should have the hearty support of the War Department, not only because of Presidential wish but because of its relationship to the long-sought co-ordination of production. G–4's recommendation of support, followed by a discussion with Mr. McCloy, brought from Colonel Brennan the draft of a letter which Secretary Stimson sent to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.[68] The letter contains this significant passage:

> . . . if passed, the bill will enable the United States to exercise effective coordination and control over all production of defense articles in the United States and, through the President, to apportion the articles so produced appropriately between the needs of the United States and those countries whose defense is a matter of vital concern to the United States.

In confident expectation of the bill's ultimate passage Mr. McCloy was host at a luncheon meeting in mid-February to discuss the amount of money that would be needed to implement Lend-Lease, those present including British and French purchasing agents, an Office of Production Management (OPM) representative, General Burns, and Colonel Aurand.[69] Mr. McCloy explained the

[66] Meeting in DCofS office, 24 Jan 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 8.

[67] Memo, Col R. H. Brennan, B&LP Br, for Col Ward, SGS, 7 Jan 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 8.

[68] (1) Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 13 Jan 41, sub: Report on HR 1776, G–4/32417. (2) Ltr, SW to Bloom, Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs, HR, 14 Jan 41, G–4/32417.

[69] See Memo, Col Aurand for Gen Moore, 12 Feb 41, sub: Conference with British Representatives, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 10. The memorandum was initialed by the Chief of Staff.

procedure of requesting appropriations and the necessity for detailed information on British requirements, and received the British assurance of a recomputation, but the Army officers' anxieties were so little relieved that on the following morning, in conference with the Deputy Chief of Staff, they and their colleagues agreed that the total requirements then announced were in excess of America's production powers. They felt that the War Department would have to cope with the situation by setting up proper controls in the forthcoming Lend-Lease organization.[70] Later in the day (and quite independently of the discussion in General Moore's office) the Secretary of War sent to Mr. Roosevelt a carefully considered series of recommendations for the Lend-Lease organization, aiming at an over-all production program providing balance and control of foreign and domestic procurement.[71] He referred to advice received from the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and to apparent support from the State and Treasury Departments, which he felt should be represented in a co-ordinating board. For the executive desk he recommended the experienced General Burns—whom in fact President Roosevelt did eventually name as Lend-Lease executive.

On this same day Arthur Purvis of the British Purchasing Commission submitted to Mr. Roosevelt a "very, very confidential" list of British deficiencies of ships, aircraft, weapons, ammunition, tools, and semifinished materials that the United States was expected to provide. It was promptly sent to the civilian and military heads of War and Navy for perusal, with a mention that those four officials, plus Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and Messrs. Knudsen, Hillman, Stettinius, and Nelson of the Office of Production Management, should be prepared to discuss these matters as soon as Lend-Lease should pass; also that the service chiefs should have in hand a list of Army and Navy needs to be laid beside the British list, with a view to learning what were the total demands on American industry.[72]

This planning of a single over-all program was again stressed by Mr. McCloy when Colonel Aurand was summoned to a meeting in the Bureau of the Budget for discussion of Lend-Lease matters.[73] It was on Colonel Aurand that the responsibility of computing the several programs was being placed; when,

[70] Meeting of 13 Feb 41 in office of DCofS, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 10.

[71] Ltr, SW to President, 13 Feb 41, AG 400.3295 (2-13-41).

[72] Memo, Secy Treas for Gen Watson, White House, 13 Feb 41, AG 400.3295 (2-13-41). This file also contains copy of the British list.

[73] Memo, Col Aurand for Gen Moore, 15 Feb 41, sub: Conference on Method of Appropriation for Lend-Lease Bill, G-4/32697-1.

one day later, General Burns proposed to the General Staff a study of what existing stocks and productive capacity could become available for Lend-Lease, and what additional capacity should be created, the matter was referred to G–4, with a note indicating that Colonel Aurand was already at work on those matters.[74] That a balance sheet of American-British defense needs in 1941–42 was currently being prepared was stated by the President at a press conference on 18 February—the implication being that the "balance sheet" was further advanced than, in retrospect, it seems to have been.[75]

Since details of British requirements were meanwhile being extracted from the British agencies, the War Department, chiefly through Colonel Aurand and Mr. McCloy, was able to work out the justification for a $7,000,000,000 appropriation bill to meet the visible needs of Lend-Lease.[76] At last, on 10 March, Colonel Aurand with General Reybold and General Burns, presented to the Chief of Staff the "estimates of production requirements and shortages in conformity with the needs of both the United States and the British," [77] and three days later General Marshall, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy testified on a $7,000,000,000 appropriation bill drawn up chiefly to implement the Lend-Lease plan. That their testimony was wholeheartedly for the measure was pointed out next day to Colonel Aurand by General Marshall.[78]

The Long-Range Influence of Lend-Lease

It is of interest to note that, whatever may have been the views of others upon the probable results of Lend-Lease, Secretary of War Stimson already recognized that the new act was taking the nation into the war. He said as much to the various supply chiefs whom he called to his office for a discussion of Departmental needs,[79] and three days later General Marshall, surveying the pending proposals for further increases in airplane orders, also recognized that the mere placing of such orders called for explanation. "Such a program cannot be

[74] Notation on CofS tally card 21210–3.

[75] *The New York Times*, 19 Feb 41, p. 6.

[76] The negotiations are recorded in summary in Memo, Col Aurand for Gen Moore, 25 Feb 41, sub: Discussion with Regard to British Requirements, G–4/32247. The agreements on weapons types are discussed in Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 19 Feb 41, sub: British Proposals Concerning Production, G–4/32575; Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for AG, 10 Mar 41, sub: Production for British Requirements, G–4/32575; and entry of 13 Mar 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 11.

[77] Entry of 10 Mar 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 11.

[78] Entry of 14 Mar 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 11.

[79] Entry of 17 Mar 41, sub: Lend-Lease Bill, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 11.

sustained as a military requirement," he wrote to the Secretary, "unless we are willing to state that we are preparing for an *offensive* campaign in the air against a foreign power." [80]

During this first month of activities under Lend-Lease Colonel Aurand's experiences led him once more to the conclusion that there must be some single planning agency capable of preparing "a supply plan to insure victory." [81] He proposed, and General Moore approved, drafting a letter for the Secretary of War's signature that would support this plan. The proposal is of interest in connection with the "Victory Program," which did in fact come to pass during the summer. Its contemporary importance is indicated by the fact that extracts of it were circulated among supply chiefs for their study,[82] and shortly thereafter, in line with the 7 April recommendation, G–4 submitted that, "in order to prepare a supply plan to insure victory, some agency competent to formulate such a plan must be created." The original proposal contemplated a meeting of representatives from Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and corresponding British agencies.[83] Presumably there was approval, for three weeks later G–4 submitted drafts of letters to be sent to the Secretary of the Navy, to the chairman of the Maritime Commission, and also to the director of the Ordnance Division of OPM, calling for an interdepartmental commission to recommend a supplies objective necessary to victory, but besides the four American members of such a conference, the proposal included four British members and one Chinese.[84] WPD's view on the conference membership was, rather, that at the outset the discussion should be conducted within the United States military establishment, specifically within the Joint Board and its Joint Planning Committee. Recommendations "for aid to China and any other nation" would then be on a "basis of our strategic aims and our own national interests." [85] This view was accepted by the Chief of Staff and recommended on 14 May to the Joint Board, which on 17 May indorsed it to the Joint Planning Committee for appropriate action.

[80] Memo, CofS for SW, 20 Mar 41, OCS 17840–320.

[81] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for DCofS, 7 Apr 41, sub: War Department Lend-Lease Policies and Action to Be Taken, G–4/32697 or AG 008 Lend-Lease (4–15–41). The latter contains the DCofS note of approval, 11 Apr 41. Also in JB 325, ser 692.

[82] AG Ltr to Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services, 18 Apr 41, sub: War Department Lend-Lease Policies and Action to Be Taken, AG 008 Lend-Lease (4–15–41) M–D–M.

[83] Memo, G–4 for Gen Moore, 7 Apr 41, JB 325, ser 692.

[84] G–4 Memo, 28 Apr 41, to which is attached WPB comment, both accompanying CofS recommendation to JB dated 14 May 41, JB 325, ser 692.

[85] *Ibid.*

A Basis Reached for Co-ordinated Supplies

With this indorsement, and after the many false starts here chronicled, the basis for a co-ordination of American-British acquisition of munitions was laid. Even then it was only a basis, since the program shortly encountered major distractions that were to call for constant revisions of the program for aid to Britain.[86] Had Britain been the only seeker after whatever munitions the United States' Armed Forces could spare, the distractions would have been sufficiently troublesome. There were many other needy nations fighting the Axis. China was a persistent applicant for aid in many of the very items which were most critically needed both by Britain and by the United States, particularly for the improvement of Pacific defenses. South American nations, encouraged by recent emphasis on hemisphere defense, made much more moderate requests and ended by getting very little—and this at the outset by an extension of credit rather than by Lend-Lease. The Soviet Union, which during the lifetime of the Hitler alliance had qualified for no aid whatever, was transformed into an eager recipient as soon as the Soviets were involuntarily arrayed instead as an anti-Axis combatant. Lend-Lease activities expanded rapidly, and soon it became necessary to provide for this rapid dispersion of American-made munitions a control that would place the much-sought supplies initially wherever in America's judgment they could be most useful and, thereafter, wherever it was clear that they were being efficiently employed and maintained. So far as British needs were concerned this was one of the numerous supervisory functions entrusted to the Army "observer" in London soon after the ABC meeting of January–March 1941 led to assignment of Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney to that duty.[87] It was on General Chaney's recommendation (supported by earnest on-the-spot recommendations from General Brett and others observing the troubled state of affairs in Egypt, plus the specific request of the British Government) that the Army sent a Middle East mission to Cairo to "coordinate War Department activities in that theater," as the mission's stern purpose was euphemistically described.[88] A joint report to the Chief of Staff by

[86] Discussed at length in the succeeding chapter.

[87] See Chapter XII.

[88] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Military Mission in the Middle East, appd by CofS same day, OCS 21326–1. See Memo, Gen Burns for SW, 4 Sep 41, no sub, G–4/32697–11. See also Memo, President for SW, 13 Sep 41, Ag 400.3295 (8–9–41) sec 1. For dispatches from U. S. Minister Alexander C. Kirk, General Brett, and Col. Bonner Fellers, urging necessity of American personnel to supervise proper maintenance of American equipment then going to Egypt, see tabs of Memo, Gerow for CofS, 10 Oct 41, WPD 4402–84. For extension of Gen. Russell L. Maxwell's responsibilities to include naval

Brig. Gen. H. B. Clagett, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) H. H. George, and Commander E. O. McDonnell, on their mission to China following attendance at the Singapore ADB Conference, plus a G–4 memorandum to the Defense Aid Division officer in the Office of the Under Secretary of War,[89] led to recognition that there must be a resident mission in China for a similar purpose. Accordingly in late August Brig. Gen. John Magruder was sent as Chief of the American Military Mission to Chungking to advise and assist the Chinese Government in supplying, transporting, and maintaining American materiel and in training Chinese personnel in its use.[90] (This was primarily for Lend-Lease purposes; the mission headed by Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell in February 1942 was given wartime functions of command.)[91] The task in the Middle East was soon found to be so dispersed as to call for two missions rather than one, a fact recognized by the President as early as 13 September, and in October two such missions were created, with Brig. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell named as Chief of the U. S. Military North African Mission with concern over the Red Sea area, Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Syria, and Brig. Gen. R. A. Wheeler named as Chief of the U. S. Military Iranian Mission, with concern over the Persian Gulf theater of Iraq, Iran, and related areas.[92] Creation of a mission to the USSR was recommended by General Burns on his return from the first mission to Moscow in September, and this was attempted in November, when Maj. Gen. J. N. Greely was sent out as Chief of the U. S. Military Mission to the USSR.[93] It was

projects in Red Sea area, see Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 20 Oct 41, sub: Responsibility of Chief of North African Mission, WPD 4511–15; also same for same on same subject, 21 Oct 41. Copies of both in OCS 21329–2. The work of the several missions here mentioned is related at length in other volumes of this series on the Mediterranean, Middle East, and China-Burma-India Theaters.

[89] See Joint Rpt of Clagett, George, McDonnell, to CofS, through CG Phil Dept, sub: Air Mission to China Covering 17 May–6 Jun 41, AG 380.3 (4–4–41) Staff Conference at Singapore. See also McDonnell's later Rpt, 24 Jun 41; Rad, Marshall to Grunert 1056, 25 Jun 41; Grunert reply, 28 Jun 41; Adams (TAG) to CG Phil Dept 1148, 19 Jul 41; Memo, Arnold, DCofS for Air, for CofS, 15 Jul 41, sub: Aid for China; Memo, R. P. Patterson, USW, for CofS, 19 Jul 41, sub: Co-ordination of Chinese Defense Aid, and many related papers, filed in Drawer 3187 of International Aid Division.

[90] Memo, Actg SW (Patterson) for Gen Magruder, 27 Aug 41, sub: Instructions for Mil Mission to China, WD 334.8 Mil Mission to China (8–26–41) MC, OCS 21300–5.

[91] Instructions of CofS to Gen Stilwell, 2 Feb 42, sub: Instructions as U. S. Army Rep in China, OCS 21367–7, with reference to Ltrs of SW to T. V. Soong, 23 and 29 Jan 41, and latter's reply of 30 Jan 41.

[92] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Military Mission in the Middle East, OCS 21326–1. (2) Ltr, SW to Gen Maxwell, 21 Oct 41, sub: Ltr of Instructions, prepared in WPD and appd by CofS, OCS 21329–3. (3) Ltr, SW to Secy State, 29 Oct 41, prepared in WPD, appd by CofS, OCS 21329–6 (this refers to President's directive to SW, 13 Sep 41).

[93] Ltr, SW to Gen Greely, 5 Nov 41, sub: Ltr of Instructions, prepared by WPD and appd by CofS, OCS 21316–9. See account of mission by T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, awaiting publication in this series of volumes.

an ill-fated affair, for the Greely mission was not admitted to the USSR and after several months' delay in Iran returned to the United States.

Early Differences with the Soviet Union

The need for a fuller flow of information from American observers in Russia was already apparent. As early as August 1941, when American Lend-Lease goods were beginning to move to the Soviet Union, General Marshall found it necessary to scrutinize the Soviet requests for materiel. He was clearly nettled by Russian complaints, a fact which gave rise to a letter from the President to Secretary Stimson on the subject of supplying the Soviets with a variety of airplane items. To the Secretary, as an *aide-mémoire* for use at the next Cabinet meeting, General Marshall wrote with unusual sharpness:

> In the first place our entire Air Corps is suffering from a severe shortage in spare parts of *all* kinds. We have planes on the ground because we cannot repair them. . . .
>
> Mr. Oumansky and his Russian associates were informed of this situation. . . .
>
> If any criticism is to be made in this matter, in my opinion it is that we have been too generous, to our own disadvantage, and I seriously question the advisability of our action in releasing the P–40s at this particular time. I question this even more when it only results in criticism, and I think the President should have it clearly pointed out to him that Mr. Oumansky will take everything we own if we submit to his criticisms. Please read their attitude toward our Attaché, which I sent you this morning.[94]

Mr. Roosevelt's pressure for expediting to the USSR such aid as was on schedule was renewed a little later, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) informing Secretary Stimson that by Presidential desire October deliveries to Russia were to take precedence over all other defense aid materiel to other countries. Furthermore, if civilian maintenance crews were not provided to accompany these shipments, the President desired that Army personnel be furnished to make sure the equipment was properly maintained. Again there was resistance. On assurance from General Moore that civilian crews were not available, General Marshall pointedly requested further instructions from Mr. Stimson:

> . . . There are two important considerations involved in the sending of officers and soldiers to Russia.
>
> In the first place, do we order them or do we endeavor to have them volunteer . . .?
>
> In the second place, what is the political repercussion at the present time, and what

[94] Memo, CofS for SW, 29 Aug 41, no sub, OCS 21302–10–B.

would it be if they were lost to us, as very easily can be the case? And what will be the repercussion if we order them, and they themselves wish to avoid such detail? . . .

On the memorandum is a note initialed "GCM":

The Secretary of War directs that we endeavor to obtain volunteers from the Army and place them in Russia in the same status as the specialists and mechanics we have sent to England and Cairo. If volunteers are not available, then he will discuss the problem with the President.[95]

The Office of the Chief of Staff, it must be remembered, possessed limited powers of interference with the Lend-Lease program. The administration of aid to other anti-Axis powers was placed by the President beyond the control of Army and Navy, and purposely so. The military was wholly aware of the policy to extend all possible aid to the nations already deployed in battle against those foes which the United States already recognized as its own foes; indeed the military had conducted many of the conversations that led toward the basic policy of measured aid to Britain. The instances just related show that on occasion the military's voice was raised in protest against aid to foreign nations which was thought to jeopardize American interests. It must be recognized, however, that the Army's role in this respect was advisory only. The determining power was that of the President, who had additional advisers, and to that superior authority the military services necessarily bowed.

[95] (1) Memo, Brig Gen S. P. Spalding, OEM, to SW, 8 Oct 41, no sub. (2) Memo, DCofS (Moore) for CofS, 13 Oct 41, no sub. (3) Memo, CofS for SW, 14 Oct 41, sub: Ordnance and Air Corps Mechanics for Russia, signed by Marshall. All in OCS 21302–19A.

CHAPTER XI

The Victory Program

The Chief of Staff's recognition of the uncertainties with which Lend-Lease, once passed, would becloud any prior program for materiel [1] was justified by developments following closely on the bill's passage on 11 March 1941. On 10 April the Secretary of War outlined the procedure to be followed under the Lend-Lease Act, setting up a co-ordinating Defense Aid Division in the Under Secretary's office and Defense Aid Committees to determine materiel needs in accordance with instructions from the Chief of Staff.[2] It was already apparent, however, that neither the Defense Aid Division nor the other agencies of Lend-Lease could make their plans for supplies without a fuller knowledge of long-range strategic plans. Even before the Secretary published his instructions G–4 made its doubts known in a memorandum prepared by Colonel Aurand for signature by his chief of division and addressed to the Deputy Chief of Staff (the communication of 7 April, previously mentioned):

> It is understood that there will be published shortly by the Secretary of War the lend-lease procedure within the War Department. It is hoped that this procedure will permit the formalizing of requests for aid. However, there is an absence of any administrative office for the clearance of these requests prior to their being forwarded to the War Department. Until some such agency is set up, the War Department must be prepared to act on sporadic oral requests. The procedure about to be published does not lend itself to such action.[3]

Colonel Aurand's memorandum, it will be recalled, had proposed that the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and the British agencies in Washington consider jointly the problems of total production and co-ordinated demand. On 18 April its various suggestions were excerpted and circulated to supply chiefs.[4]

[1] See CofS notation of 14 Feb 41 on Gen Moore's 3 Feb 41 Memo, AG 381 (2–17–41) M–F–M.

[2] (1) Procedure under the Lend-Lease Act, AG 020.1 (3–29–41) MM (Tab A). (2) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 12 May 41, sub: Co-ordination of Planning and Supply, WPD 4321–12.

[3] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for DCofS (Gen Moore), 7 Apr 41, sub: War Department Lend-Lease Policies, G–4/32697.

[4] (1) Note of approval by DCofS, 11 Apr 41, AG 008 (4–15–41) Lend-Lease. (2) Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for TAG, 15 Apr 41, sub: War Department Lend-Lease Policies, same file. (3) TAG Ltr, 18 Apr 41, sub: War Department Lend-Lease Policies, same file. This file contains also the original of the G–4 Memo of 7 Apr and Col Aurand's summary of it.

On this same day, 18 April, much the same concern over the need for a clearly stated objective was being expressed in strong terms by Under Secretary of War Patterson. His office, which had the responsibility for procurement of equipment for the Army, likewise had recognized that, if American industry was to turn out the munitions required by Lend-Lease as well as those contemplated for a steadily growing American Army, it would be necessary to chart the future requirements and make plans suited to reality. The situation was suggestive of that of June 1940 when this same office, under the prodding of Colonel Burns, had pressed the Chief of Staff for a clear statement of future requirements and had finally extracted approval of an estimate—which in reality was beyond the visible powers of industry, and which accordingly had to be whittled down.[5] Now on 18 April 1941 Under Secretary Patterson addressed to the Secretary of War a memorandum designed both to make fuller use of industry and to force from higher authority a clear decision upon the nation's real war policy, for only such a decision could clearly determine the long-range needs of the American military establishment. With a good deal of bluntness Mr. Patterson referred to "probable" (not "possible") enemies and theaters of operation:

1. At the present time funds have been appropriated, and in large part obligated, for a production objective which is substantially as follows in so far as the Army is involved:

a. Air Forces: Productive capacity of approximately 3,400 complete airplanes per month of which 1,800 pertain to the United States Army, 400 to the United States Navy, and 1,200 to Great Britain. The capacity for combat planes approximates 2,500 per month of assorted types.

b. Ground Forces: Productive capacity to support approximately 4,000,000 men on combat status.

2. While the above program will tax American industry to the limit for a number of months, it does not represent the maximum munitions effort of this country. It is believed a decision should be made as promptly as possible on the production effort necessary to achieve victory on the basis of appropriate assumptions as to probable enemies and friends and theaters of operation. It is presumed that the munitions power available to this country and its friends must exceed to an adequate extent that available to its enemies.

3. It is suggested that a joint committee be created to make appropriate recommendations, and to consist of representatives of the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and of Office of Production Management.

4. In any event this office needs a decision as to the ultimate munitions production required by the War Department so that appropriate plans can be started.

[5] See Chapter VI.

A typed note at the bottom of the copy on file in WPD records says: "Judge Patterson said the Secretary of War agreed and that General Burns has been informed." [6]

Other Influences Calling for a Firm Statement of Objectives

The importance of this communication in once more arousing the White House to munitions needs for an ultimate victory over Hitler, and to the desirability of computing these needs on a long-range basis (and hence in starting what became known as the Victory Program) is not susceptible to measurement. There were other factors, notably the General Staff activities discussed in Chapter X. Yet not only the reasoning but fragments of the very language in paragraph 2, above, will be found in a 9 July letter of President Roosevelt (later presented) which led directly to the Victory Program. There is no ready explanation of why a recommendation whose very language could persist for nearly twelve weeks, as in this case, should have taken so long to produce the President's directive. This in itself suggests the partial responsibility of the other factors. One must also have in mind the distractions of contemporary events and anxieties, a few of which may be mentioned. The Selective Service extension plan with its embarrassing political complications was already being cautiously considered.[7] The occupation of the Azores was so genuinely contemplated that an occupation date (22 June) was once designated, only to be canceled a little later.[8] The German-Russian drift into war was gathering headway,[9] and there were conflicting views of the effect which that stupendous clash would bring about.

Eleven days after the recommendation was laid before Mr. Stimson, a copy of Under Secretary Patterson's memorandum was forwarded by his executive officer, General Burns, to the Chief of Staff, with mention that Secretary Stimson in approving it had suggested the creation of a joint conference representative of Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and OPM (significantly like the current G–4 suggestion discussed in Chapter X). Without pressing the point that nothing apparently had yet been done to comply with the Secretary's wish of eleven days earlier, General Burns tactfully suggested now that the Joint Army and Navy

[6] Memo, USW for SW, 18 Apr 41, sub: Ultimate Munitions Production Essential to the Safety of America, WPD 4494 and 4321–12.

[7] See Chapter VII.

[8] Joint Board Min, 24 May 41.

[9] The invasion began 22 June 1941. See *The New York Times* of that date.

Board be asked to make recommendations.[10] The entire matter as presented in the Patterson memorandum and in those from G–4 now was considered by WPD whose acting chief, Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, on 12 May presented the division's summary of information to date upon the new Defense Aid organization, reporting it to be "seriously deficient" as a means of co-ordinating production and strategy. The summary proposed referring to the Joint Planning Committee all requests then before the Defense Aid Division, preparatory to a study by the Joint Board.[11] Presumably this was before General Marshall on 14 May when he sent to the Joint Board the G–4 suggestions of 7 April, along with the Patterson memorandum and the documents setting up the Defense Aid Division.[12] Three days later the board referred the proposal to its Joint Planning Committee.

On this same day, nearly a month after writing his provocative memorandum, the Under Secretary once more moved for action, this time orally. He was attending a conference in General Marshall's office on 17 May when the Chief of Staff raised a question as to whether the Army was justified in "going beyond the 2,800,000 for critical items; we have already gone beyond that figure for facilities, but we will not need a 4,000,000-man army unless England collapses, and . . . the shipping problem . . . is a definite factor in the size of the Army." The Under Secretary said that he had invited John D. Biggers of the Office of Production Management to explain the situation, and the conference members thereupon moved over to the Under Secretary's office to hear the explanation. Mr. Biggers observed that OPM was "getting very definite pressure from the White House to get intensified effort from industry." He added that the President felt industry should employ multiple shifts in order to increase production, but that industry was reluctant to set up a larger mechanism for Army orders without assurance that the orders would be enough to justify it. Mr. Biggers asked, apparently of the Chief of Ordnance who was present: "Is it true that if your supply or procurement service knew your whole objective you could place that load easier than if it was placed in successive bites?" The direct answer to this was self-evident, but the Chief of Staff volunteered:

> If procurement of these essential items, which amount to several billion dollars, would help you, we might possibly get them and store them against future use. However, another complicating factor is the priorities question. What will the bomber program do? [This

[10] Memo, Gen Burns for CofS, 29 Apr 41, JB 325, ser 692.

[11] Memo, Gen Malony for CofS, 12 May 41, sub: Coordination of Planning and Supply, WPD 4321 and JB 325, ser 692.

[12] See documents in JB 325, ser 692.

was the 500 heavy-bomber program which the President was already asking OPM to make a first priority.] The President has said to step up the cruiser program.[13]

WPD Suggests Action by Chief of Staff

Within WPD there was an increasing conviction that effective co-ordination of purchases should be initiated with a minimum of delay and, presumably, a doubt that efforts within the Joint Planning Committee would be immediately effective, for without awaiting JPC action Lt. Col. C. W. Bundy of WPD invited his chief's attention to "a most important matter" calling for decision "at the earliest possible moment." [14] He observed that, beyond the large and conflicting needs within the United States armed services, the British and Chinese were pressing for munitions shipments and "Prominent lay strategists are recommending all sorts of aid based on their particular interests." He referred to the Under Secretary's 18 April quest for an ultimate program, and proceeded: "The situation is extremely confused. Confusion will reign until an agency for formulating a policy based on all strategic plans is designated." [15] The need for detailed examination of requirements beyond those of the Army was so manifest that Colonel Bundy's chief, General Gerow, ultimately sent his assistant's memorandum to the director of the Navy's WPD.[16] Nothing resulted immediately either from the Navy's examination of this memorandum or from a 7 June memorandum (prepared by Colonel Bundy and dispatched by General Gerow to the Chief of Staff) reminding the Joint Board once more of the need for an over-all estimate of munitions production ultimately required for the nation's security.[17] General Marshall in the interval decided to act. Apparently convinced that the materiel situation had to be faced, he addressed to WPD the following instructions:

> We are continually receiving suggestions as to increases and changes in armament, bombers, etc., along with suggestions of a more far-reaching nature. To provide a base of departure for meeting these proposals we should have a more clearcut strategic estimate of our situation from a ground, air, and naval viewpoint. With such an estimate kept up to date, the various organizational, tactical and strategical questions which are constantly arising could be answered with more consistency than at present. . . .

[13] Entry of 17 May in CofS files, Notes on Conf, Decisions, etc., bndr 15.

[14] Memo, Col Bundy for Actg ACofS WPD, 20 May 41, sub: Coordination of Planning and Supply, WPD 4321–12.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Memo, Gen Gerow for Dir WPD of OpNav, 27 May 41, WPD 4321–12.

[17] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 7 Jun 41, sub: Ultimate Munitions Production Essential to the Safety of America, WPD 4494. See also JB 325, ser 692.

Please contact other divisions of the WDGS and take the necessary steps to have an estimate prepared to be submitted to me in the rough. It should be brief. Appendices can be added at a later date to support the various statements. The initial paper could be utilized as a basis for obtaining the views of other departments. Then we could revamp the estimates. G. C. M.[18]

Here was recognition of the Staff's own responsibility for action, in line with G–4's recommendations of previous weeks. A new G–4 memorandum asserted that the War Department should state its firm requirements for an additional $6,000,000,000, and that all orders for those requirements should be placed without delay as an aid to industry in its planning.[19] Unofficial advisers too were active; the Deputy Chief of Staff at one of his own conferences remarked:

The General Staff is receiving pressure from newspapers and otherwise to go above the present supply objectives and to procure a war reserve. . . . The only way we can do this is to make a strategic estimate of the situation, based on the capabilities of Germany, Japan, Italy and Great Britain in this respect. . . . WPD is working on this and I want every General Staff division concerned to help them as much as possible.[20]

Still later, again in apparent response to outside pressures, the Chief of Staff summoned representatives of WPD, G–3, and G–4 and said, in summary:

The OPM desires that we look into the matter of increasing and continuing our orders for materiel in order that industry may be utilized to its fullest extent. . . . We must not create the situation that a year from now possible shortages will exist and we will find it necessary to say that we were sorry that we did not anticipate the true situation.[21]

On the other hand, he was still concerned over ordering too much and too hastily, and warned his assistants against extravagance.

Make a list of items of equipment which you think we should have accumulated into a pool. . . . I want to find out how much industry needs in order to carry them for, say 6 months. . . . We must be careful that a shortage is not created by too great a demand which blocks current effort. . . . We must not get a pile of stuff which is not only obsolescent but blocks other things more essential.[22]

This sequence of discussions and the delay in meeting in any swift and thorough manner either Under Secretary Patterson's blunt suggestion of six weeks earlier or the several G–4 recommendations suggest that, despite the strong words,

[18] Entry of 21 May 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf, May 1941, bndr 15. See also unused Memo, CofS for USW, 19 May 41, sub: Stepping Up Orders, and Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for CofS, 21 May 41, same sub, both prepared by Col Aurand, both in G–4/32488.

[19] Informal Memo, Col Aurand for Gen Moore, 23 May 41, G–4/32488.

[20] Entry of 27 May in CofS files, Notes on Conf, May 1941, bndr 15.

[21] Entry of 31 May in CofS files, Notes on Conf, May 1941, bndr 15.

[22] *Ibid.*

in the Army's high command there still was insufficient appreciation of the materiel side of war, of the inescapable time lag in industrial production, and hence of the necessity of placing firm orders long before the goods would be needed. This had been the warning of the retiring Chief of Staff, Gen. Malin Craig, two years previously.[23] It had been the occasion of pressure by Colonel Burns in 1940.[24] That General Marshall had drawn his own conclusions from the delays already apparent in industry is suggested by his doubts, expressed at the 17 May conference, whether a 2,800,000-man army was not about the limit for immediate planning. Yet the sequence of events suggests that it was the pressures from the Under Secretary's office and from OPM and, most effectively, from the White House that succeeded in extracting from the General Staff that complete statement of Army needs—not for 1941 and 1942 but for the actual winning of a war not yet declared—for which Mr. Knudsen and his fellow industrialists had been asking for months. The Chief of Staff's May 1941 instructions to his principal assistants in this realm of planning finally set the mechanism to work, with WPD assigning to Maj. (later Lt. Gen.) A. C. Wedemeyer the chief responsibility for a task whose immense reach, complexity, and importance were not surmised by the Staff itself until the ultimate product, "the Victory Program" of 10 September 1941, was completed.

That task occupied the whole attention of those to whom it was entrusted and a large part of the attention of other sections of the General Staff. Colonel Aurand, for example, who in behalf of G–4 was supplying basic data for the WPD study, afforded continuous guidance upon the competing demands for production which for months had been troubling G–4 and the civilian procurement agencies. It was Colonel Aurand who (in line with his 7 April suggestions which at last were being carried out) drafted the letters addressed by the Secretary on 30 June to Mr. Knudsen, to the Secretary of the Navy, to the Chief of the Maritime Commission, and to Arthur B. Purvis, chairman of the British Supply Council, suggesting the need for an over-all balance sheet of Allied productive effort.[25] The Secretary's letter to Mr. Purvis (anticipating the Presi-

[23] See Chapter II.

[24] See Chapter V.

[25] Memo, SW for Dir OPM, 30 Jun 41, G–4/32488. For earlier abortive or inadequate efforts to draw up consolidated statements see Civilian Production Administration, *Industrial Mobilization for War,* pp. 132–40. Too little attention is generally paid to the important aid that Jean Monnet gave in the co-ordination of British and American industrial planning. Until the French surrender M. Monnet was chairman of the Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee in London; thereafter he served with the British Supply Council in North America and in numerous cases was the key figure in discussions participated in by Messrs. Hopkins and McCloy, Generals Burns and Strong, and Colonel Aurand.

dent's wishes in this respect) was a step toward the consolidated statement of British-American-Canadian production which came to pass four months later. This, to be sure, was not a part of the Victory Program nor of the strategic estimate of the following October, but the interrelation of the three enterprises is apparent. A tentative reply to the 30 June letter came on 14 July [26] promising data by the end of the week, but there was no full answer until two months later, after discussion of the matter at the Atlantic Conference. A ray of light on possible reasons for the delay was cast weeks later by the U. S. Special Military and Naval Observers in London in a letter to their chiefs. This reported that the British were reluctant to give exact figures "either because they fear such an estimate may be used to block any further increase, or because the totals may be considered by United States authorities as impossible of attainment." [27] The figures which they supplied even then were in fact incomplete, to be replaced by substantial estimates only after a War Cabinet meeting in London on 20 September 1941, held to welcome the Harriman mission en route to Moscow.[28]

President Roosevelt Orders a Survey

By 9 July, however, the President appears to have become concerned over the conflicting programs, and decided that a directive from him would be desirable, for on that date he addressed to the Secretaries of War and Navy the following letter:

> I wish that you or appropriate representatives designated by you would join with the Secretary of the Navy [or War] and his representatives in exploring at once the overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies.
>
> I realize that this report involves the making of appropriate assumptions as to our probable friends and enemies and to the conceivable theaters of operation which will be required.

[26] Ltr, Arthur B. Purvis to SW, 14 Jul 41, OCS 1183-436. See also Memo, Actg ACofS G-4 for WPD, 18 Jul 41, sub: Consolidated Balance Sheet, WPD 4494-1.

[27] Ltr, Maj Gen J. E. Chaney and Rear Adm R. L. Ghormley to CofS and CNO, 1 Sep 41, WPD 4494-5. The observers were acting in accordance with instructions of Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 21 Aug 41, for transmission to Special Army Observers, sub: Ultimate Production Requirements, AG 400 (7-9-41). A notation on the document indicates approval of it by Colonel Aurand.

[28] The mission included W. A. Harriman, J. D. Biggers, and W. L. Batt of OPM, Generals Embick, Burns and Chaney, Col V. V. Taylor (whose energy and skill were largely responsible for the collection of British industrial figures at this time), Admiral W. H. Standley, Vice Adm. R. L. Ghormley, and others. See data on the mission in WPD 4557.

I wish you would explore the muntions and mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies. From your report we should be able to establish a munitions objective indicating the industrial capacity which this nation will require.

I am not suggesting a detailed report but one that, while general in scope, would cover the most critical items in our defense and which could then be related by the OPM into practical realities of production facilities. It seems to me we need to know our program in its entirety, even though at a later date it may be amended.

I believe that the confidential report which I am asking you to make to me would be of great assistance, not only in the efficient utilization of our productive facilities but would afford an adequate opportunity for planning for the greatly increased speed of delivery which our defense program requires.

I am asking Mr. Hopkins to join with you in these conferences. I would appreciate it if the Secretary of War could take the initiative in these conferences.

Very sincerely yours FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT [29]

One cannot examine the text of the second and third paragraphs of this letter without noting resemblances to Under Secretary Patterson's memorandum of the previous April. The exact relationship is not discernible in available official records, but one may note that a frequent visitor at the White House offices at the time because of his important role in Lend-Lease matters was General Burns, who as executive for the Under Secretary had much to do with the original April memorandum. The industrious and material-minded officer, long conscious that the Army was still laggard in pressing industry to its limit, was thus in an excellent position to bring the production issue before Harry Hopkins, his superior in Lend-Lease, and thus to have more effective pressure applied to the War and Navy Departments by Mr. Roosevelt himself.[30] While the May and June conferences had increased the arms orders somewhat, it was apparent that so pointed a communication from the President as that of 9 July would provide pressure which nobody would resist, and which would bring to pass a carefully constructed over-all estimate more thorough than anything yet promised by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations.

If this was General Burns' surmise it was correct, for the letter had a galvanic effect upon both War and Navy Departments. Secretary Frank Knox on the

[29] Copy in WPD 4494–1.

[30] It appears that General Burns actually drafted not only the 18 April memorandum for Under Secretary Patterson but also a memorandum on which the President's 9 July letter was based. It was originally intended for Mr. Hopkins' signature, but Mr. Hopkins felt it should go from the President instead, and he himself dictated a redraft using much of General Burns' original language. See personal Ltr, Gen Burns to Gen Malony, 13 Apr 49, previously cited, dealing with MS of this volume, Hist Div files.

following day asked Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, to have the desired study made by the Navy's War Plans Division and a report made to him. He mentioned that Mr. Stimson was reported to be doing likewise.[31] Admiral Stark promptly referred the Secretary's letter to the Joint Board, recommending reference to the Joint Planning Committee for later report to the board. He also recommended that the Chief of Staff join him in appointing a group of experts to assist the committee.[32] So strong was the influence of that White House demand (for more specific information upon total requirements than was originally in mind) that years later General Wedemeyer, who was chief architect of the resultant Victory Program, felt that Mr. Roosevelt's letter had provided him with the principal, though not the initial, authority for assembling detailed information from all sources.[33]

Major Wedemeyer had already started his labors, to be sure. A major in WPD at the time when General Marshall gave his 21 May instructions, he was promptly assigned to the designated task. By 24 May, after consultation with Major Wedemeyer on his working requirements, General Malony, then Acting Chief WPD, addressed memoranda to G–2 asking for data upon the situations and capabilities of each of the major combatant nations, and to G–4 asking for information on shipping and munitions; two days later G–2 was asked for similar data on Russia and on the Latin American nations.[34] The next day representatives of all the Staff divisions and of GHQ and the GHQ Air Force met in General Marshall's office for an oral discussion.[35] This was followed on 3 June by circulation of a memorandum to all chiefs of Staff divisions and of arms and services, a notation mentioning that it was delivered by Major Wedemeyer in person, presumably for oral explanation of an accompanying outline of data he would require for his strategic estimate.[36] Certain aspects of the estimate were stated in advance of the computation or even of the study. Notably, the estimate was to assume "July 1, 1943 as the earliest date when US armed forces can be mobilized, trained, and equipped for extensive operations" and,

[31] Memo, Frank Knox for Admiral Stark, 10 Jul 41, JB 355, ser 707.

[32] *Ibid.*, Admiral Stark's indorsement, 11 Jul 41.

[33] Based on Gen Wedemeyer's 1948 discussion of this point with the author.

[34] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G–2, 24 May 41, sub: Strategic Estimate of the Situation. (2) Memo, WPD for G–4, same date and sub. (3) Memo, WPD for G–2, 26 May 41, same sub. All in WPD 4510.

[35] Memo, Executive WPD (Gailey) for ACofS WPD, 28 May 41, sub: Attendance at Conference 27 May, WPD 4510.

[36] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD (Malony) for ACofS G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, 3 Jun 41, WPD 4510.

further, it was to assume that the nation would be "participating in the war under Rainbow Plan 5." The memorandum stated that WPD would integrate all the information the other divisions would provide upon the combatant nations' capabilities, intentions, and limitations, as well as upon America's troop basis, shipping, munitions requirements, and munitions production. A memorandum from General Malony to the Chief of Staff reported that the study was under way "to determine the capabilities and probable lines of action of Axis powers and of friendly powers. When completed, this study will present the War Department views on current and projected policies and actions, and will provide a troop basis and a production basis." [37] The draft was in fact completed in early July "as of July 1, 1941" but was regarded by General Gerow on 16 July as needing further development.[38] Possibly his judgment was influenced by knowledge of the President's 9 July letter asking for far more than this rather hastily gathered estimate. The WPD chief could also have been made uneasy by the circumstance that, although the need for joint planning with the Navy was manifest, and the President's new letter specifically sought it, the "as-of-July 1" draft was a purely War Department enterprise, in which there had been no trace of participation by the Navy. A third reason for hesistancy was expressed in the memorandum to General Marshall:

> The estimate is based upon a more or less nebulous national policy, in that the extent to which our Government intends to commit itself with reference to the defeat of the Axis powers has not as yet been clearly defined. An effort has been made to reconcile the spirit of the various official pronouncements and laws with their literal and legal interpretations.
>
> The time element is vital in strategic planning. To insure timely and effective exploitation of our war potential a careful coordination is necessary to provide and maintain munitions for a rapidly expanding military force. The lag between plan and execution is considerable, and makes necessary a clearly defined national policy for guidance in future planning.[39]

General Marshall requested that the estimate be submitted to General Embick and the Navy for comment. This was done, and General Embick's oral comment was presumably given, but when 29 August went by without recorded comment from the Navy the Chief of Staff gave his approval to the WPD estimate.[40]

[37] Typed note bearing pen notation "Given to Gen Marshall by Gen Malony 6/2/41," WPD 4510.

[38] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 16 Jul 41, sub: Strategic Estimate, WPD 4510.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 29 Aug 41, sub: Strategic Estimate, WPD 4510. General Marshall's penned indorsement is on this copy.

A Large Task Is Undertaken

By that time WPD exploration of the supply situation had been engulfed in the much larger enterprise—the quest of a real Victory Program made necessary by the President's letter of 9 July. In that letter Mr. Roosevelt sought an estimate of the ultimate production requirements for victory over the Axis and its allies. The WPD's July strategic estimate was only the first step toward the desired production estimate but a necessary one, and, because the basis for that first step had been explored for weeks by Major Wedemeyer, General Gerow gave to this same officer the major responsibility for the new and larger task.[41] The gathering of new information began with a request to G–2 for an estimate of the production capacity, present and ultimate, of Germany and the occupied territories and the German allies as related to airplanes, to armored divisions, and to infantry divisions. Four days later the reply came in detail.[42]

About two weeks later, Assistant Secretary McCloy drafted for Mr. Stimson's signature a letter that would report to the President the progress made to date in complying with Mr. Roosevelt's wishes.[43] It noted that on 30 June, some days in advance of the President's directive, the Secretary had initiated inquiries on this matter, through letters to OPM and to the British, as part of the War Department's continuous study of the munitions prospect. It indicated that the information desired by the President would be available shortly. A memorandum from General Gerow to Mr. McCloy, with suggested alterations for the draft, is of special interest as showing not only that WPD was at work upon the estimate but that the professional Staff was disturbed by the possibility of civilian thinking that the war might be won solely on the production line. General Gerow said:

> We must first evolve a strategic concept of how to defeat our potential enemies and then determine the major military units (Air, Navy, and Ground) required to carry out the strategic operations. . . .
>
> It would be unwise to assume that we can defeat Germany by simply outproducing her. One hundred thousand airplanes would be of little value to us if these airplanes could not be used because of lack of trained personnel, lack of operating airdromes in the theater, and lack of shipping to maintain the air squadrons in the theater. . . . Wars are

[41] The available written record of these events is incomplete and is supplemented for purposes of this narrative by recollections of General Wedemeyer as given to the author during 1948.

[42] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G–2, 14 Jul 41. (2) ACofS G–2 to WPD, 18 Jul 41. Both in WPD 4494–1.

[43] Draft of letter to the President for SW's signature, WPD 4494–1. It bears no date, but it is referred to in a Memo, ASW for ACofS WPD, 31 Jul 41, WPD 4494–3. The draft apparently was never sent.

won on sound strategy implemented by well-trained forces which are adequately and effectively equipped.[44]

The Method of Calculation Employed

The President's instructions had been that the Army (and Navy) provide information on "the over-all production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies," and the assumption might have been that from this computation the Army would proceed to a calculation of the manpower that would be needed to make use of the arms thus produced. Assistant Secretary McCloy was puzzled by the fact that WPD's calculations followed the reverse course. In his memorandum to General Gerow, accompanying the draft of the letter to Mr. Roosevelt, he had remarked that he would be "very much interested in seeing how your method of 'first figuring the number of soldiers that it will require to defeat the Axis powers and from such figures determining the number of weapons that are necessary' jibes with the method outlined in the enclosed." [45]

It was undeniable that, regardless of estimates of the height to which production of equipment might soar, there would be need for accompanying estimates of the number of divisions and other units that would make up the Army and use the equipment. This calculation would call in turn for a computation of the number of men making up those units, and it was obvious that the nation's population would itself determine the absolute limit of that number. To provide himself therefore with a controlling guide for the end process of computation—the maximum number of men—Major Wedemeyer explored at the outset through a variety of government departments the available estimates of the nation's total able-bodied manpower. He deducted from it the number presumably required by industry (as estimated by departmental statisticians) and by the Navy (whose first estimate of 1,300,000 proved far from the mark) and by other agencies, and thereby reached a total remainder which, without combing out the exempted and deferred classes, would surely be available to the Army, if needed. This total remainder consequently became in his calculations an approximate maximum, and almost as completely a nonvariable in figuring as was the promised date of 1 July 1943. With this as a prospective known result he and his colleagues then could proceed more knowingly toward a strategic plan which could surely be implemented by American manpower; thence toward a calculation

[44] Memo, Gen Gerow for Mr. McCloy, 5 Aug 41, WPD 4454-3.
[45] Memo, ASW for Actg ACofS WPD, 31 Jul 41, WPD 4494-3.

of units; thence toward a computation of needed weapons and equipment; thence at last to the statement of ultimate production requirements that constituted the Victory Program. This method of step-by-step deduction helps explain the otherwise startling fact that the total of the conjectured army, stated in the Victory Program of 1941 before the United States was openly at war, was very close to the actual total achieved four years later. The Victory Program's total in manpower was 8,795,658 and the actual peak strength (air and ground) as reported on 31 May 1945 was 8,291,336.[46] The Victory Program army's conjectured composition item by item, however, was far from the actual composition of the 1945 Army—a conspicuous variation being from the conjectured total of 215 divisions, including 61 armored, which compared with the ultimate 91 divisions, of which 16 were armored.[47] The excessive estimate was useful, however, in setting production sights for equipment, which ultimately went to Allied divisions in addition to U.S. divisions actually organized. The program also proposed such specialties as 51 "motorized" divisions which did not continue as a separate type, being regarded on reconsideration as too vulnerable to enemy attack while on the march, uneconomical in keeping trucks idle much of the time, and exacting too much shipping space which then was priceless: the mobility which the motorized divisions were designed to provide was afforded by motor transport units from a common pool.[48] The 10 airborne and 10 mountain divisions contemplated in 1941 shrank to 5 and 1 respectively in the actual Army: this decrease was determined in the one case by practical considerations of training and in the other by a known (and relatively nonmountainous) as distinguished from an unknown terrain. The ratio of service forces to combat elements, on the other hand, had to be materially increased; this again was due to actual theater requirements, including long and numerous lines of communication, of which prewar study of possible requirements could provide no sure foreknowledge. The number of men proposed in the Victory Program for antiaircraft artillery units was 464,695, which was far in excess of the actual May 1945 total of 246,943; however, as late as November 1942 over 600,000 men were so assigned in the 1943 Troop Basis; the number fell away because Allied air superiority had

[46] The May 1945 figure is from Strength of the Army (STM–30), 1 Jun 48, p. 39.

[47] The figure 215 divisions is given on p. 12 of the WPD Supporting Study of the Victory Program. The actual achievement in the activation of divisions is analyzed in Robert R. Palmer *et al., The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 489–93.

[48] K. R. Greenfield *et al., The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 336–39. Several divisions, led by the 4th, were so equipped and trained, but were reconverted to standard infantry divisions before going overseas.

been achieved and therefore, fewer ground defenses against enemy air attack were called for.[49] The contemplated composition of the future armored corps—two armored divisions and one of motorized infantry—was shortly discarded despite its impressive origin: it was an organization recommended at the German War College some years earlier (when Major Wedemeyer had been in attendance as a U.S. Army exchange student) in expectation of encounter with weaker foes, and it was later adjudged unsuited for combat with a sturdy opponent. A further factor causing Germany to abandon it was that it called for more equipment than German industry could provide at that stage save at the cost of other production deemed even more essential.

The 1941 calculations, in sum, dealt with an unknown future as well as a doubtful present. They not only recognized that without air control large antiaircraft defenses would be needed, but they contemplated the possibility of Russian defeat which, had it come to pass, would beyond doubt have necessitated the use of greater armored and infantry strength than the American Army was in fact called upon to produce.[50] The items ultimately developed, accordingly, varied a great deal from the original computation, as was inevitable from the ensuing alterations of the world situation and of resulting strategy and tactics. The total of manpower varied little, on the other hand, simply because the Victory Program was boldly calculated on the assumption that all able-bodied men not required for Navy or industry would be taken by the Army, and this was not very far from the fact, if one keeps in mind the exacting standard set for the category of "able-bodied." In making long-range plans in that grand perspective, the Staff did in fact meet the hope expressed in the Patterson memorandum of 18 April for "a decision . . . on the production effort necessary to achieve victory" and a resultant program that might well "represent the maximum munitions effort" of the United States. This goal, never before squarely faced by the Staff, the Victory Program definitely sought.

There was need for continuing revisions of the estimate because of such additional unknowns as the future of the war at sea. In the summer of 1941 that

[49] Palmer *et al.*, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 120–23. The May 1945 figure is of T/O&E Ground Type Units, Strength of the Army (STM–30), II, 1, dated 1 Jun 45.

[50] For information relating to the organization of armored forces see Greenfield *et al.*, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 68–72 and *passim*. For a suggestion of WPD's emphasis on motorized, armored, airborne, and mountain troops in August 1941, when the Victory Program was being formulated, see Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for ACofS G–3, 26 Aug 41, sub: Number and Types of Divisions in Augmented Protective Mobilization Plan, 1942, WPD 4537–3. Whether the U. S. Army would have suffered fewer losses by using more armor was a subject of prolonged professional debate years after the war.

future was recognized as extremely dark, with enemy submarines still aggressive. Hence the calculations of America's possible overseas strength for a proposed mid-1943 D-day had to include the large, yet undeterminable, element of shipping. This critical requirement was the subject of a G–4 memorandum of advice:

> Production requirements should be determined by the over-all forces of all friendly powers necessary for the defeat of our potential enemies, and from these over-all requirements must be subtracted the production possibilities of our friends. A balance sheet of production by friendly powers is now under preparation by a secret committee of the War Department.
>
> A time at which our effort to defeat our enemies can be made must be determined on the availability of shipping to carry our monthly production of munitions, rather than our ability to ship troops.
>
> The availability of shipping will be the deciding factor in determining how large a force can be shipped and maintained overseas. In this connection the following considerations would seem to govern:
>
> By July 1, 1943, the date assumed by WPD to be critical in equipping a force of 10,000,000 men, our proposed shipbuilding program will provide a total of about 6,000,000 gross tons of shipping that may be assigned to an overseas effort. Such an amount of shipping would transport and maintain a force overseas of about 3,000,000 men. . . .
>
> Assuming the present planned rate of increased ship construction . . . it would probably be another 3 years, or 1946, before a force of 10,000,000 men could be maintained overseas, unless the shipbuilding program were further accelerated and ship sinkings greatly reduced.[51]

The President Enlarges the Objective

By 23 August, thanks to inquiries and rechecks among numerous sources of information, WPD had completed not only an amplification of the original strategic concept of the previous month but, with special aid from G–3, a fourteen-page estimate of the Army forces (within the 8,795,658 maximum already accepted) which would be required to attain victory. Concurrences had been received from other Staff divisions. On this date WPD asked that G–4 employ the G–3 estimate of combat units to determine the number of equipment items that such a force would require. G–4, and more particularly Colonel Aurand, made the detailed computations sought and provided them in two

[51] Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for ACofS WPD, 5 Aug 41, sub: Overall Production Requirements to Defeat Our Potential Enemies, WPD 4494–4 and G–4 32488. See comments of G–1, G–2, G–3, and AAF, in WPD 4494–11.

weeks.[52] It was rapid delivery, but not rapid enough to keep up with the President's impatient desires.

The Staff's thoroughness in preparing the report and its desire to arrive at a sound estimate—disturbed almost daily by reports of new German successes in Russia and of Japanese maneuvers in the Far East—had prevented a swifter assembly of information. There were no complaints from the White House in early August, because the President was on the ocean until 16 August, absorbed in the Atlantic Conference.[53] But on 29 August WPD (Colonel Bundy) received a peremptory request via General Burns whose telephone call, as reported to the Chief of Staff by General Gerow, announced that "the President is getting very impatient concerning the delay in submission of the report on ultimate requirements." General Burns had added that "the President would expect the report to be submitted to him complete by September 6, 1941," and he further requested Colonel Bundy to "notify the Navy Department to this effect." [54] In the meantime, however, the President's adviser, Mr. Hopkins, who had lately returned from Moscow and then made the August sea voyage with the President and now was spending the week end at Hyde Park, apparently discussed events in Russia with Mr. Roosevelt; he exhibited much greater confidence than the Army itself felt in Russia's ability to withstand Hitler's massive drive to the east, and a belief that more aid to Russia would prove a good investment. The President was already working on his coming broadcast, in which he was to pledge "everything in our power to crush Hitler and his Nazi forces." [55]

Mr. Roosevelt's own sights may have been raised by recent developments, for he now wished considerably more information than he had previously asked of the War and Navy Departments. There came, therefore, to the Secretary of War, close on the heels of General Burns' telephoned message, a memorandum from the President himself, so completely superseding his 9 July request that it mentioned neither the earlier communication that had sped Major Wedemeyer and his colleagues into action nor the recent Burns-conveyed instructions for a response to it by 6 September. It called, rather, for a more

[52] (1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for ACofS G–4, 23 Aug 41, sub: Ultimate Requirements for the Army, WPD 4494–4 and G–4/33473. In the latter file is a copy of the 14-page estimate. (2) Memo, Actg ACofS G–4 for ACofS WPD, 5 Sep 41, sub: Ultimate Requirements for the Army, G–4/33473.

[53] *The New York Times*, 17 Aug 41, p. 1.

[54] Memo, Gen Gerow to CofS, 29 Aug 41, WPD 4494–1.

[55] Text of broadcast in *The New York Times*, 1 Sep 41, p. 1.

extended report, for a more enveloping purpose, to be delivered on 10 September. His memorandum of 30 August read:

As you know, I recently sent Mr. Hopkins to Moscow to inquire into Russian needs for munitions that might be obtained from American production and to inform the U. S. S. R. that this government is willing to help with such supplies to the extent of its ability.

As a result of that visit and Mr. Hopkins' report to Mr. Churchill and myself, a suggestion was sent to the U. S. S. R. that a conference be held in Russia in the near future to be attended by representatives of Russia, Great Britain and this country to have as its objective the formulation of definite munitions aid programs to assist Russia in its war efforts which might be supplied by Great Britain and the United States.

Russia accepted that suggestion and the representatives of the various countries are to meet in Russia by October 1, 1941.

I deem it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of America that all reasonable munitions help be provided for Russia, not only immediately but as long as she continues to fight the Axis Powers effectively. I am convinced that substantial and comprehensive commitments of such character must be made to Russia by Great Britain and the United States at the proposed conference.

It is obvious that early help must be given primarily from production already provided for. I desire that your Department, working in cooperation with the Navy Department, submit to me by September 10, 1941, your recommendation of distribution of expected United States production of munitions of war as between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and the other countries to be aided—by important items, quantity time schedules and approximate values for the period from the present time until June 30, 1941. I also desire your general conclusions as to the over-all production effort of important items needed for victory on the general assumption that the reservoir of munitions power available to the United States and her friends is sufficiently superior to that available to the Axis Powers to insure defeat of the latter.

The distribution of production from existing production after June 30, 1942, and the distribution of the victory production objective will obviously have to be decided at a later date in the light of then existing circumstances.

After the above reports and recommendations are submitted, I propose to arrange with the Prime Minister of England for a conference of high military officials for the purpose of discussing the above two recommendations as well as the aid to be provided by England to Russia. In view of the date on which the conference is to be held in Russia, it is important that the recommendations resulting from this British conference reach me not later than September 20th, next.

With the knowledge of these recommendations, and after further consultation with the Prime Minister of Great Britain, I will be able to instruct the mission going to Russia as to the aid which will be supplied by this country. Should adjustments to this program

of assistance be necessary, they will be recommended to me by the mission to Russia after due consultation with the Russians and the British on the spot.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT [56]

Here was a large addition to the already large requirements of the 9 July directive, itself not yet satisfied, and also a firmly set date of accomplishment. The information upon which these additional Russian requirements could be computed was fragmentary, and it does not appear that they entered into WPD calculations at this time seriously enough to effect any change in the figures of the Victory Program. They became a large factor in the later computations for Lend-Lease and, hence, for over-all production.

Last-Minute Discussions with the Navy

On 5 September the Navy Department, which up to the date of the 30 August letter does not appear to have offered any active co-operation in the joint enterprise directed by the President eight weeks earlier, presented its own sixteen-page estimate of requirements from the somewhat oblique approach of a "Proposal for the National Defense Policy of the United States." [57] Examination of it by General Gerow led the WPD chief, while agreeing with some of the Navy statements, to the opinion that "much of it is not responsive to the President's directive" and to the belief that he and Admiral R. K. Turner, the Navy's WPD chief, should hold a conference without delay.[58] A revised Navy draft, dated 9 September, was then sent to the Chief of Staff, and was immediately and critically examined by WPD with a view to advising General Marshall on his answer.[59] Both General Gerow and Major Wedemeyer expressed concern that the Navy statement which on one page explicitly recognized that "only land armies can finally win wars" proposed on another that the Allied land

[56] Ltr, President to SW, 30 Aug 41, WPD 4494–1. A more specific directive was issued on 31 Aug 41. See Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 10 Sep 41, sub: Ultimate Requirements, WPD 4494–9. The 30 August memorandum, it appears, was actually prepared for the President's signature by General Burns, as instructed by Mr. Hopkins. See personal Ltr, Burns to Gen Malony, 13 Apr 49, previously cited, Hist Div files.

[57] JB 355, ser 707.

[58] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for Admiral Turner, dated 3 Sep 41 (*sic*), sub: Ultimate Production Requirements, WPD 4494–6.

[59] Memo, CofS for CNO, 10 Sep 41, sub: United States Overall Production Requirements, WPD 4494–10. This file contains the original draft of the reply, with General Marshall's numerous critical notations.

armies to be pitted against the Germans on the continent of Europe should be inferior by a ratio of one to five.[60]

General Marshall found numerous other objections to the Navy paper. On the very morning when the joint paper was due at the White House he wrote Admiral Stark with an unusual touch of acerbity, listing a dozen points of disagreement, notably with the Navy paper's paragraph touching the tender issue of how to employ Army munitions. General Marshall wrote that he had noted:

> . . . many suggestions that we should arm or help to arm the British, the Russians, the French in North Africa, as well as China, the Netherlands East Indies, and Malaya. While agreeing in general that we should aid where we can I believe that such broad statements may give the President an erroneous idea of the amount of aid which we can offer and might lead to commitments which would seriously impair the efficiency of our own forces. Furthermore, in this paragraph the suggestion is made that a large proportion of the troops of the Associated Powers employed in North and West Africa should be supplied from the United States. This statement seems rather premature.
>
> . . . [as to Paragraph V] The War Department has been engaged in the study of the Army forces required, for the last two months. I feel that in the matter of Army forces the Navy should accept the Army studies to the extent that we accept the Navy statement of requirements, recognizing that the Navy is the expert so far as naval matters are concerned.

The Chief of Staff added pointedly that he was enclosing a copy of WPD conclusions in which "the purely naval requirements . . . have not been included." He proceeded: "It seems to me that we should submit our respective requirements to the President at an early date with a simple statement as to how they were determined." [61] Indeed there now was no time for a considered agreement of Army and Navy, if the delivery date specified by the President was to be met. On that same morning, with Mr. McCloy pressing for delivery of the Army's section of the voluminous report, General Gerow completed his memorandum to the Chief of Staff, to accompany Major Wedemeyer's exhaustive study. He cited the President's letter of 9 July and the memorandum of 30 August directing report by 10 September, cited also the steps taken to comply with both directives, and offered some conclusions which he apparently felt should be emphasized for the attention of higher authority. A significant item was the following: "Ultimate victory over the Axis powers will place a demand upon industry which few have yet conceived. There is no easy or short method of defeating our potential enemies." He mentioned that "discussion with the Navy, with a view to reconciliation

[60] (1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 10 Sep 41, sub: United States Overall Production Requirements, WPD 4494–10. (2) Memo, A. C. W. (Wedemeyer) for Gen Gerow, 9 Sep 41, WPD 4494–10.

[61] Memo, CofS to CNO, 10 Sep 41, WPD 4494–10.

of conflicting views, is now being carried on" and recommended that (this day being the date set by the President for completion of the report) the Secretary of War approve the accompanying statement of Army critical items, for later inclusion in a joint Army-Navy report, the Navy's part not being on hand then.[62]

To this voluminous set of documents and exhibits the Chief of Staff appended a hastily penned note to the Secretary of War, dated 10 September, 5:30 P. M.: "General Gerow is now—at this hour— in consultation with Admiral Stark. I have not had time to examine these proposals. They are submitted herewith." With the original of this note in the records is filed a penciled note from "A. C. W." (Major Wedemeyer) dated 10 September 1941 10:15 A. M. and reading: "Copy with complete set of Tabs taken personally by Col. Bundy to Chief of Staff's office. The Chief of Staff did not have time to review the complete study. However, Col. Bundy was given permission to deliver same to Assistant Secretary of War [Mr. McCloy] who wanted the data immediately."[63] It would appear that the Chief of Staff, meeting as well as possible the President's directive to have the study ready on 10 September so far as the Army's part was concerned, purposely avoided accepting personal responsibility for that portion until he could reach with the Navy an agreement on the entire joint statement. So far were the two services from agreement that when (on 25 September, fifteen days behind schedule) the joint letter of explanation from the Secretaries of War and Navy was finally delivered to the White House it was accompanied not only by a single Joint Board report but also by estimates of three separate "ultimate requirements," for Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Navy.[64] The carefully considered study of WPD was necessarily a long document, and next day the Secretary of War reported wryly that the President was not disposed to read the entire bulky assemblage of papers at one time; what he kept for immediate perusal was not the painstaking Army discussion but the shorter reports of the Joint Board and the Air Corps.[65]

The Secretary, it must be understood, was no mere official agency of transmission for this study. The President's specific instructions had been addressed to him, both on 9 July and 30 August, and before his compliance on 25 Sep-

[62] Memo, ACofS WPD to CofS, 10 Sep 41, sub: Ultimate Requirements, WPD 4494–9.

[63] *Ibid.* These several items are assembled as a unit in the record. WPD 4494–9.

[64] (1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Ultimate Requirements of Army, Ground, and Air Forces, WPD 4494–13. This was prepared by Major Wedemeyer; the original is in AG 400 (7–9–41) Ultimate Production. (2) Ltr, SW and SN for President, 25 Sep 41, same file. (3) Minutes of Joint Board meeting of 22 Oct 41, JB 355, ser 707.

[65] Memo from SW, unaddressed, 26 Sep 41, AG 400 (7–9–41).

tember with these instructions Mr. Stimson discussed with his advisers the resultant Victory Program and its accompanying reports and also the issues of strategy and policy involved. At these conferences of 16–17 September were Assistant Secretary McCloy, Harvey Bundy of the Secretary's Office, General Gerow, and Major Wedemeyer.[66] In the interval between 17 September and 25 September Mr. Stimson completed and presented to the President his own work on the Anglo-American Consolidated Statement, the fruit of the ancillary inquiry of this period, designed to show by accepted official totals the stocks of war material as of 30 June 1941 and the expected quarterly production from the plants of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain until December 1942.[67] This statement was presented on 23 September, two days before Mr. Stimson and his Navy colleague Colonel Knox presented the Victory Program and its accompanying papers.

A Restatement of National Policy

Essential to beginning compilation of the Victory Program's estimate of requirements had been a statement of the national policy's objective, for without a knowledge of the desired end there could be no intelligent determination of the means to attain it. But in July 1941 the Staff planners still possessed as their official guide only that "more or less nebulous" policy of which General Gerow had complained. It remained therefore for the Staff to project its own clear statement of a strategic concept. This would be the hypothetical policy to support which Major Wedemeyer could then address himself. On the early steps taken in the Staff to draft that initial policy statement the record thus far examined is barren, but they can be easily conjectured. The routine of General Staff procedure would have called for extended consultations of the Chief of Staff with WPD; a resultant outline to the planning agent of WPD (in this case Major Wedemeyer) of the various items to be incorporated in such a state-

[66] (1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 19 Sep 41, sub: Résumé of Conferences, WPD 4494–12. (2) Memo, Ex WPD for ACofS G–2, 17 Sep 41, sub: Strategic Estimate of the Situation, WPD 4494. (3) Memo, Actg ACofS G–2 for ACofS WPD, 18 Sep 41, sub: Strategic Estimate of the Situation, WPD 4494. (4) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Ultimate Requirements, AG 400 (7–9–41).

[67] Ltr, SW to President, 23 Sep 41, AG 400 (9–17–41), Military Requirements of the War Dept and Defense Aid. In addition to the joint letter to the President from Secretaries of War and Navy, Mr. Stimson prepared a note dated 23 September 1941, which he handed to Mr. Roosevelt two days later. It recited the differences in his advisers' estimates on speed and quantity of production, on the size and timing of the land forces, and on other matters, and expressed a desire for the President's views on these estimates before consolidating the munitions data. SW Papers, 1848–A.

ment; the planning agent's development of the outline into an ordered and complete statement; his reference of this statement to his immediate chief and to other Staff divisions for criticism; his revision of the original as needed; his resubmission of the document to his chief and, eventually, to the Chief of Staff. Certain of these conjectured steps are in fact suggested by the record.[68] It discloses the preparation in chart form, not later than 31 July 1941, of an initial "Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies" and examination of this chart in ensuing days by G–1, G–2, and G–3, whose chiefs returned it with their comments. Criticisms were so few as to suggest that the items had previously been discussed orally and already adjusted to Staff views. This chart's explicit assumptions dealt with items of national policy in plain rather than "more or less nebulous" terms. Unquestionably in so grave a matter the Chief of Staff had directed the use of explicit terms. These were the boldly stated assumptions of national policy:

Monroe Doctrine. Resist with all means Axis penetration in Western Hemisphere.

Aid to Britain. Limited only by U. S. needs and abilities of the British to utilize; insure delivery of this aid.

Aid to other Axis-opposed nations. Limited by U. S. and British requirements.

Far Eastern Policy. To disapprove strongly Japanese aggression and to convey to Japan determination of U. S. to take positive action. To avoid major military and naval commitments in the Far East at this time.

Freedom of the seas. The United States would permit no abridgment.

Eventually the U. S. will employ all armed forces necessary to accomplish national objectives.

The principal theater of operations is Europe, but other possible theaters may later appear desirable.

The defeat of our potential enemies is primarily dependent on the defeat of Germany.

Field forces (air and/or ground) will not be prepared for ultimate decisive modern combat before July 1, 1943 due to shortage of essential equipment.

The chart recommended three phases of American activity, with definition as to time and objective, as follows:

1st Phase (Until M Day or when hostilities begin). Objective: Insure delivery of supplies to the British Isles and provide munitions for other nations fighting the Axis, in

[68] (1) Memo, ACofS G–3 for ACofS WPD, 31 Jul 41, sub: Strategic Concept of United States Future Operations. (2) Memo, Lt Col Zim E. Lawhon, G–1, for ACofS G–1, 1 Aug 41, sub: Strategic Concept of Operations. (3) Memo, G–2 for ACofS G–2, 2 Aug 41. (4) Memo, (unsigned) for ACofS WPD (undated), sub: Comments on Strategic Concept of Operations. (5) Memo, ACofS G–3 for ACofS WPD, sub: Revision of Chart "Brief of Strategic Concept." All in WPD 4494–11. Copies of the original chart are not in this file, but copies dated September are there and, judging from comments made in July and August (see above citations), no great changes were made.

order to preclude a diminution of their war effort, and concurrently to prepare U. S. forces for active participation in the war.

2d Phase (M Day until prepared for final offensive action). Objective: Prepare the way for eventual defeat of Germany by active participation as Associate of Great Britain and other nations fighting the Axis powers.

Final Phase. Objective: Total defeat of Germany.

If the chart's strategic estimate was necessary as a preliminary to developing the Victory Program's estimate of production, a corresponding study was felt to be equally necessary to explain that "Statement of Ultimate Requirements." The original strategic concept therefore was revised by WPD from day to day until 24 September when it was ready for Secretary Stimson's approval, so that it could take cognizance of such current events as the Atlantic Conference and the ominous developments in the Pacific. Thus the group of documents that was given to Mr. Roosevelt on 25 September contained not only an elaborate chart of production needs (his specific request) but a complete statement of the Army's views on strategy in that tense autumn.[69] It is the most searching of the strategy statements up to that time and, while it was textually prepared by WPD and so accredited, it must be recognized as the considered view of the Chief of Staff whose responsibility it was. The document may be summarized as follows:

The United States must be prepared to fight Germany directly and defeat her, conscious that Germany and the satellite states now have 11 million soldiers in 300 equipped and trained divisions and by 1943 can have 400 divisions in the European theater. This means that the Allies must have air superiority and a strong sea force; that the United States must create production capacity to provide for

a. an appropriate force to defend the Western Hemisphere.

b. task forces for operations, primarily in the European theater.

c. supplies for friendly powers.

The United States must consider where, how and when its means will be used. *Where?* In Central Europe (which will be decisive) but possibly also in Africa, the Near East, the Iberian peninsula, the Scandinavian countries, the Far East. *How?* By sweeping the Axis navy from the sea; by getting overwhelming air superiority; by destroying German economy and industry (lines of communication and ports and industries); by reducing the German military forces' effectiveness by causing shortages and chaos and by lowering popular morale; by maintaining the security of the British Isles and the Near East and using them as bases, and by getting more advanced bases; by conducting an offensive in Europe and a defensive in the Pacific. *When?* First, count upon a lag of 1½ to 2 years between planning and execution. Second, accept the possibility of Russia's defeat west of the White Sea–Moscow–Volga Line by July 1942 and Russia's resultant military impotence; recognize that Germany would

[69] Accompanying the letter of SW and SN to President, 25 Sep 41, WPD 4494–13.

then need a year to restore order. The Allies' timetable would be affected by Russian events, in that so long as Russia could hold German forces in the east Germany would suffer from prolonged attrition, and there could be an intensification and an extension of Allied efforts. If during this space the Allies could accumulate enough strength to seize new military bases for later air and ground operations and for some immediate air activities, the desirability of that step is obvious, but the American forces would not soon be ready for a timely offensive of any size. There must however be a great acceleration of production for Britain and for the ultimate American offensive for which 1 July 1943 remained the target date.[70]

In estimating the capabilities of the belligerents it was assumed that Russia would be rendered impotent; that the Axis would be weakened by blockade, by losses in Russia, by British sea and air operations, and by lowered home morale; that Japan would be fully occupied with a strengthened China, plus a fear of Russia in Siberia and a threat of reprisal from Britain and the United States; that Britain would strengthen; that France would remain passive; that the Mediterranean would remain in dispute; that the United States would become an active belligerent.

The estimate's assumptions recognized that, besides bases in the British Isles and the Near East, others must be acquired in the Scandinavian or Iberian peninsulas or in northwest Africa.

Conjectures upon the weight of manpower needed started with the surmise that the Axis in July 1943 would have 400 divisions, and that the Allies, excepting the United States, would have 100—with the result that a 2–1 attack ratio would call for the impossible figure of 700 American divisions, or 22,000,000 men. This historic 2–1 concept was therefore dismissed from consideration. It was noted that mere numbers of men may not be as potent as machines and blockade, that in 1940 another million men would hardly have saved France, and that Russia's actual superiority in numbers had not yet saved her. The concept was, therefore, to surround the Axis with fewer men, but to use them in locally powerful task forces and to advance step by step. They might be used in North Africa, the Middle East, France, or the Low Countries, or in all.

Shipping was recognized as the bottleneck, and the Victory Program called for early application to that need. To move 5,000,000 men overseas would probably require 7,000,000 tons of shipping (1,000 vessels) but the two years needed to build such a fleet would also be needed to build such a force of men. It would be "folly to prepare forces without transport to move them."

The Joint Board report (which, rather than WPD's extended statement, Secretary Stimson said had engaged the President's immediate attention) under-

[70] Summarized for Victory Program's accompanying Estimate (Army only), WPD 4494.

took to reconcile the Army-Navy differences and, failing in one large instance, summarized separately the views of the services on that issue. Its broad conclusions, in some important items supplementing those of the Army document, may be summarized as follows:

> National objectives, as related to the military situation, called for (1) preservation of integrity of the whole Western Hemisphere; (2) prevention of disruption of the British Commonwealth; (3) prevention of further extension of Japanese dominion; (4) eventual re-establishment in Europe and Asia of a balance of power furthering political stability in those regions and future security of the United States; (5) establishment, as far as practicable, of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.[71]

It was fundamental that the United States provide armed forces which in all eventualities could prevent the extension of alien power in the Western Hemisphere "even though the British Commonwealth had collapsed." The objectives listed could be gained only by military victories outside this hemisphere, whether by U. S. forces or by those friendly to the United States.

The estimate of belligerents' capabilities was followed by a judgment that Germany could not be defeated without American aid to the anti-Axis forces and, likewise, that should Japan advance toward the Malay barrier the movement could not be resisted by British or Dutch without American aid. For that reason the Joint Board recommended a production objective designed to meet the needs of the United States while engaged simultaneously with Germany and Japan, with or without the continued participation of the 1940 opponents of the Axis; also it recommended that the production objective include needs of friendly powers likewise engaged against the Axis. The first military objective was held to be the total defeat of Germany, even if in the interim Britain and Russia should collapse and thereby add to the strain upon American resources. Recognition of this as the main objective dictated the need of material support meantime in all operations against Germany, and called for reinforcement of those operations with American units whenever possible; naval and air contributions being all that was currently available, these contributions should be made, but with recognition that almost invariably "only land armies can finally win wars." For the present the contributions would have to be in the forms of maintaining the blockade, prosecuting warfare in those areas where German land resistance was weak, and supporting subversive activities. Europe, patently, would ultimately be the chief theater, but "invasion by the

[71] Summarized from the JB report attached to Victory Program Estimate, WPD 4494–13.

United States of Germany will not be attempted until the air offensive against Germany has been successful and we can control the air over the area of the invasion to a very large measure."

The one insurmountable obstacle to Army-Navy agreement sprang from Navy hostility to the Army's flood of munitions orders. It was temporarily disposed of by a paragraph reciting the Navy view that, because of limited ground force strength, strategy should make full use of naval and air force resources; the opposed Army view, also recited, was that naval and air attacks admittedly could not defeat Germany, and hence land strength for the ultimate battle on the continent of Europe should be provided.[72]

WPD Again Records Its Difference with the Navy

In October WPD issued another strategic estimate of the situation, following the conventional Staff procedure of submitting to other Staff sections an initial draft for criticism.[73] Its purpose, beyond the obvious aim of providing a new current estimate of the situation, would appear to have been to press the Army viewpoint which the Navy was not yet quite ready to accept, for it emphasized the WPD wish "to determine . . . the most profitable lines of action for the employment of our military potentials" in order to pursue present national policies.[74] The measures to be taken to that end were listed: to enforce the Monroe Doctrine; to contribute in any way possible to the defeat of Germany, short of declared war; to assist all peoples opposing the Axis powers by providing munitions; to uphold the American doctrine of freedom of the seas; to discourage Japanese aggression. The situation estimate was pessimistic: WPD still expected the liquidation of Russia in early 1942, followed by German peace overtures to Britain and, these failing, a full assault on Britain at home or in the Mediterranean; Japan's bellicosity would reflect the degree of German successes; British defeat was now regarded as probable unless the United States should provide support by military forces; victory, even with American help, was thought unpredictable because of the uncertainty about Russia's future, for German conquest of Russia would be followed by a rehabilitation of Europe and the Middle East, which in time would enable the Axis to defy the British blockade.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] The response of G–4, signed by Gen Wheeler, fixes the date of Gen Gerow's circular of inquiry as 6 Oct 41. The G–4 response is dated 11 Oct and is found in G–4 33052 as Memo from Wheeler for WPD.

[74] Strategic Estimate of October 41, WPD 4494–21, sec 1.

Hence WPD now recited the effective strength of the Army as of 1 October 1941 (1 infantry division almost complete, 5 antiaircraft regiments, 2 bomber squadrons, 3 pursuit groups); as of 1 January 1942 (2 divisions, 1 cavalry regiment, 7 antiaircraft regiments, 3 bomber groups plus a squadron, and 4 pursuit groups); and as of 1 April 1942 (3 infantry divisions, 1 armored corps including 1 motorized and 2 armored divisions, 1 cavalry regiment, 9 antiaircraft regiments, 7 bomber groups, 7½ pursuit groups).

The recommendations this time were more vigorous than in September:

To secure the Western Hemisphere and Atlantic sea lanes, and to aid Latin America.

To render maximum usable aid to Britain, Russia, China, without jeopardizing the arming of American forces.

To negotiate with Japan in order to block her collaboration with the Axis. To deter her aggressiveness by display of strength in Hawaii and Alaska.

To defend Hawaii and Alaska in strength. To defend the Philippines with an augmented force, but without heavy commitments. Success in a Pacific war would be at a cost incommensurate with other American interests.

To expand merchant shipbuilding.

To exploit the military potential.

To send observer officers to potential theaters of operation.[75]

In circulating this October estimate to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and others, along with pertinent data based upon the September Victory Program, General Gerow repeated verbatim much of what he had written on 16 July to the Chief of Staff, with regard to the "more or less nebulous national policy" with which WPD still had to work. From the wording of the July letter he made a significant alteration, with a view to emphasizing the existence of a force-in-being. Instead of possible government commitments "with reference to the defeat of the Axis powers," as in July, he now discussed possible commitments "with reference to the employment of armed forces." [76]

Isolationist Inquiry into the Administration's Intentions

By coincidence, on the very day when this secret "October Estimate" of WPD was circulated among War Department officials, isolationists made known their own suspicions of the course of events. They asserted that, contrary to assurances given to Congressional committees during the draft extension hearings, the Army was currently preparing an expeditionary force for

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] Memo, Gen Gerow for SW *et al.*, 13 Nov 41, WPD 4510.

duty in Africa. To cope with this rumor the Chief of Staff issued a corrective statement affirming categorically: "There is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation or rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition to Africa or other critical areas outside this hemisphere." Three weeks later, without preliminaries, certain newspapers printed an article questioning the accuracy of General Marshall's denial, and recording in some detail the Army's formulation of a program for American participation in the war on Germany.[77] The reference was unmistakably to the highly secret Victory Program and its accompanying strategic estimate, and there was concern in the Department both over public references to that document and over the imputation against General Marshall. Within the Staff an impersonal statement of information for the press was drafted, declaring:

> This [the earlier Marshall] statement was and is correct. It does not preclude the study of possible eventualities, one of the primary duties and responsibilities of the War Department. . . . Failures to make such studies would constitute a serious dereliction on the part of the responsible military authorities. The object of the study referred to by the press was to determine production requirements. . . . We are not preparing troops nor have we asked for funds for an A. E. F.[78]

Instead of having this impersonal statement issued, Secretary of War Stimson elected himself to champion publicly the Department's conduct. He summoned a press conference for 5 December, and without waiting to be questioned, as was his custom, read to his prospective questioners two dramatic inquiries of his own:

> What would you think of an American General Staff which in the present condition of the world did not investigate and study every conceivable type of emergency which may confront this country, and every possible method of meeting that emergency? What do you think of the patriotism of a man or a newspaper which would take those confidential studies and make them public to the enemies of this country?
>
> The publications are of unfinished studies of our production requirements for national defense, carried on by the General Staff as a part of their duties in this emergency. They have never constituted an authorized program of the Government.[79]

[77] *Chicago Tribune*, 4 Dec 41, and affiliated newspapers.

[78] Draft (unissued) of proposed press statement, 4 Dec 41. WPD copies of this, including the earlier Marshall statement, and of SW statement next referred to are filed with WD Strategic Estimate of October 41 in WPD 4494–20, sec 1.

[79] Text of statement by SW at his press conference 5 Dec 41, WPD 4494–20, sec 1. See *The New York Times*, 6 Dec 41, p. 3, col. 1, for account of conference. Long afterward when the German High Command documents became available for historical purposes, light was thrown upon the reasons behind the Department's conviction that the publication would be of value to the enemy. "Notes for a Report" by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, Abteilung L (IK–OP) dated 14 Decem-

The gravity of the matter was obvious, although just how vital was military security was less apparent to the layman on 5 December than it was two days later. The Army's implementation of the Victory Program as such continued until, on 7 January 1942, under the tremendously increased pressure for swift production following Pearl Harbor, a new sighting of industrial objectives was called for. On that day the Deputy Chief of Staff announced: "The Victory Program has been replaced by the War Munitions Program." [80]

Materiel and Personnel Programs Again in Conflict

The basic information in the Victory Program—on the number of men available to the Army—was altered to a surprisingly small extent. The original computations of a few items were so large as to startle the Supply, Priority, and Allocations Board, one of whose members declared (as General Aurand later recalled) that this materiel "could not be produced before the year 2050." He was wrong, and even if the computations then seemed for a time to be setting the sights of industry too high they most abruptly ended the nation's unmistakable error of the past in having set industry's sights too low.

In the closing days of the preparation of the Victory Program, which sought an orderly basis for materiel planning, there came a serious jolt to the Army's personnel planning. Ever since 1939, when European orders from American aircraft factories had begun to encroach upon the U. S. Army's inflow of new weapons to meet its own requirements, there had been recurring conflicts of interest. Materiel production was consistently less than demand, and weapons that poured overseas to Great Britain were as unavailing to U. S. Army needs as though they never had come from the factory. The lack of weapons or ammunition not only hampered the equipping of the new Army, but delayed the training of the new units, as General Marshall pointed out in 1940 and

ber 1941, mentioned that publication in a Washington paper had supplemented the German Staff's knowledge of the "Anglo-Saxon war plans" in the realm of their general aims, such as plans for securing sea lanes, for more closely containing German power, for making crippling air attacks, and for conducting an offensive from the summer of 1943 onward to a final decision. The notes continued: "The credibility of this study is underlined by the fact that all measures of the Americans which we have found out fit into these plans." They remarked at one point that the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor had "nullified" the value of the newspaper publication; nevertheless, the notes continue for page after page reciting the disclosures in detail.

[80] Memo, DCofS (Moore) for ACofS WPD, 7 Jan 42, OCS 21145-51. The memorandum apparently was prepared by Colonel Aurand.

1941.[81] It was largely to overcome this disturbing interruption to training that the Deputy Chief of Staff on 3 February 1941 had pressed for a formal restatement of American defense objectives—an early harbinger of the Victory Program itself.

The summer's events had done much to expedite the deliveries of materiel and the planning of greater deliveries to come. But the training authorities of the Army had likewise pushed the personnel training program with energy. General Marshall had greatly encouraged such a program in the February 1941 restatement referred to, in that it projected two augmentations of the Protective Mobilization Plan—the first to a 2,800,000-man army, the second to 4,100,000.[82] With that encouragement, conditioned though it was, planning of the greatly enlarged Army proceeded. This, and the need for better training of the new troops already on active duty by way of the National Guard and the draft, had induced the decision to extend those troops' duty beyond the period of the year originally specified. The difficult fight in Congress to gain that extension was won only in late summer,[83] and as the Victory Program for materiel planning was nearing its completion the training authorities of the Army were developing their own plans for further inductions and for the building up of new divisions and corps and army troops. In late August the Operatons and Training Division of the General Staff was counting upon authorization to summon 462,000 recruits above those already authorized. At this stage the chief of that division, reading the Chief of Staff's recent remarks to a Congressional committee, became aware that General Marshall himself was not asking for any such increase, but for only 150,000.[84] It was a chilling reminder that the Chief of Staff had his own doubts about the possibility, or even the wisdom, of pressing forward rapidly with personnel training when there was an uncertainty about the proportionate inflow of equipment for distribution to the Army. Apparently this was a reflection of reasoning outside the Army. The campaign for giving much more attention to production was having a surprising secondary effect—it was encouraging a view that increased production was more im-

[81] Protests by WPD against shipments of guns are dealt with in (1) Memo, CofS, 21 May 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, 20 May–25 Sep 40; (2) Memo, SGS for ACsofS, 14 Aug 40, CofS files, Misc Conf, 20 May–25 Sep 40; (3) Entry of 19 Feb in CofS files, Notes on Conf, Feb 14, Emergency, bndr 10. See also Memo of 3 Feb 41 cited in n. 1.

[82] See DCofS statement of 13 Feb 41 with CofS conditional approval of 14 Feb 41, AG 381 (2–17–41) M–F–M.

[83] 12 August 1941; see Chapter VII.

[84] Entry of 30 Aug in Notes on Conf, Aug 41.

portant, for the present anyway, than the balanced program of production paced with training, and training paced with production, upon which so much emphasis had been laid hitherto.

A climax was reached on 20 September when the Chief of Staff summoned representatives of G–1, G–3, and WPD to a morning conference and stated that he was "going to the White House the following Monday to discuss with the President a proposal to reduce the strength of the Army in order to make available more materiel for other purposes." [85] He referred to a widely circulated newspaper article of that day, which had suggested a reduction of the Army on the ground that the trend of war made American participation one "basically of Navy, Air and manufacturing," with early need for ground forces apparently lightly regarded.[86] The Chief of Staff apparently suspected that this was in line with one of Mr. Roosevelt's own mutually conflicting views, for notes of the conference mention his recognition of difficulty in reconciling a reduction of troops with other of the President's indicated desires for "the possible occupation of bases in the Atlantic, including Dakar, Cape Verde Islands, Azores, Natal, and possibly the establishment of base service units in the Middle East." Inconsistent or no, the President's views had to be respected, and General Marshall wanted from his assistants a maximum of information for his use at the coming meeting in the White House.

The agenda for Mr. Roosevelt's coming conference must already have been made clear to him, for the notes of General Marshall's remarks to his aides proceed:

> The proposals which have been made are as follows: (1) to reduce the size of the Army; (2) to reduce the amount of materiel being used by the Army; (3) to reduce the strength of our forces in the bases. . . . The Chief of Staff also pointed out that steps are being taken to reduce the garrisons in Hawaii and Panama; that the situation in the Philippines might be decisive within the next two months (Japan's attack actually came in less than two and a half months); and that our present augmentations there are of outstanding importance.[87]

[85] Entry of 20 Sep 41, inaccurately filed in Daily Summary of Papers Cleared, bndr 23, rather than in Notes on Conf, Sep 41.

[86] *Ibid.* The author of the New York *Herald-Tribune* article, Walter Lippmann, when interviewed by the author in 1947, recalled no suggestions direct or indirect from the White House that could have led to his writing the article. Rather, he remembered that this view was expressed at the time by the Navy, the Lend-Lease authorities, the British, and even the anti-Vichy French agents then in Washington. The Navy, disturbed by the shipping shortage, was in fact discouraging the development of a large Army for overseas duty which would call for still more shipping. Britain continued to press for larger shipments for munitions.

[87] Entry of 20 Sep 41 in Notes on Conf, bndr 23.

Suggestions for Reducing the Army with Minimum Injury

The Chief of Staff's directive to his Staff advisers specified that WPD take the lead in preparing a study on two lines: (1) a defensive against a decrease and (2) a discussion favoring actual increases in the Army for an all-out effort. This final item of the directive suggests that the Chief of Staff at that time was preparing to oppose the Presidential desire for a reduction of the forces. It was not merely because a reduction was strangely inconsistent with his own recent pleading to Congress—successful only after so great a struggle and by so narrow a margin—for extension of the selectees' training period. It was also because in truth there was obvious need, rather for a considerable addition to the forces of which so much was expected by the President himself.

Over the week end both WPD and the Office of the Secretary labored on data to support the Chief of Staff's argument against a reduction of the Army. The fruit of their labors plus several relevant exhibits General Marshall carried with him to the White House as aids to his oral discussion. In the packet were an unsigned and undated memorandum labeled "Morale of the Country" and penciled "Reply of McCloy and Lovett"; an undated memorandum for the President which WPD had drafted and which recited the personnel plans for the various bases and task forces; a memorandum dated only "September 1941" from General Gerow on Ultimate Tonnage Requirements (differing sharply from the Navy's recommendation to restrict the Army's overseas force to 1,500,000 men); another of 16 September on the availability of Army forces for taking Dakar (recommending against action, by reason of weak forces and bad weather, prior to November 1942); a memorandum from W. B. S. (Colonel Smith), 16 September, to the Secretary reporting 1,200 men in Trinidad ready to protect bauxite in Dutch Guiana; a signed letter of 12 September to Admiral Stark from General Marshall, recounting what was being done to strengthen the Philippines; a memorandum of 19 September from Col. (later Maj. Gen.) R. W. Crawford, acting WPD chief, recounting (1) a conference of WPD officials with the Secretary of War on the necessity of protecting Natal and Peru and (2) the impossibility of taking and holding the Cape Verde or Canary Islands or a foothold in West Africa (the memorandum favored aid to Britain and China but questioned whether aid available to Russia would have a material effect); data on the effect of reducing the garrisons; finally, Staff recommendations on priorities in Army reduction if, after all, that should be

necessary.[88] The support of Assistant Secretaries McCloy and Lovett was spirited. It argued that "to shift our national objectives by reduction of our Army at present would be disastrous," noting from the military point of view that Russian armies might be on the verge of disintegration, that Japan and Turkey were on the brink of entering the war, and that Germany was on the point of a Middle East offensive. Politically, the Assistant Secretaries argued, American abatement of effort would "encourage collaboration with the Axis throughout Europe and permanently stifle the spirit of resistance to the Axis," and "abandonment of maximum effort in any form would be considered a step toward appeasement, for a negotiated peace is at the root of the Lippmann article—not a complete victory." Morally, they added, such a step "will inevitably be construed as an attempt to limit our commitment." Militarily, they urged the need of a large modern army to do what Britain and Russia could not do alone, and to do the things for which sea and air forces were not competent; "to write off the possibility of American manpower is probably to write off the decisive factor in victory."

The WPD memorandum pressed this argument that Germany could not be defeated by supplying munitions to friendly forces or by air and naval operations without a large ground force participation. It presented the immediate requirements of the Western Hemisphere (minimum garrisons and task forces for use against the Atlantic islands and Natal), the western Pacific (build-up of air power for the Philippines plus small increases of ground elements), and the European theater (security forces for air and naval bases in the British Isles and task forces for additional bases encircling Germany). It recited the authorizations for garrisons as follows:

Atlantic bases—Greenland, 2,500 men (few yet there), Newfoundland, 5,500 (2,500 there), Bermuda, 4,000 (800 there), Jamaica, 876 (14 there), Trinidad, 16,000 (1,800 there); and Puerto Rico, 21,000, British Guiana, 350, Antigua, 350, Santa Lucia, 350, Panama, 33,000 (all there).

Pacific bases—Alaska, 24,000 (16,000 there), Hawaii, 41,000, Philippine Islands, 31,000 (12,000 more needed and about half of equipment still lacking).

Task forces—East Coast Task Force, 27,000 men (reserve equipment lacking); West Coast Task Forces 27,000 (same); Relief forces for occupying Azores after possible capture of those islands by landing force, 27,000 (same); Expeditionary corps for possible use in Brazil or in other theaters, and for reinforcements of task forces, 154,000; Iceland Force, 28,000 (5,000 now there).

[88] In a packet labeled "Information Used by CofS at Conference with the President, Sep 22 41," CofS files, 1941 Conferences. See also Memos, Actg ACofS, WPD (Crawford), for CofS, 19 and 22 Sep 41, sub: Overseas Possessions . . ., Tab B, in WPD 4564-1.

Remainder of Army—GHQ Reserve of 4 armored and 2 cavalry divisions plus antiaircraft troops, 115,000; two field armies of 20 divisions, 465,000; Air Forces about one-fourth combat troops, 250,000; Harbor defense troops, 45,000; administration, 125,000; trainees not assigned, 150,000.

The memorandum stressed that the task forces and overseas forces needed 100 percent of their equipment, and that the "remainder of the Army" forces could not be cut below 50 percent without seriously lowering morale and retarding development of the new units. A WPD suspicion that the continued British pressure was responsible for Mr. Roosevelt's change of mind is suggested in the remark that "no appreciable increase in defense aid desired by the British can be realized except by eliminating units of the remainder of the Army," and the memorandum proceeds:

To shift our national objectives by the reduction of our Army at the present time might well be disastrous. Certainly the momentary encouragement it would give the Russian and British governments would be far outweighed by the positive indications it would give to the German government that they need not fear an eventual onslaught of ground forces.

Tentative Plan to Send Certain National Guard Units Home

Despite the week-end labors of Staff and Secretary's Office and the accumulation of these data and arguments, General Marshall failed to dissuade Mr. Roosevelt. On 3 October the Deputy Chief of Staff's conference was still discussing augmentation of the Army,[89] but the die was cast, and on 7 October General McNair proposed a plan for making the best of a difficult situation. The GHQ chief of staff came that day to General Marshall's office with a suggestion for placing the "best" National Guard divisions on an inactive status and organizing new divisions in their place.[90] This plan, General McNair explained, would avoid an actual net increase in the number of men in federalized service and thereby, possibly, meet the President's wishes. It would transfer the trained division in question to the reserve, more or less ready for reactivation in emergency. It would start the training of an entirely new division. General Marshall at first opposed the suggestion, pointing out that in retiring the best of the National Guard divisions there would necessarily be an increase in the proportion of poor

[89] Entry of 3 Oct 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf, Oct 1941, bndr 25.

[90] See also Memo, CofS for Gen Twaddle (G–3), 1 Jul 41, no sub, OCS 16810–296. In this General Marshall had passed on for consideration and later oral discussion a suggestion for sending home a part of the National Guard after one year's service in order (1) to eliminate the least fit, (2) to organize the triangular divisions, (3) to provide state troops which would guard essential plants and relieve the Army of that worry.

ones. Also he still felt it "would seem inconsistent in view of our recent efforts to obtain legislation for retention of the National Guard in service. . . . It could be expected that upon inactivation a National Guard division would disintegrate, due to its men moving to other states and obtaining defense jobs." [91]

During the week, however, the Chief of Staff became convinced that this was the best he could get out of a depressing situation, and he summoned a conference with representative of OPD, G–1, and G–3 to consider a plan for sending home the National Guard divisions in order of their summons to federal service.[92] This approximated the McNair suggestion for the "best" divisions but avoided invidious public distinction as to their quality and unnecessary public disputes over priority of release. The plan contemplated that when a National Guard division was thus sent home that part of the division's personnel which had been lately added to its ranks, and hence was not ready for discharge, would remain in camp as part of a new Regular Army division being created—a "triangular" division from the outset, thus hastening the up-building of the whole new Army on that basis. The following day, at a larger conference attended also by the Deputy Chief of Staff and a GHQ representative, this suggestion was approved with some modifications, and a few days later G–3 was directed to work up a final plan to that result.[93] This was finished in ten days, and on 31 October a G–3 spokesman presented a chart showing the prospective course of deactivation of the National Guard's eighteen infantry divisions on a progressive basis, beginning in February 1942. The plan provided for the current replacement of each with a new Regular division, save at four camps that would become new replacement training centers. Thus, beyond the old Regular divisions, there would at all times be fourteen new divisions at a fair stage of training. As the National Guardsmen went home, the relatively new trainees who had been with them would remain as individuals for completion of their training. That completed, it was proposed by the Chief of Staff that they, too, go home, to be enrolled in local reserve divisions, by a technique yet to be worked out.[94]

This was the prospective solution for a difficult problem in training, brought on by the training program's conflict with the materiel program. It remained only prospective. Long before February 1942, the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor had ended all thought of Army reduction.

[91] Entry of 7 Oct 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 25.
[92] Entry of 15 Oct 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf.
[93] Entries of 16 Oct 41 and 21 Oct 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf.
[94] Entry of 31 Oct 41 in CofS files, Notes on Conf.

CHAPTER XII

Co-ordination with Britain

The secret American-British Conversations (ABC) between military Staff representatives of the two nations, which took place in Washington from 29 January to 27 March 1941,[1] were a rational development in the drift of the United States toward active participation in World War II. The drift was marked by well-defined stages. Great Britain's purchase of airplanes and other munitions[2] had started as a series of normal business transactions with private manufacturers in the American open market. By developing in 1938 to a grand-scale enterprise it had affected the American military program itself by reason of open-market competition with Army and Navy procurement activities. In the following year this competition became so real a concern of the American military establishment that on 6 July 1939 President Roosevelt assigned to the Army and Navy Munitions Board the task of co-ordinating such purchases. On 6 December 1939 he designated an informal interdepartmental committee (made up of the Treasury Department's Director of Procurement, the Army's Quartermaster General, and the Navy's Paymaster General) to take over this function and to "serve as the exclusive liaison with reference to procurement matters between this Government and the interested foreign Government." By mid-1940, when the importance of exact co-ordination of purchases had grown still greater, the liaison mechanism was given formal status as the Interdepartmental Committee For Co-ordination of Foreign and Domestic Military Purchases, with Col. James H. Burns as Army representative; the liaison with the White House was, as before, via the Secretary of the Treasury.[3] In 1940, it will be recalled, there was a formal division of American plane production schedules so that Great Britain would get a stated part of the whole output even when the residue was insufficient to meet the existing schedule of American rearm-

[1] See Chapter IV.

[2] See Chapter V.

[3] For information about the organization for co-ordination of foreign sales see: (1) Memo, ASW and ASN for President, 30 Jun 39, SW 572; (2) Ltr, President to SW, 6 Dec 39, SW 676; (3) Memo, President for SW, 13 Dec 39, SW 681 (it was in this memo that the President overruled the objections of the Secretaries of War and Navy to removing the co-ordination from ANMB); (4) *U. S. Government Manual, March 1941* (Washington: GPO, 1941), p. 87.

ing.[4] The direct shipment from U. S. Army stores of weapons and ammunition to Britain in the great emergency of June 1940 involved the military establishment still more deeply, and was in no sense an open-market transaction. The subsequent exchange of the fifty U. S. Navy destroyers in September 1940 for leases of Britain's west Atlantic bases, however profitable for both nations, cannot be presented as an act of unquestionable neutrality as between Britain and Germany.[5] Cordell Hull in later years remarked that in November 1940 "three days after the Presidental election Mr. Roosevelt announced that henceforth half of all the planes and other implements of war produced in the United States would go to Britain."[6] At a press conference on 17 December 1940 the President announced his plan for Lend-Lease (enacted into law in March 1941), under which the now immense flow of munitions to Great Britain and other nations at war with the Axis would be determined by the Allies' need for such supplies (and America's ability to supply them) rather than by the current or prospective ability of the beneficiaries to pay for them as normal purchases. The announcement came at a time when British ship losses had mounted to the unprecedented rate of 4.6 million ship tons a year (it would reach 5.4 millions in April 1941) against a British shipbuilding rate of 1.5 million tons, and bringing from Admiral Stark a forecast that Britain could not at this rate outlast another six months. The Lend-Lease announcement was clearly intended to commit the United States to further, and purposely unlimited, aid to Britain, and thus to help overcome the discouragement of the shipping losses. It was a public and official declaration of the principle which the Army's War Plans Division in that same month was enunciating when it recommended a major national policy of maximum "aid to Britain, short of war."[7]

[4] Chapter VI.

[5] For criticism of this transaction as a breach of international law see Edwin Borchard, "The Attorney-General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases," *The American Journal of International Law* (Washington, D. C., October 1940), Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 690–97. Other aspects of the Attorney General's opinion are challenged in the same publication (pp. 569ff.) by Herbert W. Briggs, "Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal." Quincy Wright, commenting editorially on the above articles (pp. 680–89), arrives at opposite conclusions. For text of the President's message to Congress on the destroyer transaction and accompanying papers, including the opinion of Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, see *Cong Rec,* 76th Cong, 3d sess, for September 3, 1940, pp. 17276–17279 (daily edition); also H Doc No. 943, 76th Cong. Note also Robert Sherwood's belief (in his *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper, 1948), especially p. 274) that Mr. Roosevelt was conscious of the possibility of impeachment for exceeding his Constitutional authority. Events leading up to the destroyers-for-bases transaction are discussed in draft MS, Kittredge, U. S. Defense Policies, Ch. X, Sec. B.

[6] Hull, *Memoirs,* I, 870.

[7] Unused Memo, Actg ACofS J. W. A. (Col Anderson), WPD, for CofS, 13 Nov 40, sub: National Policy of the United States, WPD 4175–15.

These increasingly wide departures from a strict neutrality as between two warring nations were, with one exception (the contemplated manning of the west Atlantic bases), concerned wholly with materiel. The planning activities of Army and Navy had necessarily been concerned also with personnel, to be sure, but up to then had involved only such informal contact with the British as the Ghormley-Strong-Emmons visit to London in August 1940 and similar exchanges of information between military representatives. Yet it had now become apparent that no reliable planning for possible military action in either hemisphere, anticipating an ultimate conflict with Germany and Italy, or with Japan, or with all three, could be carried on without a fairly definite understanding of what could be expected from Britain in such an event. The U. S. Navy at this time still was manifestly a one-ocean navy incapable of engaging enemies simultaneously in both seas, and its chiefs were increasingly aware that against an energetic Japan it could not at the moment be responsible for policing the whole of even the Pacific Ocean. It was accordingly Admiral Stark who took the lead in pointing to the necessity of knowing what could be expected from the British in an emergency, and hence in suggesting a conference with responsible British Staff officers. The suggestion, welcomed by General Marshall, was accordingly pursued and on 2 December 1940 it became known in the War Department that a British delegation would come to Washington for the awaited "exchange of ideas." [8]

Rationally such a high-level discussion would not, like earlier conferences, be for consideration merely of further purchases or lend-lease of materiel; the aim clearly was for consideration of a contingent employment of American personnel and American combat units in a theater or theaters of war. The discussion could not avoid some degree of joint planning of U.S.-British strategy, contingent though it would be by advance stipulation, and negative though it would be, for the same reason, in political commitment of the United States to any war agreement whatever. Cautious as these stipulations would be, and scrupulous as "political" (as distinguished from "military") members of the United States Government would be in abstaining from official attendance, the very subject matter of the discussions and the two-nation participation in them alike marked an epochal change in the war policy of the United States. The conferring Staff members were to be of high level, but not the highest in the case of either nation, and this supported the polite assurance that the conference decisions would not

[8] See Chapter IV, latter part, for the events leading up to ABC.

be actually binding upon anyone. Constitutionally of course they could not be. Yet examination of the list of conference delegates shows how instantly responsive each American participant would be to the chief of the service he represented and hence to the government itself. The Navy members were Rear Adm. (later Vice Adm.) Robert L. Ghormley, Special Naval Observer in London, Capt. (later Admiral) R. K. Turner, director of the Navy's WPD, his assistant, Capt. (later Commodore) Oscar Smith, and Capt. (later Admiral) Alan G. Kirk, former naval attaché in London lately become Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington. Captain Smith was replaced by Capt. (later Admiral) DeWitt C. Ramsey, and Lt. Col. O. T. Pfeiffer, USMC, was added. Mentioning these appointments in a 26 December memorandum to the Chief of Staff,[9] General Gerow recommended the Army's naming General Embick (then engaged in organizing hemisphere defense), General Gerow and Col. (later Gen.) J. T. McNarney, both of WPD, and Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, who were so named shortly.[10] Lt. Col. W. S. Scobey and Commander L. C. McDowell were the American secretaries of the meeting.

Establishing the American Position Prior to the British Parley

The mounting anxieties of late 1940 had so convinced both Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of the need for a unified American military policy, accepted by the President in advance of any meeting with the British, that in their capacities as Joint Board members they had already, in mid-December, directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare recommendations for the agenda of the coming meeting.[11] Inevitably preparation called for consultations with the Chiefs themselves, and the committee's resultant memorandum to the Joint Board, signed by Colonel McNarney and Captain Turner, presumably struck an attitude which it was known would be acceptable to higher authority. Significant passages in this critically worded document follow:

> Recent British political and military leadership has not been outstanding with the exception of Prime Minister Churchill's leadership, Admiral Cunningham's command

[9] This memorandum also listed the six designated British visitors, Maj. Gen. E. L. Morris, Rear Admirals R. M. Bellairs, former chief of plans, and V. H. Danckwerts, Air Commodore (later Vice-Marshal) J. C. Slessor, Capt. A. W. Clark, RN, and Maj. A. T. Cornwall-Jones. Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 26 Dec 40, sub: Army Representatives for Staff Conferences with Great Britain, WPD 4402. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were represented at meetings of the British section but not in the joint meetings.

[10] TAG Ltr to Maj Gen S. D. Embick, 30 Dec 40, sub: Army Representatives for Staff Conferences with Great Britain, WPD 4402.

[11] Memo, Secy JB for JPC, 14 Dec 40, JB 325, ser 674.

of the Mediterranean fleet, and General Wavell's command of the British forces in Egypt. It is believed that we cannot afford, nor do we need, to entrust our national future to British direction, because the United States can safeguard the North American continent and probably the western hemisphere, whether allied with Britain or not.

United States Army and Naval officials are in rather general agreement that Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless the United States provides that nation with direct military assistance, plus a far greater degree of material aid than is being given now; and that, even then, success against the Axis is not assured.

It is to be expected that proposals of the British representatives will have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British Commonwealth. Never absent from British minds are their post-war interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual interests. . . .

In order to avoid commitment by the President, neither he nor any of his Cabinet should officially receive the British officers; therefore the Joint Planning Committee recommends that the British representatives be informally received by the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff. . . .[12]

Something of this same suspicion of British intentions was being exhibited by the military attaché, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee. On 7 January he informed his superior in Washington that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared for the use of their delegates in the coming Staff Conversations data so secret that they did not see fit to discuss them with him at the time. He proceeded: "It seems to me that proposals which have taken them a month or more to draw up justify most careful scrutiny and analysis by our own authorities. . . . The United States might find itself being urged to conclude far-reaching and binding agreements without sufficient examination." [13]

It must be remembered that at this season the British situation was none too secure. The shipping losses were still mounting and destined to continue mounting. The end of 1940 had seen a lull in the bombing of London, but there was no certainty that the lull would last long. On the contrary, in late January one of the Army's most trusted military observers was predicting freely that the Germans would make a new air-and-land onslaught in the spring or early summer. "I am certain they are going to England . . ." he said. "Last fall there was a doubt as to what they might do. However, now there is none in my mind. . . ." [14] The observer spoke lightly of a Nazi invasion of South America, which he was confident Germany, a land power, would not attempt in the certainty of being opposed by the United States Navy. He remarked that the

[12] Memo, JPC for JB, 13 Jan 41, sub: Joint Instructions for Holding Staff Conversations, WPD 4402–1.

[13] Rad, Military Attaché (Lee), London, to Military Intelligence Division, War Dept, 7 Jan 41, WPD 4402–1.

[14] Notes of remarks by Col Truman Smith in office of CofS, 27 Jan 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 8.

Germans were less interested in South America than in the Soviet Union, in which midyear developments would prove his judgment correct. To this sound estimate he added, in discussing invasion of the USSR, that "if they [the Germans] massed their forces, it would be as easy as ABC," an estimate not borne out by events.[15]

Accompanying the Joint Planning Committee's memorandum were proposals of procedure and agenda and a statement of the United States' national position that was approved verbatim by the two senior members of the Joint Board.[16] By 26 January this statement apparently had been seen by the Secretaries of War and Navy and certainly examined in detail by the President, as on that day Mr. Roosevelt returned it to the Secretary of the Navy with revisions.[17] The statement was intended, in line with the Planning Committee's admonitions, to discourage the British visitors at the outset from enterprises unacceptable to the United States, and to channel the conversations into areas of usefulness for the planners of both nations. As finally delivered by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, the statement contained these significant passages:

2. As understood by these two officers the purpose of these staff conversations is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war, and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained it must be supported by their responsible military and naval authorities. Therefore no specific commitments can now be made except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisaged must for the present remain contingent upon the future political action of both nations. All such plans are subject to eventual official approval by both governments. . . .

5. If the U. S. Government decides to make war in common with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that

a. The broad military objective of the United States operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily must also maintain dispositions which under all eventualities will prevent the extensions in the western hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.

b. The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Memo, Actg AChofS WPD for CofS, 14 Jan 41, sub: Staff Conversations with the British, WPD 4402–1.

[17] Memo, President for SN, 26 Jan 41, WPD 4402–2.

c. The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or attacking the Dutch.

d. Should Japan enter the war, United States operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.

e. As a general rule United States forces should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived from the United States-British joint plans.

f. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportions as to provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany.

6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination of those military efforts which will contibute most directly to the defeat of Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation tentative agreements should be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme control and as to unity of field command in cases of tactical joint operations. Staff conversations should also include an examination into the present military situations of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situations that might result from the loss of the British Isles.

7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if the British Staff representatives could furnish the United States Staff representatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth as a preliminary to the staff discussions.[18]

It was in paragraph 2 of the original draft that the President, politically vigilant, had spotted a verbal serpent. The military advisers had written ". . . should the United States desire to resort to war." The President made it read "should the United States be compelled to resort to war," and his wording was of course adopted.[19] Other revisions of slight concern were made (the President substituted "Associates" for "Allies"' and suggested that aid in the Mediterranean would be given "navally"), and the initial statement of United States views, almost exactly as the two military chiefs had drawn it up, was presented accordingly on 29 January when the two delegations met in a Navy Building room vacated for the purpose of the conference.

[18] Statement by CNO and CofS, 27 Jan 41. Copies in WPD 4402-94 and WPD 4402-89 (Gen Embick's set of Conference papers). Though dated 27 January there is evidence in accompanying papers to show that this was the statement actually presented two days later.

[19] (1) Memo, President for SN, 26 Jan 41, WPD 4402-2. (2) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 27 Jan 41, WPD 4402-2.

The American-British Conversations of January 1941

Although the plan had been for the British visitors to be welcomed officially by the Under Secretary of State as well as by the military chiefs of Army and Navy, Mr. Welles was absent.[20] No official on the Cabinet level was present to confess political knowledge of this meeting of military technicians and, having made welcoming speeches, neither Admiral Stark nor General Marshall took part in ensuing discussions. That both were kept currently informed was well understood,[21] but the warnings contained in their opening statement were, with one notable exception, enough to prevent the raising of issues beyond the intended scope of the American delegates' authority. That exception was the British effort on 12 February to exact an agreement upon American aid to Singapore, an issue so important that it called for consideration—but not at these Washington conversations. The resultant proposals for Singapore and the Far East in general will be discussed later.

By 5 March the United States Chiefs of Staff Committee, directing its energies to the more promising co-operative prospect of the Atlantic, had reached tentative agreement upon the proposed mission of ground and air forces in the British Isles. The following proposal, with General Gerow's recommendation, was submitted to the Chief of Staff:

(1) The primary role of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the western hemisphere, and to protect naval bases and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack. Forces will be built up for an eventual offensive in a manner to be agreed upon at a later date.

(2) The primary objective of the air forces, subject to the requirements of the security of the United States and an unimpaired pursuit cover in the British Isles, will be to reduce as quickly as possible the disparity between the Associated and enemy air strength particularly with respect to long-range striking forces operating from and against the British Isles.[22]

The memorandum covering the recommendation bears General Marshall's OK of 6 March 1941.[23] In the next two weeks agreements were reached on several items and on 19 March General Gerow was able to give to the Chief of Staff for his scrutiny, and presentation to the Secretary of War, drafts of all the conference "serials" to date. They included the report of the Staff Conversations themselves

[20] Minutes of Plenary Meeting, British-United States Staff Conversations, 29 Jan 41, in Gen Gerow's papers relating to the Conference, WPD EX File, item 11 No. 4.

[21] See Memos for CofS from Army representatives, 12 Feb, 20 Feb, 5 Mar 41, WPD 4402 to 4420.

[22] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 5 Mar 41, sub: U. S. British Staff Conversations, WPD 4402–3. The quotation, above, is from the untitled accompanying enclosure.

[23] *Ibid.*

thus far, the report on Strategic Direction of Military Forces, that on Communications, that on Control of Shipping, and that on Estimates of Time for U. S. Naval Forces to Be on Station.[24]

Ten days later the conversations ended with a detailed report of agreement on basic policies, primary objectives, and the plans for attaining them—all on a contingent basis as scheduled.[25] The agreements were "subject to confirmation by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom," and by "the Governments of the United States and . . . United Kingdom." The governmental confirmation, which could come only from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, was not given, either for the ABC report or for the later Joint Rainbow Plan 5 that was based upon the unconfirmed ABC compact. Even so, the Staff views were so clearly expressed and accepted by both sides that, while the approval of higher authority was being awaited, planning could proceed. The Staff Conversations served to put into written form the views which already were held and on which there was general agreement, to make a few significant additions to those views, and to permit declarations of a highly particularized nature on the division of responsibility, the actual areas in which troops would be used, the probable number of Army units, planes, and ships, and the character of command.

The Agreements Reached at ABC

The stated and obvious purpose of the Staff Conversations Report, made in two installments, ABC–1 and ABC–2, was "to determine the best method by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war." This made it desirable "to coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers" and encouraged the conference

> . . . to reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the

[24] (1) Memo, Secy Army Section (Lt Col W. P. Scobey) for members of the Army Section, 17 Mar 41, WPD 4402–3. (2) Memo, Secy Army Section for CofS, 19 Mar 41, sub: Staff Conversations, WPD 4402–3.

[25] The United States–British Staff Conversations report (Short title ABC–1) with annexes, 27 Mar 41, and the air collaboration report (ABC–2), 29 Mar 41, are published as Exhibit 49, pages 1485–1550 of Part 15, the *Hearings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Cong, 1st sess.

major lines of the Military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme Military control and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic and tactical joint operations.[26]

One of the contingent commitments provided that "the High Command of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategic policies and plans which will govern the conduct of the war." [27] It is a memorable statement, for events immediately following the conference dictated that it become partially operative, and in this pledge is discernible the genesis of the fully co-operative Combined Chiefs of Staff organization which in less than a year came into being as agreed upon. The report proceeds: "The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In these circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising . . . [with Japan] must be taken into account." [28] This was a considerable element in the decision that

. . . the United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom but . . . will retain materiel in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her allies. It is recognized that the amount and nature of the material aid which the United States affords the British Commonwealth will influence the size and character of the Military forces which will be available to the United States for use in the war. The broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her allies.[29]

The strategic defense policies of the two nations were three:

(1) that America's paramount territorial interest was in the Western Hemisphere, (2) that the security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances and that dispositions must provide "for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations," a cardinal policy being retention of a Far East position "such as will assure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth," (3) that security of sea communications of the Associated Powers was essential.[30]

The accepted offensive policies were seven:

1. To maintain an economic blockade of the Axis by sea, land, air, and by commodity control through diplomatic and financial means.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 1488.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 1489.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] Summarized from text of ABC-1, paragraph 11, which is given in full on pp. 1489-90 of *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings,* Pt. 15.

2. To conduct a sustained air offensive to destroy Axis military power.

3. To effect "early elimination" of Italy as an Axis partner (of which much more, of a less harmonious nature, would be heard in 1943).

4. To conduct raids and minor offensives.

5. To support neutrals and underground groups in resisting the Axis.

6. To build up the necessary forces for the eventual offensive against Germany.

7. To capture positions from which to launch that offensive. (On this, too, there would be controversy in 1942 and 1943.) [31]

In pursuit of these basic policies it was agreed that "the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater" and that in it accordingly would be exerted the chief American effort, although the "great importance" of the Mediterranean and North African areas was noted. The principal activity contemplated for United States Navy forces in the Atlantic would be in the protection of the shipping of the Associated Powers.[32] The emphasis on this, in early 1941, when the new ground and air forces of the Army were still largely in incubation and deficient in training and equipment, marks a recognition of the Navy's existing resources as America's most useful contribution in immediate prospect, and already needed for coping with Britain's dismal situation at sea where sinkings by U-boats continued to mount. During the Staff Conferences, in fact, a U. S. Navy group headed by Capt. (later Admiral) Louis A. Denfeld was sent to Northern Ireland and western Scotland to inspect base sites for U. S. Navy surface and air forces "which at some date in the future might be employed on escort of convoys." [33] The message which was originally sent mentioned that the War Department contemplated assigning two Army officers to the party sailing on 21 February, but on reconsideration the mission was decided to be solely one for naval personnel.

It was agreed further that if Japan should enter the war, military strategy in the Far East would be defensive, the United States making no promise of adding to its military strength in the Orient but agreeing to "employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power . . . by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia." [34] It was pointedly observed in the report (and was to be sharply emphasized later in the year) that America's augmentations of forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean

[31] Summarized from ABC-1, paragraph 12, given in full on pp. 1490–91 of *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings*, Pt. 15.

[32] See *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings*, Pt. 15, p. 1491.

[33] Msg, CNO to U. S. Naval Attaché at London, 20 Feb 41. Copy for information at CofS, U. S. Army, filed in WPD 4402-1. Also Memo of correction, ACofS WPD to CofS, same date.

[34] *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings*, p. 1491–92.

would enable the British Commonwealth "to release the necessary forces for the Far East." [35]

As to the land forces of the Associated Powers, the principal defensive roles would be to hold the British Isles against invasion, to defend the Western Hemisphere, and to protect outlying military bases and islands of strategic importance. The land forces of the United States, in particular, would "support the United States' naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. . . . [They] will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces." [36]

Subject to requirements of security for the bases and for land and sea communications, the agreed air policy was to be "directed toward achieving as quickly as possible superiority of air strength." The American air resources in particular would be used to support the United States' land and naval forces, and to defend their bases. Offensively, they would be used in collaboration with the Royal Air Force against German military power.[37] This was the general statement; the particulars of air force employment were enumerated in the ABC–2 annex, dated 29 March, which was prepared by the three aviation authorities of the conference, Vice-Marshal J. C. Slessor, Captain Ramsey and Colonel McNarney, and approved by their colleagues.[38]

There obviously was a great deal of detail which the annexes to the main document could not encompass, and this, plus a continuing liaison, was left to military missions which the British and American parties to the conversations agreed to exchange. (The United States agreed also to exchange with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand such liaison officers as would be necessary).[39] These essential missions were in fact designated with little delay, regardless of the fact that the conversations that created them never were given the formal approval which had been termed necessary. The principles of future co-operation, the areas of sea responsibility, and the specific number of combat units that would be available were laid down in the document itself—of necessity, if the United States planning establishment was to proceed with the newest and much the most important of the Rainbow Plans, No. 5. It was this objective which, months before, had made

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 1492.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] See n. 25.
[39] *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings,* pp. 1494–95 and 1497–1500.

the conversations necessary.[40] Further, it now was anticipated that, even in advance of a declared war, there might be need for deploying American naval vessels in the Atlantic in a more intensive manner, and this anticipation was borne out in the closing days of the Staff Conversations. (On 25 March 1941 Germany announced that U-boat warfare, hitherto conducted for the most part in waters immediately surrounding the British Isles, now would be extended to the eastern coast of Greenland.) In Annex II therefore, the ABC planners assigned to the U. S. Navy in the event of war the waters of the Atlantic west of long. 30° W and north of lat. 25° N, excepting the Canadian defense area and a zone southwest of the Azores. In the Pacific the U.S. Navy responsibility was much more extended, the British Navy agreeing to patrol only the south and southwest areas. The responsibility for strategic direction of the Associated Powers' naval forces in the Far East (except those which were retained by the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet for Philippines defense) was without argument assigned to the British.[41]

Annex III of the conversations made a formal designation of naval, land, and air tasks, and in doing so listed the forces of both nations which should be available. In the naval tasks (for performing which each nation's naval contributions were listed by ship classes) were included the work of ocean escort, of striking force, patrol force, fleet marine force, and of the coastal frontier defense. For the land tasks to be assigned to the U. S. Army it was noted that 2 cavalry, 6 armored, and 27 infantry divisions were in training, but that of these only 2 armored and 4 infantry divisions could be ready by September 1941. The U. S. Army air forces then being organized were numbered at 41 groups. This was recognized as a start in the 54-group program, from which an expansion to 100 groups was already envisaged. The number immediately available was not stated.[42] A warning of American intentions with regard to the output of the new airplane factories was presented in ABC–2:

> Allocation of output from new capacity for production of military aircraft beyond that envisaged [in the stated commitment] should, in principle, and subject to periodical review, be based on the following:
>
> a. Until such time as the United States may enter the war, the entire output from such new capacity should be made available to the British.

[40] See Chapter IV.

[41] *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings*, Pt. 15, pp. 1501–02.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 1504–10. Note that on 1 October 1941 WPD was to report only one infantry division and no armored division ready (see Chapter XI, p. 358).

b. If the United States enters the war . . . for planning purposes the United Kingdom should assume that such capacity will be divided on approximately a 50/50 basis between the United States and the British Commonwealth.[43]

This applied chiefly to Army air equipment, the need for which would be swift. U. S. Navy aviation progress, it was stated, would "reach maturity concurrently with completion of the authorized shipbuilding program in the fiscal year 1946," the need for carrier-based planes obviously having a relationship to the completion of carriers.[44]

American Interpretations of the Agreement

The importance of an agreement being not only in what it says but in what it is meant to emphasize, there is interest in two contemporary comments upon it. One is a quick digest of the recommendations that was prepared, it would seem, in WPD and filed with other basic documents of the period. It summarizes the findings thus:

That the paramount interest of the United States lies in the Western Hemisphere.

That the security of the British Isles must be maintained.

That full economic pressure will be maintained against the totalitarian powers.

That military (including air and naval) measures will be maintained against the totalitarian powers.

In order to accomplish . . . [this, assign] strategic areas of responsibility . . . Pacific area . . . [and] Western Atlantic area to the United States. The Far East area, including China and Malaysia . . . the Eastern Atlantic and Middle East to Great Britain. . . .

Initial United States naval operations will be to maintain a strategic naval reserve in the Pacific, in order to influence Japan against further aggression; and to relieve Great Britain of responsibility for security of shipping in the Western Atlantic, including the North Atlantic route to the British Isles.

United States Army operations initially are limited to providing combat aviation in support of the British Isles, including offensive operations against Germany, relieving certain British garrisons in the Western Hemisphere (Curaçao and Aruba), protecting such bases as may be established by the Navy, and building up a strategic reserve to be used in future decisive operations.[45]

The other document is Colonel McNarney's summary of what he regarded as the important points of ABC–2 on which he and his aviation colleagues had done most of the work. This summary he prepared for General Arnold's use on

[43] *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings*, Pt. 15, p. 1548 (ABC–2).

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 1548 (ABC–2).

[45] Undated and unsigned memo prepared in WPD for use in connection with conferences of 16 April, WPD 4402–9.

a forthcoming trip to England for examination of base facilities in the British Isles. Colonel McNarney suggested that the Air Deputy should note the following points:

a. ABC–2, in listing the allocations of equipment, had planned factory delivery to the United States of a certain number of planes and "so long as we are not at war" release of all others six months earlier than scheduled. But, again, this was to "hold good only while not at war."

b. The United States therefore was deferring the 54-group plan at the expense of American security, in order to get planes into the combat zone. In view of this, requests which were not closely coordinated with actual military needs, or which ignored the possible effect on the American program, might delay rather than advance superiority in the combat zone. The British request for four B–18 cargo planes was cited as an example of minor aid to the British and injury to the American training program. All British requests, it was advised, should come through military channels, preferably with concurrence of the Mission.[46]

Colonel McNarney reminded General Arnold that the United States planning for air activities contemplated the use, when ready, of three groups of pursuit planes in Northern Ireland, to protect two near-by naval bases. Pursuit groups were to be "broken in" there and then were to pass on to more active sectors in England. Three heavy and two medium bomber groups were contemplated for duty in England, operating under American commanders in the British Bomber Command, and there was a suggestion that it "might be well to insist that they be not scattered" in small units—survival of the abiding American insistence upon American command of American forces. "We propose to establish a bomber command to control operations; strategic tasks to be assigned by the British." [47] The tentative troop tables of the Rainbow 5 Plan then being worked out in line with ABC, as affecting the ground force assignment to the British Isles—inclusion in this memorandum demonstrating how closely tuned the ABC Staff Conversations were to current war-planning of the United States forces—were summarized thus by Colonel McNarney:

a. Reinforced division for Ireland.

b. Ten antiaircraft regiments for protection of U. S. naval bases and airdromes in the British Isles, to be sent as bases are completed.

c. Ten battalions of National Guard troops for protection of the bases.

d. One reinforced regiment, a token force.[48]

[46] Summarized, not quoted, from Memo, Col J. T. McNarney for Gen H. H. Arnold, 7 Apr 41, sub: Staff Conversations, WPD 4402–7.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] *Ibid.*, summarized, not quoted.

Although commitments for the Middle East were avoided altogether in the discussion, the fact that in 1942–43 it would be "probably impossible to crowd any more operating units into the British Isles" induced the Staff to consider a plan for supporting large air forces "in Egypt, Asiatic Turkey, and Syria, via the Red Sea, with an airway via Takoradi, British Gold Coast to Cairo." At the same time it was stated "we are dead set against any commitments" in the Far East.[49]

In a significant declaration suggestive of the coming transfer (in May) of three U. S. battleships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff united, on 4 April 1941, in informing the British Chiefs of Staff that, having approved the ABC report conditionally, they would "at an appropriate time" lay it before the President. Their message continued:

> It is their opinion that the present grave threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom may require a much stronger reinforcement of the United States Atlantic Fleet, by forces drawn from the Pacific, than is contemplated by the Report. In such circumstances, offensive action by the United States Pacific Fleet other than in connection with enemy trade, would necessarily become less influential.[50]

The last sentence quoted is particularly worthy of note, as an official recognition, eight months before Pearl Harbor, that the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific would be "less influential" than in the past. This consciousness of its limited powers was a factor in Navy planning (under Rainbow 5) in the ensuing months. The fleet's unreadiness for long-range offensive operations was due in part to its need for a much larger supply "train" than was then on hand.

Rapid Developments in the Atlantic War

Events in the Atlantic were pressing rapidly at just this time. On the night of 3–4 April—a month after Hitler had declared Iceland to be in the war zone—a wolfpack attack of German submarines was directed against a convoy of ships in mid-ocean, south of Iceland, and ten of the merchantmen were sunk. As an immediate result the British Admiralty recognized the need of establishing a

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Draft of Ltr, CNO and CofS to Special Naval and Army Observers in London, 4 Apr 41, sub: Tentative Approval of the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC–1), WPD 4402–18. The substance of this letter, evidently drawn up at the time the appointment of observers was under consideraion, was subsequently delivered to the British Chiefs of Staffs Committee in London. Ltr, Special Naval (Ghormley) and Army (Lee) Observers to the Chiefs of Staffs Committee, 21 Apr 41, WPD 4402–14. A copy of the letter was handed General Chaney when he departed for London early in May. See notation on copy in WPD 4402–89, Part V.

convoy escort base on Iceland, where British Army elements had been on guard since May 1940. At President Roosevelt's direction Admiral Stark dispatched the destroyer *Niblack* to make reconnaissance of Iceland for American information, and on 7 April Admiral Stark issued the order by which during the next month the Navy shifted from Pacific to Atlantic waters the three battleships *Idaho, Mississippi,* and *New Mexico,* the carrier *Yorktown,* four light cruisers, and two squadrons of destroyers. Within that same week, however, *Niblack* engaged in what appears to have been the first World War II action, a very minor one, between armed forces of Germany and the United States. The destroyer was quitting Iceland when it paused to pick up survivors from a newly torpedoed Dutch merchantman. Detection devices revealed that the German submarine was not only still in the vicinity but was apparently maneuvering for another attack. *Niblack* took the initiative by moving in and dropping depth charges in the apparent vicinity of the raider, without recorded result save to drive the submarine away. On 18 April Admiral Ernest J. King, then commander of the Atlantic Fleet, issued Operations Plan No. 3, fixing at long. 26° W the eastern border of the Western Hemisphere.[51]

In the following month the concept of defending actively the Western Hemisphere rather than the American mainland alone, laid down in Rainbow 1 (August 1939) and Rainbow 4 (June 1940), was developed to the point of including not only Navy, but Army activities at three of the newly acquired bases. On 12 May 1941, under direction of the Secretary of War who in so grave a matter must have been acting with the knowledge and approval of the President, General Marshall sent to Admiral Stark this letter:

> Orders were issued today to the Commanding General First Army, and the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, to instruct Army Base Commanders in British possessions as follows:
>
> "In case any force of belligerent powers, other than those powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere territory, attacks or threatens to attack any British possessions on which any U. S. air or naval base is located, the commanding officer of the Army Base Force shall resist such attack, using all the means at his disposal."
>
> This modifies the information contained in my memorandum of May 1, 1941 on the same subject.[52]

[51] Admiral King's order, in its relationship to larger aspects of strategy, will be referred to later in the chapter. This sequence of events at sea is recited by Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Battle of the Atlantic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), pp. 56–58.

[52] Ltr, CofS to CNO, 12 May 41, sub: Directive to Army Base Commanders, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad, WPD 4351–98, copy in OCS 21160–67. Attached is the memorandum to WPD next referred to, signed "G. C. M." The 1 May memorandum is not on hand.

Filed with the copy of this letter is General Marshall's memorandum of the same day to WPD, quite clearly prepared for the record in order to show that this important step was not taken on his own responsibility:

> Reference instructions to Army Base Commanders in British possessions, please note on the amended copy that the alterations are in the handwriting of the Secretary of War, that he directed the issuance of the instructions to Base Commanders, and that he further directed that a copy be sent to the State Department with a note informing them he had made the changes.

The 12 May 1941 directive to each commander on the newly leased bases—to use all means at his disposal in resisting a force which threatened to attack one of the British islands on which there was an American base—is the first recorded explicit authorization to U. S. Army forces to engage in action not immediately related to the defense of an American installation.

As to the ABC–1 agreement, its final approval at the Cabinet level came some weeks after the end of the conversations. The report itself was signed only by the delegates, but upon the cover of a copy that was introduced in evidence at the Congressional Pearl Harbor Inquiry in 1946 is a penciled notation, itself unsigned and undated, reading: "Approved by Sec. Navy 28 May 1941. Approved by Sec. War 3 June 1941. Not approved by President." To that extent it was made clear by the Chief of State in the United States (and this was true of Great Britain as well) that the conversations were not those of the highest civil authority. The test specifically mentioned that agreements were subject to confirmation by the military chiefs (which was given) and also by the governments. These last confirmatory signatures were never affixed.

The Start of Formal Military Co-operation of Britain and America

Significant as had been the August 1940 meetings in London "for standardization of arms," the Staff Conversations of January to March 1941 must be recognized as the true opening of formal permanent relations between American and British Staffs. The progress of this relationship was rapid. The importance of the contingent decisions that had been made, and the necessity of continuing exchange of information on which to make plans conforming to those decisions, was apparent. This made it desirable to establish a formal mechanism for making the exchange. Within a week of the close of conversations there was active discussion of the composition of a mission to be sent to London, the successful recommendation being that of WPD to the Chief of

Staff, with which the Navy was in apparent agreement. It provided not for a united mission but for two "observer" groups, whose Army members would be wholly separated from the establishment of the military attaché at the Embassy, the purpose being to keep the attaché as a separate source of information: the Navy members assigned to London would also report to their own chief in Washington; there would be a "British Military Mission" in Washington representing Army, Navy, and Air, later formally designated the "British Joint Staff Mission in Washington."[53] There was contemplated, eventually, a Commanding General U. S. Troops in Great Britain, his relations to the observers not stated in the recommendation. The primary function of the Army observers was to represent the War Department in the formulation of broad policies for the conduct of the war and for the planning and execution of joint tasks that might or might not be a direct concern of the United States forces in the British Isles. If the United States should enter the war, decision as to who would command the troops would then be made.[54]

The recommendation was approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, with notification that the chief of the Army's delegation would be known as a "Special Army Observer, London," and his colleagues as "Special Assistant Army Observers, London." Even the word "mission" was avoided. The chief, it now was determined, was to be a "major general qualified and intended for the command of a United States force that may be sent to England, or as Chief of Staff for any other commander that may be designated." He would communicate directly with the Chief of Staff, and pointedly not via the military attaché. The nucleus Army group would have 16 members in its staff, plus 10 clerks; the full group would have 40 members and 20 clerks. As the largest initial combat force then contemplated for Britain was from the air establishment, the appointment as chief of mission was given to an air officer, Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney. His 24 April letter of instructions from the Chief of Staff, besides enjoining him to secrecy on his functions other than as observer, continued:

> Nevertheless it is essential that all channels for effectuating cooperation between the United States and British Commonwealth be established as soon as practicable. You will not

[53] Ltr, Joint Secretaries Br JSM in Washington to U. S. Secretary for Collaboration, 9 Jul 41, sub: British Military Mission: Proposed Change in Nomenclature, WPD 4402-28.

[54] Discussion of action leading to the establishment of the observers group is in: (1) Memo, Actg ACofS for CofS, 7 Apr 41, sub: United States Military Mission in London, WPD 4402-5. (2) Memo, Actg ACofS G-2 for CofS, 7 Apr 41, sub: United States Military Mission in London, WPD 4402-5. (3) Memo, Maj Gen S. D. Embick for Actg ACofS WPD, 5 Apr 41, sub: Military Mission, WPD 4402-5.

enter into political commitments. However, in conjunction with the special Naval Observer in London you will negotiate with the British Chiefs of Staff on military affairs of common interest relating to joint United States-British cooperation in British areas of responsibility. Such negotiations will be subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. It is intended that military matters pertaining to the British Chief of Staff Committee which require joint decision will be taken up through you or through the British Military Mission in Washington, as may be appropriate, and not through diplomatic or other channels. You will endeavor to have American representatives in London to handle all matters of a military nature through your group, and to avoid presenting such matters direct to British military officials.[55]

On 23 May General Chaney reported by cable that the Special Observers Group had been established in London on 19 May, and that he personally had reported his presence to the American ambassador and to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.[56] In Washington the U. S. Navy had already provided office space for the British Mission, made up of 3 members and 28 staff assistants, and WPD was arranging for a committee room in which group meetings could be held, and for appropriate staff liaison with the British.[57]

American Involvement Causes Anxiety

Meantime the Staff planners were grappling with the special problems inherent in the existing status of a nation at peace but increasingly involved in the processes of war. The recently concluded American-British Staff Conversations were only a part of the involvement. Shipping was being sunk with increasing frequency and, with Vichy France being slowly bent to total compliance with Hitler's demands, there was a prospect that French bases on both sides of the Atlantic would soon be made available to German sea raiders to the still greater imperilment of American munitions-carrying merchantmen. The British in the Middle East were doing so badly that Hitler had boldly declared a blockade of the Red Sea. In this complex situation wide differences in American opinion were manifest, isolationists calling for a cessation of munitions shipments and interventionists urging, rather, use of the Navy for moving more supplies to England.[58] The immediate issues affected the Navy almost entirely, but the ultimate involvement of the Army, in the event that expeditionary forces were

[55] Ltr, CofS to Special Army Observer in London, 24 Apr 41, sub: Letter of Instructions, WPD 4402–5.

[56] Cable, Special Observer, London, to TAG, 23 May 41, WPD 4402–5.

[57] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 13 May 41, sub: Liaison with British Mission, WPD 4402–10.

[58] For recital of this background see Morison, *The Battle of the Atlantic,* pp. 56–64. See also contemporary newspapers.

employed for the occupation of overseas bases, was so likely as to arouse the concern of the Chief of Staff. His advice appears to have been sought by a troubled Harry Hopkins, the President's principal adviser at the time, dubious about the commitments which Mr. Roosevelt was contemplating. The principal issues—the extent to which U. S. Navy vessels should be employed in the war in the Atlantic and the manner in which the order for this employment should be issued—came to discussion at the White House on 15 April when the President brought to hearing a Navy proposal, made by Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy, for establishing a neutrality patrol in the west Atlantic.[59] It advocated the delineation of a restricted zone west of long. 26° W. (including Greenland and part of the Azores), entry into which by belligerent vessels would be interpreted as marking their intention to attack. This was a way of saying that the United States should establish convoy protection in that zone. The discussion as guided by Mr. Roosevelt was less upon the basic decision than upon the question of whether convoying should be ordered secretly or by proclamation. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau opposed secrecy, it would appear, because he felt that it could not be maintained and that eventual disclosure would embarrass the President. Secretary of War Stimson opposed secrecy but on another basis: he felt strongly that a public declaration of active American naval effort was called for because it would strengthen the standing of the British Government at that moment and shatter whatever appeasement sentiment was still existent in England. The President wished more advice and more time for consideration, and Mr. Hopkins, still troubled over possibilities whose gravity he felt the President did not recognize, apparently asked assistance from the War Department in clarifying the issues. The assistance especially sought was that of General Embick as an experienced authority, at the moment on leave after his participation in the prolonged American-British Staff Conversations. That officer's judgments, considered, direct, and sometimes extremely blunt, had impressed the President in the past and now he was looked upon as qualified for the difficult task of persuading Mr. Roosevelt to examine certain distasteful facts about the Army's unreadiness for a large combat mission.

Soon after he reached his office on the morning after the White House meeting General Marshall discussed the situation with his two deputies, Gen-

[59] Documents used for this summary narration are: (1) Notes of conference in office of CofS, 16 Apr 41 (early forenoon), CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13; (2) Notes on later conference (11:25 A. M.) same day, place and file location. (3) Memo, CofS for SW, 16 Apr 41, same file; (4) Memo, J. W. A. (Col Anderson of WPD) for CofS, 16 Apr 41, sub: Strategic Considerations—Peace or War Status, WPD 4402-9.

erals Bryden and Moore, and three WPD officers, General Gerow and Colonels McNarney and Anderson. His summary of prospects, as recorded in unrevised notes of the conference, reported:

. . . It is being arranged for General Embick to fly to Washington for the purpose of conferring with the President in a series of discussions which will inform him as Commander in Chief of national strategy for the future without regard to politics. . . . Mr. Hopkins hopes that by a series of talks the President will become aware of the fundamental problems which face this nation. Mr. Hopkins feels . . . that we are frittering away materiel without tangible results, that the influence and accomplishments of the State Department have been unfortunate . . . and that the President must be protected against the importunities of those who are not fully aware of the seriousness of the present situation. . . . If we have gotten to the point where we can no longer operate on a peacetime status should we recommend a war status? Or is it of importance to do something immediately? . . . What I must be prepared to suggest is what should the President do? What do we think should be done? Of course the President is also governed by public opinion. There are two things we must do: begin the education of the President as to the true strategic situation—this coming after a period of being influenced by the State Department. The other thing is, does he have to make a decision now. We must tell him what he has to work with.[60]

The WPD representatives were asked to make their recommendations promptly, and later in the forenoon the group reassembled, this time with the addition of Lt. Col. Charles W. Bundy and Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Paul McD. Robinett; they apparently had assisted in preparation of two brief unsigned statements that Colonel Anderson now presented to General Marshall, (1) a memorandum entitled "Strategic Considerations, Peace or War Status" and (2) "Digest of United States-British Staff Conversations." The former follows:

1. A war status for the United States at the present time offers the following advantages:

a. The United States would be awakened to the gravity of the current situation and brought together in a cohesive effort that does not today prevail. Production of equipment and preparation in general should be materially speeded up.

b. The Churchill Government would be strengthened.

c. Axis Powers would be weakened.

2. Opposed to these advantages:

a. The United States Army is not now prepared to undertake active military operations on other than an extremely minor scale, due primarily to shortages in equipment and ammunition.

[60] Notes of conference in office of CofS, 16 Apr 41 (early forenoon), CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

b. Active participation in the war would have to be limited for the time being to the Navy and to commitments of Army forces essentially as indicated in the recent Chiefs of Staffs agreement [ABC].

3. In the Atlantic there appears to be no serious counteraction that Axis Powers could take immediately upon our entry into the war.

In the Pacific if Japan joins the Axis Powers in a declaration of war against us we will probably lose the Philippines and the effect on Singapore and the Dutch East Indies is open to question.

4. We are prepared to defend our possessions in the Western Hemisphere and the North American Continent against any possible threat than can be foreseen. Subject to the availability of shipping we can promptly relieve British forces in Iceland and relieve Naval forces that may undertake the occupation of the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands. We can undertake, likewise subject to the limitations of shipping, any operations that may reasonably be required in the Caribbean or in Northeast Brazil.

Conclusion.

Upon the assumption, which appears reasonable, that the United States will enter the present war sooner or later, it appears to the War Plans Division highly desirable that our entry be made sufficiently soon to avoid either the loss of the British Isles or a material change in the attitude of the British Government directed toward appeasement.

In contrast to this view, it must be recognized that the Army can, at the present time, accomplish extremely limited military support to a war effort, and from this point of view it is highly desirable that we withhold active participation as long as possible.[61]

General Marshall thereupon questioned Colonel Anderson on whether his judgment had been influenced by what was said earlier in the forenoon. The WPD officer said it had been influenced only with respect to possible consequences of a change of government in England. The discussion then proceeded, largely upon the involvements that a war status would bring, the commitments of the ABC plan should it be accepted, and the means by which those commitments could be undertaken. The 1st Division was reported available; the 2d and 5th would be by 1 May; ammunition, however, would be short until 1942.

In the course of discussion General Embick was admitted to the room. The Chief of Staff reviewed what had been said and done, read aloud the WPD memorandum, and asked the newcomer's views. General Embick remarked that WPD proposed stronger action than the Navy itself had asked. He questioned the appraisal upon which the conclusion was based, observed that British Near East reverses might at least simplify defense of the British Isles, and clearly startled

[61] Memo initialed J. W. A. (Col. Anderson) for CofS, 16 Apr 41, sub: Strategic Considerations, WPD 4402–9. The "Digest of United States-British Staff Conversations" presented at the same time is the one recorded on p. 380 above.

his hearers with the opinion that the British position would not be weakened by Churchill's withdrawal from the premiership. General Marshall did not discuss the concluding opinion but began a catechising on the several items of the WPD memorandum, paragraph by paragraph. General Embick agreed with the substance of the first, that a war status should increase production and reduce ship-sinkings, which was vital, and with the second, which emphasized the Army's unreadiness for major action. Entering the war voluntarily under such conditions he said would be wrong from military and naval viewpoints, and would be a wrong to the American people, who by a war status would be committed to unpredictable happenings. As to paragraph 3, he recognized that war would lead to a loss of Pacific positions. His earlier remark on Army unreadiness for any save minor action may have covered his views upon the WPD optimism of paragraph 4; in any case he gave no recorded indication of agreement or disagreement. Colonel McNarney's oral remarks, as presented in the conference notes, resolutely supported the WPD document, arguing:

> . . . that anything that would tend to cause the fall of the British Isles would tend to put the whole load on the United States; that it is imporant that we start reducing the war-making ability of Germany. We do have a Navy in being and can do something. If we wait, we will end up standing alone, and internal disturbances may bring on communism. I may be called a fire-eater, but something must be done.[62]

General Gerow and Colonel Bundy agreed with their WPD colleague and Colonel Anderson made only small reservation. Their advice given, the conference closed without General Marshall indicating his own view. Somewhat strangely, at his ensuing conference with the President there was no reference to convoys.[63] The decision of the President, however it may have been influenced by General Embick, was for a west Atlantic patrol, but for a statement of purpose so cautious as to postpone a war declaration. Stimulated by the U.S.S. *Niblack* episode, the decision was implemented on 18 April with the issuance by Admiral King of Operation Plan No. 3, which stated:

> The Western Hemisphere extends from approximately 26° W, westward to the International Date Line and, in the Atlantic, includes all of Greenland, all of the islands of the Azores, the whole of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Bahama Islands, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

[62] From previously mentioned discussion of 11:25 A. M. conference in office of CofS, 16 Apr 44, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

[63] Memo, CofS for SW, 16 Apr 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval ships or aircraft of belligerents other than those powers having sovereignty over territory in the Western Hemisphere is to be viewed as possibly actuated by an unfriendly interest toward shipping or territory in the Western Hemisphere.[64]

Three days later he issued Operation Plan No. 4, which repeated these stipulations and organized the fleet for patrol purposes. That the decision of April 1940 called for a "neutrality patrol" rather than for outright convoys evidenced the caution which the United States had to exercise at this time. Because of Axis submarine successes American naval authority regarded the Atlantic situation as "obviously critical." Also Japan and Russia had agreed on their treaty, seemingly strengthening Japan's position in the Pacific, and Japan promptly gave warning of intervention if America should actively engage in the war on the Axis.[65]

In such particularized matters as fleet movements the advice of the new British Mission in Washington was sought. An instance is afforded by an *aide-mémoire* from the British Admiral V. H. Danckwerts in reply to "an American inquiry." His opinion, in which Australia and New Zealand were represented as concurring (and to which the American 14 April radiogram to London, supporting the ABC report, had given encouragement) was to the following effect:

. . . a marked advance by the U.S. Navy in or into the Atlantic could be on the whole more likely to deter Japan from going to war than the maintenance of the present very large fleet at Hawaii, and further it might exercise a profound influence on the present critical situation in Spain, Turkey and Vichy France. . . . The problem for the United States authorities is so nicely to judge the degree of the transfer that, while still retaining the deterrent effect of a strong U.S. fleet in the Pacific there will also be the deterrent effect of an increased U.S. fleet in the Atlantic. . . . In our view the necessary effect will not remain unless the fleet in the Pacific consisted of not less than 6 capital ships and 2 aircraft carriers. Inclusion of the latter is considered of the greatest importance.[66]

Proposals for Co-operation in the Pacific

For months there had been differences between the nations upon Pacific strategy, chiefly springing from a British view that the naval base at Singapore

[64] See Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, p. 61. Operation Plan No. 3 was mentioned earlier in this chapter in its relationship to the action of U. S. S. *Niblack*.

[65] See Kittredge, U. S. Defense Policies, Ch. XIII, Pt. C, pp. 29–33.

[66] *Aide-mémoire*, Rear Adm Danckwerts, 8 May 41, unaddressed, but bearing Gen Marshall's initials, WPD 4402–15. The inquiry to which it replied came from Admiral Turner, dated 25 April 41, President Roosevelt having previously asked the Navy Department for the information.

must by all means be maintained as an Allied stronghold dominating southeast Asia. In numerous British quarters it was felt that the means of maintenance should be to a considerable extent American, particularly American naval units, and on occasion this view found support in the United States as well until the firm recognition of America's priority of concern over the war in the Atlantic. The purely naval aspects of planning for the defense of the Netherlands East Indies, necessarily with British sea and air power providing support, were under scrutiny by the U. S. Navy. Japan's interest in the oil and other rich resources of the islands was unconcealed, and the Netherlands' own powers of defense were manifestly weak, with the homeland occupied by Germany and with the royal government in temporary exile. In January 1941 on instruction from Washington [67] Admiral Thomas Hart, commanding the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, sent his chief of staff, Capt. W. R. Purnell, to Java to discuss defense plans with Vice Adm. C. E. L. Helfrich, commanding the Dutch sea forces in the Pacific. (The assistant chief of staff, Commander F. P. Thomas, had gone to Singapore in October 1940 for preliminary talks and Captain Purnell visited Singapore in December 1940.) The resultant report, forwarded to Washington, was of course shared with the Army, which Captain Purnell understood would itself provide information about such Army Air Force elements as might be available for operations, corresponding to his own oral estimates of available Navy elements.[68] Captain Purnell's report of the "exploratory conversations looking toward possible future combined operations," as Admiral Helfrich put it, showed the fullness both of Dutch expectations of attack and of Dutch desire for support. A Dutch committeeman referred "caustically" to previous conversations with British authorities at Singapore in which, he remarked, British interest in defense of the islands dwindled as the scene moved eastward from Singapore. The Netherlands authorities laid before the American consultant copious data on such matters as their own sea and air strength, facilities, ports, bases, and storage. They received from Captain Purnell an assurance that the Philippines' neutrality was guaranteed "to the extent of attacking with all forces available" but a prediction that America would maintain only a benevolent neutrality with regard to British and Dutch possessions. The naval officer reminded his hearers that these views were personal only. Admiral Helfrich approved a num-

[67] See personal Ltr, Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart, 22 Oct 40 (in *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings,* Pt. 16, p. 2448), and same to same, 12 Nov 40 (p. 2449).

[68] Summarized Rpt of Conversations Held by Chief of Staff, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with Netherlands East Indies Naval Authorities at Batavia, 10–14 Jan 41, WPD 4402–3.

ber of tentative suggestions such as those for continuing exchange of information and for joint use of facilities in the event of war.[69]

American Objections to Helping Reinforce Singapore

On 12 February, as mentioned earlier, the British desire for America's active participation in the defense of Singapore was brought up in the American-British Conversations in Washington. The British delegation, admitting that in case of Japanese attacks upon that area Singapore would need larger forces than the Admiralty was then planning to provide, proposed that the United States Navy detach four cruisers from its Pacific Fleet and station them at Singapore. This suggestion the American delegation opposed, partly because the Stark-Marshall statement at the opening of the conversations had discouraged any such project, partly because they felt unanimously—and so wrote the Chief of Staff—that a four-cruiser addition to the local defenses would not suffice to save Singapore. Hence the United States would later be compelled either (1) to abandon these vessels to their fate and thereafter face Japan in the Pacific with a weakened fleet, or (2) to reinforce the four vessels to the extent of applying the Navy's principal strength in the Far East rather than elsewhere, with resultant risk, among other things, to the security of the British Isles.[70]

Instead of acceding to the British view the American delegation recommended holding to the American strategic plan and limiting aid, both for Singapore and for the Netherlands East Indies, to what the U. S. Fleet might accomplish while operating from its base at Pearl Harbor and while still free to detach vessels as needed to the Atlantic. "The ultimate fate of Singapore will depend upon the outcome of the struggle in the European theater" they concluded.[71] The Chief of Staff presumably supported the Army representatives in these expressions which echoed his own of previous months, for nothing of the dispute appears in the record of ensuing days. The British pressure for American aid in protecting Singapore was simply transferred to the subsequent ADB (American-Dutch-British) meeting in Singapore.[72]

The need for joint consideration of Singapore's situation, as for the whole Far East problem, was unquestioned. Admiral Stark's Plan Dog Memorandum

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Memo, U. S. Army Section for the CofS, 12 Feb 41, sub: Dispatch of U. S. Forces to Singapore, WPD 4402–1.

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] Later known as ABD.

of 12 November 1940 had specifically recommended not only Staff Conversations with British and Canadians on the Atlantic but talks with the Dutch in Batavia (which Admiral Hart's chief of staff conducted two months thereafter) and with the British in Singapore. On 2 April 1941 therefore, shortly after ABC closed and before General Marshall and Admiral Stark had signified their acceptance of even the limited responsibility specified in those conversations, General Marshall sent to the commanding general of the Philippines Department, then Maj. Gen. George Grunert, a full copy of ABC-1 plus five of its annexes. He informed General Grunert that he had not yet formally approved the report and that its provisions would not become directives until such approval was given. His purpose in sending a copy thus early was to permit advance planning by American Army authority in the Philippines in concert with the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet and the Commander Sixteenth Naval District (at Manila). This planning General Grunert was directed to "initiate without delay" but "not discuss with the British or Dutch" until he should receive specific authority from the War Department.[73] The bases of General Grunert's planning were listed thus: The Philippine Coastal Frontier would be composed of "such areas as are necessary for defense of the entrance to Manila Bay," and for the means of establishing this defense the recipient was referred to the accepted Joint Plan of 1935.[74] Jointly, the American forces were to hold the entrance to Manila Bay; the Army was to "delay the enemy at Subic Bay and elsewhere as may be practicable, without jeopardizing the timely withdrawal of mobile ground forces to Bataan Peninsula."

Two days later a cablegram informed General Grunert that a 2 April communication was on its way by courier, to arrive 14 April, but that the situation prevailing when the message was dispatched was now altered. In the interim it had been determined that the British Commander-in-Chief Far East (in Singapore) would conduct a conference to which were invited representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands East Indies, the British Commander-in-Chief China, the British Commander-in-Chief East Indies, and the United States. The 4 April dispatch accordingly revoked the 2 April instructions against conferring with British and Dutch and, while the new Staff Conversations were not yet officially approved, the Philippines commander was "authorized to

[73] Ltr, CofS to CG Philippines Dept, 2 Apr 41, sub: U. S.-British Staff Conversations. This letter is Tab B to Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 15 Apr 41, sub: Staff Conversations in the Far East, WPD 4402-8.

[74] For an extended examination of this and other plans for the Philippine Islands see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, a volume now in preparation for this series.

designate a well-informed officer of sound judgment" to represent him at the Singapore meeting.[75]

Somewhat in advance of the Singapore meeting the British Mission in Washington provided the Army with its proposal for the agenda. Once more WPD, to which General Marshall referred the proposal, exhibited uneasiness about a British tendency to press the United States toward undesired commitments. A 15 April memorandum from Colonel Anderson to the Chief of Staff recomended limiting the agenda to the subjects listed in the ABC–1 agreement and to plans specifically for the Far East area, Australia, and New Zealand.[76] The recommendations were approved by the Chief of Staff and by Secretary of War Stimson as well, and on the following day were transmitted to General Grunert for his guidance.[77] Col. Allan C. McBride, slated at the time to become General Grunert's departmental chief of staff, proceeded to Singapore as his representative at the Singapore conference of 21–27 April.

At the close of the conference Colonel McBride returned to Manila with a report of the American-Dutch-British conference recommendations that troubled General Grunert and brought from him, in a letter to WPD, an extended recital of the points of disagreement. In general he concurred, but he took exception to numerous particulars and to basic British conclusions with which "our present mission and restrictions as to means are not in accord."[78] He stated that Colonel McBride had discouraged British expectations (1) that the American forces in the Philippines would be strengthened; (2) that there was likelihood of American planning of a determined defense of the archipelago, beyond Manila; (3) that Luzon would serve as a base for offensive operations by increased U. S. forces. General Grunert felt that the British were already regarding the U. S. Asiatic Fleet units as being at Singapore's disposal and that, on the whole, British thinking was directed almost wholly to the defense of British Singapore rather than to the American interest in the Philippines. His long, considered criticism of the Singapore conversations was dispatched to Washington by naval courier on the clipper-plane that departed from Manila on 8 May, two days after a more expeditious British service, via cable to London

[75] Rad, CofS to CG Philippines Dept, 4 Apr 41. This is Tab C to Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 15 Apr 41, sub: Staff Conversations in the Far East, WPD 4402–8.

[76] See n. 75.

[77] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 16 Apr 41, sub: Staff Conversations, WPD 4402–8.

[78] Ltr, CG Philippines Dept to ACofS WPD, 2 May 41, sub: American-Dutch-British Conversations of April 21–27 1941, held in Singapore. This is incl B to Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 8 Jul 41, sub: Report of American-Dutch-British Conversations, Short Title—"A. D. B," WPD 4402–18.

and the British Military Mission in Washington, had provided the Navy and Army with three copies of the British summary of the conversations.[79] By a grotesque delay General Grunert's message had not reached Washington on 3 June and on that day General Gerow recommended a cable of inquiry to Manila. General Grunert's prompt reply was followed on 7 June by the War Department's admission of an obviously painful discovery: upon arrival at San Francisco air base General Grunert's message, hurried thus far by the Navy's flying courier, then had been put aboard a Navy vessel bound for Norfolk, Va., for leisurely transmission to Washington. A message to Panama intercepted the vessel and the long-awaited report, placed upon another plane, eventually reached Washington on 9 June.[80]

Staff consideration in Washington, therefore, was of the British summary without immediate benefit of General Grunert's unfortunately delayed massage. The long British text was summarized in an unsigned and undated condensation prepared within WPD for the Chief of Staff, as follows:

Our object is to defeat Germany and her allies and hence in the Far East to maintain the position of the Associated powers against Japanese attack, in order to sustain a long term economic pressure against Japan until we are in a position to take the offensive.

Our most important interests in the Far East are security of sea communications and security of Singapore, the latter largely dependent on denial to the enemy of bases in the Netherlands East Indies. An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippines, since so long as submarines and air forces can be operated from Luzon, Japanese expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East, other than those proceeding via the protected line of the Pelews, can be outflanked.

Japan can attack the Philippines or Hongkong; Malaya, direct or via Thailand and bases in Indo-China; Burma via Thailand and those bases; Borneo or the northern line of the Netherlands East Indies; sea communications in all areas.

Until the Philippines are reduced, Japan would be taking a great chance elsewhere.

The main strategy in the Far East must be defensive, but certain measures are possible: organize air operations against Japanese territory; in addition to Luzon's defensive value, it is useful for an eventual offensive; support the Chinese by financial and material aid; support guerrillas in China; organize subversive activities in Japan; conduct an economic blockade.[81]

[79] Incl with Ltr, Secy British Military Mission, without attached address, 6 May 41, WPD 4402–18.

[80] (1) Memo, Gen Gerow, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 3 Jun 41, sub: U. S.-Dutch-British Staff Conversations. (2) Grunert dispatch 1058 to TAG, 5 Jun 41. (3) Msg 993 WD AGO to CG Phil Dept, 7 Jun 41. (4) Msg 995 WD AGO to CG Phil Dept, 9 Jun 41. All filed in AG 380.3 (4–4–41).

[81] This summary originally accompanied a 10 May Memo from Brig Gen Harry J. Malony, Actg ACofS WPD, to CofS, WPD 4402–18. It is a condensation of various points in the British telegraphed summary previously noted.

While the two summaries were under study by Staff officers, who saw in this final paragraph the extent to which ABD had soared beyond American desires, further pressure for American aid to Singapore was being applied. A paper prepared by Stanley K. Hornbeck of the State Department and forwarded to the War Department suggested that the United States further Singapore's security by keeping three-quarters of the fleet based in Hawaii, sending more planes and submarines to the Philippines, and equipment to China, the Netherlands East Indies, and Singapore. To these suggestions General Marshall announced his opposition. He found nothing new in the facts cited, and no satisfaction in the conclusions. His own view was that "Collapse in the Atlantic would be fatal; collapse in the Far East would be serious but not fatal." [82]

Stark and Marshall Reject the Singapore Proposals

On 7 June Army and Navy chiefs—undoubtedly with Presidential approval—sent to the British Military Mission a strongly worded rejection of the views expressed at Singapore. The message mentioned that no final approval would be given until after examination of the official text of the report, but proceeded in unmistakable terms:

> The United States intends to adhere to the decision not to reinforce the Philippines except in minor particulars. . . .
>
> The principal value of the position and present strength of the forces in the Philippines lies in the fact that to defeat them will require a considerable effort by Japan and may well entail a delay in the development of an attack against Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. A Japanese attack in the Philippines might thus offer opportunities to the Associated Powers to inflict important losses on Japanese naval forces and to improve their own dispositions for the defense of the Malay Barrier.[83]

How violently the intention stated in the first paragraph quoted was to be upset in a matter of weeks is related at length in Chapter XIII of this volume, but there was no hint of it in early June. The 7 June 1941 note offered no comment on British proposals for United States air aid in the Far East and prepara-

[82] Memo, CofS (prepared in WPD by Col Bundy) for SW, 20 May 41, sub: Paper Presented by S. K. Hornbeck, Department of State, WPD 4402–18.

[83] Ltr, Secy for Collaboration (Comdr L. R. McDowell) to Secy British Military Mission (Capt A. W. Clarke), 7 Jun 41, sub: Report of the Singapore United States-British-Dutch Conference April 1941. WPD 4402–18.

tions for support to China. It rejected altogether British suggestions for dealing with naval command arrangements, on the ground that they were beyond the proper scope of the discussion.[84] More than a month later the British views were rejected in the still more conclusive terms of a letter drafted on 3 July in which the American Chiefs of Staff regretted that "they are unable to approve the ADB report because in several major, and numerous minor particulars, it is at variance" with the restrictions stated in ABC–1. Specifically, in the language of a brief of that document:

a. It contains political matters beyond scope of a military agreement . . . [such as] necessity for concerted action by Associated Powers and undertaking of subversive activities and sabotage in Japan.

b. It commits U. S. Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in "Eastern Theater" which is more extensive than the Far Eastern Area prescribed in ABC–1. U. S. cannot agree.

c. Inadequate provisions are made for the security of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Barrier. Naval defense of this position entrusted solely to U. S. and Dutch forces while British naval forces operate on escort and patrol duty at great distances from this vital area. Until a plan providing that British naval forces take predominant part in defending British position in Far East Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff must withdraw agreement to permit U. S. Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in that area.

d. It commits U. S. Naval aviation to operate under command other than Naval, in violation of ABC–1.

e. It does not provide a practical operating plan for the cooperative effort of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area.

f. It sets up an Eastern Theater and provides for a new commander termed "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," neither of which appears to be advantageous.[85]

The letter gave polite assurance that the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations would "be glad to consider suggestions as to an agenda for any further conferences in Singapore" but added a suggestion that such a conference

[84] These British Chiefs of Staff suggestions appear as inclosures A and B attached to a note of the Secretary to the British Military Mission in Washington, 20 May 41, sub: Report of the Singapore American-Dutch-British Conference April 1941, WPD 4402–18.

[85] This brief, filed in AG 380.3 (4–4–41), is attached to copy of a Ltr, CofS and CNO to Special Army and Navy Observers, London, 3 Jul 41, sub: Comment on the Report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, WPD 4402–18. While this letter was drawn up 3 July, it was not actually dispatched until 26 July. See notations on copies of Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 21 Jul 41, sub: Report of American-Dutch-British Conversations, original in AG 380.3 (4–4–41) and copy in WPD 4402–18. The letter was six pages long. On 8 July General Gerow, WPD, forwarded to the Chief of Staff a letter from General Grunert, with which he agreed in opposing the Singapore report. See Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 8 Jul 41, sub: Report of American-Dutch-British Conversations, WPD 4402–18.

"should be guided by agenda agreed upon in advance among the United States, United Kingdom, and the Dutch." [86]

The controversy that had reached this stage was halted for a time by considerations more pressing for both groups of disputants, since both were shortly to be summoned to the historic Atlantic Conference at sea between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. There the discussions were resumed more genially, and on 1 September the Special Army Observer in London sent word that the British Chiefs of Staff Committee were engaged upon redraft of the ADB requirements, in line with agreements made at the Atlantic Conference.[87] Even the redraft was found in Washington to be unsatisfactory,[88] however, and two months later, by which time Japanese behavior was much more indicative of war and the United States was hastily strengthening its Philippines defenses, the British made radical revisions in their arrangements for the Pacific. Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, informed Admiral Stark that after reviewing the naval situation the Admiralty was able to start forming a new capital ship force for the Orient. Admiral Sir Tom Phillips was already en route aboard H. M. S. *Prince of Wales,* and two other battleships would proceed in November and another in December. Sir Dudley continued:

> I do not consider that either ADB–1 or ADB–2 meets the new conditions [caused by the recent change of government in Japan] and I would suggest that the need for a conference to draw up strategic operating plans for the Far East area based afresh on ABC–1 has now become urgent. . . . If you agree in principle to abandoning further discussions on ADB–1 and ADB–2 and to holding of a fresh conference on the basis of ABC–1 we can then proceed to discuss the agenda. Perhaps you would care to make proposals for this.[89]

The British desire to come to agreement was not to be gratified immediately, although Admiral Stark promptly agreed that there was need for early action by both the United Kingdom and the United States, in pursuance of which the Army was already "reinforcing both its land and air forces as rapidly as practicable, and training the Philippine Army intensively." [90] It was nearly a week later that a more studied and more insistent communication was sent

[86] Ltr of 3 Jul 41, cited in n. 85.

[87] Ltr, Special Army Observer, London, to CofS, 1 Sep 41, sub: Draft Agreement ADB (Revised), WPD 4402–18.

[88] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 17 Nov 41, sub: Draft Agreement ADB (Revised), WPD 4402–18.

[89] Cable from Admiralty, London, to B. A. D. (British Admiralty Delegation), Washington, 5 Nov 41, WPD 4402–18 and AG 380.3 (4–4–41).

[90] Cable, CNO to SPENAVO, London, 6 Nov 41, WPD 4402–18.

in Admiral Stark's behalf by the American Secretary for Collaboration to the British Joint Staff Mission, for transmission to London. It acknowledged the 5 November and other messages, expressed concurrence in the British decision to send more vessels to Singapore, and suggested that still others be sent. It mentioned air reinforcements that the United States had lately sent to the Pacific and suggested that the British air strength in Malaya also be increased. It expressed a belief that the tasks which the British proposed to assign to land and air forces in the Far East, Australia, and New Zealand should be enlarged to include protection of Rabaul and other bases that would be needed by the United States Fleet for operations against the Japanese mandates, for protection of Torres Strait, and other purposes. It postponed decision on the proposals to assign greater strength to the Asiatic Fleet and to base the British Fleet in the Philippines, on the ground that repair facilities were insufficient and badly exposed to attack. It suggested new conferences at which Admiral Phillips might discuss the situation with Admiral Hart and Lt. Gen. (later General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur, who now was commanding the U. S. Army in the Philippines, but it urged that the conferences be held in Manila rather than in Singapore.[91] Admiral Phillips visited Manila on 4–6 December 1941 but no definite operating plans were agreed upon. The next high-level discussions of arrangements for defense of the Malay barrier, too late and of necessity with too little, would be occasioned by the arrival of the war itself. It so happened that the operating plan on which the Allies then had to rely for better or for worse was the so-called PLENAPS which in default of an accepted plan the British command had drawn up for emergency use. This was based upon the rejected ADB–1.[92]

The Atlantic Conference, August 1941

The event which in midsummer had interrupted for a time the flow of American criticisms of the ABD Conversations at Singapore was the summon-

[91] Ltr, U. S. Secy for Collaboration to the Joint Secretaries to British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, 11 Nov 41, sub: United States-British Commonwealth Cooperation in the Far East Area, WPD 4402–18 and AG 380.3 (4–4–41).

[92] Acually the Admiralty set in train the necessary arrangements for producing detailed joint operating plans, but the action came too late. See Ltr, Joint Secretaries to British Joint Staff Mission in Washington to U. S. Secy for Collaboration, 26 Nov 41, sub: U. S.-British Commonwealth Co-operation in the Far East Area, AG 380.3 (4–4–41). For the development of PLENAPS see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, Ch. I.

ing of another Anglo-American conference, this time principally political although the military chiefs were present. This was the Atlantic Conference of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, held, with high appreciation for dramatic effect, aboard a man-of-war lying offshore in Argentia harbor. The circumstance of the meeting, with whatever it might connote on freedom of the seas and the antitotalitarian purposes that were boldly announced by the two Chiefs of Government, carried their own implications at home and abroad.[93] For the political aspects of that historic meeting, which were the main aspects, the reader must seek detailed information in other narratives. The military discussions carried no commitments and, despite the presence of Chiefs of Staff of both nations, led to little in the way of immediate results, because of the wide gap between British views as expressed in a prepared document and the American responses to these views.

The initial meeting of all members of the conference, civilian and military, took place on 9 August aboard the cruiser *Augusta* of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, where President Roosevelt was quartered. For the daily conferences the Prime Minister moved over from the near-by British battleship *Prince of Wales,* which had brought the British party to the high seas rendezvous. The notes of the first meeting, set down from memory one week later, attempt only to summarize Mr. Churchill's speech to the conference, which was largely a review of the world situation. The recorder, Colonel Bundy, felt that the Premier's chief aims were (1) to win support for his program for developing a strong Allied force in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt, for which he clearly looked to America for assistance; (2) to bring about a joint warning to Japan; (3) to move some 52 vessels out of the western Atlantic in order to use them for antisubmarine operations nearer Britain; (4) to revive the idea of a league to enforce peace (which may in fact be thought of as the inception of the United Nations). Mr. Churchill offered some thoughts about methods of warfare, expressing the view that smaller numbers of men than in 1918 would be used in the eventual western theater (Russian successes with massed troops notwithstanding) and that more would be done with machines. "By inference [he] advocated early American action to join Britain and Russia."[94]

[93] Eight bases for world peace following "destruction of the Nazi tyranny" were stated by Roosevelt and Churchill. See *The New York Times,* 15 Aug 41, p. 1.

[94] Memo, Lt Col C. W. Bundy for CofS, 16 Aug 41, sub: Notes on Speech by the Prime Minister on USS *Augusta,* 9 Aug 41, WPD 4402–62.

In preparation for the military conference the British Chiefs of Staff—at that time Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir John G. Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff—had prepared under date of 31 July 1941 their review of the war situation. It opened with a declaration that "The vital consideration is to ensure the security of the United Kingdom and of our sea communications, while we build up and deploy the forces necessary for the offensive described in Part 2." [95] It contained these conclusions on strategy:

A German shift to Spain would make Gibraltar unusable as a base, and force occupation of the Canaries.

Need for establishing forces in French Morocco and French West Africa might have to be faced but, while there remained a threat of invading Britain, the United Kingdom would have no forces available for the African tasks.

Loss of the Middle East would be disastrous, through loss of communications and also of Iranian oil. For retention of the Middle East much would depend upon American assistance.

Security of the Singapore base was essential for Far East operations.[96]

"The intervention of the United States would revolutionize the whole situation," the strategy review continued.

At sea the situation would immediately be relieved, and this should be reflected in reduced shipping losses. Even if Japan intervened, the balance of advantage would still be with us. American forces might be able to prevent enemy penetration in Morocco and West Africa, and could take over potential commitments in the Atlantic Islands.

It is clear, however, that if intervention is to come, the longer it is delayed the greater will be the leeway to be made up in every direction.

In contrast with the pessimism with which the existing situation was portrayed, the review was extremely hopeful for the future, noting that "We must first destroy the foundation upon which the [German] war machine rests—the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it . . . and the hopes of victory which inspire it." The methods to be employed were blockade, bombing, subversive activity, and propaganda. "The bombing offensive must be on the heaviest possible scale" and, after security needs were met, "we give to the heavy bomber first priority in production." Bombing of Germany's transportation system would have its own effect upon

[95] General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff, 31 Jul 41. This was an inclosure to a letter from Col C. C. Hollis, Secy Chiefs of Staff Committee, to CofS, 10 Aug 41, WPD 4402–62, revised copy in JB 325, ser 729, in ABC 381 (9–25–42) Section I.

[96] Summary of selected parts of Strategy Review cited in n. 95.

civilian morale, and to this last mentioned objective were other references that the critical American readers thought to be unsatisfactorily vague. The emphasis of the review was upon the scheduled combination of blockade, bombing, and subversive activities, the British Chiefs' conviction being that:

> . . . if these methods are applied on a vast scale, the whole structure upon which the German forces are based . . . will be destroyed, and that, whatever their present strength, the armed forces of Germany would suffer such a radical decline in fighting value and mobility that a direct attack would once more become possible.
>
> When that time will come . . . will depend largely on how well we are able, with American assistance, to keep to our program of Air Force expansion and to obtain and protect the necessary shipping.
>
> It may be that the methods described above will by themselves be enough to make Germany sue for peace. . . . We must, however, be prepared to accelerate victory by landing forces on the Continent to . . . strike into Germany itself.

They proceeded, on the theme that Mr. Churchill had touched: "We do not foresee vast armies of infantry as in 1914–18. The forces we employ will be armored divisions with the most modern equipment. . . . When our armored forces had dominated an area, it would be handed over to the patriot force to garrison. . . ." They concluded with the view that "United States intervention would not only make victory certain, but might also make it swift." [97]

On 10 August this document was sent in triplicate to General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and General Arnold, who were then aboard U.S.S. *Augusta* with Mr. Roosevelt and his group of civilian and other military advisers.[98] It was dispatched by Col. C. C. Hollis of the British secretariat who was then aboard H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* with Mr. Churchill and his military and civil advisers. Colonel Hollis's accompanying letter, proposing in the British Chiefs' behalf that the review be discussed aboard the *Prince of Wales* next day, suggested also that major points of criticism by the American Chiefs be communicated to him that same day so that the British Chiefs would be in a position to discuss them on 11 August.[99] It would appear that the only immediate response was to agree upon the time for the next day's meeting, for the notes available on the Staff conferences indicate that the strategy review was first discussed on 11 August.[100]

[97] Quotation from same Strategy Review.

[98] The group included Harry Hopkins, W. Averell Harriman, Admiral King, and General Burns. See *The New York Times*, 17 Aug, p. 3.

[99] Ltr, Col C. C. Hollis, Secy Chiefs of Staff Committee, to CofS, 10 Aug 41, WPD 4402—62. Duplicates were sent to Admiral Stark and General Arnold.

[100] The notes referred to are in a Memo of Lt Col C. W. Bundy for CofS, 20 Aug 41, sub: Notes on Staff Conferences, August 11–12, 1941, on Board *Prince of Wales*, WPD 4402–62.

The meeting aboard the British battleship was attended only by military personnel. The British were Admiral Pound, General Dill, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid R. Freeman, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (his superior, Chief Marshal Portal, having remained in England), Col. C. C. Hollis, and Lt. Col. E. J. C. Jacobs from the office of the Minister of Defense, five officers representing the Admiralty, two the War Office, and one the Air Ministry. The Americans were Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Admiral Turner and Commander (later Admiral) Forrest Sherman of the Navy's War Plans Division and Lt. Col. C. W. Bundy of the War Department WPD. Admiral Stark, the principal American spokesman, said that he and his colleagues would ask time for analyzing the British Chiefs' review (which the First Lord read aloud) and for reconciling the eventual reply of the United States Chiefs with Army and Navy requirements. He expressed his colleagues' willingness to go the limit (in the words of Colonel Bundy's notes) in co-operation under existing United States policies, but made clear at the outset that these policies would constitute definite limits. He asked that the present conference be restricted to discussions only.[101] Colonel Bundy's notes present little evidence of a hearty co-operation, but rather, a critical attitude on the part of the Americans with regard to the British Chiefs' review (the criticism was even sharper in the eventual formal response) in painful contrast with the harmonious chorus from the Chiefs of State on the *Augusta.* Admiral Stark discussed several points of difference with the review, objecting to its paragraphs on bomber priority, shipping needs, distribution of sea-patrol planes, and proposed occupation of the Azores. General Marshall interrupted with a reminder that the peaceful occupation of necessary facilities in the Azores was already in sight, indicated by a Portugese letter to which Mr. Roosevelt had referred the previous day. General Marshall revealed his concern over the prospective need to replace the Marine garrison on Iceland with 10,000 Army troops. There was a request that the British supply more information on Dakar, which the British Chiefs apparently were expecting the United States to occupy eventually. General Marshall introduced a further discussion of the situation in the Middle East, to which area the United States was sending equipment, whose unsatisfactory maintenance by the British was already a cause for anxiety.[102] General

[101] *Ibid.*

[102] On 9 August General Gerow had sent a radiogram to General Chaney in London informing him that the War Department was considering establishing groups in the British Isles and the Near East to administer Lend-Lease aid and to observe the use of American equipment. Chaney agreed it would be useful and Maj. Gen. George H. Brett of the Air Corps was sent to discuss the matters with General Chaney

Marshall also reminded the British Chiefs of the mounting pressure upon the United States for munitions now that Lend-Lease supplies for Russia constituted a large additional drain, and intimated that arms shipments would be determined by priorities in Washington rather than solely by Middle East developments. He explained the difficulties encountered thus far in strengthening the Philippines as a protection for Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies.[103]

The 11 August session covered only 15 of the strategy review's 39 paragraphs, the rest being left for attention in a formal study. The 12 August session was given over entirely to a review of the materiel situation in the United States, in the course of which there was plain speaking about the lack of co-ordination among the British purchasing authorities in Washington, and about failures to appreciate the exactions of the priority system. It brought from the British Chiefs an admission of ignorance of the confusion and an indication that they would reorganize their Washington services so as to make them conform to strategic needs. Admiral Stark read a draft of his plan for making the U. S. Joint Board, under the President, the agency to determine the distribution of defense equipment in accordance with the principles of ABC-1.[104] (The plan was to prove unsuccessful, the determination being given instead to the civilian War Production Board).

In brief, the Atlantic Conference, eventful enough as a political meeting, owed little of its result to the military Staff's participation, other than an agreement between the Navy Chiefs upon the basis of co-operation in convoy escort, effective in September 1941. The large influence was that of the civilian Chiefs of State in arriving at the terms of the proposed "bases for world peace" jointly signed by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, which were made public in London and Washington at the close of the conference, while the *Augusta*

and thereafter to proceed to Egypt. See (1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 9 Aug 41, sub: Proposed Administrative Mission in Great Britain and the Middle East, WPD 4402-51; (2) Paraphrase of çable from Special Army Observer, London, 26 Aug 41, WPD 4402-51; (3) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 2 Sep 41, sub as in (1), WPD 4402-51; (4) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 4 Sep 41, sub as in (1), WPD 4402-51; (5) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for Maj Gen Chas. M. Wesson, 2 Sep 41, as in (1), WPD 4402-54. At about this same time General Burns, Lend-Lease Executive Officer, was urging that Lend-Lease representatives be sent to England and the Middle East to supervise and assist in the handling of defense aid supplies. See (1) Memo, Gen Burns for SW, 8 Sep 41; (2) Memo, Gen Burns for SW, 13 Sep 41. Both in WPD 4402-72. Thereafter there came from representatives of the State Department, the Army, and the Air Forces a series of reports on wasteful British methods in Egypt. These (notably from Kirk, Fellers, and Gerow) were assembled as Tabs A to I accompanying Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 10 Oct 41, sub: Unity of Command, British Forces in Middle East, WPD 4402-84.

[103] Col Bundy's notes on Staff Conferences of Aug 11-12, as cited in n. 100.

[104] *Ibid.* The 12 August notes, however, were based on Commander Sherman's recollection.

and the *Prince of Wales* with their distinguished passengers were still at sea.[105] The political effect of this enunciation, with its reference to aims "following destruction of the Nazi tyranny" leaving small doubt of the rapid American drift toward war, was so great as to conceal from the public the disagreements of the military that the *Prince of Wales* discussions, like the recent ABD discussions in Singapore, had disclosed.

U. S. Staff Criticisms of the British Suggestions

Upon the return of the Chiefs of Staff to Washington General Marshall laid the British review before his own WPD for examination and report. There resulted a series of memoranda from several members of the division addressed to General Gerow or to Col. Thomas T. Handy of WPD (later General and Deputy Chief of Staff). They were unanimous in their opposition to the British expressions, for varying reasons.[106] They all opposed the concluding British suggestions that "United States intervention would not only make the victory certain but might also make it swift." One (Kibler) found "no cause for optimism as to a British victory" and criticised a British tendency to assign to the United States the protection of the British Empire: "We ought to retain our freedom of action until we have forces to undertake worth-while operations in the war." Another (Allen) denied that the United States' strength was sufficiently developed to make an impression on military operations and asserted that, rather, Germany should be engaged with economic force and that "the position as a nonbelligerent seems most suited to our existing situation." A third (Wedemeyer), noting a defeatist attitude in the British paper and holding that more of the British Commonwealth's resources should be employed, suggested also that there should be assurance of an American determination to assist in every possible way short of war: he pressed for recognition that "we must not become an active belligerent until we have created the means by which we can accomplish our national objectives." The realistic attitude of this officer with regard to the Army's potentialities was founded on intensive studies of

[105] *The New York Times*, 15 Aug 41, p. 1.

[106] The memoranda, undated, informally prepared, and in some instances unsigned, appear, along with General Gerow's recommendations, as inclosures to accompany a note for record by Col. Clayton Bissell, 31 Oct 41, sub: General Strategy Review by British Chiefs of Staff, WPD 4402–64. Included in the binder is a copy of the approved Joint Planning Committee report directing final action on the Strategy Review, 25 Sep 41. The report was forwarded to the Special Naval and Army Observers with appropriate instructions for presenting its substance to the British Chiefs of Staff. See JB 325, ser 729.

previous weeks which led to the monumental Victory Plan of which he was the principal author.

The WPD staff, using these memoranda, developed a draft study to be presented over General Gerow's signature to the Chief of Staff. According to this study, General Gerow felt that, contrary to the British idea that American entry into the war would help, the United States would be of more assistance as a neutral able to supply munitions in large quantities, the nation's potential combat strength not being sufficiently developed to permit more than a moral effect in land or air operations, and the Navy being still incapable of offensive operations against Germany. He summarized the strategic conceptions which had been approved in ABC-1, and held them to be still valid.[107]

These recommendations were not formally presented to the Chief of Staff but were combined with recommendations of the Navy's WPD to form a Joint Planning Committee report which the Joint Board accepted as its own. The strategic concept of ABC-1 was accepted as still sound. Military operations were held to be in need of specific direction, not aimed at "destruction of morale," and a bombing offensive against civilian morale was opposed. (It is necessary to recognize the American distinction—that the industrial and economic structure of Germany, as well as the purely military, should be bombed intensively, but that the effect on morale was secondary.) [108] The vagueness of the British Chiefs' proposal for a land offensive, save after naval and air offensives should have beaten down German resistance, was unacceptable. The Joint Board felt the need of strong bases in Port Sudan, Massawa, Baghdad, and Basra, in case the Middle East's other positions should be lost. Singapore was important, but it could not be held unless the Netherlands East Indies were held, and the Joint Board felt that aid to Singapore should be accompanied by aid to the Dutch, and also to the Chinese, in order to help Singapore. It was premature to count the Soviet Union out of the war, for chances favored a Russian resistance that would continue for several months at least, and effective arming of Russia would help to provide it. The Joint Board discerned in the British Chief's review only minor attention to preparations for land operations, and remonstrated: "Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost and, by weakening enemy strength, may contribute greatly to victory. . . . It should be recognized as

[107] Draft Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, Sep 41, sub: General Strategy—Review by British Chiefs of Staff, WPD 4402-64.

[108] See paragraph 3a of Tab 2, Sec. II, p. III, Appendix II (Ultimate Requirements Air Forces—Supporting Study) to Army and Navy Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements, 11 Sep 41, JB 355, ser 707, copy in AAG 381 (Bulky).

an almost invariable rule that wars cannot be finally won without the use of land armies." In accordance with this view the Joint Board proposed to equip and train land task forces for offensive use "wherever land offensives may ultimately appear to be profitable." (This expression suggests how far from Staff thinking at this time was the President's sudden desire of that week to reduce the Army's forces in training. See Chapter XI.) Patrol bombers should be stationed at Freetown in West Africa. Taking up that ill-timed last paragraph of the British Chief's review, and supporting General Gerow's opposition to present intervention, the Joint Board continued: "Involvement of United States Army forces in the near future would at best involve a piecemeal and indecisive commitment of forces against a superior enemy under unfavorable logistic conditions." In sum: "The major strategic concept, and the principal military operations set forth . . . [in ABC–1] are still sound, and should form the general guide for the conduct of a war against the Axis Powers, in which the United States is associated with the British Commonwealth." [109] This "Final Action" of Army and Navy, signed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, was dispatched to London on 25 September for transmission to the British Chiefs.

Efforts to Harmonize Views on a Bombing Policy

Meantime pressure for the air offensive was being applied elsewhere. British advocates of the idea were convinced that it should be pushed, whatever might be the plans for other operations. At the time of the Atlantic Conference Maj. H. S. Hansell, an Air Corps officer then on duty in England, was informing General Arnold of the hopes that were being expressed to him in London. The British consensus, he reported on 11 August, was that "it is probably possible" to cause a German breakdown by means of prolonged bombing, and "it is highly improbable that a land invasion can be carried out against Germany proper, at least within the next three years. If the air offensive is successful, a land offensive probably will not be necessary." The air bases and sea communications must be made secure, the letter continued, and disrupting of Germany's electric power, transportation, and petroleum systems should be pursued; also the "undermining of German morale by air attack on civilian concentrations." It would first be necessary to neutralize the German Air Force and continue attacks on submarines

[109] Memo, JB to Special Naval and Army Observers, London, approved 25 Sep 41, sub: Comment on "General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff," JB 325, ser 729, copy in WPD 4402–64.

and surface craft as well as the Channel "invasion" bases.[110] A week later General Chaney supported the view of a sustained air offensive against Germany as "fully warranted" and held that it "should be planned and executed at the earliest possible time." [111]

The exchanges of secret code information, agreed upon at the Atlantic Conference, were made without reference to the sharp disagreements in other respects,[112] nevertheless the disagreements remained so acute that in London the War Cabinet's planning staff eventually met with the resident observer groups from the U.S. Army and Navy in an effort for reconciliation of views. It is difficult to see why this step was postponed until November and equally difficult to determine why a report of the meeting and the much more tactful expression of British views there offered failed to reach Washington promptly. The British Chiefs' reconsidered statements, which the American Special Observers eventually reported by radio, were:

(a) In attacking "morale" British mean disruption of transportation, living, and industrial facilities of German population rather than more restricted meaning. . . .

(c) British give assurance of ultimate intention to land forces on continent.[113]

This statement came much closer to the views of the American Chiefs of Staff. Oddly, although the British planners' meeting referred to took place on 21 November, the radiogram reporting it was received in Washington on 10 December 1941. By that time the United States was at war.

The disagreements between the British and the American Chiefs of Staff during and after both ABD and the Atlantic Conference had served one constructive purpose almost as useful as the points of agreement. They had warned the British of certain strong views held in Washington, and had provided unmistakable evidence that the United States was likely to be the controlling partner in any coming alliance. Yet neither at the Atlantic Conference nor at other meetings, where the likely course of many coming developments was accurately discerned, was there even suspicion of an event already being planned in Tokyo, which would come to pass at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, with immediate con-

[110] Memo, Maj H. S. Hansell, AC, for Gen Arnold, through Gen Chaney, 11 Aug 41, sub: An Air Estimate of the Situation for the Employment of the Air Striking Force in Europe (ABC-1, WPD 4402-61.

[111] 1st ind on 11 Aug 41 Memo of Maj Hansell (cited in preceding note) to CofS, 19 Aug 41, WPD 4402-61.

[112] See Instructions from CofS and CNO to Observers in London, 12 Sep 41, WPD 4402-88. For history of negotiations on the use of code words see Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 23 Feb 42, sub: Code Name Index-Agreement with Great Britain, WPD 4402-88.

[113] Rad, Special Naval and Army Observers to CofS and CNO, 10 Dec 41, WPD 4402-64.

sequences upsetting most of the planning for the Far East, and delaying some of the projects in mind for the Atlantic. The aim at the ABD discussion had been to insure the security of Allied sea communications in the Far East and the security of Singapore, both of which were due to be lost with appalling celerity. The planning of Rainbow 5 was based on sober estimates of American capabilities and deficiencies in the Pacific. Sound as much of that planning was in theory, none of it allowed for the wholesale reduction of American offensive powers—and consequent wreck of the plans—that would be brought about in one disastrous early morning raid upon the principal American installation in mid-ocean.

CHAPTER XIII

Darkening Clouds in the Far East

The succession of dramatic events in Europe and the Atlantic theater in late 1941 held American attention chiefly in that direction rather than westward. It could hardly have been otherwise. Despite the German Army's "irresistible" sweep across western Russia, America's aid to the Soviet Union had been announced on 15 August 1941. The German submarine operations in the Atlantic, if not irresistible, were impressively successful, and now were involving America more and more: several American cargo ships were sunk, the American destroyer *Greer* was attacked (on 4 September 1941), and on 11 September Mr. Roosevelt issued his "shooting orders" in the form of a warning that Axis war vessels entering waters which the United States was protecting would do so "at their own risk." Americans were garrisoning Iceland and were rapidly taking over the defenses of the eight new west Atlantic bases leased from the British. Congress was asked by Mr. Roosevelt on 9 October to modify the 1939 Neutrality Act so as to permit arming of American merchant vessels, which Congress did on 17 November.

These striking circumstances, emphasized by the dramatic mid-Atlantic meeting of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill and by the former's strong references to the German menace in his speeches, inevitably focused public attention upon the war in the Atlantic rather than upon Pacific developments. In the Atlantic the Navy was sustaining casualties. There the Army was deploying its forces, to garrison the newly acquired bases. In the Atlantic and in Europe lay the primary objective of American military policy—by definition made as early as 5 October 1940, and reaffirmed as late as 3 November 1941,[1] when all possible aid was at last being rushed to the Philippines. That objective was the defeat, first, of Germany. From the armed services, then, it is fair to say that there was no continuous effort that could have directed the chief attention of

[1] The 1940 reference is to the SLC meeting mentioned in Chapter IV. The 1941 statement is in the Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 3 Nov 41, sub: The Far Eastern Situation, WPD 4369-29, copy in OCS 14513-16: "The primary objective is the defeat of Germany . . . the principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war."

the public from the European aspects of the war, and the public was thus permitted to maintain its own first interest in European developments. This first interest was natural. American ancestral roots were dominantly in Europe. Language, literature, and cultural tastes in general were akin to Europe's and remote from Asia's. Europe was nearer, far more accessible, and hence far better understood. Trade relations, in almost all cases, were closer than with Asia. Newspaper reports were relatively far fuller, far more numerous, far more interesting to most readers. For an infinitude of reasons America was to some extent familiar with the European situation and hence interested in it and alert to its developments. To the Sino-Japanese war much less attention was given. It was remote and indifferently reported. It had been going on for years. Its immediate and principal victims were Orientals rather than Americans or other Occidentals to whom any large body of Americans felt consanguinity. Even affronts and injuries to Americans—notably in the sinking of U. S. S. *Panay,* in the attack on U. S. S. *Tutuila,* and in the succession of insolent "accidents" for which Japan studiously made correct if hollow apology—remained unpunished and hence after a time were themselves patiently absorbed and half forgotten. In an area which in the event of war would be the first to suffer, Maj. Gen. George Grunert, then commanding the Philippine Department, U. S. Army, felt that a sterner policy toward Japan was desirable, and he protested to the Chief of Staff against "appeasement and catering to Japan." [2]

Only if all this is borne in mind, and only if one is conscious of the numbing effect of injuries oft repeated and never firmly dealt with, or alarms repeated and never (until the last time) followed by fulfillment—only then, it would seem in retrospect, is it possible to account either for the amazement of the American public when war actually burst into flame at Pearl Harbor instead of in the Atlantic, or for the equal amazement of most of the military establishment when an event long recognized as possible actually came to pass at Pearl Harbor instead of in the Far East—so suddenly that all the vigorous actions contemplated to combat that very event were for the most part untaken.

Limitations of Planning for the Philippines

Earlier chapters of this volume have noted fleetingly certain aspects of American war planning which took cognizance of the perils of the Pacific. Diplomatic

[2] Ltr, Grunert to Marshall, 1 Sep 40, AG 093.5 Phil Isl (7–2–40).

phases and naval aspects are dealt with in a variety of other publications.[3] A great flood of records and judgments is available in the 15,000 manuscript pages of the Congressional inquiry into the Pearl Harbor attack and the 9,000 pages of seven ancillary inquiries into the same events.[4] The discussion in the pages that follow will therefore concern itself with those actions and judgments which involved or directly influenced the Office of the Chief of Staff.

For an understanding of those actions it is necessary to bear in mind that the military program for defending the Philippines over a period of years was itself a variable influenced by numerous political considerations but dominated for years, so far as the Army was concerned, by the lack of officers, men, material, airfields, and shipping. It was these shortages which down to 1940 were primarily responsible, in the view of WPD, for "failure to undertake adequate defensive measures" in behalf of the Philippines.[5] The nightmare of all these lacks was ever present, and to think that the vigorous reinforcement of the islands which finally got under way in late 1941 was due solely to a belated recognition of the islands' needs would be to miss the point of first importance. The reinforcement, such as it was, came about because in late 1941 (Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska being at last cared for after a fashion) the Army for the first time felt that men and materiel were available for the Far East.

The widespread archipelago's vulnerability at one point or another was so great that at best the defense of it could be only partial, and probably could be only temporary as well, without an inflow of assistance from continental United States. This over a long period of years was the basis of Joint Board planning which contemplated the firm defense of an area about Manila Bay for a period whose extent would be determined by the ability to bring up reinforcements after war should develop. The strength of defensive instal-

[3] Cordell Hull's *Memoirs* provide a memorable diplomatic record. The naval aspects are treated at length in naval histories, some of the most discerning judgments on Japan's policy in this period being presented in Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Rising Sun In The Pacific* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), Ch. I. The background of U. S. Army operations is briefly and effectively portrayed in Louis Morton, The Fall Of The Philippines, Ch. II, now in preparation.

[4] *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, Congress of the United States, 79th Cong, 2d sess, Document 244, Washington, 1946, and 39 volumes of testimony and exhibits covering not only the hearings the Joint Committee held between 15 November 1945 and 31 May 1946, but also those of the Roberts Commission, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, the Army's Pearl Harbor Board, the Navy Court of Inquiry, Col. Carter W. Clarke, Maj. Henry C. Clausen, and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. These are presented as Committee Exhibits 143–49 in Parts 22–39 of the 39 volumes referred to.

[5] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Reinforcement of the Philippines, WPD 3251–55. See also Memo, same (Gerow) for SW, 8 Oct 41, sub: Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands, WPD 3251–60.

lations had been increased little since 1922 even though the preventive clauses of that year's naval limitation treaty were no longer binding after Japan renounced that treaty in 1936. A factor had been Congressional reluctance to make military gestures that might offend Japan. Another was the passage of the Philippine independence act which marked the approaching date of American withdrawal from the Philippines and discouraged military expenditures in an area so soon to be vacated. In 1940, when it became apparent that there was need for immediate reinforcement of the islands, for American strategic purposes as well as for Philippine security, reinforcement could not be extended save by taking men and material away from areas, such as Panama and Hawaii, which the War Department then regarded as more essential to American strategy than were the Philippines themselves. This situation continued well into 1941. "Deficiencies in arms and equipment . . . for the immediate defense of the Western Hemisphere . . . were so serious that adequate reinforcements for the Philippines at this time would have left the United States in a position of great peril," explained General Marshall in his official report on 1941 policy.[6] He had said much the same thing more picturesquely in 1939 when President Roosevelt asked if he could not reinforce the islands. He could do so, he replied, only by sending out of the country, to its peril, the Army's "few grains of seed corn."[7] What was done thereafter, when he felt it possible to send aid, was to send such as could currently be spared—first, money to increase the Philippine Scouts; next, temporary officers as they received sufficient training; next, as munitions productions increased, material which no longer had to be placed exclusively nearer home. Consistently the controlling factor was availability of aid. General Grunert, assigned in June 1940 to command the Philippine Department, supplied a succession of warning reports and recommendations—eight of them in July–August 1940 alone—in response to which betterment came only slowly, so large were the difficulties to be surmounted. The attitude of defeatism then noticeable among the Filipinos General Grunert attributed to ". . . the lack of an announced policy backed by visual evidence of defense means and measures."[8]

For years responsible officers had made repeated protests against the inconsistency of professing defense of the Philippines as a national policy, while

[6] *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff . . . July 1, 1941–June 30, 1943*, p. 6.

[7] See Memo, Gen Marshall for Hist Div, undated (Apr 49), sub: MS "The Office of the Chief of Staff in World War II." Hist Div files.

[8] Ltr, Gen Grunert to Gen Marshall, 1 Sep 40, AGO 093.5 (Phil Isl) 7–2–40.

maintaining there forces insufficient to provide a respectable defense. In 1933 when General Embick, then a brigadier, was commanding the harbor defenses of Manila Bay, he wrote his protests against serious reliance upon the Orange Plan of that day, because of twenty-five years' "progressive weakening of our military position in the Philippine islands." He proceeded:

> As a result the Philippine Islands have become a military liability of a constantly increasing gravity. To carry out the present Orange Plan—with its provisions for the early dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters—would be literally an act of madness. No milder term can be employed if facts are squarely to be faced. In the event of an Orange War the best that could be hoped for would be that wise counsels would prevail, that our people would acquiesce in the temporary loss of the Philippines, and that the dispatch of our battle fleet to the Far East would be delayed for two or three years needed for its augmentation. . . .

He urged a re-examination of military policy with respect to the islands and recommended, in light of the feeble defenses then available, the withdrawal of military and naval establishments to a peacetime strategic frontier of Alaska-Oahu-Panama, in its purpose strikingly suggestive of the withdrawal to the 180° meridian which WPD itself advocated seven years later. In his indorsement of General Embick's study, Maj. Gen. E. E. Booth, then commanding general in the Philippines, added his own warning against the vulnerability of a weak garrison in the islands.[9] The following year brought about a statement of policy that recognized the relationship of defense to availability of funds, and not much more:

> Depending on the availability of funds, the War Department desires to keep up existing strength, both in personnel and materiel, in the Philippines, and in particular to provide adequate protection for the harbor defenses of Manila Bay, but to go to no further expense for permanent improvements unless thereby ultimate saving will result.

This dubious declaration, approved by General MacArthur who then was Chief of Staff, was repeated verbatim in 1936 in a WPD declaration, again in 1939 in that year's revision of the Philippine Defense Project, again in 1940 in a WPD summary for the Chief of Staff and, in abbreviated form, in a WPD recapitulation of U. S. policy between 1922 and 1940.[10] The 1939 protest of WPD against incon-

[9] Memo, Gen Embick for CG Phil Dept, 19 Apr 33, sub: Military Policy of U. S., and 1st ind by Gen Booth, 25 Apr 33, both in WPD 3251–15.

[10] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, appd by CofS, 5 Apr 34, WPD 3251. (2) Memo, Lt Col J. H. Cunningham for Col Walter Krueger, WPD, 14 Jul 36, sub: Phil Def Policy, WPD 3251–17. (3) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 21 Aug 39, sub: Mil Policy in the Philippines, WPD 4192, accompanied by an undated memo on this subject bearing corrections signed "G. C. M." (4) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 10 Oct 40, sub: War Dept Policy on Defense of the Phil Isl, WPD 3251–37. (5) Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Reinforcement of the Phil, WPD 3251–55.

sistency of policy and preparation to support the policy was a realistic recognition that Army and Navy points of view on the subject were at complete variance, the Army still considering the Philippines a military liability rather than an asset and hence opposing reinforcement of the garrison, especially in view of the anticipated independence of the islands in 1946; in this the Navy did not concur. In August 1939 WPD held that if there was to be sound planning there must be a clear definition of national policy and a choice of three alternatives: (1) to maintain the existing defenses, inadequate as they were to hold Manila Bay against a determined Japanese attack and hence foredoomed to defeat; (2) to withdraw from the Philippines and maintain a western defense at the 180° meridian with awareness that this would augment Japanese prestige and weaken America's; (3) to provide adequate defense for the naval base by air and antiaircraft and ground reinforcements even though this should be at the cost of other American areas needing defense.[11] The paper was returned to WPD as "noted" by the Chief of Staff on 6 May 1940, without indication of immediate results or explanation of the long delay. In the interval the question was discussed by the Joint Board, notably on 20 February 1940 when Navy members suggested the wisdom of increasing both Army and Navy aviation strength in the Philippines "in time of peace as an additional deterrent to further Japanese plans for expansion." [12]

The suggestion was opposed by General Marshall unless the garrison increase could be sufficient to provide an actual self-sustained defense, the possibility of which he would explore later. It was to that end that WPD, after conferring with Air Corps officers, reported that proper defense would require a composite air wing made up of 441 planes of all categories (there were 37 planes in the islands at the time), and pointed out that such a force would require additional facilities costing in excess of $22,000,000; the equipment and allowances for 9,454 new air personnel would involve an added cost of $99,000,000. The proportionate addition in ground forces (infantry, antiaircraft, and harbor defense) was estimated at 12,741 men (there were 4,800 U. S. troops and 6,400 Scouts there then). The memorandum is of particular interest in its recognition in early 1940 that "the principal reliance would be placed on air power not only to deter an attack on Luzon but to defeat one if made" (a belated but significant recognition of the airplane's role in strategic planning) and in its confident belief that the prospect

[11] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 21 Aug 39, previously cited in n. 10 (3).

[12] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 2 Mar 40, sub: Practicability of Increasing Army Aviation Strength in the Philippines, WPD 4191–3.

of an enlarged air-navy-ground force's defeating a first attack and thus allowing time for the U. S. Fleet to reach the vicinity "would be a serious deterrent to any overt act." For such an establishment, however, WPD suggested that a very considerable augmentation of strength was essential (following the view which General Marshall had expressed in the Joint Board meeting). A lesser addition would be impractical.[13]

General Grunert's Pressure for Reinforcement

Immediately after his arrival in Manila in June 1940 General Grunert, in a series of personal letters to General Marshall and formal memoranda to The Adjutant General,[14] began his efforts to provide much of that augmentation. In July he urged the sending of ammunition (a much smaller amount than he recommended was approved on 5 September after repeated inquiries); also of antiaircraft defense materiel and personnel (a greatly reduced amount was approved on 29 July); also of Air Corps materiel and personnel (no action for months); he pressed for immediate increase of the Philippine Scouts to 12,000 (he was supported in this by WPD but opposed by G–1 for the persuasive reason that such an increase would be charged against the number of new personnel allotted to the Regular Army in that critical period); he sought more funds, largely for harbor defense installations (this proposal was rejected, the explanation citing a policy established three years earlier when, as General Grunert sharply remarked, there was no world war in action and no situation comparable to that of 1940). Another of his unheeded communications, as he reminded General Marshall, was the 16th indorsement upon a question raised twenty months earlier—which meant that the War Department had taken no effective action upon it in that considerable period. This discouraging sequence of events General Grunert recited to General Marshall in his personal letter of 1 September. His primary purpose, however, was to point out the defeatist attitude which had developed in the Philippine Commonwealth, to the point where it was believed that the United States no longer intended to defend the archipelago. General Grunert urged action that would overcome the pessimism. Specifically he recommended "a really strong air force and a strong submarine force both based on the Philippines," the building up of the U. S. Army units in the islands, and the assignment of American officers to train the Philippine Army units

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Listed in the 1 Sep 40 letter to Gen Marshall cited in n. 2.

(these being the early elements of the force that General Douglas MacArthur, as Military Advisor to the Philippine Government, was developing: the Scouts, a well-trained and extremely effective group of Filipino soldiers, who were not in the Philippine but in the U. S. Army).

The letter was well timed, for in the War Department there was already a mounting realization that Far East developments were calling for a firmer American policy. This had been indicated by WPD's midsummer effort in behalf of General Grunert's proposal for increasing the Scouts. It now was manifest in an extended study that WPD prepared in discussion both of General Grunert's long letter and of a plea from President Manuel Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth for support of a Commonwealth military training program.[15] WPD summarized briefly the series of recommendations by General Grunert and noted the scant support given them; antiaircraft materiel had been augmented only to a limited degree; the ammunition reserve had been increased to the extent of only one priority rather than three; the aircraft warning service was disapproved on grounds of cost; no action was yet taken on the request for increasing the U. S. infantry regiment; that for Air Corps additions in planes and personnel was still under study; increase for the Scouts had been disapproved in spite of WPD appeal. Mr. Quezon's proposal was under study. The WPD memorandum then noted briefly the crippling character of current policy, quoting the 1934–1936–1939 versions of the Philippine Defense Project previously recited: "to provide adequate protection for the Harbor Defenses in Manila Bay, but to go to no further expense for permanent improvements unless thereby ultimate savings will result." This had resulted, naturally, in no modernization of defenses. WPD referred to its own recommendations of 2 March 1940 for a composite air wing, a Regular Army division, an antiaircraft regiment, and 2,300 harbor defense troops. It referred also to the 21 August 1939 recommendations, still unacted upon, and then recited the large changes which the world situation had undergone since that time in the forms of the Tripartite Alliance, the increase in the Army as a result of the draft act, the new flow of funds, and the naval expansion program which "in a few years" would "permit us to take a firmer stand." But the new WPD recommendation, in default of knowledge of a new national policy to the contrary, had to be based on military expediency alone: it therefore proposed submitting to the President a plan to withdraw to

[15] Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for CofS, 10 Oct 40, sub: War Department Policy Reference Defense of Philippine Islands, AG 093.5 Phil Isl (10-10-40), copy in WD 3251-37.

the 180° meridian, variants of which, it will be recalled, had been suggested in 1933 and again in August 1939. This startling proposal, now formally advanced in the more nervous atmosphere of October 1940, had an impressive result. It did not win support for any such retreat from the Far East to the 180° meridian, and quite probably was not intended to. But a few weeks later there came about a decision of an almost opposite nature—to increase the Scouts to 12,000 (as WPD had urged long before), to increase the infantry and coast artillery components of the garrison, and to augment local defenses.[16]

Evidence of a Changed Attitude in 1940

The causes of this radical change in American policy with respect to defense of the Philippines were numerous and cumulative, with the written record presently available providing no certain indication of which was dominant. How fully the WPD memorandum of 10 October had reflected the genuine views of higher authority or, in contrast, strengthened a determination to compel a new and contrary policy decision, can only be conjectured. How fully the flow of world events in late 1940 altered previous judgments again is a matter of speculation. But the fact is that in this period occurred events that called for a change of policy, and developments that permitted such a change. In the latter category can be mentioned the mounting appropriations which provided the War Department with a previously unhoped-for inflow of draft troops which would provide needed manpower. In the former category—events that made obligatory a change in Far East policy—can be mentioned the new reports from Manila, and also the continuing uneasiness over Japanese intentions.

Mr. Quezon initiated in August his request for financial assistance in providing the Filipinos with military training comparable to that now in prospect for Americans under the new draft act. His views were opposed at the time by U. S. High Commissioner F. B. Sayre who felt that Quezon was merely looking for American funds to meet expenses that otherwise the Philippine Government would have to meet, but who also felt that it was a matter for

[16] This is noted succinctly on a disposition slip OCS 18136-30, 24 Feb 41, attached to the study. See also memoranda of Col McNarney, of Col Anderson and Col Loomis, WPD, for Col Crawford, 8 Oct 40, WPD 3251-37. All were nonconcurrences, which suggests that the memorandum of 10 October was prepared with a view to providing a decision quite different from that recommended—as actually happened.

professional military decision. A WPD summary, referring to this correspondence, held that the United States, being itself unprepared for a threatened two-ocean war, should first attend to its own security and should not weaken itself by diverting funds or materiel to the Philippines.[17] The blight of insufficient funds, responsible for the deterioration of defense equipment over two decades and largely responsible also for the current shortages both of trained personnel and of materiel, was still the crippling factor observable in Pacific defenses, as at home: the increase in appropriations during 1940 was still insufficient for the vast rebuilding now necessary. Far more important, that increase was destined to prove too late as well, since it could not buy more production from already overloaded industrial plants.

Pressure for improvement of the Philippine defenses, however, was continuous, from General MacArthur in his labors to build up the Philippine Islands' military forces, from General Grunert as head of the U. S. Army's Philippine Department, and again from Mr. Quezon, who renewed his pleas in October. The Staff's original resistance to their suggestions did not stem from doubts of the military soundness of these proposals, but from that same consciousness which had been expressed in August 1939, that unless large additions could be provided, notably in air and antiair equipment, the islands' vulnerability to full-scale attack would doom the defending forces. The key to a successful defense was to be provided by a large addition to defensive power, not a small one, and a large addition manifestly could be provided only by larger funds than were in sight in mid-1940.

In November General Grunert added his support to the Quezon plea, in a presentation quite different from that in his September letter. In September he had noted an air of defeatism in the islands. In November he expressed concern over the possibility, in the United States, of a quite different state of mind that he regarded as much more ill-informed and even more dangerous. He illustrated his point by sending to General Marshall a local newspaper clipping that implied that the new Philippine Commonwealth Army already possessed 12 first-line divisions of 120,000 trained men ready for combat. To make sure that nobody in the War Department was beset by this delusion General Grunert presented the

[17] (1) Rad, Quezon to the President, through Dept of Interior, 6 Aug 40, copies in WPD 3389-34 and in AGO 093.5 Phil Isl (7-2-40). (2) Rad, U. S. High Com to the President, same date. (3) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 7 Sep 40, sub: Proposed Federal Support for Mil Training Program of Phil Govt; also unused draft of Ltr, SW to Secy Interior, all these in same file as (1). See also Ltr, Quezon to Sayre, 22 Oct 40, quoted in Ltr, Sayre to President, 24 Oct 40, copy in JB 305, ser 672.

realities of that force in precise and unflattering terms. He explained that while General MacArthur's long-term project for a Commonwealth Army to mature in 1946 (the date set for Philippine independence) contemplated 1 regular and 30 reserve divisions, feeble progress was thus far made toward that ambitious goal. Currently the Regular Filipino Army had 468 officers and 3,697 enlisted men, so scattered that the largest single unit was the incipient 1st Infantry Regiment, with 286 enlisted men. The Reserve force had, nominally, 6,416 officers and 120,000 enlisted men, it was true, but, of the officers, 50 percent had received no training whatever and an additional 15 percent no field training: none had commanded a unit larger than a company. The enlisted men's training was limited, groups totaling 17,000 having had 5½ months individual and company training during the previous 3 years, and 24,174 having received 10 days' field training in May 1939, but no unit as large as a battalion having yet been assembled for training. Shortages in clothing and equipment were large. There was no ammunition and only small amounts could be provided from local U. S. Army stores, themselves restricted. Should there be immediate need, General Grunert proposed to utilize such Luzon elements of ill-trained infantry and artillery as were available, in company or battalion units, with one experienced American commander for each company, if available. Even so, the Philippine units would be "capable of only defensive operations involving little or no maneuver, and then only in units not larger than a battalion when closely supervised by experienced officers of the U. S. Army." For efficient defense, he went on, organized and equipped Philippine units "should be mobilized now . . . and training instituted." His need was for 500 qualified American officers, 300 from the Infantry, 50 from Field Artillery, 60 from the Medical Corps, 30 Engineers, 20 Quartermasters, 10 from the Signal Corps, 30 for administrative posts.[18]

The fact that the mobilization General Grunert recommended in this persuasive argument did not take place for many months, and that he was provided not with 500 American training officers, but with 75, is best explained by examination of the memorandum recording the judgment at which WPD arrived, working under the policy then prescribed. Mobilization of the Commonwealth Army had already been considered and the draft of an emergency proclamation by the President for that purpose was already approved by the War and Navy Departments and ready for Presidential signature at a time not

[18] Personal Ltr, Grunert to Marshall, 2 Nov 40, AGO 320.2 (11-2-40), copy in WPD 3251-39.

determined: this preparatory step had been taken in October.[19] The physical difficulty of providing 500 qualified Reservists was much greater. G–1 reported that such a number could not be provided and G–3 pointed out that the service schools already were under pressure to provide officers for the training of the new draft army. General Gerow, speaking for WPD, held that under existing conditions ammunition in quantity could not be provided for additional Philippine forces in less than eighteen months. Beyond these physical difficulties WPD pointed to certain large strategic obstacles. Notably, the mobilization might convince the Japanese that the United States was building up its own Far East forces, and thus encourage Japan to steps designed to prevent or forestall such an organization, which itself could not be consummated for a year. Even the Philippine force thus envisaged would not itself suffice in an unlimited war; it would necessarily require American aid, and WPD (speaking for the Chief of Staff and the Joint Board as well) was opposed to committing the United States to a two-ocean war. General Grunert's proposal, if carried out, would undoubtedly help Philippine morale but "it would contribute little to the defensive strength . . . in the immediate future, and might result in involving us in action in that theater which we are not prepared to sustain." Record copies of the letter note concurrence of G–1, G–2, and G–3 and, while General Marshall's view is not specifically stated on the document, he must have approved the action taken. This was substantially as recommended by WPD, namely, the postponement of the summoning of the Philippine Army

[19] Getting such a proclamation ready for announcement was no small feat. On 1 July 1940 Commissioner Sayre had recommended that, against the possibility of unpredictable events which would interrupt communications, the President should prepare such a proclamation in advance, send it to the Philippines, and, when necessity demanded, have it issued by Presidential order—or in acute emergency by agreement of the Commissioner and the Commanding General. See Rad, Grunert to TAG, 2 Jul 40, in AG 003.5 Phil Isl (7–2–40). Authority to do so was contained in the Philippine Independence Act of 24 March 1934. On 6 July the Chief of Naval Operations turned over the job to the Joint Planning Committee. Memo, CNO for JPC, 6 Jul 40, same file. WPD directed the Judge Advocate General to prepare a draft. Memo, WPD for TAG, 11 Jul 40, and TAG for JAG, 12 Jul 40, same file. For necessary steps thereafter, see Memo, JAG through TAG for JPC, 23 Jul 40; JPC for JB, 27 Sep 40; JB for SW and SN, 17 Oct 40; SW and SN for Dir Budget to SW, 11 Dec 40, reporting approval by President; WPD for TAG, 19 Dec 40, which shows that General Grunert was actually notified of action on 26 Dec. All are in the same file. For later stages see Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Jul 41, making revision calculated to put the Philippines under Gen MacArthur rather than Gen Grunert, and Ltr, Actg SW to Dir Budget, 18 Jul 41, both in WPD 3251–53. On 26 July the revised order, calling into U. S. service all organized forces of the Philippine Government, was issued and on the same day the new command, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, was created. Ltr, TAG to CG's of Armies, Corps Areas, etc., 30 Jul 41, sub: Military Order mobilizing the Philippine Army, AG 381 (7–29–41) MB–E–M; and Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 26 Jul 41, OCS 18136–35.

to U. S. service, but the assignment of seventy-five U. S. Reserve officers to assist in training that army as such.[20]

December 1940 Brings New Action

It is surprising to see that, despite this chilly November attitude toward Philippine defense requirements, a pronounced change was imminent in War Department policy—which coincided, of course, with the nation's policy. It was heralded on the day after Christmas 1940 in another and quite different memorandum from WPD to the Chief of Staff. This too was signed by General Gerow. It asserted that certain steps, previously recommended by General Grunert and rejected because of their cost in dollars, men, and materiel, now could be taken without jeopardy to other defense interests. These were the long-sought increase in the Philippine Scouts from 6,000 to 12,000, the U. S. infantry regiment's increase from 1,100 to 1,653, the two coast artillery regiments' increase from 1,489 to 2,954, the promise to ship in April twenty more 3-inch antiaircraft guns, the immediate shipping of ten 155-mm. guns and fifty 75-mm. guns, and the provision of $1,250,000 in the coming budget for construction.[21] The Chief of Staff's approval of this significant urging of a reconsideration was not formally initialed for ten days, but he must have given oral approval for, without awaiting the formal act, WPD confidently sent to General Grunert a radio request that he submit his priority list for construction work, and with equal confidence sent rough estimates of these amounts to the Budget officer.[22] Implementation of specific parts of the program within his own jurisdiction was soon approved by the Chief of Staff, and by 27 January the President approved the Scouts' increase.[23] The shipping of the antiaircraft guns was not so easily achieved. They were not then available in any such quantity, save by taking them away from their holders. Four antiaircraft guns which had been set aside

[20] Memo, ACofS WPD (Gerow) for CofS, 20 Nov 40, sub: Calling into Active Service Some or All of the Organized Military Forces of the Philippine Commonwealth Government, AGO 093.5 Phil Isl (7–2–40), copy in WPD 3251–39.

[21] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 26 Dec 40, sub: Defense of the Phil Isl, appd by Gen Marshall 6 Jan 41, WPD 3251–39.

[22] (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 27 Dec 40, sub: Estimates for Defensive Installations, WPD 3251–42, also speed-up request on 9 Jan 41 in same file. (2) Memo, ACofS WPD for Col Haislip, B&LP Branch, 28 Dec 40, sub: Construction Estimates, Philippine Dept. WPD 3251–42.

[23] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 9 Jan 41, sub: Defenses of the Phil Isl, appd by Marshall 21 Jan 41, WPD 3251–39. (2) Memo, SW for the President, 19 Jan 41, no sub, copy in OCS 18812–46B.

for protecting two American coastal cities were in fact diverted to the Philippines, and delivery of the remaining sixteen was simply postponed until guns could be available.[24] That they should be made available soon was urged by WPD at this time in an impressively farsighted memorandum to the Chief of Staff:

> Conditions may warrant the full requirements of antiaircraft materiel being furnished the Philippine Department in preference to units in the United States. . . . Except for a limited number of regiments designated for special tasks, the problem in the United States is one of training, whereas the overseas departments may be confronted with the execution of combat missions on short notice.[25]

A few days later General Marshall sent to General Grunert the following radiogram:

> For international effect during the next few days it is desired that you give evidence of genuine activity in developing Scout Force to 12,000 strength. Later radio will probably carry instructions, for same reason, regarding retention of officers now due to return to States, and commencement of reduction of Army women and children.[26]

It must be recognized that the marked change in Departmental viewpoint with regard to Philippine defense that came at the turn of the year was not implemented by immediate betterment of defenses in any large sense. The additions to personnel and materiel were modest and their delivery slow, due in part to the distance to be covered but largely to the actual unavailability of men or materiel in quantity. A few examples of insufficiency may be cited: General Brett's emphasis to WPD that its current estimates for defensive installations in the islands should allow for large improvements of an establishment which at the time was "entirely inadequate for the air defense"; General Marshall's remark that "recent action was taken as one of a number of means to impress Japan with the fact that we mean business" (the action being merely retention of sixty officers who were due to return); the hearty assurance to General Grunert that " the entire project" for one of the construction items was approved, so that he could proceed immediately (the amount involved being only $1,000,000); the WPD recommendation in February against activating a headquarters company, which was reversed in April only by "a certain amount of juggling" of personnel; and the unhappy confession that probably no respectable amount of .50-caliber ammunition could go out "before the late spring of

[24] Memo, ACofS WPD (Gerow) for CofS, 27 Jan 41, sub: Defenses of the Phil Isl, WPD 3251–39.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] Rad, Gen Marshall to CG Phil Dept, in Memo, CofS for TAG, 11 Feb 41, OCS 15036–9.

1942." [27] The situation is perhaps better revealed in the large by General Marshall's letter to General Grunert in late March, observing:

I have just looked over two staff papers dealing with the improvement of Philippine defenses. On both of these papers the action was considerably short of your recommendations, which have been denied in part only because we are at present unable to stretch our available resources far enough to meet the tremendous pressure we are subjected to from all directions. This is particularly true in the matter of planes, although the staff is exploring every possible way to get modern equipment for your bombardment squadron as well as to meet deficiencies in defensive reserve.

I am telling you this informally because I am acutely conscious of the depressing effect of repeated stereotyped disapprovals on a commander in the field. I want you to know that your recommendations are not being handled in a perfunctory, routine way.[28]

A later note, following General Grunert's new request for ammunition, antiaircraft equipment, and aircraft, was in much the same tone:

. . . I have looked into the matters you mentioned but am afraid that except for the material concerning which you have already been advised, there is nothing new in the offing. We are doing everything we can for you, and I am sure you understand our limitations.[29]

The dismal condition of antiaircraft material supply, not only then but for long afterward, is vividly portrayed by a reply of General Somervell late that year to an inquiry about much-needed aircraft warning service equipment. The amount required would not be completed until the end of 1942, at the current production rate, he said, and certain equipment of newly standardized type not until 1943 and early 1944.[30]

General MacArthur's Large Plan for Defense

During all these months the correspondence on major phases of Philippine defense had been with General Grunert as commanding general of the Philippine Department. Until early 1941 there was relatively little with General

[27] (1) Memo, Gen Brett for WPD, 11 Feb 41, sub: Estimates for Defensive Installations Phil Isl, WPD study of 5 Feb 41, WPD 3241–42. (2) Memo, CofS for G–1, 13 Feb 41, sub: Phil Isl Pers, OCS 15036–9. (3) Memo, ACofS G–4 for TAG, 13 Feb 41, no sub, WPD 3251–39. (4) Memo, ACofS WPD for G–3, 7 Feb 41, sub: Hq Co Phil Dept, WPD 3251–43. (5) Personal Ltr, Marshall to Grunert, 8 Apr 41, OCS 18812–48. (6) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Apr 41, sub: Defense Phil Dept, WPD 3489–16.

[28] Personal Ltr, Marshall to Grunert, 27 Mar 41, no sub, OCS 18812, copy in WPD 3251–46.

[29] Personal Ltr, Marshall to Grunert, 2 May 41, OCS 18812–55.

[30] Memo, Gen Somervell for Gen Gerow, 31 Dec 41, sub: Production of Equipment, G–4/27963–217, copy in WPD 3640–21.

MacArthur, who on completion of his extended tour of duty as Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, in 1935 had gone to Manila as U. S. Military Adviser to the Philippine Government. This activity, open to him as a retired U. S. Army officer, was in harmony with the long-term program for Philippine independence in 1946 as laid down by Congress in 1934. General MacArthur's mission in his own words was not only that "of preparing the Commonwealth for independent defense by 1946, but also the mission given me by President Roosevelt, so to coordinate its development as to be utilizable to the maximum possible during the transitory period while the United States has the obligations of sovereignty."[31] The 1 February 1941 letter to General Marshall, in which he thus recites his aim, may be regarded as the real reopening of General MacArthur's wholehearted relationship with the U. S. Army, as distinguished from that with his immediate employer of the previous three years, the Philippine Government. The Philippine Army constituted a somewhat nebulous potential in the scheme of the Philippine Department, U. S. Army. General Grunert's skeptical observations, previously mentioned, on the current state of the new force and his additional remarks in ensuing weeks were such as an observant departmental commander would make with regard to forces that were scheduled in emergency to come under his command. Not only did General Grunert expect that he himself would have that command if such an emergency should come to pass, but well into the spring of 1941 his expectation was shared by Staff officers in Washington.

General MacArthur's 1 February letter took up an enterprise entirely new to the War Department planning to date. It recapitulated his own ambitious program for the Commonwealth's ultimate 1946 defense forces, to include thirty reserve divisions plus special combat troops, the whole ground force of 250,000 scheduled to be 50 percent complete in 1941; plus a balanced air corps, plus a naval corps "whose primary striking element will consist of from thirty to fifty high-speed motor torpedo boats." This considerable establishment was projected "within the limitations of finances, to provide an adequate defense at the beach against a landing operation by an expeditionary force of 100,000, which is estimated to be the maximum initial effort of the most powerful potential enemy." To that end General MacArthur now explained, there was in ultimate contemplation a defense not only of the Manila Bay area (as envisaged by Orange Plan) or even of all Luzon, but of Luzon and the Visayan

[31] Personal Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Feb 41, AG 093.5 Phil Isl (2–1–41) in (7–2–40), copy also in OCS 20891–88 and in WPD 3251–44.

G.C.M.

To WPD
Information indicates definitely Presence of Japanese force, including carrier, in area between latitude of S. F. and Cape Mendocino

Attack a possibility 9 - 11 A.M. Washington time

Dictated, with additional details, to Col. Barnett, Hdqrs. Fourth Army at 10:12 A.M., by me personally.

G.C.M.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
Dec 12, 1941

Dec 12, 1941

fw 4622

To WPD

Information indicates definitely presence of Japanese force, including carrier, in area between latitude of San Francisco and Cape Mendocino.

Attack a possibility 9 - 11 A.M., Washington time.

Dictated, with additional details, to Col. Barnett, Hdqrs. Fourth Army at 10:12 A.M., by me personally.

G.C.M.

A WARNING FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF. *In this penned memorandum to the War Plans Division General Marshall reported his telephone conversation on 12 December 1941 with Fourth Army Headquarters at San Francisco, warning against a possible attack (which did not come to pass) by a rumored Japanese raiding force. The typewritten transcript, with file number, was made for War Plans Division records.*

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

BY AUTHORITY OF A. C. OF S., WPD

Date _____ Initials _____

March 5, 1942.

for 381 (Aust.)(3-4-42)
(3-1-42)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following secret message be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to Lieut. General Brett, CG, USAFIA, Melbourne, Australia:

PERSONAL FROM MARSHALL TO BRETT STOP THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION IN YOUR CG DASH 520 CONFORMS CLOSELY TO ~~MY OWN~~ OUT CONCLUSIONS EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN DIFFERENCES IN SUGGESTED BOUNDARIES STOP I THINK THOUGH IT ~~WOULD BE~~ ONLY ~~COURTEOUS AND PROPER~~ highly important and only decent TO INVITE THE DUTCH TO PARTICIPATE COMMA AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT OF BEING REPRESENTED ON THE COMMANDERS STAFF STOP ~~I FEEL WE CANNOT BE~~ We must not be put IN THE POSITION OF IGNORING A PEOPLE AND A GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE PUT UP such A MAGNIFICENT ~~EVEN IF LOSING~~ FIGHT IN ~~THAT REGION~~ STOP THEIR G DASH 2 AND particularly their CODE PERSONNEL ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE ~~PARTICULARLY~~ outstanding EFFICIENT AND MIGHT BE OF GREAT VALUE STOP MOREOVER COMMA AT LEAST A SMALL PORTION OF THE TERRITORY THAT WILL NECESSARILY BE INCLUDED IN THE AREA OF THE NEW COMMAND WILL BE DUTCH COMMA ALTHOUGH OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY STOP I HOPE YOU WILL PRESENT THIS INFORMALLY TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS YOUR PERSONAL VIEW AND CONVICTION AND CAN BY THIS METHOD ARRANGE FOR AN APPROPRIATE INVITATION TO THE

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A REVISION BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF. *The alterations by pen, in this draft of a memorandum prepared in WPD, are in General Marshall's script.*

SECRET

DUTCH STOP PARA I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE THE QUESTION OF COMMAND SETTLED QUICKLY AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN YOUR CG DASH 217 AND CG DASH 305 COMMA BUT ~~YOU WILL UNDERSTAND MY REASONS FOR DESIRING THAT~~ the DEFINITE PROPOSAL TO THAT EFFECT should BE MADE BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS STOP SUCH A PROPOSAL MIGHT BE TRANSMITTED BY THEM TO LONDON AND WASHINGTON SIMULTANEOUSLY STOP IF THE SUGGESTION SHOULD REACH HERE OFFICIALLY I AM OF THE OPINION THAT THE WHOLE MATTER WOULD BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF STOP I AGREE WITH YOU THAT DELAY MAY BE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED POWERS IN THAT AREA STOP ACKNOWLEDGE STOP

MARSHALL

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

But you must be most careful not to in any way give the impression that you are acting under instructions from War Department Stop

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
REGRADED
ORDER SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER
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

CLARIFYING THE INSTRUCTIONS. *The handwriting of the original draft of this message to the Southwest Pacific is not identified. The vigorous revisions, in smaller script and blacker ink, are those of General Marshall.*

Islands as a "homogeneous unit" establishable by blocking the straits leading to its inland seas and thereby leaving those waters free for movement of friendly ships. The blocks were to be effected by mines and coast defense guns supported by the torpedo boats. To effect the blocks the Commonwealth Government would need the grant of materiel from America, to the extent of seven 12-inch guns, twenty-five 155-mm. guns, ammunition, and thirty-two mobile searchlights. General MacArthur requested approval by the Chief of Staff and submission of this project to the Secretary of War and the President.

WPD, examining this letter while already harassed by the endless equipment demands from continental United States, new bases, and British dependencies, immediately questioned the urgency of the Luzon-Visayan project, and also the advantage that this would afford the United States at an early date, comparable to advantages that the same equipment would afford if employed elsewhere in so critical a time. It was suggested that General MacArthur be informed that in any case 12-inch guns would be unavailable before 1943 but that 8-inch railway guns could go forward; that the 155-mm. guns he desired (beyond those previously sought by General Grunert) could not be manufactured before 1942 or supplied from PMP stock without interfering with current plans; that the searchlights would be unavailable before 1942; but primarily that he be asked about the urgency of his project. WPD also suggested that General Grunert be asked for comment.

The replies came together. General Grunert, who reaffirmed the "complete unity of purpose" of the two neighboring establishments, stated his accord with General MacArthur's plan for the archipelago's defense. He too questioned its urgency and observed that for the present his concern was over the defense of Luzon alone, by reason of the lack of munitions, particularly of ammunition about which he had lately received such discouraging information from Washington. General MacArthur's proposed seacoast defense for the inland seas he regarded as "a step in the right direction" and he advised starting available equipment as soon as possible, in the hope that by the time it arrived the other aspects of the situation would be more favorable. At the same time he firmly restated some of his earlier unfavorable judgments on the current state of the Philippine Army. The ground forces might be "50 percent complete in 1941" so far as that pertained to paper organization and personnel for fifteen of the reserve divisions, but these units would not so soon have their required equipment or training: there had been "practically no field training nor target practice"; the air and sea components of the force which General MacArthur contemplated

were "merely in their infancy," with two torpedo boats on hand and a total of forty-two planes.

General MacArthur, in his reply to the Chief of Staff, confessed his own insufficient knowledge of other demands which should enjoy greater priority in the Department's schedule of arms delivery, but observed that the Luzon-Visayan project was imperative to successful defense anyway and merited immediate action in whatever could be afforded: he readily accepted the idea of using 8-inch guns which were ready, rather than waiting for 12-inch guns of a distant future. In accordance with the MacArthur-Grunert judgment and with WPD assurance that neither American needs nor commitments to Britain were impaired thereby, General Marshall recommended to the President (whose own action was necessary for a transfer to the Philippine Government's possession) the grant of the seacoast materiel available. He assured General Grunert that his aid to General MacArthur's large enterprise would not delay delivery of goods to meet the more pressing needs of the U. S. Army's own garrison (General Grunert's) in the Philippines. Shipments began on 3 June.[32]

Of the development of the Luzon-Visayan enterprise not much more need be said, save that with the larger authority that came to General MacArthur at mid-year, which will shortly be discussed, he pushed the enterprise with energy. That it would lead nowhere, although unforeseeable, proved the fact, for fate allowed insufficient time and materiel, manpower and training. What this impressive plan might have developed in another six months, had the Japanese attack been delayed so long, is a matter for diverting but fruitless speculation. General MacArthur's high optimism over the prospect was revealed at intervals as the work advanced under his direction. From a personal letter from him to General Marshall in late August the Chief of Staff extracted a portion for the President's examination, as follows:

> The Philippine Army units that have been called are now [30 August] mobilizing in a most satisfactory manner and the whole program is progressing by leaps and bounds. President Roosevelt's proclamation [mobilizing parts of the Philippine Army for training in the USAFFE] had a momentous effect throughout the Far East. Locally it changed a

[32] (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Feb 41, sub: Seacoast Artillery, Phil Govt, WPD 3251–44. (2) Personal Ltrs, Marshall to MacArthur and Marshall to Grunert, same date and file. (3) Personal Ltrs, Grunert to Marshall and MacArthur to Marshall, both of 3 Mar 41 and both in AG 093.5 Phil Isl (7–2–40). (4) Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Mar 41, sub: Seacoast Artillery, and accompanying papers, including Memo, SW for President, marked "OK FDR," 29 Mar 41; also Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 16 Apr 41, and Memo, CofOrd for TAG, 24 Jul 41, sub: Seacoast Artillery Equipment, Phil Dept, all in AG 093.5 Phil Isl (7–2–40).

feeling of defeatism to the highest state of morale I have ever seen. It was hailed with utmost enthusiasm by all classes. . . .

I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the formation of this command. With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid.[33]

In October, in a letter to The Adjutant General (correcting that unfortunate dignitary for a letter erroneously addressed in the old manner to Commanding General, Philippine Department, instead of Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, as lately ordained) General MacArthur reported:

The Philippine Islands are now being organized into a potential Theater of Operations, with a force of from eleven to thirteen divisions with corresponding Air, Corps and Army troops. The total force will soon be equivalent to an army of approximately 200,000 men. The strategic mission as formerly visualized, of defending merely the entrance to Manila Bay by a citadel type defense with a small token force, should be broadened to include the Defense of the Philippine Islands. . . . The wide scope of enemy operations, especially aviation, now makes imperative the broadening of the concept of Philippine defense, and the strength and composition of the defense forces here are believed to be sufficient to accomplish such a mission. . . .[34]

The progress made on his inland-seas project was such as to encourage General MacArthur six weeks later to plan an enlarged coastal defense for the Lingayen Gulf area, north of Manila (over which the Japanese invasion ultimately came). His proposal to General Marshall was referred to WPD which in turn called on Ordnance and Coast Artillery for comment upon the USAFFE commander's specific requests for additional heavy guns and other equipment for fighting off enemy transports and supporting naval vessels. Before the necessary data had been accumulated the events of 7 December had ended the need for further study.[35] Regardless of this lack, correction of which unmistakably called for a long period of preparation, General MacArthur's satisfaction with the defense force's advancement to date led him, ten days before Pearl Harbor, to report to the Chief of Staff in such optimistic vein as to bring from General Marshall an expression of gratification: "The Secretary of War and I were highly pleased to receive your report that your command is ready for any eventuality. . . ."[36]

[33] Extracted from Memo, CofS for the President, 9 Sep 41, no sub, signed by Marshall, OCS 18136–48.
[34] Ltr, MacArthur to TAG, 1 Oct 41, sub: Operations Plan R–5, WPD 4175–18, Rainbow 5, Sec 2.
[35] Personal Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 17 Nov 41, WPD 3251–69.
[36] Extract from Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 28 Nov 41, OCS 18136–132.

General MacArthur Given a New Command

The record available at this time does not reveal the whole chain of circumstances that led in late July 1941 to the return of General MacArthur to the active list of the U. S. Army as commanding general of all U. S. Army forces in the Far East. There is no hint in early 1941 that the Staff, usually well informed, expected such a development. A WPD memorandum of 6 June suggested that "if" he was to be restored to active duty it be only as a successor to General Grunert in the enlarged responsibilities that would come about with mobilization of the new Philippine Army for training under U. S. command: there was no present need, WPD stated (presumably in support of a Chief of Staff wish), for making him Far East commander, as the Army's Far East operations then contemplated were to be solely in the Philippines. Nevertheless, it is to be assumed that General MacArthur himself must have received encouragement from some high authority in Washington, since he wrote a letter on 29 May recommending the creation of a Far East command, with himself as commander. No tangible evidence of who provided any such encouragement is yet found. The 21 May entry in the diary of Secretary Stimson notes that on that day General Marshall said he had already decided to restore General MacArthur to the active list in event of a sufficient emergency; a 20 June confidential letter from General Marshall to General MacArthur says that at a discussion with Mr. Stimson "about three months ago" it was decided that "outstanding qualifications and vast experience in the Philippines" made General MacArthur the logical selection for Far East commander in a crisis: this would date such a decision back to March 1941, but the files reveal no other evidence of such a thing, and while the same letter to General MacArthur makes reference to "your letters to the President and to the Secretary of War" those two documents also remain undiscovered at the time of this volume's preparation. If it was Mr. Roosevelt who initiated the MacArthur appointment the records available at present do not prove it.

It was General Grunert who on 21 May 1941 spontaneously recommended that Commonwealth officials—General MacArthur being particularly in view—be invited to conferences on plans for improving Philippine defenses with funds derived originally from sugar excise taxes and current devaluation.[37]

[37] This was a device originally proposed by President Quezon who pointed out the existence of $52,000,000 in these idle funds, which would not be utilized except by Congressional authority. He favored their

It was coincidence that on that same day, 21 May, but before the Grunert message arrived, Secretary Stimson received from Joseph Stevenot, a Manila telephone official, a suggestion of closer contact between General McArthur and General Grunert. Secretary Stimson immediately relayed the suggestion to General Marshall, and on 29 May, in accordance with formal recommendation from WPD, General Marshall approved General Grunert's similar proposal.[38] It is interesting to note that General MacArthur already knew that this step would be taken, and also was acquainted with certain connotations that are not apparent in the Marshall-Grunert letter. On 29 May in Manila (a half-day ahead of Washington in time) he addressed to General Marshall what must have been a singularly authoritative letter, for in it he disclosed a fuller foreknowledge of events than General Marshall himself seems to have possessed.[39] In reply, three weeks later, the Chief of Staff wrote to General MacArthur the letter previously referred to, and now given in full:

In your letter of May 29th you state that the Philippine Army is to be absorbed by the United States Army in the near future and, consequently, you are closing out your Military Mission. At the present time the War Department plans are not so far reaching. Contingent upon the appropriation of sugar and excise tax funds, Grunert has recommended that about 75,000 troops of the Philippine Army engage in a period of training from three to nine months, in order to prepare them for the defense of the Philippines. While the decision as to the termination of the Military Mission is yours, the War Department plans do not contemplate taking over all responsibilities of your Mission in the near future.

Both the Secretary of War and I are much concerned about the situation in the Far East. During one of our discussions about three months ago it was decided that your outstanding qualifications and vast experience in the Philippines make you the logical selection for the Army Commander in the Far East should the situation approach a crisis. The Secretary has delayed recommending your appointment as he does not feel the time has arrived for such action. However, he has authorized me to tell you that, at the proper time, he will recommend to the President that you be so appointed. It is my impression that the President will approve his recommendation.

use for the much needed defense installations. The proposal met the approval of American authorities in the islands and later, heartily approved by the General Staff, was recommended to Congress, as noted in Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 14 Jul 41, sub: Phil Islands, OCS 18812–60. Complexity of legislation prevented Congressional action in advance of Pearl Harbor. The entire file of relevant documents is to be found in WPD 3251–47.

[38] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 29 May 41, sub: Consultation with Military Adviser, WPD 3251–49, and Personal Ltr, Marshall to Grunert, same date, same file.

[39] This letter, absent from the files of the Department of the Army, is referred to in a personal letter from Marshall to MacArthur, 20 Jun 41, copies of which are in WPD 3251–50 and OCS 20805–15.

This letter is also an acknowledgment of your letters to the President and to the Secretary of War. Please keep its contents confidential for the present.[40]

This was written on 20 June, and for several weeks thereafter the correspondence regarding defense of the Philippines continued to be addressed to General Grunert as the responsible authority. This included a letter of 11 July in which General Marshall commented favorably on the Grunert program of expenditures and on his co-operation with General MacArthur. On 12 June General Grunert himself had supported a mobilization of ten Philippine divisions.[41] Preparation for the shift of the larger command to General MacArthur, however, was under way, and on 14 July in a summary of steps for augmenting the Philippine defense WPD made note of yet another letter from General MacArthur, dated 7 July, urging once more the creation of a Far East command (rather than merely such a Philippine command as WPD had supported).[42] The WPD summary listed also (a) the drafting two days earlier of a bill for appropriating to Philippine defense use the $52,000,000 accruals from sugar excise and currency devaluation funds; (b) the study for summoning the Philippine Commonwealth forces to U. S. active service and temporary allotment of $10,000,000 from the President's Emergency Fund for that purpose; (c) the proposal to send to the Philippines 425 additional Reserve officers (only seventy-five having been sent in response to General Grunert's winter request for 500); and, most significantly, (d) a study being prepared that would recommend creating a Far East command and granting it to General MacArthur. By this time, it may be conjectured, some authority higher than WPD had made the corrective decision which, by normal Staff procedure, WPD now was engaged in justifying. Three days later a month-old WPD memorandum was approved by the Chief of Staff; it urged exploitation of the Philippine Army units available and recommended compliance with General Grunert's plan for building up his supplies to support a total defense force of 50,000 men (rather than 31,000) as a war garrison, for a period of six months.[43] On the same day, and in obvious compliance with instructions, WPD prepared a new and more considered statement upon the needs of an emergency mobili-

[40] See n. 39.

[41] Memo, Grunert to TAG, 12 Jun 41, sub: Program of Expenditures, AG 093.5 6–12–41) and WPD 3251–47.

[42] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 14 Jul 41, sub: Phil Isl, noted by CofS, OCS 18812–60. The 7 July letter from General MacArthur which it mentions, like those earlier cited, is not in the present files.

[43] Memo, ACofS WPD, 16 Jun 41, sub: Defense Reserves, Phil Dept, WPD 3602–21, copy in OCS 18812–59. CofS approval is dated 17 Jul 41.

zation of the Philippine Army. It noted that previously it had been impossible to approve General Grunert's April recommendation of a partial mobilization because there were then no funds for the purpose; that the order for mobilization had been prepared for future execution, however, and that it had lately been revised to permit grant of the command to any general designated (namely, General MacArthur) instead of being limited to the commander of the Philippine Department; that through legislation now initiated the necessary money would ultimately come from the excise fund; that until then it might come from the President's Emergency Fund; that accordingly the time now was opportune for mobilizing the Philippine Army, for hastening the 425 necessary training officers overseas, for calling General MacArthur back to active duty, and for bestowing on him the whole Far East command. All these recommendations were approved by General Marshall on 26 July.[44] On that same day the Chief of Staff sent to General MacArthur the following message:

> Effective this date there is hereby constituted a command designated as the United States Army Forces in the Far East. This command will include the Philippine Department, forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines called into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and such other forces as may be assigned to it. Headquarters United States Army Forces in the Far East will be established in Manila, Philippine Islands. You are hereby designated as Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East. You are also designated as the General Officer United States Army referred to in a Military Order calling into the service of the armed forces of the United States the organized military forces of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines dated July 26, 1941 . . . . Report assumption of command by radio.[45]

A fuller statement of the initial mission of USAFFE, as the new command soon came to be called, was forwarded two days later at the instance of WPD.

[44] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 17 Jul 41, sub: Emergency Mobilization and Training of the Phil Army, WPD 3251–52.

[45] Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 26 Jul 41, copy in OCS 18136–35. See also Rad, Marshall to Grunert, same date and file, advising him of this action. See n. 19 for the elaborate sequence of actions between the High Commissioner's recommendation of this Military Order in July 1940 and its final issuance on 26 July 1941. See also TAG Ltr to CG's Armies and Depts, 30 Jul 41, sub: Military Order Mobilizing the Philippine Army, giving text of President's order of 26 Jul 41, AG 381 (7–29–41) MB–E–M. General Grunert continued as CG, Philippine Dept, until 23 October 1941 when he was relieved and this function added to General MacArthur's as CG, USAFFE; see Memo, DCofS for TAG, 21 Oct 41, sub: Orders for Maj Gen George Grunert and Lt Gen Douglas MacArthur, OCS 18136–78. An AG notation indicates orders were issued 23 October 1941. See also Memo, WPD for CofS, 13 Oct 41, sub: Command in the Philippines, WPD 3251–61, which contrasted prospective strength of MacArthur command and weakness of the U. S. Navy forces in the Far East. It recommended concentration of all forces under MacArthur command and recommended that acceptance of this plan be requested of the Navy. The note bears a skeptical comment by Col (later Lt Gen) W. B. Smith, SGS, and General Marshall's comment: "Hold."

It called for present compliance with the Philippine Defense Project of 1940, stated that General Grunert would be able to afford full information on recently ordered reinforcements of the establishment in the Philippines, and added meaningly that, except for the 425 additional Reserve officers in prospect, nothing beyond present commitments could be looked for in the near future.[46] Nevertheless, two days later a WPD communication to General Marshall stated that "consideration had been given to the possibility of reinforcing the armament of the Philippines by antitank guns and tanks." Accordingly there was recommendation of sending out fifty half-track 75-mm. guns in September; also a company of light tanks which would be "of great value in meeting hostile attacks against the shores of Luzon"; also a total of 24,000 rounds of 37-mm. antitank ammunition "in view of the possibility of an attack against the Philippine Islands." General Marshall promptly approved.[47] The next day dispatch of the 425 Reserve officers was approved, to be followed the next month by orders for 246 additional officers of general and field grade, as now requested by General McArthur (101 Regulars, 145 Reserves); a little later, in response to another request from the USAFFE commander, General Marshall gave assurance that "specialists, individuals and organizations required by you will be supplied promptly when you send details." [48]

Factors in the 1941 Change of Attitude

These rapid additions to Philippine defenses, in contrast with the restraints of earlier months, it would seem, came as a surprise to numerous planning officers. That they marked an actual shift of military policy, so considerable as to call for General Marshall's emphasis of it to his immediate Staff, is indicated in General Gerow's office diary notation of 31 July. This recorded a conference in the office of the Chief of Staff that day, attended by himself, the Deputy Chief (General Bryden), and the Chiefs of G–1 (General Haislip) and G–3 (Brig. Gen. H. L. Twaddle), at which General Marshall "stated it was the policy

[46] Memo, WPD for TAG through SGS, 28 Jul 41, sub: Mission U. S. Army Forces in Far East, containing substance of radiogram for Gen MacArthur, OCS 18136–39.

[47] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 30 Jul 41, sub: Additional Armament for the Philippines, appd 30 Jul, OCS 18812–61.

[48] (1) Memo, ACofS G–1 for TAG, through SGS, 31 Jul 41, sub: Additional Reserve Officers for Training the Phil Army, OCS 18136–40. (2) Memo, ACofS G–1 for CofS, 15 Aug 41, sub: Regular Army Officers for Duty with the Phil Army, appd by DCofS, 23 Aug 41, G–1/13864–482, copy in OCS 18136–45. (3) Same for same, 19 Aug 41, sub: Additional Regular Officers, copy in OCS 18136–44. (4) Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 9 Sep 41, quoted in Memo, G–3 for CofS, 12 Nov 41, sub: Reinforcements for the Phil Dept, OCS 18136–103.

of the United States to defend the Philippines. This defense will not be permitted to jeopardize the success of the major efforts made in the theater of the Atlantic." [49] If this seems like a mere reiteration of official policy, in that the United States had never formally ceased to regard Philippine defense as its policy, the fact remains that the emphasis was sufficient to impress the remark on the planning chief so strongly as to cause this entry in his diary. It suggests how laggard, in that officer's judgment, the nation had been in implementing its policy. The timing of General Marshall's remark on Philippine defense less than a week after the MacArthur appointment is as significant as is the accompanying caution, even then, against jeopardizing Atlantic defense.

Manifestly, it was a growing recognition of Japanese intentions that provided much of the special stimulus to action in mid-1941, but it is doubtful that to any specific act on Japan's part can the rapidity of the movement be attributed. In contemporary explanations one may note the 12 June declaration of General Grunert that his own recommendation of a 10-division mobilization had its basis in "the tense international situation, the vulnerable location of the Philippine Islands, and relative deficiencies in the U. S. war garrison . . .; the only remedy lay in early reinforcements." General Gerow's testimony in support of the bill for appropriating the sugar excise funds was that "with the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia and the possibility of hostilities extending to the Far East" the War Department had recommended that the Philippine Army be called. General Marshall wrote to General MacArthur that "as a result of the alignment of Japan with the Axis, followed by the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, the strategic importance of the Philippines was enhanced. Reinforcement, particularly with air units, was indicated, and the assignment of a broader mission than that contained in Rainbow 5 appeared practicable." [50] Japan's "alignment with the Axis" was followed on 22 July 1941 by her establishment of bases in a newly gained zone of Indo-China; these bases would provide a new flanking threat to the Philippines, and while this fact no doubt added to existing American alarms, it did not initiate them. The abortive planning of the ADB conference and its sequels were also a factor in the mid-year agitation, but not a measurable one.

[49] Entry of 31 Jul 41 in General Gerow's informal office diary of the period 28 May–6 Sep 41, filed as item 1, Exec 10, P&O files.

[50] (1) Grunert to TAG, 12 Jun 41, Program of Expenditures, WPD 3251–47. (2) Testimony of Gen Gerow before Senate Committee on Territories, 6 Oct 41, on S 1529, copy in WPD 3251–47. (3) Memo, CofS for MacArthur, 18 Oct 41, sub: USAFFE, WPD 4175–18.

Finally, one may reasonably suspect that America's great burst of activity in the Philippines came about not so much from alarms over the new threats as from a sudden awareness that in the newly developed B–17 heavy bomber America at last had a weapon with which the Philippines could actually and effectively and for the first time be armed against such threats. This strategic development had been envisaged early in 1940, when Navy members of the Joint Board proposed increase of air strength in the Philippines and WPD recognized that thereafter "principal reliance would be placed on air power, not only to deter an attack on Luzon but to defeat one if made." [51] Although the great flow of heavy bombers to Manila could not be started then, the policy was well established in 1941 and en route to full implementation. It was summarized late that year in a letter from General Bryden to General MacArthur:

> Heretofore, contemplated Army action in the Far East area has been purely of a defensive nature. The augmentation of the Army Air Forces in the Philippines has modified that conception of Army action in this area to include offensive air operations in the furtherance of the strategic defensive combined with the defense of the Philippine Islands as an air and naval base.[52]

Items in the 1941 Rearming of the Philippines

But the newly available might of the Army Air Force's B–17, potent as it was in the sudden alteration of strategy, seems to have been only one of the factors in Army thinking about the Philippines in the midsummer of 1941. WPD's judgment was set forth in a memorandum concurred in by G–3 and G–4 and the Chief of the Army Air Forces. After reciting the augmentations to date of Philippine defense, it listed requirements for the future. These requirements included three categories of material. They were antiaircraft, an infantry division, and (with no emphasis on this item) "modern combat airplanes to replace obsolescent types on hand." In fact much more attention was paid to the need for shipping. It was felt that while the Philippines should receive another regiment of American antiaircraft artillery and another infantry division (both National Guard units which it was hoped the service-extension legislation then

[51] Memo, WPD for CofS, 2 Mar 40, sub: Practicability of Increasing Army Aviation Strength in the Philippines, WPD 4192–3.

[52] Ltr, Actg CofS (Bryden) to CG USAFFE, 21 Nov 41, sub: U. S.-British Commonwealth Cooperation in the Far East, OCS 18136–107. This is a revision of a letter prepared for General Marshall's signature a few days earlier but apparently returned to WPD for the alteration. See Ltr, CofS to CG USAFFE, 17 Nov 41, sub: U. S.-British Commonwealth Cooperation, WPD 4402–112, accompanied by copy of Memo, CNO for CinC Asiatic Fleet, 7 Nov 41.

in Congress would make available) this would depend upon the Navy's ability to provide 150,000 tons of shipping.[53] (The Chief of Staff's Office disapproved sending the infantry division and added a tank battalion and maintenance company.) The necessity for swift action was briefly summarized:

> The present attitude of Japan indicates she may consider reduction of the Philippine Islands a prior requirement to consummation of other plans for expansion. The ability of the Philippine Islands to withstand a determined attack with present means is doubtful. To enhance the probability of holding Luzon and, in any event, giving a reasonable assurance of holding Manila Bay, further prompt reinforcement of the Philippines is essential.

This memorandum is of interest not only as showing what WPD then felt should and could be supplied immediately but as listing the items of aid that had been added since early 1941. They included: increase of the Scouts from 6,415 to authorized strength of 12,000; increase of the 31st U. S. Infantry from 1,107 to 1,653, enlisted strength (this regiment with two Scout regiments made up the "Philippine Division, USA"); increase of harbor defense troops by 1,500; provision of an aircraft warning service company of 200, plus two SCR-270 radio sets with an SCR-271 to go out in September; provision of thirty-one P-40B planes, with fifty later-model pursuits, the P-40E, to be shipped in September, and a squadron of the new bombers, nine B-17D's, to be flown out in September; starting of airfield improvements (many would be needed to maintain the airline of communications to distant Pacific islands); bombs and ammunition; summoning the Philippine Army; the first legislative steps toward providing $52,000,000 from the excise fund referred to; scheduling of a tank battalion and fifty-four M-4 tanks to sail in September; scheduling of fifty 75-mm. antitank guns in September; and initiation of the shipment of eighteen 37-mm. antiaircraft guns with 36,000 rounds of ammunition.

Whether by War Department design, as then urged by WPD, or as a result of new pressure from outside the Army for additional aid to the distant islands, General Marshall made additional allotments within a month. An informal memorandum in mid-September to the Chief of Naval Operations (who had asked what the Army was doing for the Philippines) brought the following schedule of recent and prospective aid:

> 26 August; part of the antiaircraft regiment had sailed from San Francisco.
>
> 8 September; remainder of the regiment had sailed, plus a battalion of fifty tanks, plus the fifty P-40E pursuit planes.

[53] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Reinforcement for the Philippines, WPD 3251-55. This copy bears the revisions ordered by the OCofS, initialed "SRM" (Lt Col S. R. Mickelson).

18 September; fifty self-propelled mounts for 75-mm. cannon would be shipped from San Francisco; also fifty more tanks.

"Today" (12 September); the nine B–17's, whose September departure had been promised, landed in Manila after their Midway–Wake–New Britain–Indies Flight.

30 September; two more squadrons of B–17's would leave San Francisco en route to the Philippines.

October; a reserve shipment of pursuit planes would begin moving, probably thirty-two of them in October, a total of 130 additions by December.

November; there would be dispatched a reserve of six to nine B–24 planes ("super-Flying Fortresses" General Marshall enthusiastically called them, although later the term "Superfortress" was applied rather to the B–29).

December; some thirty-five more B–17's, plus fifty-four dive bombers, plus two additional squadrons to build up the pursuit group, would be dispatched.[54]

Four days later WPD recommended the shipment of the 192d Tank Battalion then on maneuvers (this fulfilled the 14 August recommendation), to sail on about 1 November; this was approved, and in another week assurance went to General MacArthur that equipment for his forces was already enjoying the highest priority. It was estimated that, save for ammunition, his defensive reserves for 50,000 men would be substantially in hand by February 1942. Significantly, the full supply of ammunition could not be promised before September 1942.[55] The lamentable delay in its delivery was beyond cure, so immense was the drain at that time upon arsenals only just coming into production. But priority in troop transportation now became threatened by current Navy plans to convert the transports *West Point, Wakefield,* and *Mount Vernon* to aircraft carriers, and against that conversion plan General Marshall made protest to Admiral Stark. With the three vessels, he explained, much-needed reinforcements could reach Manila by 10 December; without them the troops would arrive in late February, a difference of seventy days. The memorandum proceeded:

Knowing that you are as much interested as I in speeding up the Philippine threat to Japanese shipping, and the vast importance of this threat becoming clearly apparent to the Japanese in the next few weeks, I am sure you will appreciate our situation.[56]

[54] Summarized from Memo (informal), CofS for Admiral Stark, 12 Sep 41, no sub, OCS 18136–56, with notation "I gave original to Mr. Stimson. GCM."

[55] (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 16 Sep 41, sub: Additional Tank Battalion, appd 24 Sep 41, OCS 18136–60. (2) Memo, WPD for TAG, through DCofS (Moore), 23 Sep 41, sub: Supplies for Phil Army, WPD 4560–1, copy in 18136–61.

[56] Memo, CofS for Admiral Stark, 25 Sep 41, sub: Conversion of Troop Transports, signed by Crawford, OCS 17396–56–B.

In September 1941 it can be seen that there was still no adequate realization in the War Department of how rapidly time was running out. Hence the 10 December arrival was thought of as important in the planning. At the very end of September there was a recital of planning that aimed partly at the immediate future, but also at an augmentation running to October 1942 and of course fated never to be attained. This was in the form of an extended radiogram to General MacArthur giving him instructions that justified his expansive title as Far East commander. In this message he was advised of the War Department's plan to integrate the defense of the Philippines, Australia, the Dutch East Indies, and Singapore through improvement of operating fields throughout the area and their supply with fuel, bombs, and ammunition. General MacArthur was asked to obtain from the British in the Far East permission for America's heavy bombardment and reconnaissance planes to make use of British facilities at Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul, and Port Moresby and emergency fields; to urge on the British creation of a new airfield in North Borneo; and to negotiate with the Dutch with regard to their facilities. In expectation of this permission being granted he was advised to place some of his own stocks at these bases. For his own purposes he was informed, in this same message, of the prospective sailing within the week of a supply of 3,500 500-pound bombs and of the personnel of the 19th Bombardment Group; of the departure of fifty pursuits and fifty-two dive bombers in November–December, of the arrival of thirty-five B–24's before January, and of thirty-five B–17's about 1 January. In sum, this would provide him a total of

> . . . 136 operating heavy bombers and 34 additional in reserve, 57 operating dive bombers and 29 additional in reserve, 130 operating pursuits with 65 additional in reserve. One additional pursuit group is under consideration. This augmentation to be commenced about April 1942 and to be completed about October 1942.[57]

That these planes did not arrive before the outbreak of war was another item in the succession of tragic events that marked late 1941; had they reached Luzon and escaped the initial Japanese raids, their usefulness in harassing the enemy's invasion fleets could have been a temporarily decisive factor, even though the accuracy of aerial bombing should fall far below optimistic expectations. But, as if the difficulties of airplane production and manpower training were not enough, once some of the new airplanes and crews were ready and en route, bad fortune

[57] Memo, WPD for TAG, 30 Sep 41, sub: Air Facilities in the Far East, marked "OK GCM," OCS 18136–67.

dogged their trans-Pacific delivery. A November shipment of B–17 bombers was delayed in California for days by a series of unseasonable and hence unpredicted headwinds, so that they unluckily finished the California–Hawaii leg of their scheduled journey just in time to run into the Pearl Harbor raiders. A group of dive bombers fared little better. General Marshall had ordered this newly equipped and manned group to leave the Louisiana maneuvers and hurry toward the Philippines. They reached Hawaii intact but there, unknown to the Army, the Navy's convoy authorities split the group in two, sending the personnel by fast ship direct to Manila, in order to afford maximum protection, and sending the planes by the slower freight-route through the South Pacific. The Army's first knowledge of this arrangement came after Pearl Harbor when word came that the plane element was aboard a ship diverted for safety's sake to Australia. On arrival at Sidney the planes were hastily uncrated under the trying conditions prevalent at a crowded port with insufficient trained personnel. In assembling the planes the ground crew could find no trace of the solenoids necessary for firing the wing guns, and too late it was discovered that the instruments had originally been fastened to the planes' crating and apparently had been thrown away with that "useless" lumber. By the time new solenoids had been received from the United States, Japan had captured Borneo and, with it, the landing fields without which the short-range dive bombers could not hope to make the transit from Australia to Luzon. By this pair of mishaps General MacArthur failed to get the two vitally needed shipments of heavy bombers and dive bombers.[58]

The specialists whose assignment had been promised to General MacArthur as soon as he should send specifications were approved in 10 October, by which time they were found to include a full infantry regiment and a field artillery brigade as well as medical, chemical, signal, and other service units.[59] A plea for tankers was less successful, the Joint Control Committee (on employment of shipping) informing the Army that there already were ample tankers in the Far East, and that only a small cargo vessel was needed, which would be supplied. The report to this effect General Marshall referred to G–4 with instructions to "put pressure on the second paragraph" and to keep him informed as to the certainty of General MacArthur's access to tanker requirements.[60]

[58] See General Marshall's previously cited Memo (Apr 49) for Historical Division, sub: MS "The Office of the Chief of Staff in World War II."

[59] Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Oct 41, sub: Reinforcements for Phil Army, appd by Marshall 10 Oct, OCS 18136–69.

[60] Memo, DCofS for Air (Arnold) for CofS, 8 Oct 41, sub: Tankers for the Philippines, OCS 18136–72.

A Hopeful View of Philippine Defenses

The fact that these considerable additions were already on the way to the Philippine defense establishment did much to improve WPD confidence in the Far East situation. The planners' newly optimistic viewpoint was expressed in some detail on 8 October in a communication addressed directly to Mr. Stimson. It presented a study of the strategic situation in the Philippine area, holding that Japan's known aspirations in the Siberian maritime provinces, China, and Malaya were being retarded by Russia's unexpected resistance to Germany, by China's resistance to Japan, by the economic embargoes, and by Japanese uncertainty of a new war's outcome. It stressed the need of keeping Japan nonbelligerent so as to permit the concentration of Allied resources against Germany, and hence recommended not only a continuation of existing deterrents to Japanese aggression but the provision of strong air forces to provide offensive powers that should be clearly visible to the Japanese for purposes of intimidation. In such an enterprise the Philippines were an important part, and the steps to increase their strength and to integrate it with that of the anti-Axis nations in the Far East were enumerated. The study concluded:

> Consideration of Japan's forces and her capabilities leads to the conclusion that the [American] air and ground units now available or scheduled for dispatch to the Philippine Islands in the immediate future have changed the entire picture in the Asiatic Area. The action taken by the War Department may well be the determining factor in Japan's eventual decision and, consequently, have a vital bearing on the course of the war as a whole.[61]

That this was Departmental doctrine is proved by General Marshall's inclosure of the study with a letter to General MacArthur ten days later, identifying it as "an indication of present War Department thought on this subject." This was a step toward explaining to the USAFFE command a prospective change in Rainbow 5 concepts. That plan had originally contemplated defense only of the approaches to Manila Bay and, thus limited, had not proposed wartime reinforcements from the United States. The Tripartite pact and the German-Russian war, however, called for acceptance of a broader mission of which the current reinforcements, particularly in air units, were an earnest: the revision of the operations plan for Rainbow 5 (which General MacArthur had asked for on 1 October) probably would be effected by the Joint Board in ten days. Most

[61] Memo, Gen Gerow, Actg ACofS, for SW, 8 Oct 41, sub: Strategic Concept of the Phil Isl. WPD 3251-60. 3251–60.

vitally, as specifically requested by General MacArthur, the new aim was to defend, not Manila Bay alone but the whole Philippine archipelago—a far more prolonged task calling for much more equipment including ammunition. In proportion to this national objective the enlarged Army missions now would be:

a. In co-operation with the Navy, defend this significantly enlarged Philippine Coastal Frontier which now was placed in the category of Defense E (i. e. in all probability subject to major attack).

b. Support the Navy in raiding Japanese sea communications and destroying Axis forces.

c. Conduct air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases.

d. Co-operate with the Associated Powers in defense of the territories of these powers in accordance with approved policies and agreements.[62]

In his letter General Marshall repeated his assurance that reinforcements were being forwarded with all possible speed. Tanks and field artillery were moving well. The lag in ammunition was again so disturbing to planning authorities, however, that WPD reported warningly on 31 October that General MacArthur's 10-day defense needs in .50-caliber ammunition were admittedly less than one-third met; the 20-day defense needs in 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition were less than one-seventh met.[63] "The garrison has not reached the effective strength desired by General MacArthur." To cover what he thought of as the publicity needs of the occasion, with Japanese readers as well as American readers in mind, the Secretary of War provided Secretary of State Hull with the text of a purposely brief but suggestive press announcement: "As a routine strengthening of our Island outposts we are replacing obsolescent aircraft in the Philippines with modern combat planes." [64]

Swift Developments of November 1941

The recurring uneasiness of WPD, suggested by the memoranda of late October and early November, reflected greatly increased uneasiness elsewhere.

[62] Summarized from Memo, CofS for MacArthur, 18 Oct 41, sub: U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, with incls, WPD 4178–18. See also Memo, MacArthur for TAG, 1 Oct 41, same file, and Memo, CofS for CG USAFFE, 21 Nov 41, sub: United States-British Commonwealth Cooperation in the Far East, WPD 4402–112.

[63] (1) Memo, DCofS (Moore) for CofS, 28 Oct 41, sub: Shipment of Tanks and S–P Guns, OCS 18136–65–B. (2) Memo, WPD for DCofS, 31 Oct 41, sub: Ammunition for the Philippines and Tab A, OCS 18136–97. (3) Memo, same for CofS, 3 Nov 41.

[64] Memo, SW for CofS, 31 Oct 41, sub: Proposed Announcement as to the Rearmament, OCS 14528–27.

The prolonged discussions of Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, who was professedly seeking a formula for peace although the Japanese plans for the Pearl Harbor raid now were well advanced, continued to accomplish nothing; rather they marked the two nations' approach to complete disagreement. On 3 November Joseph C. Grew, U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo, warned the State Department against any delusion that economic weakening of Japan would hasten a collapse of Japanese military spirit; he specifically warned that it would be short-sighted for American policymakers to regard Japan's known war preparations as mere saber-rattling.[65] On 7 November Mr. Hull informed the Cabinet meeting that there was "imminent possibility" of Japan's setting out on new military conquest, and the Cabinet soberly discussed the advisability of speeches which would prepare the American public for tragic events which might come to pass. On Armistice Day, therefore, Secretary of the Navy Knox in a formal address referred to "grim possibilities" in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, and Assistant Secretary of State Welles to waves of world conquest "breaking high both in the East and in the West" and threatening to "engulf our own shores," the United States being in greater danger than in 1917, with the possibility that "at any moment war may be forced upon us." So acute were premonitions of trouble that on 17 November Mr. Grew cabled a warning for vigilance against sudden Japanese attack in regions not then involved in the China war.

The effect of this, properly and accurately enough, was to quicken Army apprehensions with regard to the Philippines. Unfortunately it served also to lessen, relatively, the worry over Hawaii. Thus on 10 November at a conference with G–3, G–4, Quartermaster, Navy, and Maritime Commission representatives the WPD spokesman announced that "Philippine movement should have priority over movements to Hawaii, and that the Hawaiian movements would be deferred accordingly." Troop movements to the Philippines that had been scheduled for January would be moved up to December, and shipments in general for that area were to be expedited in every possible way.[66] Ten pack howitzers with ammunition, then thought excess to Panama Canal needs, were ordered shipped to the Philippines. A few days later WPD recommended, and General Moore immediately approved, the withdrawing of 130 antitank 75's

[65] The detail of these warnings from the diplomatic branch is presented at length in U. S. Dept of State, *Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy 1931–41.*

[66] Memo, WPD for ASW (McCloy) and DCofS (Moore), 10 Nov 41, sub: Shipping for Philippines, WPD 2789–17, copy in OCS 18136–121. See also informal Memo, G–3 for DCofS, 12 Nov 41, sub: Reinforcement for the Philippines, G–3/44816, copy in 18136–103.

from nontask forces in the United States in favor of the Philippines and the immediate shipment of forty-eight 75's from Hawaii to the Philippines for later replacement; shipment (with Hawaii's approval) of 123 more .30-caliber machine guns from Hawaii to the Philippines; forwarding even of a small lot of 1916-model 37-mm. guns.[67] Two days later G–3 recommended and General Bryden approved the release of 3,564 officers and men of signal and ordnance companies from army maneuvers in the United States so that they could be ordered to the Philippines.[68] On 25 November WPD got General Moore's approval for sending out 5,000 mustard gas shells, five tons of toxic smoke equipment, one hundred flame throwers, and 15,000 land mines, all from the Chemical Warfare stores. Two days later even the removal of task force reserve ammunition was approved in order to supply 37-mm. ammunition to the Philippines and, this time, to Alaska also.[69] By 28 November WPD was called on for another statement of troops and materiel which were in or en route to the Philippines. Because it is the last such computation made before Pearl Harbor, it is of interest to note that by this computation there then were 29,000 U. S. troops in the islands, with 2,700 more en route, plus 80,000 Philippine troops if one includes the ten divisions expected on 15 December. (Table 3.) This total of 111,700 was far from the total force of 200,000 which General MacArthur had cheerfully looked forward to on 1 October and estimated as sufficient for defense needs. Scheduled to sail in the first week of December were 19,000 more, who of course were turned back en route when the blow fell on Pearl Harbor. As to airplanes, this final summary reports eighty-one P–40E's on hand and sixty-four en route in time to arrive before 7 December; fifty-two A–24 dive bombers en route; thirty-five 4-engine bombers on hand. (Table 4.) As to ground force materiel reinforcement, equipment of one regiment of antiaircraft artillery was on hand, 109 tanks and fifty self-propelled mounts for 75-mm. guns were on hand; forty 105-mm. howitzers were en route, likewise forty-eight 75-mm. guns in one lot and 130 in two other lots scheduled too late to arrive by 7 December.[70]

[67] Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Nov 41, sub: 75-mm. Pack Howitzer Equipment, WPD 849–20, copy in OCS 18136–99, and Memo, same for same, 12 Nov 41, sub: Machine Guns, Philippine Army, OCS 18136–65.

[68] Memo, G–3 for CofS, 14 Nov 41, Reinforcements for the Phil Dept, G–3 44816, copy in OCS 18136–103.

[69] (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Nov 41, sub: Chemical Warfare supplies for the Philippines, OCS 18136–117. (2) Memo, same for DCofS, 26 Nov 41, sub: 37-mm. Gun AA Ammunition, WPD 3602–3, copy in OCS 18136–119.

[70] Memo, WPD for SW, 28 Nov 41, sub: Reinforcement of the Philippines, noted by CofS, OCS 18136–124.

TABLE 3.—U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 30 NOVEMBER 1941

Unit	Total	Officers	Enlisted		
			Total	American	Philippine Scouts
All units	31,095	[a] 2,504	28,591	16,634	11,957
Headquarters units	671	367	304	304	0
Philippine Division	10,233	517	9,716	1,807	7,909
Other field units	5,070	280	4,790	2,813	1,977
Harbor Defense	5,225	335	4,890	3,318	1,572
Air Corps [b]	5,609	669	4,940	4,940	0
Service detachment	4,268	317	3,951	3,452	499
Other [c]	19	19	0	0	0

[a] Includes 31 Philippine Scout officers.

[b] According to W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (University of Chicago Press, 1948), I, 170, Air Corps strength on 7 December 1941 was 754 officers, 6,706 men.

[c] Includes officers for whom no unit is indicated.

Source: Philippine Department, MRU Report of Station Strength, Officers and Enlisted Men, November 1941. AGO records, SAB files. Note that these figures do not correspond exactly with the round numbers employed by WPD.

TABLE 4.—MODERN COMBAT AIRCRAFT ON HAND IN THE PHILIPPINES: 8 AND 9 DECEMBER 1941 [a]

Type	Number Assigned	Operational	
		8 December	9 December
Total	194	120	84
B-17	35	30	17
P-40	107	72	[b] 52
P-35	52	18	15

[a] Represents number on hand at 1200 (Philippine time) each day. Does not include data for 39 obsolescent bombers and 16 fighters assigned to the Far East Air Force as of 8 December 1941.

[b] Includes an unknown number of P-40's that were not operational; 55 were reported destroyed in the air or on the ground.

Sources: History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predecessors), Part I, Air Historical Office, pp. 9-10; *The Army Air Forces in World War II,* I, 192 and 213; Memo, Gerow for CofS, Nov 41, sub: Airplanes in Phil Is, Incl 1, 19 Nov 41, WPD 3633-20. Note variation from WPD estimate of 28 November.

The extent to which reinforcements had lately gone to the Philippines, plus the deceptive confidence that what was en route would also be installed soon and in operating order, appear at last to have built up in the mind of the Chief of Staff, among others, a larger faith in the Luzon defenses than was warranted. There was a significant expression of this on 26 November at a Staff conference in his office, with General Gerow, General Arnold, Colonel Bundy, and Colonel Handy of WPD present. The notes of the conference record the Chief of Staff as reporting that the President and Mr. Hull felt the Japanese were dissatisfied with the current conferences and "will soon cut loose." The notes proceed:

> While both the President and Mr. Hull anticipate a possible assault on the Philippines, General Marshall said he did not see this as a probability because the hazards would be too great for the Japanese. . . . We know a great deal that the Japanese are not aware we know, and we are familiar with their plans to a certain extent. . . . We are not justified in ignoring any Japanese convoy that might be a threat to our interests. Thus far we have talked in terms of the defense of the Philippines, but now the question is what we do beyond that.[71]

At this conference General Gerow said the Japanese probably would not go into Siberia, but most likely into Thailand (a view then prevalent in the Staff), raising a question of American action after the Japanese had passed the agreed-upon limit of 100° E–10° N. He also raised a question of immediate instructions for General MacArthur, and was advised that prior to actual hostilities [72] General MacArthur should, in co-operation with the Navy, take such reconnaissance and other measures as he felt necessary. This message was to be discussed later with the Navy. (It actually was sent on 27 November.)

Already, as previously noted, the scope of General MacArthur's control was in debate. He had taken over General Grunert's departmental duties in late October, but the WPD recommendation that (in view of the growing might of Army air power in that area) he also be granted over-all command of Navy elements in the Far East had not got beyond General Marshall.[73] General MacArthur ventured the opinion that the Navy was seeking "control" of the Army's

[71] Notes on conference in office of CofS, 26 Nov 41, 10:40 A. M., WDCSA 381 Philippines (12–4–41).

[72] The use of the term "actual hostilities" was the result of a cynical interjection by General Marshall. General Gerow's draft had said "a state of war," but the recorder's notes attribute the Chief of Staff's revision to the reasoning that "there is war in China and there is war in the Atlantic at the present time, but in neither case is it declared war."

[73] (1) Memo, DCofS for TAG, 21 Oct 41, sub: Orders for Maj Gen George Grunert and Lt Gen Douglas MacArthur, OCS 18136–78. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 13 Oct 41, sub: Command in the Philippines, marked "Hold" by Marshall, WPD 3251–61.

air forces—this interpretation stemming from a contention (apparently by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commanding the U. S. Asiatic Fleet) that tactical command by the Navy was necessary when aircraft attacks on vessels were made in areas where Navy ships were operating. The Navy proposal, which would have placed Army air elements under Navy control in this respect, was forwarded to Washington with General MacArthur's declaration that it was "entirely objectionable." The commander of USAFFE reiterated that his own portion of the prescribed mission involving support of the Navy would be carried out with all possible energy, but that co-operation would be best found in leaving elements under their normal commands, with a mere co-ordination of their assignments. WPD supported General MacArthur, added that "when unity of command over specific operations is desirable, arrangements may be made by agreement between General MacArthur and the appropriate Naval commander," and recommended that the Navy be informed of the War Department's views.[74] This was on 18 November, and the difficulty of reaching an agreement between Army and Navy chiefs on this issue is suggested by the fact that General Marshall did not provide formal approval of the recommendations until 5 December, when apparently General MacArthur had radioed his views on the matter and directly asked for instructions. In the meantime the MacArthur-Hart controversy had been getting too lively, involving a letter which Admiral Stark brought to Army attention. General Marshall felt called upon to inform General MacArthur as follows:

> I was disturbed to receive your note of November 7th transmitting correspondence between Hart and yourself. I was more disturbed when Stark sent over to me your letter to him of October 18th. However, your cable of November 28th stating "intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy" was reassuring. . . .[75]

The following week (in answer to another inquiry) General MacArthur was assured that there were

> . . . no commitments made here that conflict with your proposed method of cooperation with the Navy. Gratified that you and Admiral Hart are entirely in accord on most effective employment of our combined forces in the Far East. It is intended that Army air units would be placed under Navy unity of command for specific tasks of tem-

[74] Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Nov 41, sub: Control of Air in the Far East, WPD 4615, copy in OCS 18136-132. The views of Admiral Hart on this and related points are presented in his manuscript "Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, Leading Up to War," a photostatic copy of which is in the files of the Army Historical Division.

[75] Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 28 Nov 41, OCS 18136-132.

porary and definitely naval character. Army unity of command for specific tasks would be established for similar reasons. . . .[76]

The 5 December letter was simply a fuller explanation of the continuing view that "coordination shall be effected by the method of mutual cooperation." It mentioned as an illustration the possible necessity of detaching Army air units from the Philippines to operate from Singapore in support of a naval operation, in which case the air units would operate under command exercised by the Asiatic Fleet commander.[77] All this provided a smarting example of interservice difficulties of the sort that would arise on and after 7 December. For the immediate present matters in the Far East appeared to be under control, as indicated by General MacArthur's 28 November message to which General Marshall had referred:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio 624, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Ground security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theater of operations, everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Immediate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.[78]

This message was primarily in response to the 27 November warning from the Chief of Staff, already mentioned,[79] which stated that negotiations with Japan appeared to be terminated and that while Japan's future action was unpredictable, hostile action was "possible at any moment." It directed General MacArthur to "take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary" and to report measures he was taking. This General MacArthur's reply did.

[76] Memo, WPD for TAG through SGS, 3 Dec 41, sub: Army and Navy Relations, contains substance of cable for MacArthur, appd by Marshall, WPD 4615, copy in OCS 18136–138.

[77] Personal Ltr, Marshall to MacArthur, 5 Dec 41, prepared in WPD, WPD 4615 and OCS 18136–132.

[78] Cable, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Nov 41 (No. 1004), initialed by Marshall, copy in OCS 18136–118.

[79] The message will be discussed at greater length in Chapter XV.

CHAPTER XIV

The Nation's Outlying Defenses in 1941

The peacetime strategic frontier of Alaska–Oahu–Panama that was recommended in 1933 [1] as America's outlying western defense line readily commended itself. It was a line that the United States could probably maintain with its normal forces. Also it was one that the United States would have to maintain as a minimum for the full security of the west coast. The need of holding a sea frontier marked out by those specific land areas was apparent. (1) Alaska's long line of Aleutian Islands bordered the Great Circle route from Japan to the west coast ports; developed by America, it would provide a series of bases for defense against any attack from the northwest; on the other hand, in enemy possession it could offer continuous threat of harassing raids, if nothing more, against coastal cities, and obviously an enemy should be prevented from getting a foothold in any part of Alaska. (2) Oahu, the most populous of the Hawaiian Islands and the site of Pearl Harbor, provided a natural base for mobile defense forces protecting America from seaborne attacks from either west or southwest; likewise it would be an invaluable base for mounting an American seaborne assault upon enemies in the west. (3) Panama was vital to America by reason of the Canal, which permitted rapid shifting of the fleet between Atlantic and Pacific and in that sense doubled the size of the battle fleet and its auxiliary shipping.

All three of these essential bastions of America's outer defenses were comfortably distant from the west coast (from Dutch Harbor to Seattle is 1,707 sea miles, from Honolulu to San Francisco 2,091, from Panama to Los Angeles 2,913). While this meant that supplying and reinforcing them from the mainland called for exertion and shipping resources, it also meant that so long as these bastions (and the patrol screens based upon them) remained intact, an enemy would be held off from America by a considerable margin of safety. Each part of the strategic triangle therefore was important of itself. Each was still more important

[1] See Chapter XIII, p. 415.

as a factor in America's outer defense line; Oahu-based forces would be capable of co-operation with the forces based at the other points of the triangle and with lesser forces installed at secondary bases in mid-ocean.

On the inviolability of this strategic triangle, accordingly, rested much of the prewar strategic planning of Army and Navy. It was an understood premise in the program of the Navy's Hepburn Board, whose report of 1 December 1938 (weakened though it was by Congressional refusal to fortify Guam or even dredge a harbor there) started the Navy at its all-important base-development activities of 1939–41.[2] Prior to the development of the long-range airplane (which by 1941 was beginning its tremendous modification in strategic planning) the nation's first line of defense was wholly provided by the Navy. It was for this reason that in peacetime the Navy normally possessed the readiest of the nation's military forces and, accordingly, exerted leadership in many aspects of defense planning. The Army's primary function in the Philippine and Hawaiian archipelagoes was to protect the naval bases, just as its primary function in Panama was to protect the Canal installations that were essential to the Navy. Planning of Army and Navy was developed in unison through the Joint Board, but with recognition that in the first phase of any war in the Pacific the Navy would provide the principal American offensive instrument; the Army would require a considerable time for the upbuilding of its strength before it could assume anything more than a defensive posture. The actual aid that the prewar Army could provide to the strategic triangle itself (exactly as in the case of the Philippines, previously discussed) was limited by the Army's scant current resources of men and materiel. The places that were chiefly defended, therefore, were the places that most surely must be defended, as judged by the military planners.

The Situation in Alaska

Defense of the extreme north Pacific was not a major anxiety of the War Department in 1939. General Marshall's estimate of the situation, in late November of that year, was that while any major operations by an enemy in the Alaska–Aleutian area were highly improbable, the undefended harbors should be provided air and ground defense against seizure by minor enemy forces. Specifically the naval stations at Kodiak and Sitka and the radio station and fuel

[2] The board, headed by Rear Adm. A. J. Hepburn, was named under Congressional authorization of May 1938. Its report is discussed in Morison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific*, Vol. III of History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, pp. 32–34, and in Kittredge, U. S. Defense Policies.

reserves at Unalaska called for protection. At Anchorage the War Department wished to set up an Army air base and was including this item in its coming budget estimates for the 1941 fiscal year; also, in order to protect the projected air base, it was seeking authorization for installing at Anchorage a composite ground force of 3,000 men.[3] In April 1940 there was increased anxiety, for the House Appropriations Committee disallowed the $11,000,000 request for the Anchorage base, thus limiting the Army's air facilities in Alaska to an auxiliary base at Fairbanks that the Army judged to be wholly inadequate for major defense purposes. Within the Department at this time there was less anxiety over Japanese intentions than over what might develop in the Russian maritime provinces. Hitler's attack on the USSR was not to take place until 22 June 1941, and at the moment, April 1940, German naval and technical personnel were still assisting the Soviets under the existing Russo-German agreement. This threat was set forth in a Staff memorandum that showed uneasiness over imperilment to the strategic triangle of Alaska–Hawaii–Panama and, giving up hope for the entire amount of $11,000,000 needed for the proposed air base at Anchorage, urged an appropriation of $4,000,000 for preparatory work there.[4] Later in the month WPD urged the Chief of Staff to renew his efforts to get the whole appropriation for Anchorage and also to seek authorization for the 3,000-man garrison, arguing shrewdly (in quest of Navy support) that otherwise the Navy's contemplated Alaska installations would be insufficiently protected from enemy attack.[5] The effort succeeded, but not because of WPD's pleading. Rather, it was the German Blitzkrieg that startled Congress into hasty approval not merely of preparatory work but of the whole Anchorage project, now estimated at $12,743,060 for the air installation alone. Congress also looked with favor on allowing $6,379,225 for permanent construction for the ground forces; and without waiting for final formalities General Marshall authorized preparation of the garrison troops for departure.[6] While Alaska was then in

[3] Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to the President, 22 Nov 39, WPD 3512–50.

[4] Memo, prepared in OCS for SW signature, for the President, 2 Apr 40, unsigned and not sent, OCS 21209–5, copy in WPD 3512–58.

[5] Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for CofS, 20 Apr 40, sub: Alaska, WPD 3512–59. See also "Statement furnished Col. Loughry" for use before HR committee, signed "J. W. A. [Col Anderson] 3/7/40," WPD 3512–55. See also Memo, OCS for ACofS WPD, 16 May 40, sub: Dispatch of Forces, signed by Lt Col Omar N. Bradley, Asst SGS, OCS 14943–22.

[6] (1) Memo, OCS for G–3, G–4, and WPD, 27 May 40, no sub, signed by Lt Col Orlando Ward, SGS, OCS 14943–21, copy in WPD 3512–59. (2) Memo, CofS for G–3, G–4, WPD, QMG, CofAC, 28 May 40, sub: Plan for Development of Defenses, copy in WPD 3512–60. (3) Memo, G–4 for "All other interested WD Agencies," 29 May 40, G–4 30436–13, copy in WPD 3512–59. See also Ltr, WPD to CG Fourth Army, 18 May 40, sub: Dispatch of Forces to Alaska, and specifically 1st ind of CG Fourth Army, 31 May 40, all

the area of the Fourth Army, the latter's commander recommended creation of a special Alaska command. Accepting the suggestion, General Marshall designated as commander Col. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., later, as a lieutenant general, to meet death on Okinawa.[7]

Midsummer consideration by the Joint Board developed a realization that there was now a "recognizable menace of surprise aggression against Alaska by either Japan or Russia." A seven-page study concluded that while potential Alaskan bases could be controlled without actual military occupation, there was need for development of the permanent installations at Kodiak and Sitka and of the Army bases at Unalaska, Anchorage, and Fairbanks. In a broad sense control of the peninsula was recognized as dependent upon control of the north and east Pacific, but it was seen that sea control in turn would be aided by the existence in Alaska of secure operating bases ashore. This placed upon the Army responsibility for affording protection both to air and naval bases, particularly during the unavailability of the fleet.[8] With secretarial approval of the Joint Board's plan for improving the Alaska defenses, garrisons began moving northward in greater number, Navy and Marine Corps assuming interim responsibility. Besides the 153 officers and 3,388 enlisted men designated for the Anchorage garrison, plus a composite air group (1 pursuit and 2 bomber squadrons) to move in as soon as the base was ready, 1,489 men were designated to go to Unalaska on 1 July 1941, and 2,300 more to Sitka and Kodiak when facilities should become available.[9] Still later in the year WPD was suggesting assignment of tanks to the Alaska airfields for protection against paratrooper attacks from Russia, and scheduling work upon 11 emergency airfields.[10]

As the winter advanced, WPD faced the possibility that the real peril to Alaska was from Japan, and asked G–2 for a study of the situation. G–2's con-

in WPD 4297. The indorsement vigorously urged sending "without delay" a reinforced regiment to Anchorage, with a view to splitting it into combat teams, if necessary, for Dutch Harbor and Kodiak.

[7] Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for CofS, 17 Jun 40, sub: Designation of Commander of U. S. Troops in Alaska, WPD 3512–62, appd with modification by CofS, 18 Jun 40. See also WD Ltr (TAG), 25 Jun 40, sub: Designation of Commander, AG 320.2 (6–17–40) M–A, and Ltr, CG Fourth Army to Col Buckner, 9 Jun 40, sub: Duties and Responsibilities, copy in WPD 3512–62. For General Buckner's work on Okinawa see, in this series of volumes, Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*.

[8] JB 312, ser 650, 14 Aug 40, sub: Defense of the Naval Bases, copy in WPD 3512–68.

[9] Ltr, TAG to CG IX Corps Area, 24 Sep 40, sub: Augmentation of Anchorage, AG 320.2 (9–12–40) M–C–M, and Memo, Lt Col S. H. Sherrill (WPD) for ACofS WPD, 30 Sep 40, sub: Garrisons in Alaska, WPD 3512–82. See also Memo, WPD (Strong) for Gen Marshall, 9 Oct 40, Units in Alaska, WPD 3615–75.

[10] Memo, WPD for G–3, 25 Nov 40, sub: Light Tanks for Alaska Defense, WPD 3512–81, and Memo, WPD for TAG, 21 Dec 40, sub: Reinforcement for Alaska, WPD 4297–1.

clusion was against Japan's diverting from her own "impregnable area" enough forces to seek use of Alaska for primary fleet operations. On the other hand G–2 predicted that, if unopposed, Japan would promptly occupy useful parts of Alaska with a reinforced division, in order to gain a base for light naval, submarine, and air strikes against American targets ashore and at sea. An added purpose would be to deny to the United States use of these same areas for such attacks against Japan.[11] The Navy took Alaskan matters less seriously. It was explained that enemy forces were too much occupied elsewhere to be so disposed, and that Alaskan objectives were much less important to Japan than were Hawaii or the west coast: Navy deployment, however, would be such as "to make any enemy movement in force toward Alaska extremely hazardous." [12] Nevertheless the Navy appears to have pressed for an increase in the protective Army garrisons and, with both WPD and the Chief of Staff recommending an increase in the total garrison by 18,500 men, the Secretary in mid-April took a considerable step in that direction, approving 11,200.[13] July 1941 brought another wave of anxiety with respect to Alaska, occasioned by what WPD regarded as the "increasing danger of complete Russian collapse and subsequent possibility of Axis operations toward Alaska." The result was consent to increase the Alaska garrison to a total of 1,154 officers and 22,892 men; it was intended that only one-third should be sent before 1942, but later arrangements placed 22,895 officers and men there by October 1941, and 29,566 by February 1942.[14]

There was a desire within WPD for increase also of the air strength of Alaska at the earliest practicable date, not only for normal defense but for possible preventive attacks on enemy installations in eastern Siberia. Already, however, Alaska's peril was being eclipsed by that of the Philippines, and General Marshall wrote a regretful personal letter to General Buckner that further air reinforcement of Alaska was beyond immediate possibility. He was able only to inform the Alaskan commander of the schedule of future air deliveries to that

[11] Memo, ACofS WPD for G–2, 18 Jan 41, sub: Estimate of Situation—Alaska, and G–2 response, 27 Jan 41, both in WPD 4297–2.

[12] Memo, Lt Col R. W. Crawford for (WPD) Gen Gerow, 3 Feb 41, no sub, WPD 4297–2.

[13] (1) Memo, Gen Marshall to CNO, 11 Feb 41, sub: Alaskan Bases, OCS 14943–39, copy in WPD 3512–87, which refers to Ltr from CNO of 7 Feb 41. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 Mar 41, sub: Reinforcements for Alaska, appd by CofS, WPD 4297–1. (3) Memo, CofS for CNO, 16 Apr 41, sub: Alaskan Bases, same file as (1).

[14] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for TAG, 3 Jul 41, sub: Alaskan Situation, WPD 3512–119 (Rad for Fourth Army CG). (2) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 26 Jun 41, appd by DCofS 9 July 41, WPD 4297–1. (3) Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jul 41, sub: Status of Troops, WPD 3512–120. (4) Memo, WPD for CofS, 2 Aug 41, Status of Garrisons, WPD 4564. (5) Strength of the Army (STM–30) data.

distant outpost, running on to October 1942.[15] Navy touchiness over General Buckner's vigorous use of such air patrols as he possessed (the old issue of Navy responsibility for air patrols far out to sea) brought about a mild controversy which ended with General Marshall's discreet decision that the need for those particular Army air patrols was past. He assured Admiral Stark that the patrolling had ceased. "However," he continued "the situation may change sud denly. . . . The operation of such patrols is a responsibility of the Navy, but if adequate Naval forces are not available for this purpose, the Commanding General in Alaska must, in an emergency, employ the means at his disposal. . . ." [16] The vulnerability of Alaska was recognized, but the impossibility of hastening more aid there, even on the day after the 27 November "war-warning" message, was also admitted. As war drew nearer, this was beyond dispute.[17]

The Panama Situation

While it was obvious that Alaska's long coast line and meager defensive installations exposed that area to attack, whether by Japan or by a strengthened Russia, Army and Navy rightly estimated that the logistic difficulties of operations in the forlorn and fog-swept region made a grand-scale assault unlikely: the results to be gained would be disproportionate to the necessary effort. The threat of a raid on either of the other two points of the American defensive triangle in the west was entirely different in both respects: it was logistically practicable, and strategically attractive to an enemy. A successful assault on Hawaii would do incalculable damage to the United States Fleet, and it was primarily to safeguard the fleet and its base, as the Chief of Staff pointed out to the new commander in Hawaii in 1941,[18] that the Army was there at all. Much the same thing was true of Panama where, again, it was recognized that the Army's function was "to guard the Canal that it may at all times be available to the Navy." [19]

[15] (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 11 Jul 41, sub: Alaskan Security, WPD 4297–3 (not used). (2) Personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Buckner, 23 Sep 41, OCS 14943–60, copy in WPD 4297–6.

[16] (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Oct 41, sub: Alaskan Situation, WPD 3512–125, copy in OCS 14943–64. It refers to Ltr, CNO to CofS, 21 Aug, and CofS's acknowledgment, 30 Aug. (2) Memo, Gen Marshall for CNO, 18 Oct 41, sub: Offshore Patrols in Alaska, OCS 14943–64.

[17] (1) Memo, CofAS for TAG, 22 Nov 41, sub: Alaskan Situation. (2) Same for same, 28 Nov 41, sub: Air Defense of Alaska, appd by Marshall, 3 Dec 41. Both in OCS 14943–69. See also Memo, Lt Col C. C. Dusenberry to ACofS G–2, 1 Dec 41, sub: Visit to Alaska, WPD 3512–148, and Memo, Lt Col Nelson M. Walker for ACofS G–3, 5 Dec 41, sub: Report of Observation, WPD 3512–146.

[18] From personal Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Short, 7 Feb 41, WPD 4449–1.

[19] From personal Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Van Voorhis to Gen Marshall, 24 Jun 40, WPD 4326.

In August 1939, when the minatory rumbling of Hitler's drums convinced observers that war was imminent in central Europe, these Panama Canal defenses were among the War Department's first concerns. It was already decided that if war should come immediate reinforcement of the Canal garrison would be required, and a message assuring reinforcements was sent to the Commanding General, Panama Department, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Daniel Van Voorhis. In the Canal Zone were 13,403 men; the promise was of 889 antiaircraft "filler" personnel to sail in early September, to be followed by an infantry brigade of 2,678, and later by aviation reinforcements. (The brigade would "not form a permanent part of your garrison, and its return after the emergency is contemplated.") Besides the immediate reinforcements, plans of that period called for the ultimate but unscheduled forwarding of still other elements, which would raise the August total of 13,403 to an eventual 37,554 officers and men.[20]

Later in the winter General Van Voorhis made persistent efforts to round out the Canal Zone's defenses against enemy air raids. He envisaged a likelihood of brief but destructive attacks which (with a surmise of what later eventuated at Pearl Harbor) he said "may come before any offensive action is expected"; they were likelier from the Pacific than from the Atlantic, "due to the surveillance of both Army and Naval forces based on Puerto Rico." A small enemy bombing force in a few minutes might "completely stop marine traffic" through the Canal for a period of months. Because no emergency help from the United States could arrive instantly to cope with such an attack he stated that it was necessary to prepare adequate defenses on the spot in the form of an established force whose "primary mission remains the protection of the Canal," not the supplying of elements for an expedition elsewhere.[21] In this same letter General Van Voorhis emphasized the necessity of establishing in peacetime a reliable aircraft warning service. His recommendations for the defense project in general were for the most part approved by WPD, and WPD's resultant program was accepted by

[20] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for TAG, 22 Aug 39, sub: Immediate Action Measures, European War, WPD 4191–3. (2) Memo, ACofS G–3 for TAG, 26 Aug 39, sub: Movement of Reinforcements, G–3/41309, copy in WPD 4191–3. (3) Ltr, CG Panama Canal Dept to TAG, 26 Aug 39, sub: Estimates, copy in WPD 4191–3. (4) Memo, ACofS G–4 for TAG, 1 Sep 39, sub: Immediate Action Measures, G–4/20686–30, copy in WPD 4191–3. See also Memo, ACofS G–3 for G–1, G–2, G–4, and WPD, 5 Sep 39, sub: Reinforcements for Puerto Rico and Panama with accomp tables, G–3/41309, copy in WPD 4191–3.

[21] Ltr, Gen Van Voorhis to TAG, 12 Feb 40, sub: Air Defense of the Panama Canal Dept, copy in WPD 4270. In same file is Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Apr 40, sub: Panama Canal Defense Project, accepting Gen Van Voorhis' conclusions. It provides useful background for a study of events leading to Pearl Harbor—indicating the War Department's proper concern with the necessity of erecting better defenses in Panama as well as Hawaii.

General Marshall. Antiaircraft artillery increases, creation of a mechanized reconnaissance unit, and lesser changes were approved; General Van Voorhis' proposal to substitute heavy for medium bombers and long-range for medium reconnaissance planes (which the Chief of the Air Corps did not support) was rejected, and one for the construction of a bombproof command post was deferred for later consideration.[22]

In June the Pacific prospect was altered by the Russo-Japanese compact which for a time greatly reduced the possibility of those two nations' coming to war. The Staff conjecture in Washington was that this compact could well free Japan of a long-standing uneasiness over Russian intentions, and to that extent encourage Tokyo to embark on a trans-Pacific raid against American installations, without prior declaration of war. Accordingly on 17 June General Marshall ordered that warnings and instructions be sent to the most important and vulnerable of American possessions, Hawaii and the Canal. He directed that General Van Voorhis

> . . . quietly but immediately take every possible precaution against surprise action, naval, air, or sabotage, which may be intended to put the Canal out of commission. Your air component and antiaircraft forces must be in state of preparedness for action at any hour. . . .[23]

Three days later General Marshall penciled another message informing General Van Voorhis: "Fleet may be ordered to Atlantic; possibility of sabotage of canal anticipated; continue present precautions." In the interval there was a disturbing incident in Panama waters. A strange submarine surfaced some 5,000 yards from Taboga Island and was detected during searchlight drill as it moved away and out of sight. After consultation with the governor and the naval district commandant, General Van Voorhis reported, protective mines were laid on both sides of the Canal, in accordance with the joint plan of defense.[24] The celerity with which General Van Voorhis' office was attending to increased responsibilities soon involved him in a resumption of the ancient conflict of Army and Navy commands. The squadron commander in the port pointedly reminded the Army chief orally, and later in writing, that the squadron was "not in your chain of command." The sting of that reminder was not wholly concealed by the cordiality of his added remarks. A little later, by ac-

[22] Brief of WPD recommendations in a 15-page study, also study itself in form of Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Apr 40, WPD 4270. General Marshall approved the WPD recommendations on 20 April 1940.

[23] Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 40, sub: Defense Precautions, ordering radiogram to CG, Panama Canal Dept, WPD 4326. In same file is Marshall-Van Voorhis message, next mentioned.

[24] Rad 484, Van Voorhis to CofS, 20 Jun 40, WPD 4326.

knowledged error, General Van Voorhis' office sent to the naval district commander a directive (rather than the normal request) for implementing the 17 June alert. The oversight brought from that dignitary's chief of staff this extraordinary communication:

1. The Fifteenth Naval District not being part of the command of the Panama Canal, and orders emanating from that source having no authority in said District, enclosed order is returned herewith.

2. If it becomes necessary to communicate important information to the Commandant of the Fifteenth Naval District he may be found through Telephone 2–2661 or 2–2662.

This brought results reaching much further than the distance between Panama's Army and Navy installations. General Van Voorhis addressed to General Marshall a four-page letter quoting both communications. He gave assurance of the cordiality of his Navy relations and expressed the view that the existing dual command was equally embarrassing to the admirals. However, he made it clear that "after all, the Army is here to guard the Canal that it may at all times be available to the Navy," and that he could not even continue laying his defensive mines without having them guarded by destroyers that the Navy was not supplying.[25] Ignoring for the time being the latter point, General Marshall directed his attentions to the irritating matter of interservice protocol persisting even in those critical times, and himself started the preparation of a sharp written complaint to the Chief of Naval Operations, as the Panama admirals' superior. It began and ended thus:

Please glance over the following and then talk to me about it. The Canal is a pretty important consideration in our National Defense structure, and any accident there might have calamitous results. We cannot defend it with a debating society. . . .

The Commandant of the 15th Naval District is not under General Van Voorhis, but the whole tone of this procedure awakens my concern as to satisfactory arrangements for the defense of the Canal. We cannot be involved in quibbles over such matters at the present time, and I am deeply concerned over the reaction shown in these communications. Van Voorhis has a long record of getting along with people. He became conspicuous for that quality in the handling of the flood situation in the middle West. I am certain of his qualities.

I think it would be unfortunate to bring this up in an official manner, but I do think you and I will have to arrive at some satisfactory basis for the defense of the Canal. Germany has given us too good an illustration of the contrast between unity of command and the reverse.[26]

[25] Personal Ltr, Van Voorhis to Marshall, 24 Jun 40, WPD 4326. This file also contains a personal Memo, Gen Marshall for Gen Strong, 3 Jul 40, providing an incomplete draft of a Memo for Admiral Stark (which Gen Strong was to complete) and copy of resultant personal Memo for Admiral Stark, dated only "July —— 1940."

[26] See n. 25.

United Command Becomes an Issue

In this manner the military chiefs of Army and Navy came to oral discussion of the united command problem which was to recur time and time again, and which a year later was to bring about in this Panama-Caribbean area an experimental and not too successful merging of interservice authority. A necessary step toward this was the consolidation of the several Army commands that sprang up with the development of the new bases, and such an establishment was formally proposed by WPD in December 1940. It called for creation of a Caribbean Defense Command, made up of the Panama Canal Department (including Jamaica), the Puerto Rican Department (including the Bahamas, Antigua, and Santa Lucia), and the Trinidad Base Command (including British Guiana). The War Plans Division argued that these areas, plus adjacent neutral areas, would be included in a Caribbean theater of operations, and that the prospective wartime commander of such a theater should be making his peacetime preparations.[27] General Marshall approved the program and also the designation of the Panama Canal Department commander to the over-all post. In May the majority of the Staff divisions came to the conclusion that the over-all post was important enough to occupy one man's whole time and recommended both that the Caribbean Defense commander be relieved of immediate responsibility for the Canal Department, and that his headquarters be moved to Puerto Rico. Although G–1, G–3, and G–4 joined WPD in its proposal, General Marshall disapproved.[28] His desire was to have the headquarters kept at the Canal, possibly because Army Air was being increasingly recognized as sure to be the dominant defense element at that point, whereas Navy was likely to insist upon Navy domination in the Caribbean proper; possibly, too, General Marshall already had in mind the Air officer who would one day exercise unified command at Panama. This was Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, lately Chief of G–3 in Washington, now the new commander of the air elements in the Panama Canal Department, and in September 1941 successor to General Van

[27] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 19 Dec 40, sub: Caribbean Defense Command, appd by Gen Marshall 4 Jan 41, copy in WPD 4440–1. See also personal Ltr, Marshall to Van Voorhis, 4 Jan 41, and TAG to Van Voorhis, 10 Feb 41, same file.

[28] (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 22 Apr 41, sub: Organization of the Caribbean Defense Command, copy in WPD 4440–8. (2) Memo, G–3 for WPD, 24 Apr 41, sub: Station, Hq Carib Def Comm, G–3/44587, copy in WPD 4440–7. (3) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 8 May 41, same sub, disapproved by Marshall 14 May 41, copy in WPD 4440–7 with related papers.

Voorhis as commander of both the Caribbean Defense Command and the Panama Canal Department, with rank of lieutenant general.[29]

In the first week of 1941 General Marshall had written to General Van Voorhis enclosing a tentative study of this question of unified command. He admitted the difficulty of effecting agreement with the Navy on the touchy subject, and proposed, first, the Army's full co-ordination of the activities of its own air elements. It was "for that reason that [he had] sent Frank Andrews down to the Canal Zone, so that [General Van Voorhis] would have a very competent man for this purpose." [30] Two months later, in another personal letter, General Marshall asked for the Panama commander's review of the situation with regard to defense from air attack, remarking that "coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." It brought from General Van Voorhis a prompt and extended reply. The word "coordination" appears to have touched a spot made tender by earlier communications on that subject. "While recognizing its necessity," the Panama commander wrote, "I have been more concerned with the acquisition of means and training than I have with coordination." He outlined his own views on patrols, with which he was not in accord with the Air Corps; on the necessity of a much fuller aircraft warning service; on the circumstance that the Caribbean's problems were so different from those of the United States that he could not see great profit in sending representatives to the coming west coast air defense exercises, to which General Marshall had invited his attention.[31] Absence on an inspection trip prevented General Marshall from considering either the substance or the tone of this letter until April. He then wrote a letter mildly referring to his wish that, despite admittedly differing situations, basic control and co-ordination techniques which were applicable should be applied generally in the interests of uniformity. Only a little later, following critical observations by the Chief of the Air Corps and by General Andrews, a nettled WPD recommended a letter to Panama pointing out the faults of the Canal's air defense organization and ordering their correction. (Sometime later an extended report by Col. William E. Lynd to WPD related

[29] WD Special Orders 219, 19 Sep 41, par. 2, copy in WPD 4440–16. See also Ltr, TAG to CofS GHQ, 15 Nov 41, sub: Command of U. S. Army Forces in the Caribbean, AG 320.2 (11–8–41) MC–E–M, copy in WPD 4440–23. This placed GHQ over the CDC, in a command relationship which will be discussed in a later volume.

[30] Personal Ltr, Marshall to Van Voorhis, 4 Jan 41, copy in WPD 4440–1.

[31] (1) Personal Ltr, Marshall to Van Vorhis, 5 Mar 41, copy in WPD 4440–5 and in AG 320.2 (4–15–41). (2) Reply, 12 Mar 41, copy in AG 320.2 (4–15–41).

them in detail).[32] This letter brought from General Van Voorhis, in the form of an indorsement, a detailed and obviously angry reply. He referred to his earlier letters. He intimated that Washington staff officers' "superficial knowledge" of the situation had inspired the criticism. He reiterated that "I am more concerned about means at the present time than I am coordination." And, while recognizing the War Department's difficulties, he grimly listed the continuing shortages in equipment which he had tried unsuccessfully to correct. It was an impressive list—not one modern combat plane; no modern detectors; no 37-mm. ammunition; no balloons; a shortage of 30 antiaircraft directors; a lack of two thirds of the allotted 37-mm. guns, 92 of the 90-mm. guns, and quantities of ammunition. He requested that his reply be brought to General Marshall's personal attention.[33] It was, and instead of using a formal indorsement drafted by WPD for his signature, General Marshall wrote his angry subordinate a personal letter, admonishing him but with noteworthy gentleness. He assured the older officer that there had been no Staff intention to reflect on him, and that in fact the Caribbean Defense Command air defense organization had been brought to conformity with general practice. He concluded:

> Frankly, while you have your difficulties with the government of Panama, I do not think you have quite enough. You lack the flood of daily irritations and disturbances that we have every hour, which eventually produces either prostration or a case-hardened front to the world. So far as I can, I try to deal in a very direct and semi-personal manner with the overseas commanders, but there are limits, and the formal staff productions should be received with due regard for the immense burden these people up here are carrying.[34]

The unsettled question of the dual Army-Navy commands in Panama apparently did not disturb the agreeable personal relations of General Van Voorhis and his naval colleagues. General and admiral may even have co-ordinated their reports to higher authority, for their separate admissions that their joint antisabotage measures were inadequate, because of insufficient equipment and personnel, reached Washington at about the same time in July. General Marshall and Admiral Stark discussed them both. General Van Voorhis was thereafter assured by

[32] (1) Personal Ltr, Marshall to Van Voorhis, 9 Apr 41, copy in WPD 4440–5. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 Apr 41, sub: Air Defense Command, Panama, AG 320.2 (4–15–41), copy in WPD 4270–8. Appd by DCofS (Bryden), 28 Apr 41, noted by CofS. (3) Ltr, TAG to CG Panama Canal Dept, 28 Apr 41, sub: Air Defense Command, Panama, AG 320.2 (4–15–41) M–WPD. (4) Report of Col Lynd, GSC, to WPD, 1 May 41, sub: Defense Installations in Panama Canal Dept, WPD 4452–3.

[33] Ind on TAG Ltr of 28 Apr, by CG Panama Canal Dept, 7 May 41, AG 320.2 (4–15–41).

[34] Personal Ltr, Marshall to Van Voorhis, 12 Jun 41, copies in OCS 17611–38, in WPD 4270–8, and in AG 320.2 (4–15–41). It was prepared by General Marshall personally.

WPD that the Navy Department was sending some of the needed equipment. He was also advised that, contrary to his wishes, the local Navy forces could not be put under his command, but that he must continue to rely on mutual agreements with the naval district commander.[35] His correspondence with Washington as late as 17 September continued to stress the needs of his aircraft warning service and the inadequacy of naval means for surveillance of the Pacific coastal zone. On 19 September (his retirement for age coming a year afterward) he was replaced as head of the Caribbean Defense Command by General Andrews.[36] It is of interest to note that once more the Army had given to General Andrews exceptional responsibilities, first as G–3, and now as head of a critical defense command. In both cases, it may be conjectured, the appointment was made because of General Andrews' recognized broad qualifications for command, but with awareness of his special qualifications in this case as an Air Corps officer of long experience. Air patrols and air defense techniques, clearly, were of dominant importance at Panama and in the Caribbean command generally, for defense in the war then envisaged.

During 1941 the Panama garrison had been appreciably enlarged, and its equipment materially bettered. The ground force now was approximately up to its 21,000-man authorization and the air garrison up to its authorized 11,000. (The 31,447 total of 30 November 1941 compared with a 13,403 total in August 1939.) It was recognized at the War Department (under Rainbow 5 planning) that war's arrival should add 10,000 to the ground garrison and 6,100 to the air element, but in November 1941 it was ruled that no immediate increase was practicable.[37]

The Situation in Hawaii

Of the three points in the Pacific's "strategic triangle" Hawaii, after May 1940, was most important in one pre-eminent sense—it was the base for the United States Fleet, and this meant that at times practically the entire fleet was

[35] (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Jul 41, sub: Effectiveness of Sabotage Measures, Panama Canal Dept, copy in WPD 4129–19. (2) Personal Ltr, Marshall to Admiral Stark, 25 Jul 41, same file. (3) Memo, Van Voorhis for TAG, 23 Jul 41, sub: Naval Assistance, with long summary of incidents on Navy relationships 1940–41, AG 660.2 PC Dept (7–23–41). (4) WPD 1st ind to same, 5 Aug 41, same file.

[36] (1) Ltr, Van Voorhis to TAG, 17 Sep 41, sub: Local Joint Board Report on Surveillance, AG 600.2 PC Dept (7–23–41). (2) Personal Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen Marshall, 26 Sep 41, copy in WPD 4440–20 and reply thereto, 13 Oct 41, same file.

[37] Memo, G–3 for CofS, 19 Nov 41, sub: Analysis of Personnel, with atchd tabulation, G–3/43804, copy in OCS 16374–32.

in Pearl Harbor. That is, the Hawaiian defense's mission was to care for the fixed installations of the great base (just as the mission at Panama was to protect the Canal) but it included also the protection of that portion of the fleet itself which at any given time was in harbor. It was the fleet which constituted the Navy's most important weapon. It was the fleet which made the Pearl Harbor base and most other sea bases necessary. It was the fleet which would supply patrols northward toward Alaska and eastward toward Panama as a defense screen for the west coast. It was the fleet, and only the fleet, which could make possible the ultimate reinforcement of Manila Bay, and thus justify the holding of that distant strong point long enough to permit reinforcements to make their way across the sea. Long before, in 1919, this aspect of the situation was plainly summarized in the Joint Board judgment that

> . . . our retention of the Philippines in case of war with Japan is entirely dependent upon our command of the sea in the Pacific. Without a naval superiority no military garrison, however large, will be able to defend the Philippines indefinitely as it could not be supplied with food and munitions.[38]

This memorandum was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department of the Army in January 1920 with instructions to use it as the basis for an estimate of the Pacific situation and a revision of defense plans.[39] His mission was simply stated—to defend the naval base at Pearl Harbor against (1) damage from naval or aerial bombardment or by enemy sympathizers, (2) attack by enemy expeditionary force or forces, supported or unsupported by an enemy fleet or fleets. It was his successors, during whose tenure momentous changes took place in Pacific geopolitics and resultant strategy, who had to adjust their defense plans to a changing need. They were guided by the current Orange War Plan for use in the event of war with Japan ("Orange" in the code of that period), a plan that was modified from time to time in minor respects and in 1936 was wholly restated. The broad revision of 1936, as explained by the Joint Board, was necessitated by radical changes brought about in the situation since 1919 by the Washington Arms Limitation treaties of 1922, by the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, by the organization of the U. S. Fleet and its stationing in the Pacific Ocean, by the strengthening of the Oahu defenses, by aviation advances, and by the decision to grant Philippine inde-

[38] Memo, JB for SW and SN, 18 Dec 19, sub: Strategy of the Pacific, signed by Gen P. C. March, senior member, JB 325, ser 28-d.

[39] Memo, TAG for CG Hawaiian Dept, 3 Jan 20, sub: Revision of Defense Projects and Plans, AGO 660.2 Hawaiian Dept, Misc Div, CD of Oahu, 1-3-20, Nat Archives.

pendence.[40] A prophetic paragraph recognized the possibility of enemy attack on Hawaii by a surprise raid or by a major expeditionary force (the exact possibility developed in the 1932 joint maneuver at Oahu) and then proceeded:

> Against the first form of attack the existing peacetime forces of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands, including their necessary munitions and supplies, are believed to be adequate. The success of our defense against this form of attack will depend almost wholly upon our not being totally surprised by the enemy, and will require an efficient intelligence service, not only in the Hawaiian Islands but elsewhere.

A syllabus prepared two years later on Hawaiian defenses again included as significant assumptions "the historic purpose of Japan to attain preeminence in the Pacific; its precipitation of war without notice." [41] Thereafter from time to time there was further recognition of the peril of total surprise. In 1939, when WPD revived its own 1935 injunctions for installing an aircraft warning service at all exposed areas where the Army had major defense responsibilities, it initiated a restudy of Hawaii's 1939 requirements—even though the Joint Planning Committee's exploratory study of April 1939 had held that Japan would use commercial and economic means, rather than military, for its southward penetration.[42] The new study was directed and conducted during the next four months by a five-man board which had originally been named by Maj. Gen. C. D. Herron, then commanding the Hawaiian Department, in order to devise a warning system. Its report he approved, with modifications, and on sending it to Washington he added his own recommendations for establishment of a warning service as soon as practicable. This was the basis for airplane-detector installations initiated later in 1940 but still incomplete in 1941.[43] The need for much tighter protection of Hawaii's great naval base mounted swiftly in May 1940 when the U. S. Fleet, previously employing supply and maintenance facilities firmly set up on the California coast, transferred its base to Pearl Harbor.

[40] Memo, JB for SW, 19 May 36, sub: Mission, United States Forces, Hawaiian Islands, signed by Admiral W. H. Standley, senior member, JB 325, ser 580, copy in WPD 3878–1. The Orange Plan of 29 Jan 25 is found in AG 230.

[41] Rpt of Col E. M. Markham to CofS, 10 Jan 38, WPD 3878–6.

[42] Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for CofS, 11 Dec 39, sub: Aircraft Warning Service, appd by CofS 16 Dec 39, AG 660.2 AA (3–10–39), copy in WPD 3640–3. It quotes at length the 1935 General Staff study referred to. See also Ltr, TAG to CG Haw Dept, 15 Dec 39, sub: Aircraft Warning System, AG 676.3 (12–15–39) M–WPD. For JPC exploratory study of April 39 see JB 325, ser 634.

[43] Memo, CG Haw Dept for TAG, 17 Apr 40, sub: Aircraft Warning System, with accompanying board report, AG 676.3 (12–15–39). It was approved with modifications as shown by TAG ind, 27 Jun 40 (signed Adams).

The June 1940 Alert in Hawaii

American uneasiness over Japanese intentions was spurred in mid-1940 by the Russo-Japanese agreement for a composition of Far East differences. This, as viewed in Washington, notably by General Marshall, would free Japan of worry over possible Russian interference, which for years had been a nightmare in Tokyo, and thus would permit Japan to embark with less trepidation on a war with the United States. So intense was his uneasiness on this score that on 17 June 1940 General Marshall sent alerting messages both to General Herron and (as previously mentioned) to the Panama Canal command. The former was as follows:

> Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. . . .[44]

Two days later, General Herron was "authorized to modify gradually" the measures he had obediently set up but was instructed to maintain adequate guards at critical points, and at the same time to "avoid publicity." When nothing of note happened in the course of a month there was a further easing of the alert, but a letter of explanation that General Marshall prepared (explaining that the mid-June alarm was over a possible "raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii") was never sent out, apparently in the belief that explanation was unnecessary. It would appear from that unsent letter that General Marshall then thought of the island, rather than the fleet, as the threatened target. General Herron, however, felt that "precautions must increase," as he explained in an informal memorandum to General Marshall on 15 October.[45] He continued to press for the aircraft warning installations, as did the War Plans Division in Washington, also for bombproofing, for antiaircraft artillery reinforcements, and for a grant to the Army Air Forces of a larger defense responsibility than that allotted by the Orange War Plan. His 18 December 1940 memorandum remarked that "No single item is more important or more urgent in the defense of Hawaii than is the Aircraft Warning Service." Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was "much interested in this matter and

[44] Rad 428, TAG to Herron, 17 Jun 40, filed as directive for Strong to TAG, same date, sub: Defense Precautions, WPD 4322. Same file has copies of succeeding radios mentioned, also of unsent letter of Marshall to Herron, 27 Jun 40, and latter's 15 Oct 40 memo. No orders formally terminating the alert ever came from Washington. It was successively modified downward by General Herron.

[45] See n. 44.

in its expedition." [46] General Herron's suggestion for increasing the number of heavy bombers based on the mainland did not meet with General Marshall's immediate approval, because of a new Navy plan for stationing 180 long-range patrol planes in the Hawaiian Islands (a plan whose fulfilment was prevented by later demands upon naval air equipment).[47] The basic purpose of Army forces in Oahu did not alter. This purpose was, primarily, to defend the naval base and the air installations, and to co-operate fully with the Navy in doing so. It was the weapons and methods of defense that changed, largely as a result of the rapid development of air power and a consequent increase of the base's vulnerability to sudden assault.

The mounting concern over Pearl Harbor's security from air attack, expressed by General Herron and the Navy officers in Hawaii, was felt in Washington as well and by American observers elsewhere. An example was the message which U. S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo sent on 27 January 1941, reporting that his Peruvian colleague had heard from various Japanese sources that the Japanese were planning a mass attack on Pearl Harbor: he conceded that "the idea appears fantastic" but passed it on to Washington, where the Navy discounted it, assuring Admiral Kimmel that "no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future." [48] That it was not at all fantastic was evidenced later in the year: in that same month of January when Mr. Grew sent his warning, it was later discovered, the Japanese began their study of the Pearl Harbor raid project.

Navy dissatisfaction with the existing protection for the U. S. Fleet base was expressed in a formal communication, prepared by the Operations Division for

[46] (1) Summary of nation-wide AWS plans in Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for CofS, 31 Jul 41, appd 2 Aug by DCofS (signed Bradley), copy in WPD 3640-13. (2) Rad, Herron to TAG, 8 Oct 40, WPD 1928-27. (3) Memo ACofS WPD for CofS, 7 Oct 40, sub: Immediate Reinforcement of Hawaii, WPD 3444-4. (4) Unsigned "Surmises on Insular Operations," 12 Nov 40, filed with Ltr, Marshall to Herron, 28 Nov 40, which refers to it, WPD 3878-8. (5) Ltr, Herron to Marshall, 25 Nov 40, is referred to in latter's reply, 2 Jan 41, WPD 3878-9. (6) Memo, Herron for TAG, 18 Dec 40, sub: Funds for Aircraft Warning Service, AG 676.3 (12-15-39), found as answer to a TAG indorsement of 27 Jun 40 filed in AG 676.3 (4-17-40) M-WPD. It apparently has been removed from the AG 676.3 file which originally held it. A copy so marked is on page 128 of a most useful "Résumé of Papers in War Department Bearing Significantly on Events at Pearl Harbor, Dec 7, 1941," prepared by Current Group OPD WDSS, 11 Nov 44 (hereafter cited as Résumé). Copy in OPD History Unit file, items 7a and 7b.

[47] In Rear Adm. C. C. Bloch's discussion before the Roberts Commission of the resources at his disposal on 7 December none of these 180 is mentioned. See also Résumé, p. 23.

[48] Cited in Résumé, p. 134, as Memo, G-2 Far East Section (Lt Col R. S. Bratton) for Col Charles Mason, 28 Jan 41, sub: Report of Japanese Intention, filed in G-2 Classified Material for 1941 Jap Empire file. See also dispatch, CNO to CINCPAC, 1 Feb 41, sub: Rumored Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, cited in *Pearl Harbor Report*, p. 77.

transmittal by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War three days before Ambassador Grew's warning. This was the result of a studied discussion of Pearl Harbor affairs by Admiral J. O. Richardson, whom Admiral Kimmel had just relieved as fleet commander.[49] Admiral Richardson's views, concurred in by Admiral Kimmel, dwelt upon the insufficiency of the Army's antiaircraft defenses of the base and obviously added to the general anxiety of the period. both in Hawaii and Washington, over the possibility of an air attack. Years later General Marshall observed:

> I have never had explained to me why there was apparently the cessation of fears of an air attack which seemed to be preeminent in the mind of Admiral Kimmel in February [this is a slip of memory; the Secretarial correspondence of 24 January 1941 sprang from the Richardson letter of January, not the Kimmel letter of February] when he wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy and that official wrote to the Secretary of War and embarrassed us greatly because we had almost nothing to give—we were bankrupt so far as materiel was concerned—and the later urgent requests with regard to radar. . . .[50]

Admiral Richardson's remarks on the imperilment of the all-important base were made the more pointed by recent events in the European war, for aerial fleets were making successful attacks by bomb and torpedo upon ships at bases. Applying this lesson to the situation at Pearl Harbor, therefore, Secretary Knox wrote to Mr. Stimson: "If war eventuates with Japan it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor." [51]

Six types of danger were prophetically envisaged "in their order of importance and probability." At the top of the list were placed attacks by bombing planes and torpedo planes, from a carrier force. Mr. Stimson's studied reply two weeks later, prepared with the assistance of General Gerow of WPD, concurred fully on the urgency of preparing a co-ordinated defense against such a peril. It remarked that the Hawaiian Department already was "the best equipped of all our overseas departments" and was continuing to hold high priority for the completion of its projected defenses. Plans called for 148 pursuit planes, of which 36 were in operation, 31 were to leave San Diego within 10 days, and 50 of improved type to leave in March. Of the projected 98 3-inch

[49] See *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 39, *Report of Army Pearl Harbor Bd.*, p. 73.

[50] General Marshall's testimony, 7 Apr 44, in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 27, *Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*, p. 32.

[51] Ltr, SN to SW, 24 Jan 41, copy in WPD 3583–1, with SW reply of 7 Feb 41. See also Ltr, Admiral Kimmel to CNO, 18 Feb 41, cited in *Pearl Harbor Attack . . . Report*, p. 78, saying "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility."

antiaircraft guns, 82 were there; of 308 .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, 109 were there; of 120 37-mm. guns, 20 were en route. All the aircraft warning service equipment should be delivered by June and (it was then believed) installed promptly. Of the barrage balloons only 3 were on hand, but 84 were being manufactured for summer delivery. Smoke screens, which the Navy had suggested, the Army did not believe effective for Pearl Harbor use, but a new examination would be made. Full defense co-ordination of Army and Navy was recognized as essential, and Secretary Knox's suggestions on this subject, with further advice from the War Department, were sent on to the Army command in Hawaii.

Change in the Hawaii Command

That command shifted on 7 February from General Herron to Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, to whom General Marshall immediately wrote a lengthy letter, partly to make it clear that "the fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us; there can be little question about that," partly to impress on him specific Navy hopes for fuller protection of Pearl Harbor, and partly to inform him of the difficulty which the Army had and would have in meeting those hopes at an early date, because of shortages in materiel. As an example he cited his effort to meet the Navy's wishes for improved antiaircraft protection for the Navy's Cavite base in the Philippines. By pulling away 3-inch guns here and there from regiments in training he had accumulated 20 for Cavite, just in time to have the Navy divert 18 of them to other island defenses, leaving but 2 for Cavite. There were disturbing shortages in Panama as well, and General Short was advised to make clear to the U. S. Fleet commander, Admiral Kimmel, that the Army could not "perform a miracle." Nor, it developed, could General Short expect too high quality in some of the new equipment in prospect. Even the newest pursuit plane would "lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane." The new medium bomber, on which Hawaii would have first priority, was only just going into production. Augmentation of the .50-caliber machine guns was scheduled, but "I have no hopes for the next few months," and barrage balloons would be a long time coming. General Marshall reminded his correspondent of pressures from Panama and Alaska and the newly leased bases, all in serious need of defensive equipment, and also informed him confidentially of the possible occupation of the Azores, then contemplated by the President, which if carried out would

take still another bite from the Army's low stocks of equipment. In view of events to come in December there is interest in General Marshall's remarks of February 1941:

> . . . if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine constitute the real perils. . . .
>
> Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds . . . still persist in confusing issues of national defense. . . .[52]

In a six-page reply General Short reported conferences with Admiral Kimmel and his subordinate, Rear Adm. C. C. Bloch, commanding the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaiian Islands), with whom General Short, under the joint defense plan, divided the immediate responsibility for defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. He reported cordiality of relations and on both sides readiness for co-operation. He explained at some length his desire to effect changes that he regarded as important, several of them in line with earlier efforts by his predecessor, General Herron, although not so identified in the letter. These fields of effort, already undertaken or newly proposed, included the naming of Army-Navy committees for co-operation, dispersion of aircraft and camouflage of protective areas, improved antiaircraft defense, improved harbor defense, better use of searchlights, highway and trail construction, bombproofing of installations, and increase of engineer troops.[53] With like persistence shortly afterward he urged the War Department as had General Herron several weeks earlier, to spur the Interior Department to action whereby a park area could be utilized for installation of aircraft warning service devices, remarking sharply that the Department's radiogram "does not appear to appreciate the seriousness of the situation." Eventually he wrote to General Marshall in person expressing the view that the gravity of his needs was not yet appreciated in the War Department. In manifest irritation with the National Park Service's delays he

[52] Personal Ltr, Marshall to Short, 7 Feb 41, WPD 4449–1.

[53] Personal Ltr, Short to Marshall, 19 Feb 41, AG 381 (2–19–41), accompanied by letters and memos to appropriate subordinates on the eight subjects referred to. Note also General Short's energy and acceptance of responsibility in pressing study of installations other than his own, as shown in Memo, Short to TAG, 18 Feb 41, sub: Defense of Naval Air Station, AG 381 (2–18–41). With regard to getting Navy to extend its landing strips for B–17 use, see personal Ltr, Short to Marshall, 25 Jul 41, WPD 2550.

expressed the view that "all quibbling over details should be stopped at once" when they interfered with completion of the Aircraft Warning Service on which both "defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet [was] dependent." That General Marshall was equally indignant was apparent, for he immediately laid the case before the National Park Service authorities in a telephoned demand for action.[54]

The Army's current experiments in air defense techniques had already led the Chief of Staff on 5 March to identify air defense co-ordination as "a matter of first priority," to send General Short a copy of General Chaney's report on British methods, and to ask the Hawaiian commander for a review of the air defense situation in his area. In a prompt and vigorous reply General Short referred to the 19 February recommendations and expressed anew his concern over the vulnerability of Army and Navy airfields alike to an attack by air. He continued his insistent requests for both money and engineer troops to hasten the providing of dispersal areas, stressed the need for more antiaircraft personnel, and agreed with General Marshall's suggestion that his own antiaircraft chiefs could profitably attend the defense exercises scheduled on the west coast for later in the year. In answer General Marshall gave approval to several recommendations, assurance that engineers would be sent out in April, a forecast of materiel deliveries, and a promise that further funds would be set up when General Short's estimates were received.[55] The new commander's energetic efforts to expedite defensive measures included his pressure, both by radio and letter to General Marshall in April 1941, for authority to lease without delay 230 small parcels of land on which to erect strong points that he felt it was essential to get under way at once. Concerned by the delays in normal allotment of funds he also pressed not only for $17,000,000 for known airport construction but for an added $10,000,000 to be available in emergency.[56]

[54] Rad 2310, Short to TAG, 28 Feb 41, referring to a letter from his predecessor of 3 Jan 41, both filed in AG 676.3 (12–15–39) as are later letters and radios to and fro during the next month, revealing the necessity of tenacity in getting access to the site needed for this essential installation. The reproach on failure to "appreciate the seriousness" is in Rad, Short to TAG, Honolulu number 2339, 5 Mar 41. The personal letter to General Marshall was dated 6 March 1941. General Marshall's telephone conversation was recalled to the author in 1949 by General Ward, who in 1941 was Secretary of the General Staff.

[55] (1) Personal Ltr, Marshall to Short, 5 Mar 41, copies in AG 660.2 (3–5–41) and WPD 4271–1. (2) Reply, 15 Mar 41, AG 660.2 (3–5–41). (3) Personal Ltr, Marshall to Short, 28 Mar 41, WPD 4271–1.

[56] (1) Personal Ltr, Short to Marshall, 14 Apr 41, supporting radio request, AG 601.5 (4–14–41). (2) Rad, Honolulu 2755, Short to Marshall, 1 May. See also Memo, Actg CofAC to ACofS WPD, 29 Apr 41, sub: Dispersal and Protection of Aircraft. Both in Résumé.

The Defense Establishment in Hawaii on 7 December 1941

What the Army establishment in the Hawaiian Department amounted to on 7 December was, in manpower, 42,857. It included two infantry divisions, a light tank company, four antiaircraft regiments, four harbor defense regiments of coast artillery (two incomplete), the engineer, chemical, and aircraft warning units attached to headquarters, two bomb groups (8 squadrons), and two pursuit groups (9 squadrons). The modern heavy bombers in operating condition that day numbered only six. (Table 5.) Of the 149 fighters, modern and obsolescent, 69 were grounded for lack of repair parts. As to antiaircraft equipment, a post-raid appraisal showed that of the 98 authorized 3-inch guns all but 12 were on hand; of the 37-mm. guns only 20 of 120 authorized were on hand; of the .50-caliber machine guns only 113 of the authorized 246 were on hand. These shortages were troublesome, particularly as only the small-caliber weapons were useful against low-flying aircraft, but more serious still had been the delay in installing the Aircraft Warning Service's full equipment of detectors. Six mobile sets had been authorized and were on hand although in service for only a few hours of the day. Six fixed sets had been authorized; of these, three had not arrived, and the other three were in course of installation and hence not in service at the critical time. A very considerable amount of construction work had been au-

TABLE 5.—NUMBER OF U. S. ARMY AIRCRAFT ON HAND IN THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR: 7 AND 20 DECEMBER 1941

Type	On Hand 7 December		Lost or Damaged	On Hand 20 December	
	Total	Operational		Total	Operational
All types	234	125	128	154	117
Bombers	72	[a] 39	34	[b] 63	50
Fighters	149	80	88	83	61
Reconnaissance	13	6	6	8	6

[a] Includes 6 B–17's, 23 B–18's and 10 A–20's.
[b] Includes 29 bombers from mainland.

Source: Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 24, *Proceedings of Roberts Commission,* Exhibit No. 7, p. 1784, and Part 39, *Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board,* p. 119.

thorized at Washington, for improvement of airfields and storage, but much of it was still under way. Such bunker-building (for protection of dispersed aircraft) as had been completed was waste effort, unfortunately, for the command's precautions against sabotage called for concentration of the planes under guard, rather than for dispersal that was a requisite for resisting the aerial raid that came to pass. The WPD chief at the first post-raid inquiry, where he presented the figures just recited, felt that "all reasonable requests by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for funds and the supply of equipment and materiel have been met within the means available." [57]

General Short's vigorous planning for use of all possible resources in defending Oahu eventually brought him into a dispute with the Air Force, decided by General Marshall in favor of the latter. The Hawaii commander, in a 14 July 1941 order, directed that local Air personnel be trained for close-in defense of the area, in the event the Air Force should be rendered inoperable as such. Before issuance of the order this project was opposed by the Hawaiian Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, on the ground that this training could be given only at the cost of essential training of the Air personnel in its own principal task, but General Martin was overruled. Subsequently General Martin's case was taken up in Washington by his superior, the Chief of the Army Air Forces, and in late October General Marshall advised a somewhat resentful Hawaiian Department commander that his project should be subordinated "for the present at least" to the Air commander's own training program.[58]

The Air Commanders' Remarkable Prevision

General Short's efforts to better Hawaii's defenses had resulted in April in completion, for War Department examination, of the joint commanders' revised defense plan for the Joint Coastal Frontier (Oahu and adjacent land and sea areas as required for Oahu's defense; the Hawaiian *Naval* Coastal Frontier, in

[57] From a summary of statements by General Gerow before the Military Commission, 18 Dec 41, gathered as WPD 4268–2 but no longer filed there: it is copied in Résumé, pp. 478–97, especially pp. 489ff. See also tabulated summary of Army and Navy resources in *Pearl Harbor Attack . . . Report,* pp. 66ff. Total personnel in Hawaiian Department as of 30 Nov 41 is placed at 43,182 in the unpublished report of SW for 1942, filed in Hist Sec, AGO.

[58] (1) SOP Ltr of Haw Dept, 14 Jul 41, cited in Memo, DCofS (Arnold) for CofS, 7 Oct 41, sub: Standard Operating Procedure, Haw Dept, copy in Résumé, p. 331. (2) Ltr, Marshall to Short, 10 Oct 41, OCS 19741–62. (3) Ltr, Short to Marshall, 14 Oct 41, referred to in Ltr, Marshall to Short, 28 Oct 41, same file. (4) Personal Ltr, CofAAF to Martin, 25 Sep 41, AG 320.2 (10–7–41). (5) Martin's reply, 3 Nov 41, and Arnold's personal letter in reply, 27 Nov 41, are both found in the Résumé, pp. 357–60 and 414.

distinction, included also Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, and Wake). This plan, specifying the joint and separate responsibilities of Army and Navy, was agreed to by General Short and Admiral Bloch on 11 April 1941 and forwarded to Washington, together with a previously agreed-upon Annex VII and other documents.[59] One of these documents, the estimate of the Army and Navy air commanders in the area, includes surmises so precisely confirmed by the event of the next December as to justify quotation of the following excerpts:

[From I (c)] A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

[From I (e)] It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

[From II (b)] . . . The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain for any extended period . . . a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

[From III (b)] It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

[From III (e)] In a dawn attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it would find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start. . . .

[From IV (a) Action open to us] Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and materiel for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.[60]

After the Secretary of War had given formal approval (2 June 1941) to Rainbow War Plan 5, largely based upon the ABC agreements, the Army pushed ahead with its detailed implementation of that plan in all its commands. The Orange Plan as last revised (1938) before its replacement by Rainbow 5 was the basis for the new planning so far as Hawaii was concerned, and when the resultant Army Strategical Plan (approved by the Secretary on 19 August

[59] Memo, Asst AG Haw Dept (Grosse) for TAG, 14 Apr 41, sub: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, AG 381 (1–24–41) (1). Annex VII is found in AG 601.5/4–14–41, as is the Joint Estimate of Army and Navy air action, signed by Rear Adm P. L. M. Bellinger, Commdr Naval Base Defense Air Force, and Maj Gen F. L. Martin, CG Haw AF, 31 Mar 41. Both are included in Exhibit 44 of Joint Committee Investigation and discussed on p. 83ff. of *Pearl Harbor Attack . . . Report.*

[60] See n. 59. This estimate is emphasized in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 39, *Report of Army Pearl Harbor Bd.*, p. 75.

1941) was completed it did not greatly alter the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense instructions which Orange Plan had set up and on which the Short-Bloch agreement just referred to had been based. Notably that Coastal Frontier remained in Defense Category D—that is, one which "may be subject to major attack," rather than in Category E, which designated an area which "in all probability will be subject to major attack." [61] This was manifestly in line with War Department thinking on Pacific prospects. It must be recognized as a factor in the thinking at Oahu as well, on the eve of the raid.

The New Defensive Screen of Atlantic Bases

Until 1940 the defensive screen that the Alaska–Oahu–Panama triangle afforded to the west coast states had no such well-developed counterpart off the east coast even in contemplation, for the installations at Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands then existing were designed primarily to protect the Panama Canal rather than the United States itself. Responsibility for this relative unconcern over the east coast's security can be easily traced to the long-standing American confidence in a friendly Britain and France whose fleets, combined with America's, were half-consciously regarded as ample assurance of security in the Atlantic. It was on this reasoning that the United States had confidently moved its dominant naval units to the Pacific.

The German triumphs of May 1940 violently shook American serenity, and on 21 May a Staff memorandum to General Marshall advised that the United States take steps to acquire "British and French possessions in the Atlantic." [62] The following day WPD members suggested the "protective occupation" of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere, presumably to prevent a victorious Germany from making efforts to acquire control of footholds on the continent itself. On 24 May the Joint Board instructed the Joint Planning Committee to draw up plans for such an occupation.[63] Only lately (on 15 May) Mr. Churchill had told President Roosevelt of his hope for forty to fifty American destroyers, and in a short time two compensating programs—based on American

[61] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 21 Aug 41, directing distribution of 18 copies of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, including one to CG Haw Dept, WPD 4175–18. The pertinent part of the plan is paragraph 30 b, Category of Defense, quoted on p. 274 of Résumé.

[62] This series of events is mentioned in Ch. IV, pp. 105–06, of this volume.

[63] Navy WPD drafted such a plan, with Army concurrence on 28 May. As Rainbow 4 it was adopted by Joint Board on 7 June and approved by SW and SN on 13 Jun 40—the celerity of action suggesting how urgent the military felt the situation to be.

eagerness for a protective screen of air and naval bases, and on British eagerness for desperately needed destroyers—were merged in the destroyers-for-bases transaction that was formally announced on 4 September 1940.[64]

British intentions to grant 99-year leases on sites in the Atlantic islands, the West Indies, and Newfoundland were announced by Mr. Churchill in the Commons on 20 August without awaiting the destroyer statement, and on that day the Chief of Naval Operations orally directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare a study of suitable sites in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana. To these six sites Antigua and the Bahamas were later added. The report of a week later, plus an appendix, proposed Navy patrol planes for all eight bases, and base facilities for heavy fleet units at Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad, with Army garrisons somewhat in proportion.[65] That is, to provide security for a large Trinidad base which then was thought to be needed as a jump-off point for a possible expedition to South America, the Joint Planning Committee contemplated a 2-division corps, plus harbor defense units and a composite air wing. For Bermuda a reinforced infantry division was thought necessary, and at Newfoundland the need was calculated at only two reinforced battalions, plus air, presumably because its location permitted rapid reinforcement from Canada, at need. As to the other five bases, reinforced regiments, plus air, were originally contemplated for Guiana, Antigua, Jamaica, and St. Lucia, and a reinforced battalion for the near-by Bahamas. (All these were rapidly modified downward.) For the selection of specific sites a board headed by Rear Adm. John W. Greenslade was named by the President on 1 September and its findings examined by War and Navy Departments as each item was completed, the leases themselves being finally agreed upon in London on 27 March 1941. Work had been proceeding meantime without the excessive concern over the formal leases that troubled some of the British colonial officials for a time. As early as 6 September 1940 General Marshall approved a proposal that WPD be given full authority for site development (the work to be done by the Corps of Engineers) and ordered that estimates of expense be expedited.

It was partly the haste of the planning that produced programs and estimates remote from the later developments of several of the bases, but a large reason for the early miscalculation was the alarm of State, War, and Navy Departments alike at the time over the supposed imperilment of Latin America. This explains why, in the expenditures laid before General Marshall in obedi-

[64] See Chapter XII.

[65] JPC report of 28 Aug 40, plus 3 Sep 40 appendix, is in WPD 4351–5.

ence to his 6 September instructions, much the largest outlay was that proposed for Trinidad—$95,660,100 of the $215,000,000 total.[66] WPD planning contemplated using that island, just off the Venezuela coast and 1,200 miles from Belem in Brazil, as the jump-off base should an expeditionary force be dispatched to South America. The next heaviest outlay, $41,552,600, was scheduled initially for Jamaica in line with the Navy's short-lived intention of developing there a major supply base for Caribbean operations. Similar false starts were made, naturally, in plans for permanent garrisons at those two bases, for although the extravagant ideas about huge Caribbean operations soon were abandoned, a subsequent plan still contemplated that Trinidad would have 15,400 enlisted men and Jamaica 8,430. In contrast the three Newfoundland posts (St. John's, Argentia, and Stevensville) combined now were to have only 5,180, Bermuda was to have 4,400, and the other four bases were to have approximately 340 each.[67] Later planning reduced Trinidad and Jamaica plans much further.

Priority for Newfoundland

Special attention was given to Newfoundland at the instance of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, which had been created in August 1940 (following conversations of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King) to effect co-ordination of effort on the part of the United States and Canada.[68] This co-ordination was proceeding independently of the bases-for-destroyers negotiations, but as one of Canada's largest anxieties at the time was the protection of the mouth of the St. Lawrence, Mr. Churchill's assurance that a Newfoundland base would be leased to the United States touched a point of prime concern to the Permanent Joint Board. General Embick, senior American member of the board, laid the matter before General Marshall and on 13 September the Chief of Staff ordered consideration of a

[66] The first rough estimate proposed: Newfoundland, $34,050,600; Bermuda, $23,689,100; Bahamas, $2,409,500; Jamaica, $41,552,600; Antigua, $2,409,500; St. Lucia, $2,409,500; Trinidad, $95,660,100; British Guiana, $2,409,100. With a reserve fund of $10,429,600 for engineering, etc., the total amounted to approximately $215,000,000. The Trinidad estimate was materially reduced as the October and November reports of the Greenslade Board were received, but for months the largest of the new garrisons was at that uncomfortable post. See Memo, CofEngrs for TAG, and other estimates in WPD 4351-1 to 7 inclusive.

[67] Data on an unsigned and undated computation, with marginal notations indicating a probable increase for Newfoundland, filed in WPD 4351-47.

[68] The board was announced on 18 August 1940 at the White House. Its first meeting was held in Ottawa on 26 August, with General Embick, Colonel McNarney, and Maj. (later Brig. Gen.) Charles K. Gailey, Jr., as the American members. Its first draft of a joint defense plan, completed on 11 September 1940, was approved by Messrs. Roosevelt and King as a basis for future work. See related papers in WPD 4330.

proposal to send troops to the Avalon Peninsula of Newfoundland, and a reinforced battalion of infantry was promptly designated. But although the survey party for Newfoundland arrived there on 13 October, long before the other seven bases were surveyed, satisfactory winter housing for the supporting elements of combat troops could not be provided immediately. Not until 15 January 1941 did the initial Army garrison of 56 officers and 822 enlisted men sail from New York to support the party already ashore, and the transport that carried them remained in harbor for some weeks as their shelter.[69]

By March 1941 when the eight leases were formally announced, not only were the surveys well advanced but material progress was under way, particularly in Newfoundland. A battery of 155-mm. guns was emplaced to guard the approach to St. John's harbor, antiaircraft machine guns were in position, ammunition unloaded and stored, housing construction begun. There was a temporary delay in the arrival of a spring troop augmentation because of well-founded rumors of German intentions for Atlantic raids, culminating in the sensational and ill-fated excursion of the giant *Bismarck*. The rumors aroused President Roosevelt's special concern over the security of Bermuda and he examined with misgivings the War Department's schedule of April troop movements to Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad. Then he returned it with a notation "OK, but hurry Bermuda. That is necessary priority. Get planes there as soon as any place can be prepared. FDR." [70] As a result of his intervention the schedule of troop movements was altered slightly by reversing the time of movements for Bermuda and Newfoundland. Not much could be done with regard to planes, for the landing strips were months from completion, but air patrol facilities were enlarged temporarily by sending three more Navy flying boats to the Bermuda lagoon.

The April augmentation for Newfoundland (chiefly six B–18 planes) therefore arrived on 1 May, and the flying element was promptly assigned to the

[69] At each base the garrison's arrival was preceded by that of a temporary Marine guard. Papers recording these plans and the operation itself are in WPD 4351.

[70] Memo, SW for President, 3 Apr 41, sub: Defense of Atlantic Bases, with answering notation signed "FDR," WPD 4351–8. For reasons not appearing in the record the decision to reinforce Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad in April 1941 was cleared with Mr. Churchill who on 8 April sent a letter to the U. S. Ambassador in London indicating agreement with the plan. This letter is quoted in Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 11 Apr 41, sub: Immediate Garrisons . . ., with marginal note "To Secretary of War, GCM," in WPD 4351–99. An earlier Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Apr 41, same sub, in WPD 4351–92, Tabs A to G, lists the British defenses then in Newfoundland (one battalion of one thousand Canadians, one flight Canadian bomber reconnaissance, 356 members of Newfoundland Militia); in Bermuda (one British infantry company, two battalions Bermuda Militia artillery); in Trinidad (three batteries of four 6-inch guns, two 4.7-inch guns, four 3-inch guns).

task of making an aerial survey of Labrador in quest of possible landing strip sites. These were for the projected ferry route to Britain, via Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland, over which short-range planes were destined to be moved in large numbers during the coming year. Meantime General Embick and his Permanent Joint Board colleagues, examining the reports of the Commanding General, First Army (under which the Newfoundland activities were first placed), provided a calm estimate of the current situation. In contrast with others' alarm, General Embick felt that the situation "does not indicate the need for the augmentation of the permanent garrison . . . at this time." He recommended rather that "full advantage be taken of the present immunity of Newfoundland to correct as rapidly as possible the lack of communications," both highway and rail, which would be needed for moving supplies from dockside to the interior air bases.[71] A considerable part of the rehabilitation cost the War Department prevailed on the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to pay.

The May augmentation brought the Newfoundland garrison to 1,666 officers and men, and, little occurring thereafter to cause anxiety about the position's security, only moderate additions were made in ensuing months. In late August, shortly before it was suddenly decided to reduce the Army's total personnel[72] in order to reduce the strain of munitions production for all armed forces, the Newfoundland garrison reached 2,211, which was close to the total on 30 November, a week before Pearl Harbor, of 2,383.[73] At the time of the Staff discussion of the President's reduction proposal in September General Marshall admitted that the base garrisons were larger than had proved necessary thus far, but pointed out the time that would be "involved in reconstituting full garrisons in the bases in the event that something happened to the British Navy."[74] This was still a possibility in the fall of 1941.

Early Anxiety Over Bermuda Security

The strategic importance of Bermuda in Atlantic defense was apparent in its location, almost in the middle of a line connecting Nova Scotia and Puerto

[71] Memo, ACofS WPD for Senior U. S. Army member, PJB, 28 Mar 41, sub: 100 Octane Gasoline. . . Newfoundland Airport, and related papers, WPD 4351–9.

[72] This unexpected and soon-abandoned decision at the White House is dealt with in Chapter XI, pp. 362ff.

[73] Compiled by Returns Sec, Misc Div, AGO, from radio reports from bases, AG 320.2 (11–30–41) MRN.

[74] From previously quoted notes of conference in office of CofS, 20 Sep 41, copy of which is in WPD 4594.

Rico, and approximately a like distance from New York. Its usefulness as a coaling base had commended Bermuda to the British generations before. Its availability under the bases-for-destroyers agreement now commended it for development as a naval and air base in line with the planning of Rainbow 4. The Joint Planning Committee report to Admiral Stark and General Marshall, presented on 28 August 1940, a week in advance of the bases-for-destroyers announcement, proposed accordingly that the Navy use it for six patrol squadrons and a carrier group, while the Army proposed to place upon it a reinforced infantry division and a composite air wing.[75] As in the case of other bases, a closer scrutiny of requirements greatly reduced the original estimate, the infantry element being whittled down to a reinforced battalion.[76] By Air Corps estimate the recommended composite wing, with base personnel, would call for 220 officers and 2,300 men,[77] but these estimates also were due for reduction. The impulse to rush defense forces to Bermuda ahead of schedule in April 1941 (occasioned by Mr. Roosevelt's anxiety over threatened German raids) was controlled by the fact that the Bermuda air strips were not yet ready for use, and by the time the strips were ready, the more acute worry was over. Actually Bermuda was to be of far greater importance to Navy strategy in the antisubmarine campaigns later in the war. By the time of Pearl Harbor the base's development was moving ahead at only a moderate pace. Instead of the 2,920 total of officer, enlisted, and nurse personnel contemplated in August 1940, only 1,280 were there on 1 December 1941.

The Dwindling Importance of Trinidad

Trinidad's usefulness likewise was overestimated in the August 1940 report of the Joint Planning Committee, which contemplated sending a larger garrison than was scheduled for any other of the Atlantic bases. The September 1940 report of the board of experts cut the corps that once was proposed down to a reinforced division, but that was only the beginning of a steady reduction program. The early miscalculation was occasioned by planning of that day, when there was serious expectation that it would be necessary to send an expeditionary force to Brazil to cope with expected Nazi uprisings and invasion. As months

[75] Memo, JPC to CNO and CofS, 28 Aug 40, sub: Base Sites, WPD 4351–5.

[76] Tabulation following recommendation of Bd of Experts, 25 Sep 40, WPD 4351–7.

[77] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 6 Nov 40, sub: Air Corps Units, WPD 4351–25. A temporary contingent of 100 Marines went to Bermuda in January 1941; the first Army troops (852) arrived on 30 April 1941.

passed, such an expedition became less likely and hence Trinidad became less likely to be required as a staging base. The September planning for 23,813 personnel fell away in October to 16,202,[78] and then was so severely revised that when the first contingent of Army troops (preceded by the usual advance element of Marines) reached Trinidad in April 1941, it was made up of 1,303 officers and men, of whom 519 were National Guard personnel. By 1 December 1941 reinforcements had brought the garrison up to 2,866 of all ranks, making it at the time larger than any other Atlantic base garrison, save Iceland's, but with the slow elimination of anxiety over extensive German operations in the Western Hemisphere, Trinidad's importance faded and the garrison shrank accordingly.

Early Jamaica Plan Soon Abandoned

The Greenslade Board had originally recommended extensive development of Jamaica, including a large naval and air base, and as this met with the initial support of the Chief of Naval Operations it was accepted by the Chief of Staff and the President as well. This explains the Army Engineer's $41,552,600 estimate of construction costs, the Navy proposing to spend $7,000,000 more. By December, however, Admiral Stark had changed his views radically, reasoning that any likely war operations affecting the Caribbean would take place far to the east of Jamaica, and that as Jamaica had few requirements for a base anyway the project would best be scaled down.[79] In view of the altered strategic requirements, the Army reduced its own plan proportionately, not only in expense but in personnel. Instead of the 520 officers and 8,430 enlisted men in the once projected garrison, a January revision called for 52 officers and 1,338 men, plus about 300 service personnel.[80] In July General Marshall approved a further reduction to 800 officers and men, regarded as sufficient to cope with such small raids as could be expected there. Other than the service personnel referred to and a military police detachment of 51, the first garrison actually sent to Jamaica was of 350 men, ordered there not to cope with invasion but to protect the property from strike damage.[81] It sailed on 17 November.

[78] Photostat of schedule of "approved garrisons," dated 15 Oct 41, WPD 4351-176.

[79] Memo, CNO for Admiral Greenslade, undated but bearing penciled notation "Dec 19 1940," copy in WPD 4351-59.

[80] (1) Memo, Actg ACofS G-3 for WPD, 25 Jan 41, sub: Army Bases in British Possessions, G-3/43310, copy in WPD 4351-11. (2) Memo, SW for President, 30 Jan 41, same file.

[81] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for ACofS G-1, 30 Sep 41, sub: Garrison of Jamaica Base Command, WPD 4351-11.

Minor Bases Planned for the Bahamas, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Guiana

No large investment was ever contemplated for the Bahamas, which are moderately close to the Florida mainland, nor for Antigua, nor for St. Lucia, nor for British Guiana, although all four were in the list of eight leased bases. The island of Antigua is near the north end of the Lesser Antilles and was of interest in 1940 partly because it was conveniently near to the French island of Guadaloupe. St. Lucia, near the south end of the same chain of islands, was likewise a convenient place from which to keep an eye on the near-by French island of Martinique. British Guiana was of interest as a bauxite source, near which unidentified planes were reported in April 1941; also because it lay between Venezuela (from which a stream of important materials flowed to the United States) and Dutch Guiana, with French Guiana just beyond, with Brazil still further. Originally, the Greenslade Board had contemplated for each of the four an airplane staging field with limited servicing facilities and a guard. The JPC report of 28 August 1940 had contemplated for protecting each base a reinforced battalion and a composite air group, but by November a thriftier War Department had decided on a small standard garrison of 14 officers and 328 enlisted men, this being the estimated requirement for coping with any likely air attack from a carrier. It would be composed of an infantry company (7 officers and 226 men), with automatic weapons detachment, service troops, airways detachment, aircraft warning detachment, and Signal Corps and medical troops.[82] So far as the Bahamas were concerned, even this minimum was under suspicion, and in May 1941 the President, while approving the base site which had been selected after long delay, expressed his doubt that so much of a force was needed.[83] The Joint Board's own doubts on that subject increased to the point where it soon recommended no present action whatever, and in September all existing directives for acquiring land or garrisoning the island were finally revoked.[84] The accompanying papers noted that the islands offered no suitable site, the limestone made grading costs heavy, and results would not justify the outlay. Accordingly, the tabulation of garrison strength on 30 November 1941 in the Atlantic bases shows no troops whatever in the Bahamas. The bases in the Lesser Antilles meantime had been examined with equally critical eye, not only as to the cost of

[82] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 5 Jun 41, sub: Selection of a Naval and Air Base Site in the Bahamas, WPD 4351–18.

[83] Memo, President for SW and SN, 23 May 41, WPD 4351–18.

[84] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 16 Jul 41, sub: JB 309, ser 682, WPD 4351–18, and same for same, 11 Sep 41, Selection of . . . Base in the Bahamas, WPD 4351–18.

construction work but as to the dubious urgency of any development work upon them in a season when men and materiel were desperately needed elsewhere. At the end of November 1941, accordingly, their garrisons were still small. That at British Guiana was of 288 men, that at Antigua 282, that at St. Lucia 275.[85]

Delay in Utilizing Greenland

Even before World War II the possible usefulness of Greenland for American defense was considered and in May 1939 in the U. S. Senate there was a proposal that the United States purchase it from Denmark. The War Department was asked for an expression of views. The answer was discouraging. WPD's findings at the time, supported by the Navy's WPD, were that Greenland, mostly ice-capped and fogbound, had no natural facilities for operating either aviation or naval forces, and that strategic considerations offered "no justification for [its] acquisition."[86] General Craig, then Chief of Staff, and Secretary of War Woodring approved the view. A year later, however, with the war under way, aerial surveys from Newfoundland were seeking landing stages for the ferry route to Britain, via Iceland, and the observers noted in Greenland several landing-field possibilities which the Coast Guard cutter *Northland* was dispatched to investigate.[87] There was no immediate decision, and in February 1941 the Canadian Government indicated its own interest in building a radar station and meteorological station near Julianehaab. Canadian intention to utilize this area served to quicken American interest. So did the current report of a German flight over Iceland where British weather observers had already set up a station, and on 8 March 1941 the War Department organized a Greenland Survey which set out within ten days.[88] Without waiting for its findings, the War Department came to a decision that the delivery of planes to Britain now required landing fields in Greenland, that their construction was practicable, and that there should be no delay in building them. A WPD draft of a request to the President for funds to start the enterprise was approved by Secretary of War Stimson on 2 April and promptly carried by General Marshall to the White House where Mr. Hopkins "promised action this a. m.

[85] Compiled by Returns Sec, Misc Div, AGO, AG 320.2 (11–30–41) M–R–M.

[86] Memo, ACofS WPD (Strong) for CofS, 15 May 39, relating to SJR 119, WPD 4173.

[87] Related papers in WPD 4173–1 refer to an August 1940 flight of exploration by Capt. Julius K. Lacy, Air Corps. The *Northland* report, dated 16 Jan 41, is in this same file; copy of the State Department minutes of a 6 Feb 41 meeting with the Canadian Minister is in WPD 4173–2.

[88] Memo, SW for TAG, 8 Mar 41, sub: Orders for Greenland Survey Party, WPD 4173–8.

with funds probably from Lend-Lease." [89] Actually the necessary $5,000,000 came from the President's Emergency Fund.[90] WPD immediately urged assignment of a reinforced engineer battalion to assure protection for the construction party, but it was 17 June before the Army transport *Munargo* sailed with the initial garrison of 24 officers and 370 enlisted men.[91] There was expectation of early reinforcements, for on that same day WPD outlined a construction plan which called for housing for 2,050 personnel near Julianehaab and for 482 at Ivigtut (to protect the cryolite mines, which were a factor in aluminum manufacture).[92] The plan was laid before General McNair at GHQ, who shortly decided that Canadian fears for the safety of the mines at Ivigtut were unwarranted, that land attack on the mines was improbable, and that the Army's antiaircraft artillery unit unaided could accomplish the defense mission. General McNair recommended withdrawal of the infantry component, thereby reducing the garrison from 482 to 302 officers and men. Later the President ordered the total contemplated garrison (2,532 in the housing program) to be reduced to 1,500 by the spring of 1942.[93] The imperilment of Greenland was small, but its value was great, thanks to the weather, radio, and radar stations that were installed upon it (the weather data from Greenland helped General Eisenhower to set D Day for the Normandy invasion in 1944), and to the airstrips that provided a welcome staging for airplanes in passage.

Work on the three runways which fulfilled the latter purpose proceeded slowly because of weather harassments, but in October 1941 it was possible to report that one of them was ready for light planes. Not until January 1942 was it capable of taking all types of planes, and even then the radar was not ready to operate. The housing for ferry personnel was up by October and awaiting only furniture to make it comfortable. That for the garrison was not completed until March 1942, which meant that the garrison did its wintering in temporary quarters.[94]

[89] Ltr, SW to President, 2 Apr 41, with marginal note as quoted in part, signed "GCM." WPD 4173–16. Agreement with the Danish minister for the defense installation was signed on 9 Apr 41, WPD 4173–30.

[90] Memo, TAG for CofAC, 7 Apr 41, sub: Aviation Facilities in Greenland, AG 580 (4–2–41) M–F.

[91] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 12 Apr 41, sub: Garrison for Construction . . . in Greenland, appd by CofS 18 Apr 41, WPD 4173–23. (2) Same for same, 26 Apr 41, sub: Greenland, WPD 4173–33. (3) Actual sailing report of 17 Jun, WPD 4173–68.

[92] (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 41, sub: Greenland Defense Forces, WPD 4173–70. (2) Same for same, 10 Jul 41, sub: Command . . . in Greenland, WPD 4173–95.

[93] Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Defense of Cryolite, WPD 4173–111.

[94] Cables, CO, Bluie, West One, to Div Eng, 2 Oct 41, WPD 4173–70, and CO, Bluie, West Eight, to TAG, 23 Jan 42, WPD 4173–153.

The Situation in Iceland

The British garrisoning of Iceland started in May 1940 on invitation after the German crushing of Denmark and Norway. The possibility that reinforcements would be needed developed in September immediately after the announcement of the bases-for-destroyers transaction, when Hitler was reported to be considering seizure of the Atlantic islands from Iceland to the Azores. During the ensuing months British diplomacy appears to have encouraged a somewhat reluctant Icelandic Government to propose American garrisoning (to replace the British troops whom Mr. Churchill wished to utilize elsewhere) and in February 1941 this suggestion reached the State Department by way of the U. S. Consul in Reykjavik.[95] On 25 March the issue became more urgent. Hitler announced inclusion of Iceland in the zone within which neutral shipping would be sunk on sight, and the U. S. Navy actions previously chronicled [96] were initiated. In that month was reached not only the agreement that, in the event of war, the United States would assume responsibility for the defense of Iceland, but the decision on the manner of assuming that responsibility. The first American garrison would be a provisional Marine brigade of 4,100 men.[97] This would be relieved by reinforced elements of the 5th Infantry Division, planning for whose movement began therewith.[98]

The operation was hastened by Hitler's decision, well forecast by Allied intelligence, to open the grand assault upon Russia in late June. Up to then, the first American operation of the sort in prospect had been the friendly occupation of the Azores, as a countermove against Hitler's supposed plan for moving through Spain to a control of Gibraltar. When, instead, Germany's western Mediterranean plan was abandoned in favor of the war on Russia, the Azores operation lost its urgency and the Iceland enterprise was quickly substituted. On 16 June Mr. Roosevelt gave oral instructions to the Chief of Naval Operations that the

[95] Memo, Gerow for CofS, accompanying draft of Ltr, SW to Secy State, 10 Feb 41, acknowledging ltr and dispatch from Reykjavik, WPD 4493.

[96] In Chapter XII. These actions included the reconnaissance voyage of U. S. S. *Niblack*, resulting in its indecisive engagement with a U-boat on 10 April 1941, the first engagement of U. S. and German armed forces in World War II.

[97] As it worked out, this was a brigade that had been rushed across the country for an expected warm-weather operation via the Caribbean and that was surprised by finding itself reclothed in woolens and shipped to Iceland. See Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, p. 75.

[98] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD (Malony) for CofS, 30 Apr 41, sub: Dispatch of Army Observers to Iceland, WPD 4493–1.

Iceland operation be undertaken, relieving British troops then in garrison, and on that same day Admiral Stark ordered the Marine brigade commander to proceed with Operation INDIGO.[99] The Army's own planning proceeded, aided by an extended reconnaissance report on Iceland from the Army Special Observer in London that had previously been ordered.[100] Time would be needed, for in the upbuilding of the new Army organizations Selective Service personnel had been placed in almost every Regular Army unit and until the Selective Service Act's current restrictions should be removed it was impossible to send any draftee out of the country against his will. This was the political situation with which General Marshall himself had to grapple, and which he attacked boldly on 30 June in his biennial report, calling for new legislation which would extend the one-year term of service.[101]

The Marines, being volunteers, were immediately usable. The brigade proceeded accordingly toward Iceland, while British diplomatic agencies went through some rapid steps to have the Americans "invited" by Iceland's Prime Minister. It was close calculation, for the invitation was received and accepted only on 7 July and instantly announced by the President in a message to Congress of that date; it was on that same evening that the U. S. fleet and convoy loaded with the Marines reached Reykjavik harbor.[102] The President had been dissuaded from announcing the expedition some days earlier, the Navy pleading that no announcement be made until the Marines should finish their voyage through waters of the war zone.[103]

Further study of requirements for men and materiel and ships convinced the General Staff that the early plans for sending a total of 30,000 Army troops to Iceland (the British forces there included 25,000 Army, 2,000 Navy, and 500 Royal Air Force) would have to be revised, and the time of troop arrival extended.[104] While the Marines were at sea, accordingly, warning was sent to London that the plans for Army movements to Iceland were undergoing a

[99] See JB 325, ser 697–2, Indigo–2, and related papers in WPD 4493–41 to 66; also copy of order, CNO to CG First Mar Brig, 16 Jun 41, WPD 4493–17; also Memo, ACofS WPD (Gerow) for CofS, 25 Jun 41, sub: Navy Operation Indigo, bearing initials GCM, same file.

[100] Memo, Gen Chaney for CofS, 19 Jun 41, sub: Report on Reconnaissance, an 8-page document accompanied by 9 annexes for the several arms and branches, WPD 4493–17.

[101] See Chapter VII. See also Memo, Gerow through TAG for Special Observer, London, 5 Jul 41, sub: Indigo Relief, announcing Legislative plan, WPD 4493–37.

[102] HR Document 307, 77th Cong, 1st sess, copy in WPD 4493–45. See also Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, pp. 74–77.

[103] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 3 Jul 41, sub: Indigo, WPD 4493–40.

[104] Memo, G–4 (Reybold) for WPD, 25 Jun 41, sub: Limitations Governing Indigo Plan, WPD 4493–38.

change. It now was proposed to send an Army force of only 267 officers and 5,966 enlisted men. It also was proposed to have them relieve, not the British but the Marines, who were ticketed for expeditionary duty elsewhere.[105] Upon reconsideration this proposal of 5,966 was revised upward temporarily, the President directing in July, rather, that 10,000 Army troops be sent, but in August he altered the arrangement again, so that the Marines would remain, and only 5,000 Army troops be sent.[106] It was this circumstance that called for consideration, affecting the relationship of the Marines and the Army command. Interservice protocol finally was disposed of by Presidential order, placing the Marine brigade under command of the American senior officer, Maj. Gen. C. H. Bonesteel of the Army. On General Bonesteel descended additional duties of a semidiplomatic nature, involving relations with the British force, larger than his own, and with the Icelanders, whose coolness at the outset was gradually overcome by a combination of General Bonesteel's tact, General Marshall's advice, and the co-operation of the American Minister, Lincoln MacVeagh.[107] The matter of British and American commands had been arranged with forehanded expectation of unpleasant possibilities. These threatened to develop in October, when two United States Senators directed to the War Department inquiries on whether American troops in Iceland were under British command, and whether they would be forced into action by an attack on the British. The prompt answer was that American troops were under American command; that if there was an attack on Iceland it would be against an American position (which President Roosevelt had announced in his 7 July message); and that in such a case, certainly, Americans would react.[108]

[105] Memo, Gen Gerow through TAG for Special Observer, London, 2 Jul 41, sub: Forces Indigo, WPD 4493–34. Incidentally, by this time the "secret" planning was becoming widely known. A GHQ officer visiting the 5th Division in Tennessee was asked by several officers for further information; they knew the 5th was designated, and they knew where it was going, adding, "Everybody knows it; it was even announced on the radio." (See Memo, Maj Raymond for DCofS GHQ, 30 Jun 41, sub: Rumors Circulating in 5th Division, WPD 4493–32.

[106] See Memo, Gerow through TAG for Special Observer, London, 16 Jul 41 and Memo, Gerow for CofS, 18 Jul 41, sub: Forces for Indigo, both in WPD 4493–50. See also JB 325, ser 697–3, 16 Aug 41, copy in WPD 4493–99.

[107] (1) Presidential order of 22 Sep 41. (2) TAG to Gen Bonesteel, CG U. S. A. Forces in Iceland, 3 Oct 41, both in AG 370.5 (9–29–41) MC–E and in WPD 4493–95. (3) Ltr, CofS to Bonesteel, 2 Sep 41, sub: Instructions to the Commander of U. S. Forces in Iceland. (4) Ltr, Bonesteel to Marshall, 10 Oct 41, and reply, 13 Nov 41, both in WPD 4493–165. (5) Ltr, SW to Secy State (drafted in WPD), 15 Nov 41, AGO files, WD 370.5 (10–10–41) MC–E.

[108] Ltrs, Marshall to Mahoney, 10 Oct 41, and Stimson to Vandenberg, 16 Oct 41, both drafted by Col Handy, WPD 4493–150–51.

The graver difficulty with regard to getting Army troops to Iceland was over the issue that General Marshall had foreseen in June—the restrictions of Selective Service. Because the legislation extending the period of draft service was delayed, his expectations were dramatically fulfilled in a manner that he described to the President. Although the infantry element which was sent forward in August was less than one regiment (a squadron of pursuit planes had been sent in July aboard the carrier *Wasp*) there was difficulty in getting that small number under way. Of the Reserve officers 82 percent volunteered to go overseas, waiving their legal right to refuse. Of the Selective Service personnel only 22 percent volunteered. To fill the ranks it was necessary to comb out another infantry regiment and numerous other organizations in the division, this sometimes entailing a good deal of effort. Thus, to get qualified men in numbers sufficient to fill the roster of one of the service companies, whose total was only 3 officers and 150 men, it was necessary to obtain transfers from 19 organizations, including key instructors from one of the schools. In order to make up the expedition's shortages, other units of the 5th Division were deprived of many of their experienced 3-year men and refilled with the short-term men who had balked at overseas duty. As General Marshall described it, in explaining his acute need for draft extension: "The organization of additional forces of this nature will require the disruption of approximately three regiments for every one sent and, even so, with small probability of securing volunteers of certain specialists essential to forces of this type." [109]

The passage of the extension act ended this worry, but other anxieties about personnel replaced it,[110] and by October the Navy was pressing for a decision by which Army personnel must be found to relieve the Marines. The British had been able to relieve but 950 of their own garrison.[111] These pressures, still being applied after the Pearl Harbor attack, would constitute a subject for argument for months to come.[112] The entire Army personnel in Iceland on 1 December, just before Pearl Harbor, still numbered 5,974.[113]

[109] Memo, CofS for President, 6 Sep 41, no sub, WPD 4493–125.

[110] See Chapter XI.

[111] (1) Ltr, Admiral Turner to General Gerow, 9 Oct 41. (2) Cable, Chaney to TAG, 10 Oct 41, sub: Indigo. Both in WPD 4493–152.

[112] Relief of the Iceland garrison will be discussed in a later volume in the Chief of Staff series.

[113] U. S. Army personnel at the Atlantic bases on 30 Nov 41 (these including the eight British bases, Greenland, and Iceland) was as follows: Bermuda 1,200, Trinidad 2,866, St. Lucia 275, Jamaica 334, Greenland 687, Newfoundland 2,383, Br. Guiana 288, Antigua 282, Bahamas 0, Iceland 5,974. Figures compiled by Returns Section, Misc Div, AGO, in AGO 320.2 (11–30–41) M–R–M.

In the Dutch Islands, Aruba and Curaçao

Because of their geographical location in the Caribbean and also because of justified Navy anxiety over their protection, something may here be said of the Dutch possessions of Aruba and Curaçao, lying north of Venezuela and much more important in 1941, all considered, than was the distant Dutch Guiana. Because of their value as oil producers and their obvious vulnerability to injury by submarine raid or by local sabotage, they were included in Rainbow 4 planning. WPD (to meet General Marshall's view that Army personnel at the various bases could be reduced in order to cope with a troop shortage) re-examined the Rainbow plans and proposed to reduce the Aruba–Curaçao allotments. A letter to the Caribbean Defense Command suggested that Aruba would need only a total of 36 officers and 915 men to supplement the British and Dutch garrisons of 375 and 450 respectively. For Curaçao, where the British had 775 and the Dutch 1,100, the Staff proposed 60 officers and 1,423 men.[114] The Caribbean Defense Command suggested only small modifications (mainly for improved air patrol), but immediate action in Washington was held up because of a diplomatic complication. The State Department wished to negotiate the matter with the Dutch only if the Dutch should agree to accept a Venezuelan mission at the same time. This the Dutch declined to do, and accordingly, when the war broke, no American garrison had started for either Aruba or Curaçao. On 7 January Rear Adm. J. H. Hoover, commanding the Tenth U. S. Naval District at Puerto Rico, expressed to the Navy Department his concern over the vulnerability of these important oil areas, and stressed the need for an air patrol, fighter planes, and also naval vessels. Admiral Stark forwarded a copy of the letter to General Marshall, who pursued the matter in his own way, quite aware that any halt in the flow of oil to the United States at that critical time was to be averted if at all possible. The Dutch agreed to extend the two existing airfields to make them more useful immediately, and the Caribbean Air Force set about getting a detachment of 2 officers and 35 men to each of the two areas. On 29 January Secretary Stimson in person carried to the White House a letter reporting the State Department's role in the delay, and presenting evidence of the situation's urgency, which Admiral Hoover had not exag-

[114] Memo, Actg ACofS WPD (Gerow) for TAG, 23 Sep 41, sub: Forces for Aruba and Curaçao, with SW direction of Ltr to CG CDC, AG 320.2, Forces of Aruba and Curaçao. See also reply of 12 Nov 41, same file.

gerated.[115] On 16 February German submarines shelled the great refinery at Aruba, and sank five tankers in near-by waters.

The Fixed Defenses in Both Oceans

The Strategic Triangle in the Pacific and the defensive screen of bases in Atlantic and Caribbean were well designed to afford a basis of protection for both west and east coasts, but they were a design rather than the actuality that fuller installations would provide. No military authority thought of the bases as even potentially impregnable, for no position will stand if the attacker makes his assault long enough, strong enough, and skillful enough. Because Hawaii was a vital part of western defense, and because it was the base for the invaluable fleet, it had received a maximum of attention and personnel and equipment in proportion to the total available supply, and it was this circumstance that nurtured the unfortunate surmise that its very strength would discourage assault by an enemy, simply because assault on an alerted Hawaii presumably would prove too costly. That is a wholly different thing from making attack impossible, or from believing that an attack would be beaten off without damage to installations. Sea and air operations had already demonstrated repeatedly that, even with a foe on continuous wartime alert, surprise attacks were possible and that, while attacking forces could be made to suffer severely, some bold and fortunate pilots would unfailingly get past the interception defense and drop their bombs on target. The belief in Washington in late November 1941 was not only that Hawaiian installations were strong enough to stand against any likely assault, but that Japan, aware of it, would hesitate to risk the heavy losses that presumably would ensue. In this confidence, reinforcements were being prepared, rather, for the Panama Canal and, in lesser quantity, for the Alaskan corner of the Strategic Triangle, and of course were being hurried in greater volume to the notoriously vulnerable Philippines.

In the Atlantic defense chain nothing approached the strength of Oahu's installations. This was by design. The great base at Pearl Harbor was not only an indispensable defensive position in an immense ocean, far distant from supporting bases and hence requiring power to sustain itself against attack by a

[115] (1) Ltr, Admiral Hoover to Admiral Stark, 7 Jan 42, bearing General Marshall's marginal note. (2) Telg, Huddleston to Secy State, 9 Jan 42. (3) Telg, GHQ (signed Marshall) to CG CDC, 10 Jan 42. (4) Memo, CG Carib. Air Force to TAG via CDC, 13 Jan 42, sub: Air Defense Organization. (5) Ltr, SW to President, 29 Jan 42. All in AG 320.2 Forces for Aruba and Curaçao. The 1942 developments will be discussed in a later volume.

known foe possessing large sea and air forces. It was indispensable also as a well developed base for offensive expeditionary operations. Nothing in mid-Atlantic was comparable. Even Bermuda, most exposed by remoteness from other bases, was quickly accessible by air, and all the others were easily reached by sea as well. None of the islands was vitally needed as a base for an expeditionary force for Europe. No European foe was immediately capable of moving across the Atlantic in great strength, despite the excessive nervousness on that score that was apparent in Washington in the spring of 1941 and was still present in some degree as the year moved toward its close. The actual danger was from enemy submarine attacks upon shipping and, less troublesome, from hit-and-run raids. Against neither of these perils would large ground-force installations on the newly leased bases be of great use, and this explains the modest base-garrisoning program that has been described, greatly reduced from the extravagant original program of August 1940. The actual Army strength at the Atlantic bases in late 1941 was scant, but it was sufficient for the small need that developed. The first shock of war was due to come, not in the Atlantic, not in those Latin American areas that for years had stirred anxiety over hemisphere defense, not even where American defenses were known to be weak. Rather, it would come where American defenses were thought to be too strong to invite attack.

CHAPTER XV

The War Reaches America

The failure of Washington authorities to keep in mind the peculiar peril to Pearl Harbor that both Secretaries, the Chief of Staff, and WPD had pointed out from time to time and, more especially, the particular peril to the U. S. Fleet moored there periodically, can be traced to estimates of Japan's intentions that were arrived at late in 1941. During that autumn there was a rising expectation that attack would first be directed against targets much nearer to Japan itself. For months there was doubt, even, that America would be a primary victim. Despite the five-year nonaggression pact that Moscow and Tokyo reached in April 1941,[1] there was a persistent conviction in Washington that Japan was merely biding its time for an attack upon the Siberian maritime provinces. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union and in a few days began gaining its astonishing successes, numerous Army and Navy Staff officers expected that Japan would move northward as soon as Russia was defeated. An illustration is the Navy judgment of 5 July, expressed in a communication to the Chief of Staff (and sent on by him to the commanding generals in the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, and the Fourth Army for their guidance). In it the Navy offered "the unmistakable deduction" that the Japanese Government now had determined on a policy which "probably involves war in the near future," and pointed out a recent Japanese order to commercial vessels in east Atlantic ports that they clear the Panama Canal by 1 August. Advances against British and Dutch possessions were thought of as possible and operations against Indo-China likelier, but the northward thrust was thought of as all but certain: "the neutrality pact with Russia will be abrogated" and Japan's major military effort would be against Russia's maritime provinces probably at the end of July or "deferred until after the collapse of European Russia." [2] A few days later, how-

[1] Memo, Actg ACofS G–2 for CofS, 14 Apr 41, cited in Résumé as in G–2/2657–D 1067.

[2] Informal Navy Memo for CofS, repeating summary of Navy information, dated 3 Jul 41, WPD 4544. Copies transmitted to CG's Haw Dept, Phil Dept, Caribbean, Fourth Army, 7 Jul 41, same file, also in AG 380.3. See also, indicative of Army thinking, Memo, ACofS G–2 for CofS, 17 Jul 41, sub: Japanese Movement into French Indo-China, cited in Résumé . . . as G–2/2657–H–528, and same for same, same date, sub: Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower, G–2/2023–1025, on p. 255 of Résumé. The latter memorandum predicted Japan's later movement against the maritime provinces.

ever, the Navy's planning chief advised the Chief of Naval Operations of a decided increase in anti-American comment in the Japanese newspapers and suggested that aggressive movements against the United States, Great Britain, and the Dutch East Indies could "not be entirely ruled out." He recommended concurrent orders to the American commanders in the Philippines to establish their underwater defenses and deploy forces against a possible Japanese attack. When the Army's part in such a program was brought up at the next day's discussion in Joint Board General Marshall pointed out that there could be no deployment save by Presidential proclamation to bring the Philippine Army into United States service, and this "could be readily considered by Japan as an aggressive step."[3] As a substitute it was decided to explore means of having the Philippine Army mobilized for training, nominally.

Japan added to uneasiness and uncertainty by sending to Vichy on 12 July the equivalent of an ultimatum calling for "permission" to enter Indo-China, and four days later by installing the new and strongly militarist Konoye government, with the aggressive General Hideki Tojo as its war minister. Far from intimidating Washington, it encouraged Mr. Roosevelt to proceed immediately with measures designed to retard Japan's accumulation of war materiel. With his approval the Chiefs of Army and Navy on 25 July warned Pacific commanders that on the following day the United States would impose against Japan an embargo on all trade, save as licensed, and would freeze Japanese assets in the United States. They did not anticipate "immediate hostile reaction" but sent the information so that the commanders "may take appropriate precautionary measures."[4] The military was not in full sympathy with the decision. In answer to Mr. Roosevelt's request for advice Admiral Stark gave him on 22 July a study by Admiral Turner, the Navy's planning chief. The study recommended against an embargo, reasoning that such an act would probably result in early attack by Japan upon Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, and possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific.[5]

For some weeks thereafter there was a continuing delusion (presumably based on the continuing Russian defeats) that when Japan moved it would be

[3] (1) Memo, Dir WPD (Navy) for CNO, 11 Jul 41, WPD (Army) 4454–1. (2) Minutes of JB meeting, 12 Jul 41. Compare the WPD warning of 20 November 1940, previously cited, that Philippine mobilization might stimulate Japan to action.

[4] Joint dispatch of CofS and CNO to CG's Phil, Haw, Carib Depts, 25 Jul 41, sent by naval radio. Résumé, p. 261.

[5] See *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 5, p. 2384.

against the Soviet Union rather than the United States. In late September G–2 continued to see a crisis in Japan, and a desire to attack Siberia as soon as Russia was defeated; G–2 continued to urge "increasingly strong power diplomacy" by the United States in the expressed belief that this was the best means of gaining time and of preventing a spread of hostilities.[6] The same general attitude prevailed among General Marshall's intelligence advisers far into October. It is of interest to note that in the middle of that month the Navy issued another warning that as a result of a new Japanese cabinet reorganization, bringing Tojo to the premiership, hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly possible. There was, however, a belated realization that perhaps Japan now had other intentions, for the warning (which again was passed on to the Hawaiian naval command and thus communicated to General Short as well) proceeded:

> . . . Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intent and constitute provocative action. . . .[7]

This was still so far from Army belief that two days later General Gerow of WPD and General Miles of G–2 expressed their nonconcurrence in the view that attack upon United States forces was an early possibility and recommended a message to General Short advising that "No abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." The Deputy and the Chief of Staff having noted both viewpoints, the "corrective" message recommended by WPD was sent out on 20 October both to General MacArthur and to the Western Defense Command as well as to General Short.[8]

Factors Contributing to the 7 December Surprise

Although there was disagreement as to the timing of whatever Japan was contemplating, Army and Navy planners were in substantial accord in a large

[6] Memo, Actg ACofS G–2 for CofS, 23 Sep 41, sub: Crisis in Japan, cited in Résumé as Intelligence Bulletin 131. See also IB 135, dated 2 Oct 41, filed in G–2 and IB 144, dated 21 Oct 41; Memo, ACofS G–2 for CofS, 16 Oct 41, sub: Fall of Japanese Cabinet; and IB 112, 16 Aug 41, sub: Developments in the Far Eastern Situation. These are on pp. 310, 327, 339, 334, and 271 of Résumé.

[7] Rad from CNO (shown to CG Haw Dept), 16 Oct 41. Quoted in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 22, p. 34.

[8] Memo, ACofS WPD to CofS, 18 Oct 41, sub: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet. Sent out by radio 20 Oct 41 as message 357 to MacArthur, 266 to Haw Dept, 223 to West Def Com, the copy rubber-stamped with notations by DCofS and CofS. WPD 4544–5.

part of their appraisal. This accord was unfortunate for, by reason of it, both groups of authorities were unmindful of what proved to be the most important item of all. Both of them still failed to sense a special threat to Pearl Harbor and the fleet, even though in the light of after-events it seemed to Congressional investigators that this was unmistakable in the "Magic" intercepts available to the intelligence and operations staffs of both services. These intercepts recorded, by decoding, numerous messages between Tokyo and Japanese agents and officials in Honolulu, Washington, Berlin, and a much smaller number to and from Japanese agents in Panama. They designated, among other things, the locations of U. S. ships in harbor and their movements and timing. Regardless of the specific peril to Hawaii that should have been discerned in the messages because the invaluable fleet was based there, the U. S. War and Navy Chiefs in Washington continued to provide Hawaii with only the same broad warnings of peril which were forwarded to the Caribbean Command and the Western Defense Command at San Francisco, as well as to Manila. Hawaii received all those broad warnings, as did the others, but nothing more specific than the others. The "Magic" intercepts were passed from the communications officers to G–2 in Washington and examined consistently by only two designated officers before being referred to General Marshall. Because of their number not all were deciphered until after days of delay (several of importance only after the Pearl Harbor attack). Because of the desire for secrecy none was sent to General Short, but a few were transmitted (by the safer Navy code) to Admiral Kimmel.[9] The plain fact, as concluded by the official post-factum investigations, is that while both Army and Navy Chiefs now were tense with expectation that Japan might move in force, neither Army nor Navy expected that hostile move to be in the direction of Pearl Harbor, near which so much American strength had been concentrated.[10] Each may have leaned somewhat upon the other's agreeing judgment but, whatever the cause, the trend of thinking in both services, as 1941 wore on,

[9] See exhibits of intercepts in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Parts 12 and 13. See also testimony of Brig. Gen. Hayes A. Kroner in Part 34, pp. 42–48, upon limited access to the "Magic" information.

[10] See *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 34, pp. 47–48 for declaration that the Intelligence Estimate of 29 November 1941 "does not include in the lines of action open to Japan an attack on Pearl Harbor." General Miles' view (p. 57) was that an air attack on Pearl Harbor had been studied for 20 years and was omitted from this estimate "presumably because it was so obvious." General Gerow's view was that the Japanese inquiries about the Panama Canal (much less stressed in the inquiries) forced the American military to be quite as much on guard there, even though no attack on the Canal eventuated, for bombing of the Panama locks could have affected the fleet seriously. In brief, General Gerow explained, had WPD not been concerned with both Panama and Hawaii, it would have been remiss. "It was probable that they might attack any one of our four major areas bordering on the Pacific." *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 4, p. 1653.

was that (if Japan were not actually deterred by fear of America's slowly rising strength) her assault would be upon targets in the Far East rather than in the mid-Pacific. This thinking is apparent in the stream of correspondence and discussion during the weeks prior to Pearl Harbor.[11]

The evidence upon this and upon other points related to the disaster that fell upon Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is of overwhelming volume, including 15,000 transcript pages of testimony in the postwar Congressional committee hearings alone, which ran from 15 November 1945 to 31 May 1946, with 9,754 additional pages of testimony accumulated in the seven previous official inquiries.[12] It is out of the question to present in detail in this volume all this evidence or even all which affects only the Office of the Chief of Staff. One cannot even present, at any length, the whole variety of conflicting conclusions which have been drawn from the same evidence. The conclusions *in extenso* are available in the summaries of the majority and minority reports mentioned. It will be difficult to avoid several judgments to which items in the present chapter inevitably lead, namely: (1) that the initial attack upon Pearl Harbor (rather than upon installations in the Far East) effected as complete

[11] Asked at the Army inquiry of 1944 what were War Department conclusions in the 1941 autumn, General Marshall said: "We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam and against the Malay peninsula. We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought with the addition of more modern planes that the defenses there would make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack." *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 27, *Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*, p. 14. See also *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 39, *Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*, p. 439, recording the ejaculation of Secretary Knox on 7 December when informed of the raid at Pearl Harbor, "My God, this can't be true. This must mean the Philippines." See also in *Report*, p. 76, Vice Adm. W. S. Pye's recollection of Secretary Knox' visit to Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack, specifically the Secretary's opening remark that "no one in Washington expected an attack—even Kelly Turner," Admiral Turner then being Navy WPD chief and "the most aggressive-minded of all." On the other hand, General Miles, the ACofS G–2 in 1941, informed the Joint Committee in 1945: "We knew a surprise attack was possible. . . . But we knew also that there was no possible way that we could see of warding off or detecting a surprise attack except by reconnaissance from Hawaii, whether that reconnaissance was air or surface or sub-surface or radar." *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 2, p. 823. As to omitting Hawaii from the list of possible targets named in the estimates, this chief of Intelligence declared that such a mention was not considered necessary because "it was a fortress built for one sole purpose, defense in a Japanese war. . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 838.

[12] *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States*, pursuant to S Con Res 27, 79th Cong, with additional and minority views, (apart from the thirty-nine volumes of *Hearings*), is printed as Document 244, 79th Cong, 2d sess (Washington, 1946). It covers 540 printed pages. The testimony of the hearings before this committee, plus exhibits which include the reports of 7 earlier hearings, is found in 39 volumes under the general title *Pearl Harbor Attack*. Those earlier inquiries, with their appropriate numbers as Committee Exhibits are (1) Roberts Commission—143; Admiral Thomas C. Hart—144; Army's Pearl Harbor Board—145; Navy Court of Inquiry—146; Col Carter W. Clarke—147; Maj Henry C. Clausen—148; Admiral H. Kent Hewitt—149. See Morison, *The Rising Sun In The Pacific*, specifically, Chapter V. Many texts of nonofficial origin exist.

a surprise as the Japanese had hoped for; (2) that the event startled the high commands of Army and Navy as completely as it did the local commanders of Army and Navy at Oahu; (3) that much of the secret information available to Washington (particularly the "Magic" intercepts of Japanese communications) was not decoded in time, and much which was decoded was inaccurately appraised within the General Staff, and that its most serious implications, crystal clear *after* the tragic fact, were not discerned when there was usefulness in discerning them;[13] (4) that not all the highly relevant information which was at the General Staff's disposal was shared with the Hawaiian Command for its own appraisal, and none of the "Magic" was forwarded to General Short direct; (5) that, regardless of this, enough information was provided to the Hawaiian Command—"the sentinel on post" in Secretary Stimson's figure—to warrant a belief that it, like the forces in San Francisco and Panama, was alert to its own peril; (6) that the forces available to the Hawaiian Command were far too small to permit both the reconnaissance and the training activities directed, and that insufficient attention was paid the Bellinger-Martin warnings of March 1941 (specifically II (b) and IV (e))[14] on the impossibility of conducting the daily air-patrols contemplated in the official defense plan; (7) that, insufficient as they were, these forces were not deployed to their maximum effectiveness or with that thoroughness to be expected in light of Army doctrine and past maneuvers, and of the warnings contained in the 24 November and the 27 November dispatches; (8) that, on the other hand, despite the known peril of war throughout 1941, too much was decided at long range and there was no adequate, on-the-spot inspection by high Washington authority of what actually was being set up as an operating defense; and, finally (9) that the strategic planners of Army and Navy themselves in estimating Japanese intentions failed to make a surmise which in retrospective clairvoyance seems to have been almost inescapable, namely, that a crippling raid on the U. S. Fleet could be regarded as a necessary preliminary to any major Japanese campaign in the Pacific.[15]

[13] It should be remembered that the "Magic" device intercepted and decoded not merely the important messages but all messages. They still had to be translated into English but there was no way to tell in advance whether a message was of any importance. Because translators were few there were delays in the translation, and because of so much chaff in the heavy flow of interceptions the solid wheat was difficult to separate.

[14] See p. 476 above.

[15] Reference is again made to the formal findings of the several inquiries listed in n. 12. The Congressional committee majority, having made its final findings on the numerous failings and responsibilities for the disaster, concluded its labors (*Report*, pp. 253–66) with 25 "supervisory, administrative and organi-

This last conclusion is based upon the exact stipulation which entered into all American planning for the Pacific—that the fleet was the principal instrument of American action; that accordingly it must be kept intact as a unit rather than dispersed (for Singapore's protection, for instance); that, as General Marshall told General Short on his assumption of the new post, "the fullest protection for the Fleet [was] *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us"; that the fleet was not based on Pearl Harbor in order to protect the Army garrison, but, rather, the garrison was there in order to protect the fleet and its base. Yet with full American understanding of the fleet's supreme importance to America, there is no indication that the chiefs or the planners of the armed services credited Japanese planners with ability to recognize that same patent and basic fact. In Japan's planning of a new Pacific adventure, it would seem, the first aim surely would be to remove, or at least neutralize, the principal potential obstacle to such an adventure. This obstacle, by universal agreement, was the U. S. Fleet. Whether the Japanese adventure was toward Thailand or Malaya or Siberia or the Philippines, then, would be unimportant; in no case could it have high promise of success if a hostile U. S. Fleet was in operation, despite the fact that in late 1941 the fleet was not at maximum strength. From that stage in reasoning it is a short step to the next—that Japanese planning would require that the fleet be crippled, or its one reliable base shattered, or both. After the fact, which indicates that this is exactly the reasoning that Japanese professional planners followed, it seems extraordinary that American planners, by like reasoning, did not come unerringly to the same judgment; and hence surmise that, whatever Japan's ultimate objective, its first target could be the U. S. Fleet and its Pearl Harbor base by the often-predicted surprise attack; and hence, recognize the overwhelming necessity of emergency defenses there—not along with Manila and Panama but before them, and instantly.

zational principles" for Army and Navy study which "strongly impressed" the postwar Chief of Staff's special advisory group on this matter. In a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff on 19 September 1946 this advisory committee, headed by Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, purposely addressing its attention only to the administrative area, declared the analysis of the 25 principles showed "that the deficiencies which existed [in Pearl Harbor defenses on 7 December 1941] were due to the system employed on departmental and theater levels." Study of these principles by all commands and staff divisions was therefore recommended: approval of this suggestion by the current Chief of Staff, General of the Army Eisenhower, was followed by the Secretary of War's formal order for such study throughout the Army, followed by a review of "existing procedure with a view to developing better organization, simpler and more certain command and staff methods." See Ltr, TAG to Commanding Generals, 15 Oct 46, sub: Report of the Joint Committee . . . on the Pearl Harbor Attack, AGAO–S–C–M 334 Joint Committee of Congress on Pearl Harbor (8 Oct 46) and accompanying Memo, Gen Haislip for DCofS, 19 Sep 46, sub: Report of the Joint Committee. . . . Both filed as Tab 33 of bndr called Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, in AG records.

Ample evidence that the Japanese had made their plans on this reasoning was provided after the war, when Japanese naval officers gave to U. S. naval interrogators their recollections of pre-Pearl Harbor discussions and turned over relevant records. Thus, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's air operations officer during the attack, Capt. Minoru Genda, recalled Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's having said about 1 February 1941: "If we have war with the United States we will have nó hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." [16] From the recollections of Capt. Sadatoshi Tomioka, chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff's Operations Section, and others, came a composite answer to the question of what important factors were considered in reaching the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. The factor given first in the translated summary was this: "Rendering impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the South Seas Operation, including the Philippine Islands." [17] Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, commanding the Akagi unit in the attack, observed that "the object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the United States Pacific Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the Pacific. . . ." [18] From the printed version of an oral discussion by the Japanese Combined Fleet's chief of staff, explaining that fleet's Secret Operations Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941, are extracted these fragments:

5. In connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the Atlantic Fleet, has massed in Pearl Harbor. . . . This fleet will be utterly crushed at one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset, and deprive him of his fighting spirit. . . .[19]

In post-factum analysis of Japanese strategy this became clear to lay as well as professional strategists. When General Marshall was testifying before the Joint Committee on the fourth anniverary of Pearl Harbor he was asked, "Isn't it almost compelling that we must have kept constantly in mind that Japan would make an air strike at the main naval forces in the Pacific as long as they were sitting out on their flank [of the planned Japanese drive toward Malaya]?" Restating the hypothesis, General Marshall wound up with the simple reply that "given an opportunity to strike a crippling blow at the Fleet, it is useless to say she would probably do it, because she did it." [20] It therefore seems profitless to do more than

[16] Joint Committee exhibit 8–d, incl 1, interrog 10, in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 13, Exhibits, p. 426.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 400.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 410.
[19] *Ibid.*, extension of exhibit 8, pp. 718–19.
[20] Hearing before the Joint Committee on 7 Dec 45, in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 3, pp. 1152–53.

mention another post-factum explanation of misjudging the situation: this noted that Japan might have invaded Indo-China or even Borneo with impunity at the time, with the United States declining to go to war on such an issue; that, this being so, Japan obviously should not have forced America into the war; that American planners may have been guided by this same reasoning and by conjecture on what a sagacious enemy should do, rather than on what an aggressive enemy was capable of doing—in other words, estimating an enemy's intentions rather than his capabilities. In General Marshall's curt dismissal of that logic, "she did it."

Beyond the nine conclusions given above many other conclusions can be drawn, some pointing to the greater culpability of the local command, some to that of the higher authority in Washington. Many others were drawn in the course of the Congressional committee's inquiry, and no doubt will be drawn in further examinations and analyses to be made for years to come. The present chapter offers no more than the nine listed, supplementing the earlier recital of important actions taken, or not taken, to build up an appropriate defense for the fleet and the air bases, and an appraisal of the part played in this sequence of actions by the Office of the Chief of Staff.

Evidence of Japan's Southeast Asia Objectives

Apart from the "Magic" intercepts dealing with precise identifications of Pearl Harbor berthings, with fleet movements, with harbor defenses, and the target,[21] there was much to encourage the belief that other areas were in greater peril. Japan had obvious need for the petroleum of the Netherlands East Indies, more than ever as a result of the American embargo on petroleum. The intentions for expansion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had been publicly announced long before, and that sphere was commonly understood to include the maritime provinces of Siberia (eyed by Japan as far back as 1918), French Indo-China (already the subject of pressure on Vichy), Burma, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, as well as the Philippines which, in American hands, were recognized as a threat to Japan's southward expansion. Hence, when Japanese naval concentrations were reported, they were almost automatically assumed to be pointed toward one of these targets. One of them, in fact, was pointed toward Indo-China, and was so recognized. The certainty of the identification

[21] These are assembled as Exhibits 1 and 2 in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 12, pp. 1–316.

appears to have satisfied observers and analysts alike and, strangely, to have kept them from further observations. A few more facts and conjectures on the circumstance noted (that one naval concentration's whereabouts was unknown) might have raised their suspicion that Japan was then contemplating not the one expedition to Indo-China which was in unmistakable preparation but another against the Philippines, and yet a third. This third venture was precisely the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the fleet, which had been a stated presumption of the Orange War Plan years before.

Among the incoming warnings one may note two Manila radiograms of late October 1941. The one reported a general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the western Pacific—possibly toward Indo-China or the Malaya barrier. The other reported a number of Japanese vessels off Takao, in Formosa, to which the commander in chief of the Combined Naval and Air Forces had been ordered: the intelligence agent stated, "I believe the assembling of an expeditionary force may be under way." [22] A few days later a Military Intelligence Division (MID) summary of information from a source "considered reliable" reported that in late August General Tojo (while he was war minister) had ordered full preparations by November "to meet any emergency with the United States." The summary also quoted a Japanese judgment that "war with the United States would best begin in December or in February." [23] On the same day, 3 November, the Joint Board met to consider messages laid before the State Department two days previously. The messages were from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Maj. Gen. John Magruder, head of the current U. S. Mission to China, both urging that the United States warn Japan to remain out of Yunnan province. Secretary of State Hull, then trying to avert a break with Japan for as long as possible, saw small profit in further warnings "if we can't back them up" and found General Marshall and Admiral Stark in agreement with him. The Chief of Staff, likewise seeking time, expressed the view that by mid-December the scheduled shipment of munitions and men to the Philippines would have built up a total strength sufficient to deter Japanese aggressiveness: only then, he went on, could American declarations be backed up. The Chief of Naval Operations appears to have been unconvinced about the immediate imperilment either of Yunnan or of Chungking, the temporary Chinese capital: the notes of the meeting mention his view that the Japanese

[22] (1) Rad, Manila (signed Brink) to Milid (Military Intelligence Div of G–2), 27 Oct 41. (2) Rad paraphrase from Manila (Evans) to WD, 28 Oct 41. Copies of both in Résumé, p. 341 and p. 349.

[23] Cited in Résumé as MID summary of 3 Nov 41, MID 336 (11–3–41) in G–2 files.

were capable of attacking in five directions—toward Russia, the Philippines, Yunnan, Thailand, and Malaya.[24] That he did not mention Hawaii is not significant, for he was discussing the Far East situation and not the whole Pacific problem.

It was this meeting that led Admiral Stark and General Marshall on 5 November to make a joint estimate and recommendations to the President, in order to discourage at so critical a time anything that would either weaken the anti-Axis nations or prod Japan into hostilities prematurely. They held firmly that any offensive operations undertaken to protect the Burma Road would lead to war with Japan. They pointed out that currently the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to Japan's, so that if an unlimited strategic offensive in the western Pacific was to be undertaken it would first be necessary to withdraw from the Atlantic all naval vessels there stationed except for those in local defense. This, the Joint Chiefs continued, would endanger the United Kingdom. They therefore recommended:

1. Disapproval of dispatching troops to intervene in China.

2. Acceleration of material aid to China—consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.

3. Acceleration, to a practical maximum, of aid to the American Volunteer Group in China (the air unit of Americans fighting for Chiang).

4. No ultimatum to Japan.[25]

On 7 November, exactly one month before Pearl Harbor, Admiral Stark expressed his forebodings in a letter to Admiral Kimmel. A paragraph in which, by startling accident, he precisely dated the possibility of "most anything," was as follows:

Things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser"! A month may see, literally, most anything.

[24] Report of JB meeting, 3 Nov 41. For G–2 judgments of probabilities of an attack on Thailand (which G–2 continued to stress on 7 December) see Memo, G–2 for CofS, 27 Nov 41, sub: Recent Developments in the Far East; also same for same, 5 Dec 41, sub: Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate . . . Dec 1, 1941–March 31, 1942. These are cited in Résumé, pp. 410–13 and pp. 441–42 respectively. See also Memo, G–2 (Miles) for CofS, 15 Dec 41, sub: Sunday Morning, Dec 7, 1941, cited in Résumé . . ., pp. 472–73, recording Gen Miles' recollections. The 5 December summary discussed a reported decline in Axis morale, reasons for which in Italy and Japan were held to be obvious.

[25] Summarized, not quoted, from Memo, CNO and CofS for the President, 5 Nov 41, sub: Estimate Concerning the Far Eastern Situation, 0130012 War and Navy Departments, copy in Résumé on Pearl Harbor.

Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.[26]

The Warnings of Late November

The Army and Navy concern over Japanese intentions, which were greatly disturbing the State Department as well, now was echoed from London. A message from Military Attaché Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee reported that the British ambassador in Tokyo not only observed the Japanese likelier to attack the Dutch East Indies than either Indo-China or the Siberian maritime provinces but, more significantly, also believed that "Japan no longer feels that she must make every effort to avoid war with the United States." [27] Two weeks later, because of confirming reports from other sources and the continuing warnings of the State Department, the imminence of war was rapidly becoming clear. On 24 November, with General Marshall's concurrence, Admiral Stark sent to fleet and district Navy commanders in the Pacific area, for transmission to their Army colleagues, a warning that ". . . a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs. . . ." [28] Although there was in this no specific mention of imperilment in mid- or east-Pacific such as would most surely arouse a recipient to that possibility, the warning was sufficient to impress Lt. Gen. John DeWitt, commanding the Fourth Army and the Western Defense Command. Without delay he established a harbor alert at San Francisco, ordered like precautions in Alaska, initiated co-operative measures with the Navy, and next day requested authority to direct air as well as ground force deployment in his command. Similarly, General Andrews, at the Caribbean Defense Command, promptly reported a 24-hour alert of harbor troops in co-ordination with the Naval Defense, of the Air Forces, of the Aircraft Warning Service and the antiaircraft artillery, while warning that, despite all possible precautions, there was a marked insufficiency of personnel and materiel for the assigned mission.[29]

[26] From Ltr, CNO to Admiral Kimmel, 7 Nov 41, copy in OPD Exec 8, Tab "Miscellaneous," OPD Sec, Hist Div, SSUSA.

[27] Cited in Résumé . . ., p. 393, as paraphrase of code radiogram London 1045, signed Lee, 9 Nov 41.

[28] Cited in Résumé as Rad, CNO to CINCPAC, CINCAF, and 11, 12, 13, 15 Dist com, 24 Nov 41.

[29] Telg, DeWitt to CG GHQ, 25 Nov 41, and Memo, Andrews for TAG, 29 Nov 41, both in WPD 4544–19.

At about this time the Navy was informed that Japanese reconnaissance planes were flying over American islands in the Pacific, presumably for photographic purposes, and at a Joint Board meeting expressed a desire for corresponding photographs of the Marshalls and Carolines. General Arnold, remarking that two Army photographic planes were already en route to the Philippines (they had not yet cleared Hawaii), volunteered to have them perform the mission if provided with a memorandum of what the Navy desired. Instructions for the Army flyers were therefore drawn up and sent to them by way of General Short, in the second of two messages to Hawaii referring to this mission. The flyers were to photograph Truk, Jaluit, and Ponape and make visual reconnaissance of surface and submarine vessels, planes, fields, barracks, and camps. Significantly the flyers were to be warned that the Japanese-mandated islands were strongly fortified and manned, and that they would have to move rapidly at high altitude; if attacked they were "to use all means in their power for self-preservation"; General Short was to insure that both planes were fully equipped with guns and ammunition.[30] The reason for this last admonition became apparent when the first of the two photographic planes reached Hawaii and was found to be lacking its needed 50-caliber machine guns in three locations, as General Martin promptly reported by radio, advising that the second plane be properly equipped in the United States. Even on 7 December while the devastating attack was in progress an incoming flight of B–17's sent from the mainland was not able to defend itself. Its machine guns were packed with cosmolene, and were not bore-sighted. No machine gun ammunition was aboard.

The fixity of Japan's purpose had become clear on 20 November, with the ambassador's presentation to the State Department of an "absolutely final proposal" as Japan's foreign minister described it to Mr. Nomura.[31] While Secretary Hull regarded it as calling for an "abject surrender" of America's position as a protector of China, he remained aware of the American military's need for more time to deploy forces in the Pacific. General Marshall and Admiral Stark urged diplomatic maneuvering which would provide months or even days for that purpose and, following a White House discussion of methods, the State Department on

[30] (1) Min of JB meeting, 26 Nov 41. (2) Message, TAG (Adams-Robinson) to CG Haw Dept, No. 466, 26 Nov 41, cited in Résumé . . ., p. 407. (3) Message, TAG (Adams) to same, AF 448, 26 Nov 41, cited in Résumé . . ., p. 408. The report that the first of the planes actually arrived with deficient armament, next mentioned, is that in Rad 1044, Gen Martin (signed Short) to CofAC, 5 Dec 41, copy of which is in Résumé, p. 440.

[31] For discussion of this note and of succeeding events see *Pearl Harbor Report*, pp. 32ff.

24 November drafted for consideration a proposal of a three-months' *modus vivendi.* It was so placative in tone as to include a proposal for a partial resumption of trade between Japan and the United States. Examination of the draft immediately brought indignant protest from China and so little approval from Mr. Churchill and others that Mr. Hull abandoned the idea altogether. Instead, on 26 November (of course with Mr. Roosevelt's approval) he gave to the Japanese, as reply to the 20 November ultimatum, an "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan." [32] This action was learned of at the War Department late in the day, after General Marshall had left the city. The outline was a much sturdier expression of American views upon Pacific peace requirements, and for that reason there was such complete certainty that Japan would not accept it as a reply that both Army and Navy began preparing for expected consequences.

On 27 November Secretary Stimson sent for General Gerow, in General Marshall's absence (at the North Carolina maneuvers), and asked him what warnings had been sent to General MacArthur and what it was proposed to send. Reporting in writing to General Marshall, General Gerow explained that he had shown Mr. Stimson a copy of the Stark-Marshall message of three days earlier, but that this apparently did not wholly satisfy the Secretary. "The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines." General Gerow withdrew to prepare such a message in company with Admiral Stark, and later that day conferred with Secretary Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, and the Chief of Naval Operations.[33] As a result such a "war warning" as the President apparently wished was sent out by Navy wireless (for exhibition to Army authorities as well). This went, however, only after a much milder report of "hostile action possible at any moment" had been sent over General Marshall's signature to General MacArthur and duplicated, with certain modifications, to Hawaii, the Caribbean, and San Francisco.[34] The milder message to General Short contained this passage:

[32] For discussion and text see *Pearl Harbor Report,* pp. 380–84.

[33] Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation, WPD 4544–13. See also *Pearl Harbor Attack,* Part 39, pp. 84–88.

[34] (1) Rad 624, signed Marshall, to CG American forces in the Far East, 27 Nov 41, initialed "B" (Bryden, DCofS). (2) Rad 461 and 472 respectively went to CG Carib Def Com and CG Haw Dept, the latter initialed "G. C. M." but bearing no accompanying date. These referred to "hostile action possible." The "war-warning" message was sent by Navy radio, CNO to CINCAF and CINCPAC, 27 Nov 41. Copies of all are in WPD 4544–16 which also contains copy of message from President Roosevelt to High Commissioner Sayre, 26 Nov 41, for delivery to President Quezon, expressing his reliance on Philippine support. Message 472 appears also as Exhibit 32 (7) on p. 1328 of *Pearl Harbor Attack,* Part 14.

. . . Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5. . . .

The sharper message, as sent out by the Navy, began:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The . . . [Japanese preparation] indicates an amphibious operation against either the Philippines or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department.

In addition to these, G–2 of the War Department sent to the G–2 of the Hawaiian Department, the Caribbean, and each corps area, a brief message stating that "Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only." [35] This was Message 473; the far more significant one signed with General Marshall's name (but sent by WPD) was Message 472. In the circumstance that the two messages arrived at about the same time lay the seed of trouble, for General Short's response of that night was simply "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad [i. e., "re: your radio"] 472 27th." [36] From this circumstance the Pearl Harbor investigators of 1946 concluded that General Short regarded Washington's instructions to him as calling for liaison with Navy and for action against sabotage only, and not for the much larger defense against "hostile action possible at any moment" or against the "aggressive move by Japan" specified in general terms in the far more important messages sent out the same day. It should be remembered that much of the Hawaiian population was of Japanese birth or descent, so that expectation of sabotage by disloyal individuals was not unreasonable—although in fact it

[35] Message, Miles to G–2 Haw Dept, 27 Nov 41, No. 473, Exhibit 32 (10), p. 1329 of *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 14. General Gerow had previously blocked an effort to squeeze a "subversive" warning into the much more serious Message 472. Scrutinizing the WPD draft of that communication he saw the passage "Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately," and struck it out as conflicting with the message's main purpose. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 2, pp. 831ff., and Part 3, pp. 1023–24. Also Exhibit 36 in Part 14, pp. 1393–94, reproducing Memo, Gerow for TAG, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation, in WPD 4544–13, which shows the draft with initialed deletion.

[36] Rad 959, Short to CofS, 27 Nov 41, copy in WPD 4544–13.

was not fulfilled when the emergency came. In his postwar explanation General Marshall himself remarked that specific warnings against subversion were justified, provided other warnings were acted upon.[37] Months earlier an *aide-mémoire* prepared in the Office of the Chief of Staff for the Secretary's use had expressed the view that against Oahu's defenses a major attack would be "impracticable." Sabotage, in this view, was "first to be expected." [38]

That General Short was confused by the second of the two messages was unfortunate, but this was not all. His error was compounded by the fact that his superiors in Washington failed to observe that he was confused. They paid only passing attention to his patently inadequate response that his establishment now was "alerted to prevent sabotage" (as encouraged by the ill-timed Message 473) rather than to resist the "hostile action possible at any moment," as ordered by Message 472. At subsequent inquiries General Gerow soberly acknowledged his share in that particular responsibility. "I did not connect the two messages when this short message of General Short's came. . . . In that I was in error" he told the Army Board, and to the Congressional inquiry he said ". . . if there was any responsibility to be attached to the War Department for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility must rest on the War Plans Division, and I accept that responsibility as the Chief of War Plans Division." In much the same way General Marshall said that General Gerow "had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility," on the principle that the Chief of Staff was "responsible for what the General Staff did or did not do." General Short's declaration on this matter was: ". . . when I reported action and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much, I was 100 per cent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had." [39]

Attention Is Again Diverted

Even so, the exaggerated attention to subversion was not the sole evidence of miscalculation. In the studied judgment of War and Navy Department alike in November 1941, the expectation clearly was that when Japan's aggressive

[37] Testimony before Army Pearl Harbor Board in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 27, p. 32.

[38] Unsigned and undated *aide-mémoire* "Defense of Hawaii" in OCS 19741–53, with penciled notation "4–24–41. Original sent to SW. OW" (Col Ward). See *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 3, p. 1092.

[39] (1) Gen Gerow quoted in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 29, *Proceedings of Army Pearl Harbor Board*, p. 2191, and in Part 3, *Proceedings of Joint Committee*, p. 1036. (2) Gen Marshall quoted on this issue in Part 3, p. 1423. (3) Gen Short quoted in Part 39, *Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board*, p. 80.

action came it would be far to the west of Hawaii. It was explicit in the memorandum for the President, likewise dated 27 November 1941, which Admiral Stark and General Marshall signed jointly. This estimate of the perilous prospect opened with the declaration: "If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces." Further discussion all but eliminated the last-named area as an objective, owing to Russia's strength in Siberia, and attack on Malaya and the Indies was ruled unlikely "until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed." Japan would find less risk in attacking the Burma Road or Thailand, but "whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, Thailand or the Philippines can not now be forecast." The most essential thing, from the American viewpoint then expressed by the two Chiefs, was to gain time, not only to safeguard an Army convoy then near Guam and the Marine convoy then pulling out of Shanghai, but to allow a 21,000-man force then in the United States to make its way to Manila. In the military Chiefs' judgment, expressed in this memorandum, Japanese involvement in Thailand or Yunnan might even be advantageous, as leading to further dispersion, provided Japan did not drive into Thailand west of long. 100° E or south of lat. 10° N, or threaten territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Dutch, or such strategic areas as New Caledonia, Timor, and the Loyalty Islands. General Marshall and Admiral Stark therefore recommended that prior to completion of the Philippine reinforcement there be no military action, unless Japan pressed these threats; that if Thailand was invaded, the warning be only against passing the point mentioned; that steps be taken to associate the British and Dutch in such a warning.[40]

The next day, with a persistence which seemed to stress the odd view that subversion and sabotage were the sum of anxieties about Hawaii (despite the fact that General Gerow had struck the matter out of Message 472) the War Department sent yet another warning, to Hawaii among other places, stating that the situation demanded that "all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department. . . ." It desired that the recipient initiate additional necessary measures to afford protection against "sabotage," against "subversive propaganda," and against "espionage," and cautiously warned against "illegal measures" to effect

[40] Memo, Stark and Marshall for the President, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation, Exhibit 17, in *Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings* Part 14, p. 1083.

these purposes. The memorandum bore the typed comment that it had been noted by the Chief of Staff. Almost a duplicate message went direct to the Air commander in Hawaii.[41] Again General Short made acknowledgment, his reply once more mentioning his precautions "against subversive activities" and his problems of protecting "vital installations outside of military reservations." Most significant, it was only Alert No. 1 which General Short on 27 November directed, "due to the seriousness of the situation reported by the Chief of Staff from Washington," as he explained in his formal report on the Pearl Harbor raid five days after that event.[42] Alert No. 1, as set forth in the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, required "all vital installations to be protected against sabotage throughout Oahu." Not until the attack, at 7:55 A. M. on 7 December, was actually on, and General Short in his quarters was informed of it ("I could scarcely believe it"), did he direct the turning out of troops under Alert No. 3, which "required all troops to occupy their battle positions in the shortest possible time and defend Oahu as their mission." In this chain of circumstances is impressive evidence that—despite premonitions of a surprise raid expressed in January 1941 by Secretary Knox, despite long discussions, despite the war-games' presumption of attack, despite the clamor for the air warning service, despite the 24 and 27 November warnings—General Short's conclusion was that he was being warned against the relatively minor perils of local sabotage and subversion. In some measure this must explain the limited alertness of the Oahu command on the fatal morning of 7 December.

Two other items of evidence in the vast amount adduced were singled out by the Joint Committee for special mention—(1) General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting a distant reconnaissance such as was contemplated in the joint defense plan (actually, the fleet had insufficient equipment to make the continuous and complete reconnaissance that alone would serve the purpose, but does not appear to have made this clear to Army authorities); (2) Admiral Kimmel, on his side, assumed that the Army was on a sharper alert than one for sabotage only, and hence that the radar search entrusted to the Army under the defense plan was in full operation instead of terminating at

[41] Memo, Miles for TAG, 28 Nov 41, copy in OCS 14561–23. This memo resulted in the message of TAG (Adams) to CG Haw Dept, same date, printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 14, as Exhibit 32 (13). A message from TAG to Hawaii (Gen Arnold for Gen Martin) is filed immediately afterward as Exhibit 32 (14). The response, dated 4 December, for unexplained reasons was recorded as having been received 10 Dec 41. See Exhibit 32 (19). General Short's acknowledgment to TAG, 29 Nov 41, is filed as Exhibit 32 (17). See General Miles' discussion of this in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 2, pp. 833–36.

[42] Rpt, Gen Short to CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Report of the Battle of Oahu, WPD 4622–39.

7 A. M. In pursuit of their co-ordination of effort—paid more attention than was the case elsewhere—these two held their routine conferences on 1, 2, and 3 December, but at them failed to correct these fatally faulty assumptions.[43]

General Marshall's recollection, long afterward, of his own attitude upon the supposed security of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was that

> . . . [it] was the only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped. Therefore we were not worried about it. In our opinion the commanders had been alerted. In our opinion there was nothing more we could give them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our opinion that was one place that had enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense. . . . The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we had worked on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point.[44]

On the Eve of Pearl Harbor

The Japanese plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor, with a maximum of the U. S. Fleet present, was advanced in January 1941, at which time Admiral Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, ordered a staff study of the operation. The course of events from that time on is treated at length in numerous publications generally available and is summarized in the Congressional Joint Committee Report previously referred to.[45] The extent of the Chief of Staff's surmises on war prospects in the Pacific, specifically on the imperilment of Pearl Harbor, and of his safeguarding activities and intentions has already been indicated. It is clear that by late November 1941 responsible chiefs of the State, War, and Navy Departments had a mounting realization of war's approach. All recognized that Mr. Hull's diplomatic effort to prolong the peace could not be effective much longer, and that the military action that the United States sought to delay, certainly until the Philippine rearming could be completed, might be forced by Japan at any moment.[46] The

[43] *Pearl Harbor Report,* pp. 150–51.

[44] Extract from General Marshall's testimony before the Joint Committee, printed on p. 163 of *Pearl Harbor Report.*

[45] *Pearl Harbor Report,* pp. 53ff. deals with the plan and its execution. A vivid narration is presented by Morison, *The Rising Sun In The Pacific* and by Morton, The Fall of the Philippines.

[46] In recollections published several years afterwards Donald M. Nelson, wartime chairman of the War Production Board, asserted that at the close of his call at the White House on Tuesday, 2 December, President Roosevelt said, "I wouldn't be a bit surprised if we were at war with Japan by Thursday." Nelson added that on 3 December in answer to his guarded questioning Secretary Knox, who was "not at all reticent," replied, "We may be at war with the Japs before the month is over. . . . You bet your life it's that bad." Donald M. Nelson, *Arsenal of Democracy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), pp. 182–83.

questions in American minds were two—where Japan would strike, and when. To the first the answer seemed fairly clear, and unfortunately so, for the well-founded belief that a strike would take place in the Far East and probably in Thailand (which was indeed a part of the project) appears to have driven from most minds all active awareness that an earlier and much more important strike might take place at Pearl Harbor. To the second question American planners found no answer, but so expectant of attack at any time were the civilian heads of the State, War, and Navy Departments that when they met on Sunday morning, 7 December (Sunday work was a commonplace in War and Navy Departments at this time), in the words of Mr. Stimson's diary notation, ". . . we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the blow will strike." In later recollections Mr. Stimson confessed his "astonishment at the Japanese choice of the greatest American base as a point of attack." [47]

At this Sunday meeting there was no consciousness that on the previous day to both Navy and War Departments had already come an interception of the so-called "pilot message" of 6 December. In it Tokyo warned the Japanese Embassy in Washington of a "very long" 14-part message which would come the next day for presentation to the United States Government at a time later to be announced. The pilot message does not appear to have been decoded in the Navy until Sunday morning, but, according to a G–2 assistant's testimony, to have been made available to the War Department on Saturday afternoon.[48] Of the 14-part message, it was variously testified that thirteen parts were decoded Saturday afternoon and read that night by the President, Secretary Knox, several Navy officers, and General Miles of Army G–2, and that these first thirteen parts were not delivered until Sunday forenoon when Colonel Handy of WPD promptly commented that "this means war." Even this was not in itself too serious, for within these thirteen parts there was no indication of when or where the war would start. Nor was there any such precise indication in

[47] (1) *Pearl Harbor Report*, p. 47. (2) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 391. On pp. 391–92 of *On Active Service*, after an attribution of "major responsibility" for the Pearl Harbor disaster to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, is this passage: "It was true that the War and Navy Departments were not fully efficient in evaluating the information available to them, and of course it was also true that no one in Washington had correctly assessed Japan's intentions and capabilities. . . . Further, Washington had not adequately appreciated the importance of keeping its field commanders fully informed. . . . The men in Washington did not foresee this attack and they did not take the additional action suggested by a retrospective view. But the basic fact remained: the officers at Hawaii had been alerted . . . ; unlike other outpost commanders they proved on December 7 to be far from alert."

[48] *Pearl Harbor Report*, p. 211ff.

Part 14, which followed separately and which reached the War Department as early as 9 A. M., although there was ominous finality in the closing declaration that Japan "cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations." The real warning was in two additional messages which came at about the same time, one instructing the Japanese Embassy to destroy at once its cipher machine and secret documents, the other directing the embassy to deliver the 14-part message at 1 P. M. 7 December, Washington time. This was the hour of dawn in Hawaii. The two critical messages were delivered to War and Navy Departments in translation before 10 A. M. and thereafter sent to White House and State Department. To General Marshall, then taking his usual Sunday morning horseback ride, went a telephone warning that an important message had been received. At 11:15 or thereabouts he reached his office. He perused the 14-part message, and then came to the 1 o'clock note. In this he immediately sensed some significance, and telephoned Admiral Stark a suggestion that new warnings be sent to Pacific commanders. Although the Navy Chief thought that previous alerts were sufficient and that a new one would be merely confusing, General Marshall wrote out in longhand a warning message in his own behalf to the Army's Western Defense Command at San Francisco, to Panama, the Philippines, and Hawaii:

> The Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly.[49]

On reconsideration Admiral Stark called back to offer the Navy's transmission facilities (which were declined in General Marshall's belief that the Army's would suffice) and to ask that the Army's warning message include instructions for delivery to Navy commanders at each of the four points. It will be noted that neither officer expressed a view that Hawaii should receive earlier attention than the other three. By a grotesque circumstance of which General Marshall was not informed (and which to a Greek dramatist would have demonstrated the unconquerable power of the Fates) Hawaii, which was first in importance, was in fact the last of the four to receive the message. So concerned was the Chief of Staff with its rapid delivery that he sent officers three times to make sure that the radio message would be expedited, and he was given assurance that it would be delivered within thirty minutes. What he did not learn was that the Army radio service was then out of contact with Honolulu;

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

the well-meaning Signal officer, seeking a substitute method and failing to grasp the vital necessity of top speed, which Navy probably could have supplied, employed commercial wires to San Francisco and commercial radio relay to Honolulu; at that point by tragi-comic turn the final delivery was entrusted to a bicycle messenger, who on the long trip to distant Fort Shafter encountered the bombing attack; he delivered his message four hours late past a shattered and smoking base. The message, not marked as urgent, was still to be decoded. A post-factum inquiry of General Marshall, as to why he had not also used telephone, made public this series of unpredictable misfortunes, plus General Marshall's explanation that security forbade use of the telephone which, easily intercepted, could have warned Japanese agents that their code was broken. Significantly and with whole candor, he added that if he had employed the telephone, it would have been used first to reach General MacArthur in Manila, and second to reach the commander at the Panama Canal.[50]

It was while the ill-fated message to General Short was thus making its sluggish way from Washington to Fort Shafter that Japan's first blow fell upon Pearl Harbor and the near-by airfields. To say that the falling of the first bombs and aerial torpedoes was Hawaii's initial warning would be inaccurate. Apart from the general intimations of danger in the carefully considered Coastal Frontier Defense plan and in the several warnings referred to, there were two specific events of early 7 December which to a more alert establishment would have carried their own warnings. One was the Navy's detection at 3:50 A. M. of a submerged submarine near the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys (where American submarines were forbidden to operate submerged); the vessel was pursued and sunk soon after 6:45 A. M. and the net gate closed, but the submarine's presence was not interpreted as heralding an attack in the harbor. The other episode was the actual discovery by radar, at 7:02 A. M. of a large number of planes approaching Oahu from the north at 132 miles distance. The cloud of planes (which were the first Japanese attack force) was detected by a mobile radar unit and at 7:20 reported by telephone to the Aircraft Warning Service. Instead of remaining constantly open, the AWS closed at 7 A. M. The warning therefore reached only an Army lieutenant who was attached to the office for training and observation rather than for operation; he assumed the flight to be a naval patrol, a flight of friendly bombers in training, or possibly a flight of B–17's which were due that morning from the mainland

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–26.

(and which did arrive, unsuspecting and even unarmed, while the raid was on). His advice to the enlisted man at the mobile unit therefore discouraged that observer from continuing his alert, and he himself did nothing to bring the fateful circumstance to the immediate attention of higher authority. The mobile unit, however, continued to function, plotting the attacking flight over Oahu and back to the north, but its information was not used by either Army or Navy even for pursuit purposes.[51]

The first wave of Japanese bombers therefore sped over the well-marked objectives of harbor, warships, and airfields and opened the attack wholly undisturbed by intercepting planes or gunfire from the ground, with consequently unhurried aim and extraordinarily precise hits by explosive bombs, torpedoes, and incendiaries alike. The Navy force—being on a first-class, rather than a second-class alert—had about one-fourth of its 780 ship-based antiaircraft guns manned, and accordingly it rallied from the first stunning shock with commendable but insufficient alacrity. Ready machine guns responded "immediately" (in the Joint Committee findings), and all heavier antiaircraft batteries picked up, in four minutes in the case of the cruisers, in less than five in the case of the battleships, and in an average of seven in the case of the destroyers. The Army—being alerted primarily against sabotage rather than attack, as previously noted—was in much worse state. Not only were the defending planes carefully assembled for their own protection against sabotage, instead of being widely dispersed for protection against attack, but of the 31 antiaircraft batteries 27 were not in position and hence were unable to fire during the first attack and, in some cases, unable to fire until as much as six hours later.[52] As to aircraft, seven of the Navy's patrol flying boats were in the air but far away and in a different direction from that in which the Japanese carriers were awaiting their planes' return. Eight scout bombers of the distant carrier U. S. S. *Enterprise* that were in the air sped on to aid the defense; three landed safely and five were lost. Army planes were on 4-hour notice, but approximately thirty fighters took to the air during the attack. They were too few to serve any large purpose. No plane, from either service, reported convincingly the course of the retreating Japanese planes (the mobile radar unit's clear charting not being employed) and as a result such later efforts at pursuit as were made were fruitless, owing both to the confusion and to an inaccurate report that sent most

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 67ff.

of the pursuing naval forces off to the southwest on a false chase. Instead, off to the north the waiting Japanese carriers were able to rescue their returning planes without difficulty, and then push toward Japan through the foggy north Pacific, as undisturbed by interception as on their way in.

The attack force, it is apparent, had two large advantages. First, it started the initial assault with an enjoyment of complete surprise, with the result that it suffered no interference or injury at that stage. Second, the enormous success of the initial assault crippled the defenders in two respects; it eliminated much of the potential defense altogether, and it confused the remainder. Thus an attacking force of great efficiency and very considerable size (81 fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombers, and 40 torpedo planes) operated so efficiently that it lost a total of only 29 planes to the belated resistance of the defenders. The defending forces (by the computation used at the Congressional hearing of 1945) had available for flight 108 fighters (30 obsolescent) and 140 Army and Navy bombers of various categories (21 obsolescent), but they lost a total of 188 planes (including some of the 98 unavailable for flight), most of them so riddled in their ground locations that they never took to the air. As to lives, the Japanese lost fewer than 100, for the same reason; American dead were 2,403, most of them in the sinking of a few great warships. The only Japanese ship losses were 5 midget submarines whose lack of success on this occasion discouraged use of this type. American ship losses (sunk or crippled) were staggering, including 8 battleships, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 other vessels.[53] Most of these 18 vessels were ultimately refloated and repaired and they lived to perform useful service in the long war which followed, but they and the fleet as such were *hors de combat* for many months after Pearl Harbor. Thereby the primary Japanese purpose, so obvious in retrospect but so elusive before the event, was attained completely—the U. S. Fleet was gone. The main Pacific instrument of Rainbow Plan and inter-Allied power was paralyzed for months, and Japan was relatively free to pursue its whole Far East program. Only then could Japan's assaults upon Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines as well, be undertaken with increased confidence. All these assaults had been accurately forecast by Army and Navy observ-

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 65 and 71. The figure on American dead is that employed in Morison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific*, pp. 126–27. See also *Pearl Harbor Report*, pp. 64–65, tabulating 3,435 casualties. See also current tabulations of losses in Hawaii and Philippines as of 9 Dec 41 in WPD message file 1, Messages, Situation Reports, Telephone Conversations, and Notes, Document 140. See also Ltr, Short to CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Report of Battle of Oahu, WPD 4622–39.

ers and planners; American failure had been in the timely predicting, not of those assaults which were foreseen, but of the all-necessary first assault upon Pearl Harbor and the U. S. Fleet.

The disaster to Pearl Harbor carried its own dire warning to the whole Far East, but too late for profit, since the prime instrument for defense of that area from Japanese encroachment now was shattered. Accordingly the Philippines and the installations to the south now were dependent only upon such defensive resources as they already had in hand, and these resources were to prove tragically insufficient. The prized B–17 bombers, already installed near Manila, themselves were caught in two massive raids and in a few piecemeal operations, and soon eliminated; the few effective surface elements of the Asiatic Fleet were withdrawn to the south for fusion with the ill-fated British and Dutch vessels there based, while the submarines took over most of the Navy's offensive labors in the Philippines area; the main resistance to the conquering Japanese was that provided by the small ground forces trained for serious warfare, ill supplied for so huge a task, and hence foredoomed to the total surrender that came a few months later. Of these events, or rather of the role of the Chief of Staff in them, the record is found in a later volume.

A Fateful Series of Mischances

War had come, not merely the "active hostilities" in China where an American volunteer group of individuals in China's services was already pitted against Japan, nor a "shoot-on-sight" directive in the Atlantic in which General Marshall himself had cynically observed a deceptive resemblance to actual warfare, but at last open and declared war. For over two years World War II had been under way in Europe and for over a year the United States had been sending from its own military supplies allegedly surplus materiel to the aid of the forces fighting the Axis. War now had come, however, not in the Atlantic but in the Pacific, and in its first explosions not in the Far East where Army and Navy had confidently expected it, but in the mid-Pacific where the watch was poorly kept. The succession of errors and mischances that brought to Pearl Harbor something close to total disaster rivals the succession that Hugo recites in the memorable apostrophe of *Les Miserables* to explain Waterloo. Had the planners, in discerning Japan's several intentions in the Far East, only reasoned that none of these intentions would be undertaken until the U. S. Fleet was immobilized, Pearl Harbor must automatically have been recognized as the certain first target

of Japanese attack. Had that been fully recognized, surely the defenses at that point would have been built up to a maximum, regardless of perils elsewhere; Army and Navy commanders would have been freed of the training responsibilities that diverted much of their attention and their resources from defense tasks. Had the implications of Frontier Defense needs been fully grasped, the shortage of patrol planes required for a continuous 360° patrol would have been remedied, at whatever sacrifice. Had the imperative character of the 27 November "war-warning" message been grasped, General Short would not have believed that his first concern was with sabotage. Had Message 473 never been sent, he would not have been thus encouraged to do so. Had his odd and inadequate acknowledgment of the warning been scrutinized carefully in WPD—or elsewhere—it would have been instantly recognized as inadequate, and new and imperative orders issued. Had General Short and Admiral Kimmel, granting the insufficiency of their resources, employed those resources to their maximum for defense purposes, or acted with full enlightenment on the information that actually was supplied them, they must have prepared a much more alert front than was actually in operation on 7 December. Had the "1 o'clock message" of 7 December impressed itself upon other minds as surely and as swiftly as it did upon General Marshall's mind once he saw it, there would have been an earlier dispatch of the final warning message that arrived hours too late. Had the radio officer at the War Department given a hint of the temporary break in direct Army communications, either telephone or Navy facilities could have been used instead: there was still time for a belated manning of all defenses in Oahu. Had all of these circumstances, many of them wholly adventitious, taken the opposite course, a magnificent defense could have been interposed, sufficient to inflict on the raiders a proper penalty. Had any one of them taken the opposite course, the appalling extent of the disaster could have been greatly reduced. Because not one of all these chances fell aright, the attack was a resounding success for Japan and a staggering blow not only to America but to the whole Allied cause.

The End of Prewar Planning

The War Department's long work of peacetime preparation for this war was over, not by American design but by enemy action. The building up of the Army's personnel, conducted with so many changes of plan and even of direction, was still under way rather than completed. The draft was functioning.

The training methods were well laid down. The inflow of weapons was constantly increasing, but the sum of all equipment desired was still immense and its delivery still far in the future. The basis of co-ordinated action with Britain was laid down but subject to large alterations—many by reason of this disaster at Pearl Harbor which at one blow had destroyed the largest existing implement of American strategic planning in the Pacific. In the course of a short time it would be followed by other blows destroying much of America's remaining offensive strength in the Far East. A great deal of what had been so carefully and methodically done by the War Department since 1939, as guided by the Office of the Chief of Staff, seemed on the night of 7 December to be lying in ruins. How small the ruin was in relation to the work that was unaffected by Pearl Harbor, and in relation to that to be performed in the forty-five months following, the subsequent record will reveal.

Bibliographical Note

Wherever practicable, information on which the text of this volume is based was acquired from documents in government archives, and mainly from War Department records which postwar reorganization transferred to the Department of the Army. Of these, by far the largest and richest concentration is that of the Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office. In that section's far-reaching file cases in the Pentagon Building at Washington (and in equally accessible storage near by) are most of the varied documents that are precisely identified in the footnotes of the foregoing chapters. These records are indexed, appropriately arranged, and made available to the student within limits imposed by initial haste, wartime preoccupation, or plain human fallibility.

The footnote citations themselves best show the extent to which each of the various groups of records has been used for the purposes of the present volume, that is, examination of the role of the Chief of Staff and his Office in the days preceding World War II. Of first importance, naturally, are the papers pertaining to the Chief of Staff's Office and so filed. Of incomparable value among these, in proportion to volume, are the successive binders of Notes on Conferences in that office, recording critical decisions and the reasons for them and pointing the researcher's way—by self-indexing classification or by tally card, or often by what seems like the magic of the Records Section's veteran personnel—toward the full store of relevant documents. In practice this full store was normally found also under the broad classifications of the prewar General Staff Divisions (G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, WPD) or of the elements of the prewar Special Staff (Adjutant General, Ordnance, Engineers, Quartermaster, etc.). These records, likewise in vaults of the Historical Records Section, contain copies of the more important documents previously mentioned, together with many supplementary records, and their numerical indexing usually led quickly to the items desired. Frequently the papers sought were in the equally available files of the Secretary of War or the Under Secretary (the latter, unfortunately, still incompletely reassembled in 1949) or separately held in the compact OPD files retained, in 1949, in General Staff possession.

In the case of a particular file covering a critically important subject fully so far as one Staff division was concerned (with cross references to files of other divisions) the researcher was required to make exhaustive examination from beginning to end, with results justifying the extended labor. Thus, rich deposits of essential information on the building up of the prewar Army were found by painstaking study of literally everything in the capacious containers known as Office Chief of Staff 14440 and 16810, in G–1 15588, in G–4 31349 and 31773, and in WPD 3674 and 4161. For essential documents on the 1940–41 production and procurement of materiel, WPD 4321 and 4494 likewise called for full examination. Similar intensive treatment of OCS 21151 and G–1 3615, 15777, and 21151 proved them to be abundant sources of information on personnel procurement and selection. For national policy and war plans the search turned primarily to WPD 3493, 4175, and 4402, and for pioneering in weapons development to OCS 21157 and G–4 29552. And so on. A host of other files produced far less in volume of "ore" per file, yet supplied items of admirable quality. A great many patient searches inevitably produced little, and often nothing.

But not all documents in all files can be examined or even sampled and, if a task is to be completed by mortal, innumerable short cuts must be found. Within the Records Section itself effective short cuts are afforded by indexing and tally cards. These on countless occasions provided just what was needed, but because of the vastness and dispersion of the records and the inevitable incompleteness of indexing—together with the student's uncertainty whether documentary evidence of a given event actually exists or ever existed—it often proved both desirable and necessary to establish, first, a clew as to the possible whereabouts and nature of the evidence. This was accomplished in several ways—by correspondence with persons familiar with events during the decades prior to World War II, by interviews with such of those persons as could be readily reached, by examination of newspaper files covering the approximate dates of specific relevance (plus use of *The New York Times Index* in search of these dates), and by scrutiny of a great many other published works in book and magazine form and of unpublished studies whose generous authors made them available; by turning an attentive ear to the suggestions of unnumbered colleagues in historical labors, from within the Historical Division of the Army and corresponding establishments of Navy, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs, and from industrious and helpful, yet anonymous, toilers in the various record rooms. Suggestions from all these sources repeatedly pointed the way for the

author and his research assistants to documentary sources which otherwise would have gone unexamined.

Even so, it was not always possible to uncover an elusive document which would satisfactorily fill an interval in the sequence of events. Where some added link was essential to the narrative, a substitute for documentation had to be sought. In such cases, which are not numerous, there was resort to interviews and correspondence, from which was obtained information appearing by all practicable tests to be reliable. Annotation indicates where this method was employed.

The specific sources recited in the annotation are many. They include, chiefly: regulations, orders, letters, memoranda, and drafts of such communications (the unrevised and even unused drafts frequently revealing profoundly interesting "first thoughts" on critical issues); minutes of or notes upon formal conferences of the Joint Board, the British-United States Staff Officers (in Washington, in London, and aboard U. S. S. *Augusta* in Argentia harbor), the War Council, the State-War-Navy Liaison Committee; the informal digests of momentous meetings of these and other groups within the walls of the White House or the old Munitions Building or the Navy Building or in less official surroundings; diaries kept during the prewar period; captured enemy papers and postwar interrogations dealing with prewar events; carefully prepared studies of complex situations, from within the General Staff divisions, service branches, the old Army and Navy War Colleges, the Air Force, the Munitions Board, the Industrial College, the Selective Service Board, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Defense Aid Division and its efficient successor the Lend-Lease establishment; and reports of official missions and observers. There are numerous references to historical volumes of this series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, both those already published and manuscripts of volumes still in preparation. There are repeated references to the manuscripts of Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, which, while not themselves available for public examination, have been of great aid in pointing the way to accessible documents. Abbreviations found in both the text and the footnotes, except those that are self-explanatory or which refer to arbitrary file symbols, are explained in the glossary at the end of this volume.

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Glossary of Abbreviations

AAF	Army Air Forces
ABC	American-British Conversations (Jan–Mar 41)
ABD	American-British-Dutch. *See also* ADB.
ABDA	American-British-Dutch-Australian (planning)
AC	Air Corps
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ADB	American-Dutch-British meeting in Singapore. Also known as ABD.
A. E. F.	American Expeditionary Forces (1917–18)
AG	Adjutant General
ANMB	Army and Navy Munitions Board
AR	Army Regulations
ASF	Army Service Forces
ASN	Assistant Secretary of the Navy
ASW	Assistant Secretary of War
AUS	Army of the United States
AWC	Army War College
AWS	Aircraft Warning Service
B. A. D.	British Admiralty Delegation
B&LP Branch	Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, War Department
BofB	Bureau of the Budget
BOWD	Budget Office, War Department
CDC	Caribbean Defense Command
CG	Commanding General
CinC	Commander in Chief
CINCAF	Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
CofAC	Chief of Air Corps
CofAS	Chief of Air Staff
CofEngrs	Chief of Engineers

CofOrd	Chief of Ordnance
CPA	Civilian Production Administration
CSO	Chief Signal Officer
CVE	Civilian Volunteer Effort
DCofS	Deputy Chief of Staff
FM	Field Manual
FR	Federal Register
FWA	Federal Works Agency
FY	Fiscal Year
G–1	Personnel Section of divisional or higher headquarters
G–2	Military Intelligence Section
G–3	Operations Section (so called in the A. E. F. In peacetime its activities were limited to organization and training.)
G–4	Supply Section
G–5	Training Section (in General Pershing's A. E. F. headquarters. Not to be confused with World War II usage.)
GHQ	General Headquarters, U. S. Army
GO	General orders
GPO	Government Printing Office
HJR	House Joint Resolution
HR	House of Representatives
IB	Intelligence bulletin
Incl	Inclosure
IPF	Initial Protective Force
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JB	Joint Board (Army and Navy)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPC	Joint Planning Committee
JSM	Joint Staff Mission (British)
M Day	Mobilization Day
MID	Military Intelligence Division
MRU	Machine Records Unit
MTCA	Military Training Camps Association
NDA	National Defense Act
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OASW	Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
OCS	Office of the Chief of Staff

OEM	Office of Emergency Management
OPD	Operations Division, WDGS
OPM	Office of Production Management
OpNav	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
ORC	Officers' Reserve Corps
OUSW	Office of the Under Secretary of War
PJB	Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States
PMP	Protective Mobilization Plan
Pub	Public Law
QMG	Quartermaster General
RN	Royal Navy (British)
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
S	Senate
SGS	Secretary of the General Staff
SJR	Senate Joint Resolution
SLC	Standing Liaison Committee (of State, War, and Navy Departments)
SN	Secretary of the Navy
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SOS	Services of Supply
SPENAVO	Special Naval Observer
SSUSA	Special Staff, U. S. Army
SW	Secretary of War
TAG	The Adjutant General
TIG	The Inspector General
T/O&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
USA	United States Army
USAFFE	U. S. Army Forces in the Far East
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNR	U. S. Naval Reserve
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USW	Under Secretary of War
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WPA	Works Progress Administration
WPB	War Production Board
WPD	War Plans Division, WDGS

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

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Chart 1.—Chief of Staff's Responsibilities: 1 December 1941 (a)



(a) A simplified chart, necessarily incomplete, for graphic representation of major relationships. More detailed relationships are shown variously in Charts 2, 3, and 4. See also Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Army Ground Forces: Organization of Ground Combat Troops,* Charts pages 14, 18, 118, 120, and Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington 1946), Charts 7, 8 ff.

(b) Included Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries.

(c) Included three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, as follows:

1. For administrative matters and ground elements (less Armored Force).
2. For supply matters and Armored Force.
3. For air elements. Deputy Chief of Staff for Air was also Chief of the Army Air Forces.

(d) Included participation on Joint Board, United States-Canadian Joint Board for Defense, co-operation with British Mission, Lend-Lease, and other agencies.

(e) Included agencies of War Department reporting to the Chief of Staff directly or through the General Staff on administrative, supply, and service matters.

(f) The Chief of Staff was also Commanding General of the Field Forces. He exercised this command through GHQ, and, in the case of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments, through the respective Department Commanders.

(g) Included administrative and supply elements and elements of the field forces, air and ground, assigned as protective garrisons.

(h) The Corps of Engineers and the Signal Corps were also classified as arms as well as services.

Chart 2.—Chief of Staff's Command of the Field Forces as Exercised through GHQ: 1 December 1941



(a) Each army included its assigned corps (with component divisions and corps troops) and army troops.

(b) Each defense command in the continental United States included (as applicable) its component sectors, its harbor defense, its mobile ground troops (as assigned by army and corps), and its air force (when so directed by the War Department). The army commanders also served as commanding generals of the defense commands. Mobile troops for the defense commands were assigned from the armies, corps, and GHQ reserve. As applicable, defense commands were co-ordinated with naval coastal frontiers for co-operative action and joint defense operations.

(c) Included ground and air units specifically assigned to GHQ by the War Department as a reserve.

(d) Included special forces set up under GHQ by War Department direction for particular tasks and missions.

(e) GHQ direct supervision was confined to the armored divisions and separate tank battalions of the Armored Force—it did not exercise control or supervision over organization, school or replacement matters, which were under the Chief of the Armored Force who reported to the War Department.

(f) See also Chart 4.

(g) Included Alaska.

Chart 3.—Exercise of the Chief of Staff's Commands of the Army Air Forces: 1 December 1941 (a)



(a) A simplified chart, showing only major relationships, with detail omitted.

(b) Chief of Army Air Forces was also Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. He exercised his command of the Air Forces through his own Air Staff.

(c) Commanded the tactical air forces in the continental United States. Air units sent to overseas establishments came under the command of the commander of the area to which they were assigned.

(d) Each air force included its interceptor, bomber, air support, and air force base commands.

(e) Specially organized for the support of armored forces.

(f) Included air service areas and air depots.

(g) Included procurement and development.

(h) Included inspection, personnel, legal, medical, and fiscal affairs, buildings and grounds.